425. See respectively my “Proclus of Constantinople and Apokatastasis” and “Christian Apokatastasis and Zoroastrian Frashegird,” in addition to The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis and the two future works on philosophical apokatastasis and the rejection of apokatastasis announced in the main text.
426. On Evagrius, see my “Evagrius and Gregory: Nazianzen or Nyssen?; Evagrius’ Kephalaia Gnostika, monographic essay (vii–lxxxiv), new readings from the ms., translation, and full commentary; “Gregory Nyssen’s and Evagrius’ Biographical and Theological Relations”; “Origen to Evagrius”; “Mystical Eschatology in Gregory and Evagrius.”
427. “Origen and the Stoic Allegorical Tradition” (2006).
428. See Ramelli, Review of Karen King, What Is Gnosticism?; Ramelli, “Gnosis-Gnosticism”; Ramelli, “Gnosis/Knowledge.”
429. Analyzed in my “Origen in Augustine: A Paradoxical Reception.”
430. See some points in my “Origen.”
431. Some of these I expounded in Preexistence of Souls? 167–226; I give further reasons in “Gregory of Nyssa’s Purported Criticism of Origen’s Purported Doctrine of the Preexistence of Souls.”
432. “Apokatastasis and Epektasis in Hom. in Cant.”
433. Evagrius, Letter to Melania 23–25.
434. Ramelli, Evagrius’ Kephalaia Gnostika.
435. Ramelli, “Evagrius Ponticus, the Origenian Ascetic (and not the Origenistic ‘Heretic’).” Reviewed by Doru Costache, Phronema Volume 31.2 (2016) 109–18, esp. 115–18: http://www.academia.edu/28714187/Orthodox_Monasticism_Past_and_Present_ed._John_A._McGuckin._Piscataway_NJ_Gorgias_Press_2015._588_pages._ISBN_978_1_4632_0530_0, and by Johannes van Oort, Vigiliae Christianae 70.5 (2016) 604.
436. Oxford Latin Dictionary, 1266.
437. Ramelli, “Basil and Apokatastasis: New Findings.” In addition to the chapter on Basil in Apokatasisis.
438. Perrone, ed., Origenes: Die neuen Psalmenhomilien. These are often used in my future monograph on Origen and also confirm his life-long engagement against “gnostics” and Marcionites, against claims that this polemic was no longer vital in the last part of Origen‘s life.
439. For full analysis see Ramelli and Konstan, Terms for Eternity: Aiōnios and Aïdios; and Ramelli, Tempo ed eternità in età antica e patristica. See also here a very concise summary in Appendix I.
440. Full analysis in Ramelli and Konstan, Terms for Eternity, 37–70.
441. See, e.g., Brock, The Bible in the Syriac Tradition, 17, 19, 33–34, 111–14. See also my “Making the Bible ‘World Literature.’”
442. Daly, God Visible, 83–93. My review is forthcoming in GNOMON.
443. Daley, The Hope of the Early Church. This volume is a highly respected overview of eschatology in the early church, which I myself cited with support in many respects in my own works, along with Henryk Pietras’ book on the eschatology of the early church.
444. For Origen, full analysis in my “Origene ed il lessico dell’eternità.”
445. From Marius Mercator, PL 48.232.
Appendix III
Is Apokatastasis “Gnostic,” Rather Than Christian?
A Review of Michael McClymond, The Devil’s Redemption446*
Introduction
The Devil’s Redemption is a thorough book, which must always be praised, especially in today’s academic environment, which at times seems to encourage flashy subjects, research aimed at career or teaching relief, and inflamed ad hominem discussion (more attuned to social media than to academic scholarship), rather than life-long commitment to sustained research and systematic, important works. I concentrate here on McClymond’s extensive patristics section, which traces the story from early Christianity to Eriugena. Concerning this section, my impression is that what is good in this book is not really new, and is present, in even more detail, in my own Apokatastasis,447 Morwenna Ludlow’s Universal Salvation: Eschatology in Gregory of Nyssa and Karl Rahner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), my essay on Zoroastrianism and apokatastasis,448 and other treatments of patristic apokatastasis. Conversely, what is new, especially interpretations of universalistic arguments and critiques, is mostly not very good, in that it can easily find responses in the relevant fathers’ own works, as on occasion I highlight below. As in all my works on patristic universalism, again, here I treat this subject entirely from the viewpoint of historical theology.
Most theologians in the first millennium were saints, as I often remind students and colleagues, and as Hans Urs von Balthasar remarked e contrario: “Since the great period of Scholasticism, there have been few theologians who were saints.”449 And a good number of these patristic theologians-saints supported universal restoration (as indicated in my Apokatastasis). However, McClymond maintains the “Gnostic, Kabbalistic, and esoteric roots of Christian universalism” (125). Now the Kabbala (Jewish mysticism) did influence some early modern Christian universalists (128), but certainly was posterior to the first systematizations of Christian universalism, from Origen onwards—just like Zoroastrian Frashegird, as is recognized in Appendix B and as I had thoroughly demonstrated in my article “Christian Apokatastasis and Zoroastrian Frashegird.” Thus, purported Kabbalistic and Zoroastrian origins, just as mediaeval gnosis,450 have no bearing on discussions of patristic apokatastasis. Our focus must be, instead, on McClymond’s claims about “gnostic” origins.
“Gnostic” Origins?
My View of the Matter
I think and have argued (in Apokatastasis and in this book, as well as in a chapter of a study on Origen in preparation) that patristic apokatastasis has both philosophical and, primarily, biblical and intertestamental origins; this is why Origen spoke of “so-called apokatastasis,” referring to an earlier tradition, especially Scripture, the Petrine tradition, perhaps Clement, and philosophy (including Stoicism, though he vigorously refuted the Stoic version of apokatastasis).
Gnosticism, unlike most patristic supporters of apokatastasis, (1) had mostly no holistic doctrine of apokatastasis involving the restoration of both soul and body—such as the Carpocratians in Irenaeus’ account, AH 1.25.4, who maintained that only souls will be saved, and moreover supported metensomatosis—and (2) in most cases supported not universal salvation, but salvation only for a class of people (the so-called pneumatikoi and part of the psychikoi),451 although there may be some exceptions.452
McClymond’s Use of “Gnostic” Texts
Let us consider McClymond’s claims about “gnostic” origins for apokatastasis.453 This will involve some considerations of specific “gnostic” texts. Unlike McClymond, I would not deem the eschatology of On the Origin of the World 126–27 to be “very optimistic” (146), since we read there that the imperfect “will never enter the kingless realm,” and that “all must return to the place from where they come” and “their natures will be revealed,” which means that, since there are different classes of people, they had different beginnings and will have different ends. Similarly, in the Wisdom of Jesus Christ, some know the Father perfectly, others defectively, and each will experience the rest appropriate to their group: again different ends, and perhaps those who do not know the Father will experience no rest at all. The Apocryphon of John, treated on p. 147, teaches both metensomatosis and eternal punishment (for at least the apostates and the blasphemers), both tenets rejected by Origen. The Tripatite Tractate454 does promise the apokatastasis of the body of the church, but a whole class of humans, the “carnal” (sarkikoi), are excluded from it and will “perish” (118), as will a part of the psychikoi. So, this is also far from universal salvation, and farther from the patristic connection between restoration and the resurrection of the body, since matter is declared to perish altogether. Galatians 3:28 is here projected onto eschatology.455
A parallel is drawn by McClymond between Valentinianism and Origen on universalism (153), but the evidence of total universalism without exclusions is very meagre in Valentinian texts, and different from that of Origen and followers: it generally excludes both the resurrection of the bodies as well as whole classes of humans. Pistis Sophia speaks of a “wise” fire, which discriminates between good and evil: this appears also not only in Origen (153; 271), and not only in Hom.Luc. 24 (271) but also in Hom.Ier. 2.3 and elsewhere, and also in Clement and in Gregory Nazianzen (e.g., Or. 39, PG36.356BC). Now Gregory cannot be labelled as influenced by Gnosticism, and yet has a penchant for apokatastasis, like Basil and, even more, like Nyssen.456 It is true that there were influences of gnostic ideas on Origen, since he was well acquainted with such texts, but—like, and much more than, his colleague Plotinus—Origen devoted his life until his last works (such as Against Celsus and the recently discovered Munich homilies on the Psalms) to refuting the main gnostic tenets, especially the determinism coming from the division of humans into various natures, which we have encountered above. Indeed, it is mainly from this refutation of Gnosticism that Origen’s grand theory of rational creatures, their fall, and their restoration stemmed.457 Christian apokatastasis was, in part, an anti-gnostic move.
Metensomatosis (Transmigration of Souls)?
The account of preexistent, disembodied minds that fell into earthly bodies is certainly found in gnostic myths (248). However, unlike gnostics, most patristic supporters of apokatastasis, beginning with Origen and Nyssen, did not believe in metensomatosis (the transmigration of souls into bodies) and overtly refuted this doctrine.458 Yet metensomatosis is mentioned by McClymond on 129 and 263 as an alleged core doctrine of patristic universalism, deriving from Gnosticism, where it was linked with the tenet of the preexistence of bare souls to any kind of bodies (141). However, the pre-existence of bodiless souls was a notion that both Origen and Nyssen—among the strongest supporters of apokatastasis—in fact rejected.459 For instance, Origen declared: “The doctrine of the transmigration of souls is alien to the Church of God, since it neither has been transmitted by the apostles nor is supported in any place in Scriptures. . . . [T]he transmigration of souls will be absolutely useless if there is no end to correction, nor will ever come a time when the soul will no longer pass into new bodies. But if souls, due to their sins, must always return into ever new, different bodies, what end will there ever come to the world?” (C.Matth. 13.1–2; Pamph. Apol. 182–83). And even in the more ancient Commentary on John, the same argument appears: “If one supports metensomatosis, as a consequence one will have to maintain the incorruptibility of the world” (C.Io. 6.86), but this contradicts Scripture, he says.460
Likewise, Origen spoke only metaphorically of souls that can descend to the animal level, not literally within a context of transmigration of souls. Origen states: “Those who are alien to the Catholic faith think that souls migrate from human bodies into bodies of animals. . . . On the contrary, we maintain that human wisdom, if it becomes uncultivated and neglected due to much carelessness in life, becomes like an irrational animal [efficitur uelut irrationabile pecus] due to incompetence or neglectfulness, but not by nature [per imperitiam uel per neglegentiam, non per naturam].”461 This issue was also at stake in the interpretation of Plato’s mentions of animals: some took them as literal, others (such as Cronius, one of Origen’s favorite readings in Porphyry C.Chr. F39) as metaphorical expressions of “becoming animal”: “Some interpreters took ‘wolves,’ ‘lions,’ and ‘asses’ literally [kyriōs], but others deemed Plato to have been speaking metaphorically [tropikōs], using animals to represent characteristics of the soul. Indeed, Cronius in his work on palingenesis (i.e., metensomatosis) deems them all rational souls” (Nemesius NH 2.35).
Other “Gnostic” Motifs?
McClymond detects the notion of “Adamic androgyny” (223) in Gregory Nyssen and Eriugena—the notion that Adam had both genders together. One could note the presence of such ideas much earlier in Bardaisan of Edessa,462 but in the case of Gregory and Eriugena one would better speak of a condition above gender, planned originally by God, then modified because of, or in prevision of, the fall, and restored again at apokatastasis.463
Likewise, the “return from exile” motif—described by McClymond as a “specifically cabalistic motif” (226), a comment that has no relevance to patristic theories apokatastasis, which long-predate Kabbalah—is deeply biblical. More than that, it is found in surely non-gnostic and non-Kabbalistic texts such as the Catholic prayer, Salve regina (“et Iesum [. . .] nobis, post hoc exsilium, ostende”).
Similarly, “dematerialization” is described by McClymond as a gnostic-Kabbalistic motif he finds in patristic universalism (226), but in the early church such an idea was rejected, not embraced, by the main supporters of apokatastasis, such as Origen, Nyssen, and even Evagrius.464
Contrary to McClymond’s claims, Origen’s notion of theosis or deification is not pantheistic (266–67), resulting in an ontological absorption of a human into God’s substance, but it is prevalently a union of wills: the wills of all rational creatures will be oriented towards God and they will live the divine life.465
Augustine’s Theological Critique of Origen
McClymond is correct to note that Augustine accused Origen of postulating an infinite series of restorations and falls, a critique that McClymond endorses on the basis of the eternal presence of freewill in rational creatures (265; 277). However, Augustine sometimes failed to grasp well Origen’s thought, also being unable to access it perfectly in the original Greek. And it must be noted that originally, in his anti-Manichaean phase, Augustine seems to have embraced the doctrine of apokatastasis, using against dualistic Manichaeism Origen’s monistic arguments, which had been devised against dualistic “gnostic” thought.466 What is more, Origen argued precisely against the possibility of infinite restorations and falls in his Peri archōn, using a sentence by Paul, “love never falls,” to demonstrate that, once in apokatastasis, perfect love is achieved, and in this state a rational creature will never fall again, even though it maintains its freewill—indeed, the first fall, of Satan, was due to his being unaware of God’s love, which became manifest with Christ’s incarnation and crucifixion: this is why his own love for God paled.467 Origen posited apokatastasis at the end of all aeons, once and forever. So Augustine’s critique misses the mark.
Augustine was aware, as all patristic Platonists were, of the “perishability axiom”:468 “nothing can be without any end of time, unless it has no beginning” (nihil esse posse sine fine temporis, nisi quod initium non habet, CD 10.31, quoted on p. 335). “Prior to Augustine, Gregory of Nyssa’s arguments for the final extinction of evil and final salvation for all were likewise corollaries from Platonic assumptions” (335).469 In fact, not only Gregory, but also Origen, Basil, Evagrius, and several other patristic authors used the perishability axiom; moreover, Gregory denied the preexistence of disembodied souls, though this axiom is the basis for the eternity of souls and of Good and for the perishability of evil in his thought.470 Porphyry, as Augustine realized, “saw” that, for it to be happy, the soul must know that this happiness will be eternal, “and for this reason he asserted that the soul after purification returns to the Father, so that it may never be held back by the polluting contact of evil” (CD 10.30). Porphyry likely had learnt it from Origen, with whom, and whose works, he studied.471
Origen’s Theological Method and Case
Origen offers many zetetic statements (259), especially in eschatology and other matters, while sometimes he is more assertive (259): this latter happens, I add, in matters defined by the Bible and tradition. A “permanent habituation into evil” and “ultimate impenitence” (262) are excluded by Origen, because this would lead to the annihilation of the sinning rational creature, since evil is non-being. But this would be a defeat of God’s work of creation. This is why Origen insists that there cannot be a subst
antialis interitus of a bad soul, maybe even polemicizing against Philo’s annihilationism.472
That Origen did not demonstrate the major premises of his doctrine of apokatastasis, as McClymond asserts (275), is debatable. The tenet that “the end is like the beginning” (275) is a tenet that Plotinus also supported (Origen’s fellow-disciple at Ammonius Saccas’) and, although he was one of the greatest philosophers, he also felt no need to demonstrate this point. Also, it is not the case that Origen never demonstrated that God’s punishments are not retributive but ameliorating (275), for he often did so, mainly through Scripture, for instance in Princ. 2.5.3 and Hom.Ier. 1.15–16. Origen adduces, for example, 1 Peter 3:18ff. on the salvation of all sinners who perished in the deluge; Isaiah 47:14–15 on the ardent coals for the Chaldeans: sitting over these burning coals brings help to those sitting; and Psalm 77, according to whom God in the desert killed people in order to save them, etc. Similarly, the “primal equality among creatures” is not really undemonstrated (275), but it is argued through theodicy: otherwise, God would be culpable of injustice.473
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