Looking Down the Corridors

by Kevin Wright

  7406 SS Flight Profiles and Modus Operandi

  Missions were flown at around 24,000ft and often lasted for between twelve and fourteen hours. Their patrol areas included: over the Baltic Sea between Finland and Sweden; over West Germany to monitor the IGB and the Czech–German border areas. Another route from Rhein-Main, skirted the Balkans and ended at Incirlik in Turkey. Finally, there was a route from Incirlik to Lake Trabzon and Lake Van to the south and east of Turkey. Numerous missions were also flown over the Eastern Mediterranean – especially during the various Arab-Israeli crises. From 1956 to 1964 the squadron established its Detachment 2 (Det 2) at Bodø in Norway for forward operations, although aircraft were never permanently stationed there.49

  By October 1971, Sun Valley C-130s regularly used Hellenikon in Greece from where over half of the missions originated. They covered NATO’s southern flank by operating from Greece, Italy, Turkey, Sigonella in Sicily, Rota in Spain and Tehran in Iran.50 The move to the Mediterranean bases was justified by the growing military importance of the area, especially the volatile Eastern Mediterranean.

  On 2 September 1958 the squadron suffered a catastrophic loss when seventeen personnel were killed after their C-130A-II was shot down close to the Armenian capital of Yerevan after straying over the Soviet border. The details of this loss only fully emerged into the public domain in the 1990s. The story was a heady mixture of espionage, deception, secrecy and denial that typified the Cold War.51

  7407th Support Squadron (7407 SS)

  Perhaps the most exotic unit was the 7407 SS, which conducted high-altitude imagery collection overflights of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland. President Eisenhower had authorised the continuation of high-level overflights of denied territory in July 1953 under the ‘Sensitive Intelligence Programme’ (SENSINT). The squadron implemented part of this directive. Operating from Bitburg and Rhein-Main AB’s it participated in some relatively short-duration programmes, the best known of these being projects Slick Chick and Heart Throb. These programmes were interim solutions until the U-2 entered service.

  Project Slick Chick

  In 1955 Detachment 1 of 7407 SS was established at Bitburg AB, operating three camera-equipped variants of the F-100A Super Sabre called the RF-100A Slick Chicks. The front fuselage below the cockpit was modified to accept a combination of cameras: two split-pair vertical K-38 with 36in lens; two oblique K-17 that imaged via a mirror arrangement; a single vertical K-17C with 6, 12 or 24in lenses; and three K-17s with 6, 12 or 24in lenses in a trimetrogen installation.

  The aircraft were shipped by sea to Belfast, from where they were flown to Bitburg, arriving there on 16 May 1955. Between then and mid 1956 they flew around six penetration missions in Europe covering Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary and Poland, with the major targets being the national capitals, industrial cities, Soviet military installations and exercises.52 Although the flights were tracked by larger than expected numbers of radars, the Soviets and East Germans were unable to engage them. The detachment flew no more overflights after mid 1956 and was disbanded on 1 July 1958. During Slick Chick’s time in Europe, one aircraft was lost in a training accident.53

  Project Heart Throb

  The Martin B-57, a licence-built version of the English Electric Canberra, was a workhorse airframe for a large number of special reconnaissance projects. Many passed through Rhein-Main at some time, either as part of 7407 SS or for periods of temporary duty for other short-term or ‘special’ operations tasked directly from the United States.54

  The first RB-57A arrived at Rhein-Main in May 1955 for Project Sharp Cut. The modified aircraft carried a camera with a 240in lens, similar to Pie Face, designed by Boston University Optical Research Laboratory and installed in the aircraft’s bomb bay. The camera used ‘folded optics’ and was able to image between 65 and 75 miles into denied territory.55 It was also used on peripheral missions along the IGB, to Kaliningrad in the Baltic and Albania in the Adriatic. It remained in Germany until November 1960.

  In the summer of 1955, five more RB-57As arrived at Rhein-Main. They were designed to acquire vertical photography under Project Heart Throb. Their overall black colour scheme made them look like ‘regular’ B-57s. Internally they had been subjected to a ruthless weight reduction programme that entailed removing the navigator’s seat and associated equipment, armour and the rotating bomb door with its associated hydraulics. The bomb bay was then skinned over. An optical periscope and pilot-operated intervalometer were fitted to allow the single pilot to sight and operate the cameras. As the aircraft were expected to operate at such high altitudes, a pressure suit ventilation system was installed. Besides the Boston optical lab-designed camera, the Heart Throb aircraft are known to have carried two oblique-mounted K-38 cameras with 36in lenses and a single vertical T-11 camera with a 6in lens for mapping and tracking. The ‘Heart Throb’ aircraft had a 900-mile radius of action. The average flight time was about three and a half hours, which allowed just over an hour’s coverage of target areas.56

  After crew training and aircraft preparation, the pilots arrived at Rhein-Main on 23 August 1955. Captain (later Major General) Gerald Cooke, a Heart Throb pilot, believes that they flew some fifteen to nineteen overflights between November 1955 and August 1956.57 Navigation was by deduced (dead) reckoning using only visual fixes. Radio silence was imposed from take-off to landing. Penetrating hostile airspace above 50,000ft, as fuel burned off the aircraft gradually climbed to between 62,000ft and 68,000ft and as far as 400 miles away from Rhein-Main. The return was largely on idle power as the aircraft flew a very gentle extended descent.

  There is little verifiable information available about the areas covered by Heart Throb missions but Captain Cooke’s three flights were close to Brno and Bratislava in Czechoslovakia, Budapest in Hungary and parts of northern Yugoslavia. He believes that other missions flew along the Baltic coast across Poland and into the Kaliningrad Oblast.58 Targets included cities, large airports, industrial centres and sometimes road and rail junctions. About six to twelve photographs were taken of each target.

  The Heart Throb programme stopped in August 1956 because of the growing level of risk, exacerbated by the escalating tensions in Eastern Europe. The risks now outweighed the benefits and the missions were believed to be insufficiently productive to justify their continuation.59 Although Heart Throb did not formally end until sometime later, the halting of European flights in summer 1956 dovetails fairly neatly with the start of U-2 flights from Wiesbaden.60

  Other 7407 SS Operations

  In June 1959, six ‘big wing’ RB-57Ds were delivered to the 7407 SS from 4025 Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron (4025 SRS), which had been operating them on detached duty at Rhein-Main for some time on peripheral flights under the code name Operation Bordertown. The RB-57D was a USAF project that never met the U-2’s altitude goals and so was considered unsuitable for deep-penetration overflights, so it was restricted to peripheral missions in Europe.61 The RB-57Ds came in two versions: five single-seat RB-57D-0s that carried four cameras (two K-38s with 24in lens and a 390ft film magazine in a split-pair configuration and two KC-1Bs with 6in lenses for precision mapping, fitted in the space where the back-seat crewman would usually have been. The camera’s coverage overlapped to give high-quality, horizon-to-horizon coverage). A single-seat RB-57D-1 (53–3963) was equipped with the AN/APQ-56 high-resolution side-looking radar for all-weather radar mapping reconnaissance with the aircraft nose radome covered the antenna for the AN/APN-107 system.62 The aircraft served in Germany until 1964 when wing fatigue problems became apparent.63

  The RB-57F, another ‘big wing’ version, arrived in Germany in early April 1965. They carried the ‘HTAC’ high-altitude camera, weighing almost 2,000kg (4,400lb), used for acquiring oblique photography at up to 60 nautical miles range from the aircraft. ELINT/SIGINT equipment was also carried. On 14 December 1965 7407 SS lost an RB-57F over the Black Sea. It had departed from Incirlik in Turkey and, despite very
extensive searches by Soviet and NATO units, no bodies or significant wreckage, was ever recovered.64 The two remaining RB-57Fs, and a trainer aircraft, continued operations until the 7407 SS was deactivated on 1 October 1968.65

  Conclusions

  US airborne intelligence collection operations in Germany and covering NATO’s northern and southern flanks during the Cold War were comprehensive and very complex. What began in Europe amidst the uncertainty following the end of the Second World War, developed to become a critical part of a worldwide intelligence-gathering effort. For the duration of the Cold War, USAFE had a very wide-ranging intelligence-gathering remit, although sometimes there was a duplication of effort caused by inter-agency rivalries and lack of communication. These operations gave the USA almost daily coverage of what could have been the flashpoints for conflict in Europe. Whilst the US reconnaissance programmes developed worldwide, Berlin, the Air Corridors and the periphery, remained at the forefront of intelligence gathering on the large Soviet and East German forces located in the GDR. The intelligence collected often had strategic significance that rippled well beyond the confines of the European theatre. The US operation’s products were exchanged with other Allies, especially the British, and contributed significantly to producing a comprehensive intelligence picture of the Cold War Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies.

  Notes

  1 L. Tart (2013), History of the US Air Force Security Service (USAFSS), Vol. 2 (West Conshohocken, PA: Infinity Publishing).

  2 Rhodarmer (2003), in Cargill Hall and Laurie (2003a), pp. 15–16.

  3 J. Bessette, http://creekmisty.fatcow.com/bflb/27443/index.html.

  4 P. Lashmar (1996), Spy Flights of the Cold War (Stroud: Sutton Publishing), p. 33, Note 16.

  5 Miller (1998), p. 70.

  6 W.E. Burrows (2001), By Any Means Necessary: America’s Secret Air War (London: Arrow Books), p. 193.

  7 C. Pocock and Clarence Fu (2010), The Black Bats: CIA Spy Flights over China from Taiwan 1951–1969 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing), pp. 37 and 50. See also Lashmar (1996), p. 160.

  8 J. van Waarde (2010), Target Iron Curtain, p. 2. Available at: http://www.16va.be/TargetIronCurtain-JanvanWaarde2010.pdf.

  9 Tart (2010), pp. 594–5.

  10 Grimes (2014), pp. 19–20.

  11 Ibid., pp. 17–18.

  12 Ibid.

  13 Ibid., pp. 21–2.

  14 Ibid., p. 28.

  15 www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/aerial_intelligence/Summer_1960.pdf.

  16 Grimes (2014), pp. 27–8.

  17 Ibid., p. 36.

  18 Ibid.

  19 Ibid., pp. 37–8.

  20 Ibid., p. 38.

  21 Ibid., pp. 41–2.

  22 van Waarde (2010), p. 7.

  23 Grimes (2014), p. 13.

  24 J. Richelson (1987), American Espionage and the Soviet Target (New York: William Morrow Inc.), pp. 102–4.

  25 Cargill Hall and Laurie (2003b), Doc 4–1, p. 413.

  26 Grimes (2014), pp. 10–12 and Cargill Hall and Laurie (2003b), Doc 35–1, p. 473.

  27 Ibid., p. 12.

  28 www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/aerial_intelligence/Summer_1960.pdf Accessed 21 August 2014.

  29 Lashmar (1996), p. 192.

  30 Grimes (2014), p. 14.

  31 Ibid., and Brugioni (2010), p. 75.

  32 Grimes (2014), pp. 39–40.

  33 Ibid., p. 27.

  34 Ibid., pp. 253–4.

  35 The term ‘Big Item’ was the name used by many crews over the duration of Corridor operations simply to refer to the primary large camera carried on their particular aircraft.

  36 Grimes (2014), pp. 276–7.

  37 Ibid., p. 278.

  38 Robert Zoucha interview.

  39 Boyne (2012).

  40 Pocock and Fu (2010), pp. 37–8.

  41 Tart and Keefe (2001), The Price of Vigilance (New York: Ballantine), pp. 550–1.

  42 Beschloss (1986), pp. 158–9.

  43 https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol12i2/html/v12i2a02p_0001.htm Accessed 21 August 2014.

  44 G. Mindling and R. Bolton (2011), US Air Force Tactical Missiles 1949–1969 (Morrisville, NC: Lulu.com publishing), p. 177.

  45 Grimes (2014), p. 23.

  46 Ibid.

  47 Tart and Keefe (2001), pp. 246–7.

  48 Grimes (2014), pp. 115–17.

  49 van Waarde (2010), p. 13.

  50 Tart and Keefe (2001), p. 256.

  51 Ibid., pp. 301–510.

  52 Brugioni (2010), pp. 75–6.

  53 C.H. Rigsby, ‘Project Slick Chick Overflights in Europe: 1955–1956’, in Cargill Hall and Laurie (2003a), pp. 178–9.

  54 Grimes (2014), pp. 85–7. There is still considerable detail to be unravelled concerning precise equipment fit and individual airframes involved in RB-57 operations in Germany – especially among some ‘big wing aircraft’.

  55 G. Cooke (2003a), Early Cold War Overflights 1950–1956: Symposium Proceedings, Vol. 1: Memoirs (Washington DC: Office of the Historian, National Reconnaissance Office), p. 193.

  56 Ibid., pp. 203–4.

  57 Ibid., p. 194.

  58 Ibid., p. 202.

  59 Ibid., p. 204.

  60 Pedlow and Welzenbach (1992), p. 100.

  61 In contrast to operations from Alaska which overflew Soviet territory.

  62 van Waarde (2010), p. 20.

  63 Grimes (2014), pp. 32–3.

  64 Tart and Keefe (2001), pp. 163–5.

  65 van Waarde (2010), p. 21.

  4

  BRITISH CORRIDOR FLIGHTS AND EUROPEAN RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

  Knowledge of the British political background and approval processes for their Corridor flights is useful to better understand the experiences of those who flew the missions. The British effort was very modest when compared to the American. For example, in 1962 the RAF flew something like fifty corridor missions compared to over 500 flown by the USAF.1 Even so it represented a significant effort by the RAF and British Army for over forty years. The operation was classified as ‘TOP SECRET – UK/US Eyes Only’ for its entire duration. It was so secret that its participants over the years were warned of ‘career limiting effects’ and other dire consequences that would result from unauthorised disclosure – ‘The Tower, keys and throw away’ often featured in these threats even long after individuals’ involvement with the operation had ended.

  It was only in 2011, over twenty years after the flights ended, that the curtain began to be lifted. The security classification of Corridor operations meant that most RAF and British Army records relating to them were destroyed shortly after its 1990 termination.2 Those remaining are generally fragmentary, but offer a fascinating glimpse into the operation from the prime minister down to the dangers faced by the men flying the missions and those supporting them. The majority of information available about the flights today, certainly the operational aspects, now only resides in the memories of those former RAF and BAOR personnel involved in them.

  Early Post-War Years in Germany

  The use of British military aircraft on photographic operations in Germany required political approval. In the early years that control was only lightly exercised. Between 1945 and 1955 political control in the British Occupied Zone (BOZ) of Germany rested with the British Military Government (BMG), even after the formation of the West German government in 1949. During that time the Foreign Office (FO) in London took the view that diplomatic matters in the BOZ were the preserve of the BMG, a de facto extension of the UK government, having little direct regard to German-led administrative arrangements. The FO considered that the Air Ministry to War Office were the lead departments in any approval process for photographic flights. Locating official information on these early operations has proved elusive. So trying to establish the early approval processes is really educated guesswork. Until 1955 any submission probably started at HQ BAFO or HQ 2TAF, which probably made re
presentations to the Air Ministry in London for their endorsement and approval to undertake the missions, with the relevant ministers being kept informed. In essence there was probably little direct political control exercised from London, as the British felt it was an ‘internal issue’.

  The US forces had begun a photographic survey in their zone of Germany, and the British followed suit under Operation Nostril from autumn 1952. The operation was flown by camera-equipped Lancasters of 82 Squadron, then being withdrawn from their Middle East Air Force commitment, to RAF Benson in Oxfordshire.3 Four aircraft were detached to Germany to carry out the task – a 1: 20,000-scale photographic survey of the BOZ – due for completion prior to 82 Squadron re-equipping with Canberra PR-3s. The task was a high priority one, second only to the ‘European Targeting Programme’ (Operation Dimple). Indeed the task was considered so urgent that PR Mosquitoes from 58 and 540 squadrons were later drafted in to help complete it.4 A pause, caused by the shooting down of the RAF Lincoln on 12 March 1953, resulted in a self-imposed ban on being within 10 miles of the SOZ boundary, but this had to be relaxed for Operation Nostril.5 The operation was finally completed in 1954.

  In the 1945 to 1947 period an eclectic mix of aircraft were used for photography in the Corridors, starting with a Mosquito using a forward-facing F.52 camera in 1945 and 1946. The Mosquito’s replacement, until 1947, was the C-in-C’s personal Dakota with a hand-held F.24 camera pointed out of the co-pilot’s window. The Dakota was abandoned as a platform because the C-in-C became concerned about the compromise of ‘his’ aircraft that he used when he represented British forces on the Continent and the rather unsatisfactory view from the Dakota’s flight deck.