At the same time that some groups of early Homo sapiens were going east, other groups turned northward, migrating initially to Russia and then going west across Europe or east across Siberia. Homo sapiens bones in western Siberia have been dated to 45,000 years ago. At a site on the Don River, south of Moscow, evidence of settlement has also been dated to between 45,000 and 42,000 years ago; this site included not only sophisticated stone tools but also bone points, a carved piece of ivory, and perforated shells, presumably used as personal ornaments. There is also evidence of early Homo sapiens having reached Romania, Italy, and England between 40,000 and 45,000 years ago.11
The speed with which early Homo sapiens spread across the earth was impressive. Even more impressive, however, was the speed with which they displaced the other hominin groups. As Zimmer noted, “When Homo sapiens arrived on a territory of Homo erectus … these other humans disappeared.” Even the Neandertals, who had existed for 200,000 years and had many skills, had disappeared by about 40,000 years ago, the last remnants having apparently been pushed off the European continent onto the island of Gibraltar. Studies have shown that Homo sapiens increased in numbers much faster than the Neandertals, who clearly were no match for their new neighbors. As Zimmer summarized it, the Homo sapiens success in reproduction was part of a “spiraling pressure as clever individuals relentlessly selected for yet more cleverness in their companions.”12
AN INTROSPECTIVE SELF
Sophisticated tools, pierced shells, fitted clothing, engravings on ochre, rocks shaped to resemble animals, boat travel in open seas—a new kind of hominin had clearly emerged. The behavior of these hominins was so at variance with the behavior of their predecessors that we designate this group as Homo sapiens, “wise man.” And we assume that such individuals must have made some kind of major cognitive leap forward. What might that have been?
Wearing shell jewelry, decorating one’s body, wearing fitted clothing all suggest that early Homo sapiens had become aware of what others were thinking about them. Self-adornment can be a means for advertising one’s family relationships, social class, group allegiance, or sexual availability and is meant to send a message to observers. Self-adornment has been used by Homo sapiens in every known culture, often involving extraordinary investments of time and resources, as names such as Gucci and Cartier can attest. At the heart of self-adornment is one Homo sapiens thinking about what another Homo sapiens is thinking about him or her. This is the introspective self.
Does child development provide any clues regarding this cognitive advance? As we have seen, at about age two, children develop self-awareness, assessed by mirror recognition, and it seems likely that hominins acquired similar self-awareness beginning about 1.8 million years ago. At about age four, children begin to develop an awareness of others’ thoughts, as demonstrated by the Sally-Anne test, and it is possible that at least some hominins also acquired this skill beginning about 200,000 years ago. The next major cognitive skill is acquired by children beginning at about age six and is commonly referred to as a second-order theory of mind.
What is meant by a second-order theory of mind? In the Sally-Anne test, Anne moved the ball from the basket to the box after Sally had left the room. Sally thus believed that the ball was in the basket, because she didn’t see it moved, and Anne believed that Sally believed that ball was in the basket. This is a first-order theory of mind, an awareness of others’ thoughts.
However, the situation changes if Sally, unbeknown to Anne, was looking in the window and saw Anne move the ball from the basket to the box. In the Sally-Anne test, the child is asked: “Where will Anne think that Sally is going to look for the ball?” This is a second-order theory of mind test, because it involves thinking about what one person thinks another person is thinking. In this case, the child has to understand that Anne will think that Sally thinks the ball is in the basket because Anne did not see Sally looking in the window when Anne put the ball in the box. Most children do not begin to acquire this cognitive skill until approximately age six.13
It is also possible to test children for even higher-order theories of mind. In the earlier scenario, for example, what would be the situation if, unbeknown to Sally, Anne had noticed Sally looking in the window as Anne moved the ball from the basket to the box? Anne would thus believe that Sally would believe that the ball was in the box, because she saw Anne move it there; however, since Sally did not see Anne looking at her as Sally looked in the window, Sally would think that Anne believes that Sally thinks the ball is in the basket. Some theory of mind scenarios become even more complicated by adding misinformation given by one of the participants to the other.
According to researchers in this field, a first-order theory of mind describes simple human interactions of how one person thinks another person thinks, but “it cannot entirely capture social interaction.” Most social discourse involves “an interaction of minds which can be properly understood only when one takes into account what people think about other people’s thoughts (second order beliefs) and even what people think that others think about their thoughts, etc. (higher order beliefs).” This is the core of most complex social interactions.14
The acquisition of a second-order theory of mind requires the person to view the self as an object. It is not merely looking in a mirror and recognizing the self but rather being able to think about what you look like to other people, how they see you, and what you think about how they see you. It includes being able to think about yourself thinking about yourself. It is, in short, the introspective self. The fact that early Homo sapiens were apparently decorating themselves and wearing fitted clothing suggests that they were thinking about themselves and how they appeared to others. Thus, this may have been the first time in hominin history that a male thought his bearskin did not look good on him and a female thought her shell necklace improved her appearance. If so, it would have marked the birth of the consumer economy.
The evolution of an introspective self would have provided early Homo sapiens with major cognitive advantages over other hominins, especially in social interactions and being able to predict others’ behavior. It would have greatly facilitated group endeavors by Homo sapiens, such as group hunting, and put Homo sapiens at a significant advantage in warfare against other hominins who did not possess this cognitive skill. Nicholas Humphrey characterized this as having an inner eye: “Imagine that at some time in history a new kind of sense organ evolves, the inner eye whose field of view is not the outside world but the brain itself.… allowing him by a kind of magical translation to see his own brain-states as conscious states of mind.” British sociologist Zygmunt Bauman described it as follows: “Unlike other animals, we not only know; we know that we know. We are aware of being aware, conscious of ‘having’ consciousness, of being conscious. Our knowledge is itself an object of knowledge: we can gaze at our thoughts ‘the same way’ we look at our hands and feet and at the ‘things’ which surround our bodies not being part of them.” In humans, this ability is marvelously reflective. Like opposing mirrors, we can contemplate ourselves, and contemplate others thinking about us, and contemplate ourselves thinking about others thinking about us, ad infinitum.15
Some scholars have characterized the evolution of the introspective self as the defining moment in the development of human cognition. Theodosius Dobzhansky, a geneticist at Rockefeller University, noted that man alone “has the ability to objectify himself, to stand apart from himself, as it were, and to consider the kind of being he is.” This ability is “an evolutionary novelty … one of the fundamental, possibly the most fundamental, characteristic of the human species.” Sir John Eccles, winner of a Nobel Prize, said the development of introspection was “the most extraordinary event in the world of our experience … the coming to be of each of us as a unique self-conscious being.” Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, a French paleontologist and Jesuit priest, described it as the “hominisation of Homo sapiens, a consciousness to turn in upon itself, to take possession
of itself as of an object … no longer merely to know, but to know oneself; no longer merely to know, but to know that one knows”: “We must not lose sight of that line crimsoned by the dawn. After thousands of years rising below the horizon, a flame bursts forth at a strictly localized point. Thought is born.” In Christian theology, the emergence of an introspective self is symbolized by the Genesis story of Adam and Eve, who eat fruit from the forbidden tree in the Garden of Eden and, for the first time, become aware of themselves and their nakedness.16
The introspective self would appear to be unique to humans. We sometimes wonder what cats and dogs think about themselves, but they do not think about themselves, because they do not have the necessary cognitive components. Even chimpanzees, who can recognize themselves in a mirror, have never been observed decorating themselves. And they certainly show no concern about what humans think about them, as anyone can testify who has taken a small child to the zoo and, as chimpanzees mated unmindful of their observers, tried to think how to answer their child’s inevitable question: “What are they doing?”
THE INTROSPECTIVE SELF AND LANGUAGE
Is the evolution of the introspective self possibly related to the development of modern language? The origin of language is one of the most spiritedly debated issues in science. The arguments begin with the definition of language itself. Language is not simply communication, since honeybees, dogs, whales, monkeys, and many other animals communicate, often using complex sounds and behaviors. Captive chimpanzees and bonobos have been taught to communicate using sign language and keyboards with symbols. They have achieved vocabularies of more than 2,000 words and have demonstrated an ability to string several words together. Great apes such as chimpanzees also have a larynx and nasopharynx similar, although not identical, to humans and have been taught, with difficulty, to vocalize a few human sounds, as parrots can also do. Is this language? If, as some linguists argue, language is merely vocabulary and syntax, then it is possible to say that chimpanzees and bonobos have a rudimentary form of language. Most linguists, however, view language as more than word mechanics.
Like great apes and monkeys, early hominins almost certainly communicated using a variety of sounds, facial expressions, and hand signals. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine Homo erectus having migrated halfway around the world without having had some effective communication skills. The coordinated actions needed for hunting in groups also require communication skills, but many animals, including wild dogs, wolves, lions, baboons, and chimpanzees, do so without having developed advanced language skills. Some researchers have argued that language was acquired early in hominin evolution and may even have been a major cause of the evolution. Prominent researchers in this group include British anthropologists Leslie Aiello and Robin Dunbar, who have claimed that “the need for large groups among our early ancestors was the driving force behind … the evolution of language.” Among many primates, grooming one another is an important means of social bonding. According to this theory, as primate groups grew in size, it became difficult for one primate to groom an increasing number of individuals. Language thus developed as a substitute for grooming: “If conversation is basically a form of social grooming, then language allows us to groom with several individuals simultaneously.” If this theory is correct, then according to Dunbar “speech (and hence language) must have been in place by the appearance of Homo sapiens half a million years ago, at least in some form.”17
A related argument for the early development of language was set forth by Derek Bickerton. He proposed that Homo erectus spoke a “protolanguage” and that true language was the product of a single gene mutation, such as the FOXP2 gene identified among a British family with language impairments, that occurred approximately 200,000 years ago at the time Archaic Homo sapiens evolved. Terrence Deacon, an anthropologist at Boston University, dates the inception of language even earlier, claiming that the development of language and the evolution of the human brain were both a response to the acquisition of symbolic thinking. Such theoreticians would presumably agree with University of Michigan anthropologist Thomas Schoenemann, who said: “It is difficult to escape the conclusion that language likely played a major role in the evolution of the human brain.”18
On the other side of the debate are those who believe that the evolution of the brain came first and language second, not the reverse. Steven Pinker, a psychologist and linguist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has described language as “one of the wonders of the natural world … an extraordinary gift: the ability to dispatch an infinite number of precisely structured thoughts from head to head by modulating exhaled breath.” Such a concept of language includes consideration of the listener as well as the speaker and the possibility of conveying abstract ideas. This definition of language would thus assume the existence of self-awareness and an awareness of others’ thinking as a minimum prerequisite. Viewed in this light, the development of language would also be consistent with the development of an introspective self. English neuroscientist Richard Passingham is among those who have noted the similarities between introspection and language, “hearing ourselves think,” and the fact that “our inner life consists of a running commentary”; he specifically linked “the ability to reflect on one’s own thoughts to language.” Other researchers have similarly tied a second-order theory of mind to “the formation of linguistic conventions.”19
It thus seems possible that the introspective self and language as we know it developed together. As Simon Baron-Cohen noted, language “is not just a transfer of information like two fax machines by a wire; it is a series of alternating displays of behavior by sensitive, scheming, second-guessing social animals.” Similarly, Wake Forest University psychologist Mark Leary claimed that “language requires not only symbolic thought but also awareness of one’s own communication and awareness of others as receivers.”20
Tying language development to human cognitive development, especially the acquisition of an introspective self, also sharpens the contrast between primate language and human language. Geoffrey Pullum, a linguist at the University of California at Santa Cruz, summarized the difference as follows: “I do not believe that there has ever been an example anywhere of a nonhuman expressing an opinion, or asking a question. Not ever. It would be wonderful if animals could say things about the world, as opposed to just signaling a direct emotional state or need. But they just don’t.” The reason they don’t, of course, is that they lack the cognitive network necessary for thinking about themselves and others. Steven Pinker reflected this clearly, when he said, “deep down chimps don’t ‘get it.’ ” And University of Rochester anatomist George Washington Carver succinctly summarized it: “The only reason that an ape does not speak is that he has nothing to say.”21
There is also anatomical evidence to support human language as a relatively late evolutionary acquisition, developing in tandem with development of the frontal and parietal lobes. The speech areas of monkeys and great apes, used to make complex vocal calls, are not in the recently evolved brain cortex, as those of humans are, but rather in phylogenetically older brain areas, in the limbic system and brain stem. Humans also use these older speech areas but only when, for example, we swear as we hit our finger with a hammer or when we cry or laugh.
Most human speech, by contrast, is controlled by two brain areas that have developed in the cortex relatively recently. The first is Broca’s area, located in the frontal lobe; this controls verbal speech and is anatomically situated adjacent to the brain region controlling the muscles for the mouth, tongue, and larynx. The second speech area is Wernicke’s area, discussed in the last chapter, which is located in the superior temporal lobe adjacent to the temporo-parietal junction; this controls speech comprehension and is anatomically part of the brain region associated with hearing. It thus appears that the brain areas associated with the development of self-awareness, an awareness of others’ thinking, and an ability to think about one’s own thinking overlap with br
ain areas associated with the development of language.22
Finally, there is linguistic evidence supporting human language as a relatively late evolutionary acquisition. Quentin Atkinson, a psychologist in New Zealand, analyzed 504 world languages for phonetic complexity to ascertain which were more complex (developed earlier) and which were less complex (developed more recently). Atkinson reported that the oldest languages were in Central and South Africa, with others following closely the migration pattern of Homo sapiens as we spread out of Africa. The ability of humans to speak a modern language and the evolution of our ability to think about ourselves thinking about ourselves thus appear to parallel each other.23
It seems more likely, therefore, that language was an accelerant of human evolution rather than its cause. What good is the ability to think about yourself if you cannot talk about yourself? What good is the ability to think about what others think if you cannot gossip about them? What good is it to think about what others think of you if you cannot talk to them or others about it? The acquisition of an introspective self would have been an immense impetus to language development. This was illustrated by Robin Dunbar, who “has eavesdropped on people on trains and in cafeterias, and he consistently finds that two-thirds of their conversations are about other people.”24
Evolving Brains, Emerging Gods Page 9
