The Philadelphia Campaign

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by Thomas J McGuire


  The two armies were about five miles apart, each spread out over several miles, with hundreds of pickets and numerous scouting parties between them. The actual total of soldiers present and fit for duty can only be estimated in round numbers, for surviving statistics in the British Army are spotty at best, and they are even more so for the American forces. “It will be easily conceived by those acquainted with military affairs,” The Annual Register pointed out, “that all calculations of this nature, though founded upon the best official information, will far exceed, even at a much nearer distance than America, the real effective number that can ever be brought to action.”1

  Washington's force, generally estimated at 12,000 regulars and 3,000 militia, was encamped behind the hills of Birmingham Township on the east side of Brandywine Creek. His center was at Chads's Ford on the Great Nottingham Road, where the creek could be crossed on foot, and at Chads's Ferry, a few hundred yards south of the ford, where the water was deeper and a ferryman on a flat boat would pull goods and passengers across the water by means of a rope stretched from one bank to the other. The depth of the water here provided a natural defense. John Chads, the ferryman, was dead, but his widow, Elizabeth, known in the neighborhood as old “Aunt Betty Chads,” still lived in their modest stone house perched on a knoll overlooking the ford. When Continental troops arrived two nights earlier and began tearing up the fences for firewood and fortifications, Aunt Betty refused to leave her home.

  The bulk of Washington's army was stacked up behind the crossings for a few miles east. Greene's Division, composed of Weedon's and Muhlenberg's Virginia Brigades (2,500 troops), was posted in depth on the heights behind the ferry about half a mile south of the Great Road, forming the left center of the line. Gen. Francis Nash's Carolina Brigade (1,500) was also in this area. Wayne's Division, made up of the 1st and 2nd Pennsylvania Brigades (2,000), occupied the center ground on Greene's right, about 200 yards east of the ford; its right flank rested on the road. On the hill to Wayne's right and near the artillery park were Conway's Pennsylvania and Maxwell's New Jersey Brigades, in Stirling's Division, and Stephen's Virginians, in Woodford's and Scott's Brigades (2,500 total).

  A four-gun earth-and-log lunette, a curved artillery battery alternately referred to as a breastwork or redoubt, was constructed on a knoll near the Chads House to cover the ford. This lunette contained the brass guns of Col. Thomas Proctor's Pennsylvania Artillery: two French 4-pounders, a Hessian 6-pounder (a rebored 3-pounder taken at Trenton), and a Philadelphia-made 8-inch howitzer capable of firing exploding shells. “The army encamped on the Brandewine on the right of Shads ford on the hier ground,” wrote Jacob Nagle, a sixteen-year-old artilleryman in Proctor's unit. “Our artilery was ranged in front of an orcherd. The night before the Brittish arived the infantry hove up a brest work, so that the muzels of the guns would run over it.” Nagle also described the terrain at the ford: “A cross the road on the left was a buckwheat field opposit to a wood and the Brandewine between them.”2

  Another four-gun battery was erected on a hill several hundred yards below the ford near Greene's left, covering the ferry. Across the creek, on the west side, a third log-and-earth battery and a long breastwork of fence rails were constructed facing the road toward Kennett Square, covering the main approach to the ford. A mile or so south of Greene's position behind the ferry was Maj. Gen. John Armstrong, with about 2,000 Pennsylvania Militia belonging to Potter's and Lacey's Brigades. These units were covering Pyle's and Gibson's Fords, protecting Washington's far-left flank.

  Upstream a mile from Chads's Ford was Brinton's Ford, where Sullivan's Maryland Division (1,100), composed of Smallwood's and De Borre's Brigades, held ground. A temporary bridge made of wagons and fence rails probably stood in the water between the two fords, and a two-gun artillery battery was begun on a nearby hill to cover the crossings.3

  Sullivan detached two units from his division to guard the next three fords above the right. Col. David Hall's Delaware Regiment (250) was detached from Smallwood's Brigade and sent to Jones's Ford, a mile above Brinton's. The two battalions of 2nd Canadian, or Congress's Own Regiment (400), commanded by Col. Moses Hazen, went to cover two crossings farther north. One battalion was posted at Wister's Ford, a mile and a half beyond Jones's; the other was sent yet another mile up to Buffington's Ford, just below where the western and eastern branches of the creek come together from their headwaters in upper Chester County. The area between the two branches is called the Forks of the Brandywine.

  Proper reconnaissance in the American forces was strangely uncoordinated or flat-out lacking. “The proceedings of the battle of Brandywine suggested to me two or three important lessons,” Col. Timothy Pickering wrote a few days afterward. “1. To reconnoitre thoroughly the post you take…. Before the battle of Brandywine, we had time to have viewed all the ground several miles on our right, but did not do it…. [2.] to have correct maps of the country…. [3.] You should have guides perfectly acquainted with every road. These men should be timely procured beforehand, and not be sought for just at the critical moment when you want them.”4

  All told, Washington's main force stretched along the left bank (east side) of the Brandywine for five miles, covering eight possible crossing places. His advance forces, made up primarily of Maxwell's Corps of Light Infantry (1,000), were posted west of the creek toward Kennett Square.

  Several hundred Chester County militia with little or no training were also attached to Maxwell. The local militia's value here was to bolster the appearance of numbers and aid with scouting, but parties and whole companies of these troops seem to have been wandering through the area that morning, to little or no purpose. “On the morning of the Battle of Brandywine, we were marched down the west side of the creek near the Chad's Fording,” Pvt. William Hutchinson of the 2nd Battalion of the Chester County Militia recalled. There the unit was “ordered to cross to the east side of the creek, which we did by wading, and marched up the stream about half a mile, where we lay upon a bottom, then clothed with woods, between the hill and the creek.” The 2nd's commander, Capt. Allen Cunningham of London Grove Township, “was a gallant man, and we had full confidence both in his skill and courage.”5 Overall, though, “the militia of this country are not like the Jersey militia,” Nathanael Greene told Kitty on September 10. “Fighting is a new thing with these, and many seems to have but a poor stomach for the business.”6

  Five miles west of Chads's Ford, in the fields and woods around the village of Kennett Square, the Crown Forces, generally estimated at 18,000, were up in the predawn hours, preparing to move at first light. The troops packed their blanket rolls and knapsacks; filled their canteens; checked their cartridge boxes, haversacks, and pockets for the full complement of sixty rounds of ammunition; and prepared for a long march. “The fatigues of this Day were excessive,” Lt. Loftus Cliffe of the 46th remarked afterward. “If you knew the weight a poor soldier carries, the length of time he is obliged to be on foot for a train of Artillery to move 17 Miles, the Duties he goes thro when near an Enemy & that the whole night of the 9th we were marching, you would say we had done our duty on the 11th.”7 Lt. Martin Hunter of the 52nd noted, “The night before the battle twenty empty wagons were ordered to attend each battalion of Grenadiers and Light Infantry, to carry the wounded, which was always a preparation for battle.”8

  Civilians began to appear as events unfolded, watching both armies. Some were Loyalists and others were Patriots, but most were pacifist Quakers and country people who were simply spectators. Some of the Quakers willfully ignored the armies and went about their daily business, for Thursday was also the day for midweek Friends meetings. Others, like twenty-one-year-old Joseph Townsend from East Bradford Township, went out to see all of the activity before attending meeting. “Having curiosity, and fond of new things, William Townsend [Joseph's brother], myself, and some others rode alongside of the Brandywine for some distance to discover the approach of the British Army in case they should attempt to c
ross at any other of the fords on the creek between Jefferis’ and Chadds,” he recalled. “We fell in with many like ourselves but no intelligence could be obtained.”9

  Howe divided his army into two columns. The column heading straight for Chads's Ford was commanded by sixty-one-year-old Lt.-Gen. Baron Wilhelm Reichsfreiherr zu Inn-und Knyphausen, a dependable and able officer who had spent much of his career in the Prussian Army. “General Knyphausen was a noble specimen of a German baron, of the ordinary height & strong frame,” a Philadelphian described him. In the best tradition of the Prussian officer corps, “there was a sabre mark on one of his cheeks extending from the eye to the chin.”10

  “At 5 o'clock in the Morning,” von Knyphausen told Lord Germain, “I moved the Column from Kennets Square in the following Order: An officer & 15 Men of the Queen's Light Dragoons,” followed by “Captain Ferguson's Riflemen, & the Queen's Rangers,” numbering just over 400, and “the 1st & 2nd British Infantry under Major General Grant.” The 1st British Infantry Brigade was composed of the battalion companies of the 4th, 23rd, 28th, and 49th Regiments, totaling 1,400 troops; the 2nd Brigade, made up of the 5th, 10th, 27th, and 40th Regiments, numbered about 1,300. Behind them was “the Remainder of the Queen's light Dragoons,” about 200 troopers, and the 1st and 2nd Brigades of Royal Artillery, with six medium 12-pounders and four howitzers. They were followed by “the Baggage, Provision Train & Cattle of the whole Army covered by the 71st Regt.,” Fraser's Highlanders, a Scottish regiment of 1,200 men divided into three battalions.

  Blocking the road to Chads's Ford was Maxwell's Light Infantry. The main body was posted at Kennett Friends Meeting House, three miles east of Kennett Square. Out in front along the road between the meetinghouse and Welch's Tavern a mile west were four advance posts. “Three small detachments,” commanded by lieutenant colonels of the Virginia Line—Richard Parker of the 10th Virginia Regiment, William Heth of the 3rd, and Charles Simms of the 12th—“were early in the morning separately and advantageously posted by the brigadier contiguous to the road, some distance in his front,” Capt. Henry Lee wrote. Capt. Charles Porterfield of the 11th Virginia, “with a company of infantry, preceded these parties with orders to deliver his fire as soon as he should meet the van of the enemy, and then fall back.”11

  At the head of von Knyphausen's column was Capt. Patrick Ferguson with his small band of green-coated British riflemen. They were armed with Ferguson's breech-loading rifle, which was capable of firing up to six accurate shots per minute. “Gen. Knyphausen when I ask'd his orders was pleased to desire me to take my own way,” Ferguson wrote, “as my whole detachment was under 90 men [and] was no great command.”12 Fanning out, the riflemen moved cautiously up the road from Kennett Square toward Welch's Tavern on the Great Nottingham Road. They were supported by 300 American Loyalists of the Queen's Rangers, also uniformed in green, under the command of a British officer, Capt. James Wemyss of the 40th Regiment. “Advancing on the Road to Chads's Ford” a mile or so from their camp, von Knyphausen reported, “I had hardly come up to Welch's Tavern when the advanced Corps viz. Captain Ferguson's Riflemen & the Queen's Rangers fell in with about 300 Rifflemen of the Ennemy, who were posted in the Wood to the eastward of the Tavern.”13 Here the opening shots of the Battle of Brandywine were fired around 6 A.M.

  “The first party we had to do with was an advanced Post of 150 men and some light horse, who threw away their fire and ran off, with the loss of three or four men and a horse whom we shot flying,” Ferguson wrote.14 Behind Ferguson were the Queen's Rangers. “We came in sight of the enemy at sunrise,” Sgt. Stephen Jarvis of the Rangers recalled. “The first discharge of the enemy killed the horse of Major Grymes, who was leading the column, and wounded two men in the Division directly in my front, and in a few moments the Regiment became warmly engaged and several of our officers were badly wounded.”15

  Opposing them at the first fallback position was Lt. Col. Will Heth of the 3rd Virginia, leading 200 men. “I commanded as I mentioned before, a detachment of Light Infantry,” he told Col. Daniel Morgan, “part of which under our valuable Friend Porterfield began the action with day light—he killd (him self) the first man who fell that day.”16 Using “shoot-and-scoot” tactics, Captain Porterfield and his detachment waited until the enemy was close, fired a volley, and then fell back to the next post. “This service was handsomely performed by Porterfield, and produced the desired effect,” “Light-Horse Harry” Lee wrote. “The British van pushed forward rapidly and incautiously, until it lined the front of the detachment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Simms, who poured in a close and destructive fire, and then retreated to the light corps. The leading officer of the enemy was killed [sic]; and the detachment suffered severely.”17 Heth commended Porterfield's skill: “His conduct through the whole day—was such, as has acquird him the greatest Honor—A great proportion of British Officers fell by a party under his command.”18

  “Such a set of base runaways never before presumed to disgrace a Gentlemans profession,” Ferguson wrote of Maxwell's Corps. “In the course of two hours my lads underwent the fire of 2000 men who were kind enough to fire in general in the air and run away.” Of the Loyalists, Ferguson said, “The Queen's Rangers Americans commanded by Rachel Wymess’ husband seconded us with spirit and the line will do us the justice to allow that we kept them undisturbed and clear'd the way for them as fast as they could follow us.”19

  After firing a few volleys from their main position at Kennett Meeting, the Continental Light Infantry withdrew steadily down toward Chads's Ford, drawing the Rangers and Ferguson after them. “My Lads were so fatigued with dashing after the Rebels over all surfaces that I found it necessary to leave one half by turns in the rear with the column of march and work my way with the other—which as my whole detachment was under 90 men was no great command: however by avoiding the road, gaining their flanks, or keeping up a rattling fire from the ground or by bullying them we still got on.”20

  By the time the fighting reached the valley of the Brandywine, nearly two hours had elapsed, and the greencoats had taken numerous casualties. “Majr. Grymes's horse was shot under him, & our flanking parties were Attack'd on both sides,” James Parker observed at a distance, “but drove the Rebels till within a half mile of the Creek, where they made a stand behind a breast work of some loggs they had made” near the artillery battery constructed on the west side of the Brandywine.21

  As they descended toward the ford, some of Maxwell's Light Infantry performed a ruse de guerre, which infuriated the British riflemen and the Loyalists. The Queen's Rangers were lured close by a party of Continentals who pretended to surrender by turning their muskets upside down, but then fired at point-blank range. “The Queen's Rangers and Riffle Corps at the head of Lieut. general Kniphausen's Column, advancing to the foot of a hill, saw the Enemy formed behind the fence, were deceived by the Rebels telling them, that they would deliver up their Arms; but upon their advancing they fired a volley upon our men, and took to their Heels, killed and wounded about thirty of them Corps,” Sgt. Thomas Sullivan of the 49th wrote. “By that and the preceeding skirmishes they were much disabled, which occasioned our Brigade [i.e. the 1st Brigade: 4th, 23rd, 28th, 49th Regiments] to advance to the front, being separated (when we formed upon a little hill) by a small Creek, which ran between that & the opposite hill on which the Enemy took post.”22

  “Amongst other feats the troops behind us were witnesses,” Ferguson noted with pride, “when my 30 Lads advanced to a breast work of 100 yards in extant well lined with men whose fire they received at twelve yards and when every body thought they were all destroy'd they Scrambled into the breast work and the Dogs ran away.” The Continentals fell back by sections, providing covering fire as they withdrew: “We were Stop'd from following them by a heavy flanking fire from a very extensive breast work at 80 yards distance,” Ferguson recalled. “I threw my party immediately on the ground, but Wemyss's, who had kept the road, being close to my rear, came under
a part of it and had a fourth part of his men and officers killed and wounded”23

  This tactic gave rise to the perception on the American side that British casualties were considerably higher than they actually were. “The fire from our People was not of long duration, as the Enemy pressed on in force, but was very severe,” Washington wrote to Congress that afternoon. “What loss the Enemy sustained, cannot be ascertained with precision,” he told John Hancock. “It is the general opinion, particularly of those who were engaged, that they had at least Three Hundred Men killed and wounded.” As for Maxwell's loss, “it does not exceed fifty in the whole.”24

  Reinforcements for Maxwell arrived from across the creek. “Their numbers encreased,” Ferguson noted. “This fire continued for some minutes very heavy until we Sicken'd [of] it, after which upon the Signal to rise my Lads like Bay's dead men Sprung up and not one hurt.” Of his breech-loading rifle, Ferguson commented, “Such is the great advantage of an arm that will admit of being loaded and fired on the ground without exposing my men that I threw my people on the ground under pretty Smart firing six times that morning without losing a man, although I had 1/4 part of those afterward kill'd or wounded.”25

  Maxwell's troops “formd on the declivity of a hill on clear ground & stood till Majr. Grymes Attackd them with ye Bayonets, when they broke fled to the Woods & heid [hid],” James Parker stated. The firing was intense at close range, and the Loyalists took more casualties, including Capt. Robert Murdon, who was killed. Parker continued:

  At this time Capt. Robt. Murdon fell, & many more Wounded, but they drove them over the Creek. While this passed on our Right Majr. Weems with part of the Regt. drove them through the woods on the left till they crossed the Creek also, when their Canon began from a battry in our front, & I [we?] took Stations on high Commanding ground on our left. Genl. Cleveland took post on a hill parallel to their front battery, & a Cannonade Continued for Some time, I believe without doing much damage on either side.26

 

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