10 The next seven suttas describe, in identical terms, the enlightenment of the six past Buddhas and the present Buddha Gotama as the discovery of dependent origination and its cessation. The Pāli text is filled out only for Vipassī and Gotama; the others are drastically abridged. I have translated in full only the last sutta, where Gotama speaks of his own attainment of enlightenment.
11 From the explanation of bodhisatta in Spk it appears that the Pāli commentarial tradition recognizes alternative etymologies of the word, as equivalent either to Skt bodhisattva (“an enlightenment being”) or to *bodhisakta (“one devoted to enlightenment”); see PED, s.v. satta (1).Spk: Bodhi is knowledge; a being endowed with bodhi is a bodhisatta, a knowing one, a wise one, a sagely one. For from the time he forms his aspiration at the feet of former Buddhas, that being is always wise, never a blind fool. Or else, just as a mature lotus that has risen up above the water and is due to blossom when touched by the sun’s rays is called “an awakening lotus,” so a being who has obtained the prediction (to future Buddhahood) from the Buddhas and who will inevitably fulfil the perfections (pāramī) and attain enlightenment is called an awakening being (bujjhanasatta); he is a bodhisatta. One who lives yearning for enlightenment—the knowledge of the four paths—is devoted to, attached to, enlightenment (bodhiyaṃ satto āsatto); he is a bodhisatta.
12 The Buddha Vipassī was the sixth Buddha of antiquity, counting back from the Buddha Gotama. A detailed account of his career is found at DN II 11-51. He arose in the world ninety-one aeons ago. Sikhī and Vessabhū arose thirty-one aeons ago; Kakusandha, Koṇāgamana, Kassapa, and Gotama all arose in this present “excellent aeon” (bhaddakappa ). See DN II 2,15-28.
13 Yoniso manasikārā ahu paññāya abhisamayo. The commentaries consistently gloss yoniso manasikāra as upāyamanasikāra , pathamanasikāra, “attention that is the right means, attention on the (right) course.”There took place (in me) a breakthrough by wisdom. Spk: There was a breakthrough, a concurrence, a conjunction of the reason for aging-and-death together with wisdom (paññāya saddhiṃ jarāmaraṇakāraṇassa abhisamayo samavāyo samāyogo); the meaning is that it was seen by him, “Agingand-death has birth as its condition.” Or alternatively, the sense can be construed thus: Through careful attention and wisdom there took place a breakthrough (yoniso manasikārena ca paññāya ca abhisamayo ahu). The meaning is that the penetration of aging-and-death occurred thus, “When there is birth, aging-and-death comes to be.”
The first of these explanations is improbable, and even the second is unsatisfactory in construing careful attention and wisdom as joint causes. In general sutta usage yoniso manasikāra is the forerunner of paññā, while paññā is the efficient cause of abhisamaya. As a technical term, abhisamaya appears in the Nikāyas in two main contexts: (i) As signifying the initial breakthrough to the Dhamma, dhammābhisamaya , it is identical with the obtaining of the vision of the Dhamma (dhammacakkhupaṭilābha), and thus with the attainment of stream-entry; see 13:1 (II 134,4-5). (ii) As signifying the complete breaking through of conceit (sammā mānābhisamaya) it is equivalent to the attainment of arahantship; see 36:5 (IV 207,14-15) and I, v. 725c. A third suttanta use is to denote the Buddha’s discovery of the Dhamma, as here and in the verb form abhisameti at 12:20 below. In the commentaries abhisamaya is synonymous with paṭivedha, penetration, both terms being used interchangeably to characterize the four functions of the supramundane path; see Vism 689-91 (Ppn 22:92-97).
14 The two statements about the origination of aging-and-death from birth correspond respectively to the two forms of the abstract principle of conditionality. The abstract formula occurs at 12:21, 22, 49, 50, 61, and 62, with a variant at 12:41. See below n. 59. From this it would evidently be a mistake to insist that the formulation in terms of existence (sati … hoti) relates to synchronic conditionality while the formulation in terms of arising (uppādā … uppajjati) relates to diachronic conditionality. Since both apply to every pair of factors, they seem to be alternative ways of expressing the conditioning relationship, either of which subsumes under itself all possible modes of conditionality in their wide variety.
15 In the account of his enlightenment at 12:65 (II 104,13 foll.) the Buddha traces the sequence of conditions back only as far as consciousness, which he then shows to arise in dependence on name-and-form. The same difference in treatment occurs in the corresponding passage on cessation (II 105,20 foll.
16 The five Pāli words are cakkhu, ñāṇa, paññā, vijjā, and āloka. While vijjā is actually derived from vindati, Spk here glosses it as paṭivedha, penetration, as though it derived from vijjhati, to pierce.
17 Bhūtānaṃ vā sattānaṃ ṭhitiyā sambhavesīnaṃ vā anuggahāya. On sambhavesin as a future active participle formed from -esi(n), see Geiger, Pāli Grammar, §193A, EV I, n. to 527, and CPD, s.v. -esi(n) (2). The commentators apparently were not acquainted with this grammatical form (of which only very few instances exist in Pāli) and hence explain sambhavesin as if it was a bahubbīhi compound made up of the noun sambhava and the adjectival termination -esin. Thus Spk comments on the above line: “Beings who have already come to be are those who have been born, been produced. Those about to come to be (or, on Spk’s interpretation, ‘seekers of new existence’) are those seeking, searching for, a new existence, birth, production (sambhavesino ti ye sambhavaṃ jātiṃ nibbattiṃ esanti gavesanti).”
18 Spk: The nutriments are conditions (paccayā), for conditions are called nutriments (āhārā) because they nourish (or bring forth, āharanti) their own effects. Although there are other conditions for beings, these four alone are called nutriments because they serve as special conditions for the personal life-continuity (ajjhattikasantatiyā visesapaccayattā). For edible food (kabaliṅkāra āhāra) is a special condition for the physical body of those beings who subsist on edible food. In the mental body, contact is the special condition for feeling, mental volition for consciousness, and consciousness for name-and-form. As to what they bring forth (or nourish): Edible food, as soon as it is placed in the mouth, brings forth the groups of form with nutritive essence as the eighth (ojaṭṭhamakarūpāni; an Abhidhamma term for the simplest cluster of material phenomena); the nutriment contact brings forth the three kinds of feeling; the nutriment mental volition brings forth the three kinds of existence; and the nutriment consciousness brings forth name-and-form on the occasion of rebirth.In SN, nutriment is further discussed at 12:12, 31, 63, and 64. For general remarks on the four nutriments, see too Vism 341,7-18 (Ppn 11:1-3). Nyanaponika Thera, The Four Nutriments of Life, offers a collection of relevant suttas with commentaries. Āhāra is also used in a broader sense of “special condition,” without reference to the four nutriments, at 46:51 and 55:31.
19 These four kinds of nutriment have craving as their source. Spk: Beginning with the moment of rebirth, these kinds of nutriment comprised in the individual existence (attabhāva, the sentient organism) should be understood to originate by way of prior craving (purimataṇhā; the craving of the previous life that generated rebirth). How? At the moment of rebirth, firstly, there exists nutritive essence (ojā) produced within the arisen (bodily) form; this is the kammically acquired edible food originating from prior craving. Then the contact and volition associated with the rebirth-consciousness, and that consciousness itself, are respectively the kammically acquired nutriments of contact, mental volition, and consciousness originating from (prior) craving. Thus at rebirth the nutriments have their source in prior craving. And as at rebirth, so those produced subsequently at the moment of the first bhavaṅgacitta should be similarly understood.On the conditioning role of the nutriments, see CMA 8:23. The commentarial explanation of how craving is the cause of the four nutriments seems roundabout. A simpler explanation, more consonant with the spirit of the suttas, might be that it is craving which impels beings into the perpetual struggle to obtain physical and mental nutriment, both in the present life and in future lives.
20 Spk: The Blessed One stoppe
d the teaching at this point because he knew that a theorist (diṭṭhigatika) was sitting in the assembly and he wanted to give him an opportunity to ask his questions.
21 Spk explains that the name “Moḷiya” was given to him in lay life because he wore his hair in a huge topknot (moḷi), and the nickname stuck with him after he went forth as a monk. At MN I 122-24 he is admonished by the Buddha for his excessively familiar relations with the bhikkhunīs; in 12:32 below it is announced that he has left the Order and returned to lay life.
22 Phagguna’s question, “Who consumes...?” is “pregnant” with an implicit view of self. He sees someone—a self—standing behind consciousness in the role of a substantial subject. The Buddha must therefore reject as invalid the question itself, which is based on an illegitimate assumption. Spk: “I do not say, ‘One consumes’”: “I do not say someone—a being or a person (koci satto vā puggalo vā)—consumes.”
23 In the valid question, the Buddha replaces the personal pronoun ko, fraught with substantialist connotations, with the impersonal form kissa, genitive singular of the stem ki- (see Geiger, Pāli Grammar, §111.1). Although all eds. read here kissa nu kho bhante viññāṇāhāro, the sense seems to require that we add paccayo at the end. Spk glosses: Bhante ayaṃ viññāṇāhāro katamassa dhammassa paccayo? Paccayo does in fact occur in the reply.
24 Spk: The nutriment consciousness: rebirth-consciousness (paṭisandhicitta). The production of future renewed existence (āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatti): the name-and-form arisen along with that same consciousness.At AN I 223-24 it is said: “Kamma is the field, consciousness the seed, and craving the moisture, for consciousness ... to become established in a low (middling, superior) realm; thus there is production of future renewed existence (kammaṃ khettaṃ viññāṇaṃ bījaṃ taṇhā sineho ... hīnāya (majjhimāya, paṇitāya) dhātuyā viññāṇaṃ patiṭṭhitaṃ; evaṃ āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatti hoti).” This implies that it is the stream of consciousness coming from the preceding existence that functions as the nutriment consciousness by generating, at the moment of conception, the initial rebirth-consciousness, which in turn brings forth (or “nourishes”) the concomitant name-and-form.
25 Tasmiṃ bhūte sati saḷāyatanaṃ. Spk: When that name-and-form called “the production of renewed existence” is generated, when it exists, the six sense bases come to be. The conjunction bhūte sati is unusual and the redundancy can only be avoided if the past participle bhūte is here understood to function as a noun denoting the being that has come to be.
26 Spk: Why didn’t the theorist ask, “Who comes to be?”? Because he held the belief that it is a being that comes to be, and the Buddha’s answer would directly contradict his belief. Further, after being contradicted so many times, he became convinced, and also the Teacher continued the discourse without pause in order to prevent him from asking any more pointless questions.
27 Spk: They do not understand aging-and-death by way of the truth of suffering; nor its origin by way of the truth of the origin, i.e., that aging-and-death arises from birth and craving; nor its cessation by way of the truth of cessation; nor the way to its cessation by way of the truth of the path. Similarly, in all the following passages, the meaning should be understood by way of the four truths.Ignorance is not mentioned in the sequence because it is already implied by reference to the origin of volitional formations.
28 Sāmaññatthaṃ vā brahmaññatthaṃ vā. Spk: Here the noble path is asceticism and brahminhood, and in both cases the goal should be understood as the noble fruit. See 45:35-38.
29 Dvayanissito khvāyaṃ Kaccāna loko yebhuyyena atthitañ c’ eva natthitañ ca. Spk: “For the most part” (yebhuyyena) means: for the great multitude, with the exception of the noble individuals (ariyapuggala). The notion of existence (atthitā) is eternalism (sassata); the notion of nonexistence (natthitā) is annihilationism (uccheda). Spk-pṭ: The notion of existence is eternalism because it maintains that the entire world (of personal existence) exists forever. The notion of nonexistence is annihilationism because it maintains that the entire world does not exist (forever) but is cut off.In view of these explanations it would be misleading to translate the two terms, atthitā and natthitā, simply as “existence” and “nonexistence” and then to maintain (as is sometimes done) that the Buddha rejects all ontological notions as inherently invalid. The Buddha’s utterances at 22:94, for example, show that he did not hesitate to make pronouncements with a clear ontological import when they were called for. In the present passage atthitā and natthitā are abstract nouns formed from the verbs atthi and natthi. It is thus the metaphysical assumptions implicit in such abstractions that are at fault, not the ascriptions of existence and nonexistence themselves. I have tried to convey this sense of metaphysical abstraction, conveyed in Pāli by the terminal -tā, by rendering the two terms “the notion of existence” and “the notion of nonexistence,” respectively. On the two extremes rejected by the Buddha, see 12:48, and for the Buddha’s teaching on the origin and passing away of the world, 12:44.
Unfortunately, atthitā and bhava both had to be rendered by “existence,” which obscures the fact that in Pāli they are derived from different roots. While atthitā is the notion of existence in the abstract, bhava is concrete individual existence in one or another of the three realms. For the sake of marking the difference, bhava might have been rendered by “being” (as was done in MLDB), but this English word, I feel, is too broad (suggestive of “Being,” the absolute object of philosophical speculation) and does not sufficiently convey the sense of concreteness intrinsic to bhava.
30 Spk: The origin of the world: the production of the world of formations. There is no notion of nonexistence in regard to the world: there does not occur in him the annihilationist view that might arise in regard to phenomena produced and made manifest in the world of formations, holding “They do not exist.” Spk-pṭ: The annihilationist view might arise in regard to the world of formations thus: “On account of the annihilation and perishing of beings right where they are, there is no persisting being or phenomenon.” It also includes the wrong view, having those formations as its object, which holds: “There are no beings who are reborn.” That view does not occur in him; for one seeing with right understanding the production and origination of the world of formations in dependence on such diverse conditions as kamma, ignorance, craving, etc., that annihilationist view does not occur, since one sees the uninterrupted production of formations.Spk: The cessation of the world: the dissolution (bhaṅga) of formations. There is no notion of existence in regard to the world: There does not occur in him the eternalist view which might arise in regard to phenomena produced and made manifest in the world of formations, holding “They exist.” Spk-pṭ: The eternalist view might arise in regard to the world of formations, taking it to exist at all times, owing to the apprehension of identity in the uninterrupted continuum occurring in a cause-effect relationship. But that view does not occur in him; because he sees the cessation of the successively arisen phenomena and the arising of successively new phenomena, the eternalist view does not occur.
Spk: Further, “the origin of the world” is direct-order conditionality (anuloma-paccayākāra); “the cessation of the world,” reverse-order conditionality (paṭiloma-paccayākāra). [Spk-pṭ: “Direct-order conditionality” is the conditioning efficiency of the conditions in relation to their own effects; “reverse-order conditionality” is the cessation of the effects through the cessation of their respective causes.] For in seeing the dependency of the world, when one sees the nontermination of the conditionally arisen phenomena owing to the nontermination of their conditions, the annihilationist view, which might otherwise arise, does not occur. And in seeing the cessation of conditions, when one sees the cessation of the conditionally arisen phenomena owing to the cessation of their conditions, the eternalist view, which might otherwise arise, does not occur.
31 The reading I prefer is a hybrid of Be and Se: upayupādānābhini
vesavinibaddho . I take upay- from Be (Se and Ee: upāy-) and -vinibaddho from Se (Be and Ee: -vinibandho). The rendering at KS 2:13, “grasping after systems and imprisoned by dogmas,” echoed by SN-Anth 2:17, is too narrow in emphasis. Spk explains that each of the three nouns—engagement, clinging, and adherence—occurs by way of craving and views (taṇhā, diṭṭhi), for it is through these that one engages, clings to, and adheres to the phenomena of the three planes as “I” and “mine.”
32 Tañ cāyaṃ upayupādānaṃ cetaso adhiṭṭhānaṃ abhinivesānusayaṃ na upeti na upādiyati nādhiṭṭhāti “attā me” ti. I have unravelled the difficult syntax of this sentence with the aid of Spk, which glosses ayaṃ as “this noble disciple” (ayaṃ ariyasāvako). Spk says that craving and views are also called “mental standpoints” (adhiṭṭhāna) because they are the foundation for the (unwholesome) mind, and “adherences and underlying tendencies” (abhinivesānusaya) because they adhere to the mind and lie latent within it. Spk connects the verb adhiṭṭhāti to the following “attā me,” and I conform to this interpretation in the translation.
33 Spk explains dukkha here as “the mere five aggregates subject to clinging” (pañcupādānakkhandhamattam eva). Thus what the noble disciple sees, when he reflects upon his personal existence, is not a self or a substantially existent person but a mere assemblage of conditioned phenomena arising and passing away through the conditioning process governed by dependent origination. In this connection see the verses of the bhikkhunī Vajirā, I, vv. 553-55. Spk: By just this much—the abandonment of the idea of a being (sattasaññā )—there is right seeing.Aparappaccayā ñāṇaṃ, “knowledge independent of others,” is glossed by Spk as “personal direct knowledge without dependence on another” (aññassa apattiyāyetvā attapaccakkhañāṇaṃ ). This is said because the noble disciple, from the point of stream-entry on, has seen the essential truth of the Dhamma and thus is not dependent on anyone else, not even the Buddha, for his or her insight into the Dhamma. Until arahantship is attained, however, such a disciple might still approach the Buddha (or another enlightened teacher) for practical guidance in meditation.
The Connected Discourses of the Buddha Page 79
