The state office of admiral was given a department to supervise which included executive and judicial authority as it would run its own courts-martial. The Department of the Army was added, rounding out the military offices as conceived by Eric Sparre.
Finally, there was Oxenstierna’s own department of the Chancellery, a sort of super state department. Foreign policy was entirely within its purview. But it also delved into local government, state infrastructure, religion, education, law enforcement and any other area not specifically delegated to another department. This was Oxenstierna’s kingdom and he ran it in an authoritarian manner at first. However, with his removal to Elbing in 1626, he was forced to delegate much of this authority. By the Chancellery Ordinance of 1626, he established an executive staff of two chancery-counselors and a deputy to run things in his absence. He delegated day-to-day business to these men, but always kept the office of counselor and first advisor to the king for himself and this was heartily approved of by Gustav.
When both king and chancellor were absent from the country, the functional head of government devolved to the Råd, which was given its own staff and directed to remain in Stockholm unless called to an outside location on an errand. By the Ordinance of the House of Nobility of 1626, which fixed the procedures and membership of the First Estate, no Råd member could hold a seat in the Nobility House. The council (Råd) became a government institution of civil servants viewed by the Estates as part of the establishment. The aristocracy was firmly entrenched in the national government, but with their position they acquired the associated responsibilities. Erick Sparre’s ideas had been fully implemented. This transformation was laid out in the Form of Government issued in 1634.
Thus, an administration was developed that freed the king to pursue his overseas adventures, supply him with the materials of war and even allow the chancellor to be absent without missing a beat. Other European nations were impressed and Peter the Great would use it as his model in his governmental reforms.
One of the outgrowths of these reforms was that Stockholm became one of the true capitals alongside the other centers of European government. With a permanent national administrative body in residence, with associated foreign embassies and supporting industries the town grew into a real city with a mix of merchants, tradesmen, even clerks, lawyers and bankers, along with the government officials.
As important as the new central government reforms were, improvements in local institutions were vital if the king was to be able to rely on the taxpaying commoner for support. The free peasant must be made to feel he was being dealt with fairly by his king. Corruption and inequities had to be stamped out. Gustav Vasa had personally supervised his bailiffs, checking their accounts himself. This was no longer possible.
Gustav Adolf defined the major governing areas, the provinces, as to their exact geographical boundaries, 23 in all. The office of ståthållare (governor) already existed, but it was ill-defined. Ståthållares sometime ruled a province and sometimes a castle or area in a province under another ståthållare. This office was changed to landshövding by the Instruction of 1635 and the holder was put in charge of a province. He was to be the king’s representative in all matters except judicial. Bailiffs, henceforth, would report and pass taxes to the landshövding where accounts would be audited before being sent to the national treasury at Stockholm.
Below the province, the county (härader) remained with a sheriff (häradshöving), county court (häradsting) and standing county jury (häradsnämnd). Within the counties the parish council and vestry still fought for the rights of the parishioners. So government below the province changed little, but here, at the very local level, it always had to be much more responsive to the people.
All this expansion of government offices and the civil service raised the need for men educated in secular fields. Schools and particularly the University of Uppsala had always concentrated on ecclesiastic studies. Skytte, in charge of the accounting and auditing division of the treasury, complained he could not handle all the work alone and could find no one qualified to help him. In 1623 Oxenstierna was frustrated because he could find no Swedish diplomat fluent enough in Latin to conduct negotiations with the Poles. The king and chancellor went about remedying this by creating a new type of school. This was the gymnasium, first founded at Västernås in 1623. By 1632 six more were established and four more by 1643. These were secondary education institutions designed to teach promising youngsters in the fields of geography, history, mathematics, science and law.
The University of Uppsala was also reorganized. The number of colleges was raised from four to thirteen in 1620. Two years later there were eighteen including law, medicine, mathematics, history and political science. The university was endowed with 317 manors from Vasa family estates to be held free of taxes, all revenues for the school. Scholarships were provided for poor boys of special talent. In 1632 the University of Dorpat was founded in Livonia to educate administrators for the Swedish Baltic provinces. Here languages were emphasized including French, Lettish, Estonian and Ingrian. Eventually this improved education system would produce more qualified administrators than were needed. Government officials could select the very best and education became an avenue for upward social mobility.
Finally, there was the Riksdag, that unruly, transient, unpredictable body of three, four or five estates representing the people. They had a long history in Swedish government, but were defined only by custom as to number and membership. The Ordinance of 1617 set the number of estates at four: nobility, clergy, burghers and peasantry.
Once only an extension of the Råd, the estate of the nobles, under Gustav, became important in looking after the interests of the aristocracy. As the Råd was more and more absorbed into the government, its outlook shifted in favor of the crown and the nation as a whole rather than for the benefit of the upper class. The estate of nobles was left to fend for the upper class.
The clergy was probably the next most powerful estate for it not only represented the national church, but was in close contact with the commoners through the parish priests and tended to act as their voice. Also, it was the best organized of the estates because of the church hierarchical structure. The king, chancellor and Råd could negotiate with the clergy and reach an agreement that would endure and also carry weight with the people. Thus, the clergy often assumed the key role in settling political decisions.
The burghers, representing the business community, trades and merchants, was the least considered of the estates. Though growing rapidly, they still represented a small segment of the population and the wealth of the nation. At the same time a good share of the civil servants came from this class so their influence in the government was felt in other ways.
Finally, there was the peasant estate, representing the largest segment of the population by far and the main taxpayers, but the hardest to organize and assemble. The farmers and herdsmen could not afford, nor could they take the time to make the long journeys to the Riksdags. Yet the clout they wielded was enormous and often used by Gustav’s predecessors to cow the nobility.
As the need for more and higher taxes developed through Gustav’s reign, as well as increased troop conscriptions, frequent Riksdags were required. To facilitate this need representatives from the Estates began to meet in the 1620s instead of the entire Riksdag. The beginnings of a representative democracy were being established.
By 1627 Gustav had also created a secret committee of representatives from the three upper Estates to meet with him on foreign policy. These were matters considered too sensitive to communicate to the general population through the Riksdag. Control of finances was excluded from this group. Over the next century this committee would grow to have great importance.
All these changes produced a government capable of mobilizing the resources of a relatively small (in population and industry) nation, allowing it to become a world power. Still, an efficient government and industrious population does not necessarily tra
nslate to victory on the battlefield. To win wars, an effective and efficient war machine is needed and here Gustav Adolf was to prove his genius.
He first dealt with his navy. Gustav was the only Swedish king to have commanded a ship at sea. The Kalmar War had not only demonstrated the poor condition of the Swedish marine force, but many of the ships had been scuttled at Kalmar and again at Älvsborg. The young king began to rebuild the fleet immediately, but his ships would be bigger, stronger and better armed than his father’s. Above all, his seamen, recruited from the coastal towns of the country, were trained, then practiced and drilled until they became a superior fighting force.
A true admiralty was developed under Klas Fleming, the appointed vice-admiral under Karl Karlsson Gyllenhielm. Though not originally a seaman, he learned fast and quickly became an expert in naval affairs. He organized the fleet’s command structure and communication system. Discipline and dependability were ingrained in the service. Probably the greatest demonstration of his effective administration was the 1630 expedition to Germany. Gustav’s main army of 15,000 men was loaded onto a hundred transports at Stockholm. Covered by a fleet of warships, the troop-carriers rendezvoused with seven other contingents sailing from ports all over the Baltic. The enormous fleet crossed the sea and discharged its troops at Peenemünde, a feat of unprecedented skill and coordination. The Swedish navy became the dominant force in the Baltic.
And this was entirely necessary for the Swedish Empire was, first of all, a maritime empire. As the Carthaginians tried to control the Mediterranean and the Spanish tried to control first the North Sea (Caribbean) and then the South Sea (Pacific), Gustav needed the command of the Baltic. In a time before aircraft he could swoop down on a port or coast and deposit an irresistible force. Communication, supply, and reinforcement avenues had to be kept open. Blockades, tolls at Baltic ports and tariffs had to be enforced. The free flow of merchantmen between the empire’s ports had to be maintained. All this the navy accomplished without ever engaging in a major sea battle during Gustav’s reign. The Danish navy patrolled the Sound and forced the division of the Swedish fleets, but did not challenge Gustav in the open sea.
As efficient as the Swedish government had become and as effective as its naval arm was made to be, the battles of this age were land battles. It was the army that had to win the victories. Here again Gustav applied his talents and developed an army superior to any other fighting force of his time.
He learned from the Kalmar War that the Swedish militia and conscripts could not stand against the Danish mercenary professionals. In Livonia Karl IX’s commanders had tried to introduce the Dutch style of warfare, but discipline and time to complete the training were lacking. Swedish troops had thrown away their heavy body armor and cumbersome pikes, opening themselves up to the devastating Polish cavalry charge. On the Russian front Jakob de la Gardie’s Swedish-Finnish troops with German mercenaries and Russian auxiliaries had fared better against other, poorly trained Russians, but were beaten when contending with Sigismund’s experienced Polish army.
When Gustav took command of the troops in Novgorod he leaned heavily on mercenaries. Without time to create an army of his own design he did the best he could with what his father had left him and de la Gardie had maintained, but after the Peace of Stolbovo, the king began to building his own army.
The problem of recruitment was the first order of business. Traditionally Sweden had relied on volunteer militia for its infantry, supplemented by conscripts. Military literature of the time derided this approach and the Kalmar War, pitting Sweden’s amateurs against Danish professional mercenaries, seemed to prove the point. Heavy cavalry was also a problem. Again tradition called for the nobility to provide horsemen in exchange for tax exception. But Karl IX had received only twenty armed horsemen in response to his call to arms for the Danish war. Making matters worse, there was no permanent corps of troops or cache of officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) ready to train and lead recruited or conscripted troops in the field. Mercenaries had been used to a greater degree in Livonia and Russia, but they required large sums of money to maintain and were notoriously fickle, shifting from one side to the other for the promise of higher wages or more booty. As to generals, the country had finally developed a few. Jakob de la Gardie and Gustav Horn were professionals who had officered under Maurice of Orange, but these were exceptions. Gustav’s general corps was small and for the most part poorly trained. All this Gustav contemplated after the Russian war was concluded and gradually his vision began to emerge.
Defying conventional military wisdom of his day, Gustav decided on a national conscript army as the mainstay of his forces. Conscripts were less expensive than mercenaries and would make a relatively large standing army possible. Patriotism and loyalty to their king could be used as motivators. They could be trained in the tactics and weapons Gustav wanted them to use, not those they preferred or brought from somewhere else. The peasant farm boys were quiet, reliant and used to hardship. Gustav said of them, “They never complained, they were used to heat, cold, hunger and lack of sleep, but not to luxury and pleasure. They were satisfied with little. Obedient, strong and disciplined, they would defy all death and evil if properly led.”7 Finally, if trained, they would obey orders and do it promptly instead of dragging their feet or refusing orders altogether as professionals sometimes did.
But the process of conscription would have to be fair and seen as such by the peasants who would bear the brunt of the conscription burden. To this end Gustav drew up the Ordinance for Military Personnel which defined exactly the conscription process. All males over 15 years of age in each parish were grouped into files of twenty men (ten men in cities), a sort of draft registration. The king would issue a call for some number of recruits to be selected from each file. The actual selection was made by the conscription commission made up of a military officer, the local sheriff, the county court jury and the parish priest. In this way the crown got the troops it needed, but decisions as to who would serve were made at the local level where hardship cases, volunteers, etc., could be taken into consideration.
Having solved the problem of obtaining foot, Gustav turned to the even more difficult question of raising horse. The knight-service system had broken down, especially with the advent of taxes on the nobility first employed to raise money for the Älvsborg ransom, but used later as more money was needed for foreign wars. Gustav was never able to raise even 400 cavalrymen in this way. His final solution was to offer inducements to volunteers. The granting of land in conquered territory and the possibility of command positions in the military or government office helped to fill the ranks of his cavalry. Often these volunteers came from classes other than the high aristocracy and brought common farm steeds instead of the large chargers bred for war used by the old heavily armored knights and men-at-arms. But with the new lighter, more mobile troop units, this was not a serious problem (cavalry body armor was reduced to harness and helmet). The warrior king welded them into superb fighting units.
Through these devices the government established a reliable supply of manpower, but it had to be organized in an efficient manner. This was done through Oxenstierna’s creation of the provincial regiments. Provincial regiments were administrative units at the province level which levied the requirements on the counties and parishes, then moved those troops on to field army units. Each provisional regiment was to supply three field regiments. Thus a field regiment would be made up of men from the same area, an advantage in creating esprit de corps. This same organizational process was eventually applied to cavalry and artillery regiments as well.
So the king and his chancellor built a reliable recruiting system capable of drafting the soldiers needed and getting them to the field, but it was the molding of those resources into a disciplined, superbly equipped and trained, highly maneuverable army that was to provide Sweden with the most powerful military in Europe. In this Gustav was the architect and builder.
The young king a
pplied his talents to battlefield theory at a time when there were two competing tactical styles. Through most of the sixteenth century the Spanish tercio dominated European battlefields. The tercio was a mass of some 3,000 infantry armed with pikes and halberds. This formation, an improvement over the Swiss dense mass of pikemen, was designed by Gonzalvo di Cordoba about 1494 and came to dominate the battlefield for the next hundred years. His smallest unit was a squad of 25 men. Ten squads made up a company and 10 companies formed a regiment. The creation of units allowed for some maneuverability, but in the heat of battle the formation usually collapsed into a mob. Around the perimeter of this formation bristling with sharp points were stationed musketeers who could fire at the enemy, but withdraw behind the pikes if threatened by cavalry. The tercio put an end to the heavy cavalry charge of the Middle Ages as the sixteen foot pike easily outranged the horseman’s lance. Cavalry units adopted the caracole tact of charging to the edge of the tercio, discharging their pistols or carbines, then wheeling and retreating as a second squadron advances. Against this solid block of really long spears the cavalry became almost totally ineffective except in Poland where the advantage of the shear mass of horse and rider armed with lance and saber was maintained.
The big disadvantage of the tercio was its immobility and difficulty in maneuvering. It was, in effect, a defensive formation. In an effort to create some offense, the number of soldiers in a tercio was reduced to 1,600 with more officers and NCOs. Maneuverability was improved. The tercio could advance in a lumbering fashion crushing a lighter armed or less numerous force in front of it.
Another problem with the tercio was that only firearms on the side facing the enemy could be used. Musketeers on the other three sides were left out of the fight. In the last quarter of the century Maurice of Orange invented tactics designed to overcome the tercio’s inadequacies. Instead of great blocks of troops he arranged his forces in battalions of 550 men each. Within the battalion, soldiers were arranged in lines with each man in the second file located between the two in front of him. Thus, muskets could be fired from both front ranks and pikes could be leveled by both. Maurice also recognized the value of training and drill. With an increased number of officers and NCOs, due to the smaller units, the Dutch were able to move battalions from one point on the field to another, giving the commander some control over shaping the battle. Both schools had their adherents, but neither tactic made full use of the power of the projectile firing shoulder arms available or the potential for maneuverability with smaller units of better trained troops. Gustav would learn from both schools, then develop his own tactics superior to anything on the continent.
Warrior Kings of Sweden Page 24
