The new position was located “on some high Ground above the Warren Tavern on the Lancaster Road,” Colonel Hartley wrote. “In Part of the Front was a small wood and a Corn Field—on the Right a small wood and some open Fields—there were Roads passing the Flanks.” Most important, “Genl. Wayne being acquainted with the Country chose the ground himself.”103 Wayne stated that “the Ground we lay on was the Strongest and best suited for our Purpose, that could be found for many Miles.” As for security, “the Disposition was perfect for Defence”—or so he thought.104
A second hasty movement for the two Pennsylvania brigades occurred early that evening. Wayne and his officers never explained why they suddenly ordered the men out the left of camp and west on a road along the crest of the South Valley Hill toward the White Horse Tavern, or why they returned to the same ground a few hours later. But at the Tredyffrin headquarters, “In the evening it was reported that General Wayne had been detached by General Washington with 800 men to make the region behind us insecure,” von Münchhausen wrote in his diary. “Consequently, the 2nd battalion of light infantry and the English riflemen,” the handful of Ferguson's Corps not killed or wounded at Brandywine, “were dispatched to break camp quietly and attempt to surprise these gentlemen.”105 According to von Münchhausen, two drunken soldiers fired at a picket, giving the alarm. Wayne's force pulled out, and the British retired without any further pursuit—for the moment.
Meanwhile, as Cornwallis arrived at Valley Forge, he could see rebels on the low hills across the Schuylkill River. “The Light Infantry & Grenadiers march'd in the Afternoon about 3 OClock to the Hill above the Valley forge which is near the Sckuylkill at the Mouth of Valley Creek,” Captain-Lieutenant Peebles wrote. “Some Scouting partys of the Rebels seen hovering about, they Lit fires t'other side of the River.” He also noted “a fine Prospect from this Hill,” a spectacular view of the Schuylkill Valley from the crest of Mount Joy.106 Some Hessian Jägers that went along with Sir William Erskine scouted the area west of Valley Forge but found no rebel forces there.
Those Americans who were visible were Maxwell's Light Infantry, together with some of Gen. James Potter's Pennsylvania Militia. The militiamen were nothing to worry about, but the light infantry could be trouble. The lack of proper uniforms in the Continental Army made positive identification of units difficult, for the militia dressed mostly in civilian clothing with some military accoutrements. The Continentals wore a mixed bag of civilian clothing and military uniforms in various colors, including captured red coats, and assorted accoutrements and headgear.
Back in the Tredyffrin Camp, von Münchhausen noted that after Cornwallis's force went to Valley Forge in the early afternoon, “the detachment under Colonel Harcourt,” the 16th Light Dragoons, “came back here.”107 The dragoons set up their camp in a meadow just south of the hill where the Guards were encamped, near Howe's headquarters. A small stream, Trout Run, meandered between the two camps, and the dragoons tethered their horses to a nearby fence. Having been up for hours on end since the previous day, the horsemen set up small pup tents and built wigwams to rest on this warm, sunny afternoon.
All of this would be inconsequential save for the fact that Ensign Lord Cantelupe of the Guards found the scene interesting enough to paint it into his diary. “Light Dragoon Incampment at Trydyffinn Pensylvania 1777 Sept” is an extraordinary image of a moment in time, a peaceful moment during a busy and violent month. The details of carefully drawn trees, fences, plowed fields, and the wooded South Valley Hill are extraordinary. But the mundane record of which regiment was where at what time—the Guards were camped on this hillside only one full day, and the dragoons were there south of them in the afternoon—together with the shadows cast by the trees are the clues that reveal the moment in time: the midafternoon of September 19, 1777, in the Great Valley. This is the only image known at present of a camp drawn by an eyewitness during this campaign.108
Across the valley and just beyond the left edge of the picture was the Samuel Jones house, Howe's headquarters. As the day wore on, information arrived here that the main Continental Army was on the move toward the Schuylkill. Later that evening, an intercepted message from Washington to Wayne not only confirmed Wayne's presence, but also revealed that the main American army was marching to cross the Schuylkill at Parker's Ford. Washington planned to cross the river and come down in front of Howe to reinforce the American position at Swedes Ford and other crossing places, including Fatland Ford, Pawling's Ferry, Richardson's Ford, Long Ford, and Gordon's Ford, all of which were near Valley Forge. Washington was trying to block Howe's movement across the Schuylkill and, with Wayne in position, possibly catch him in a pincer movement.
This captured intelligence was almost too good to be true. Wayne, who had sent the two letters to Washington that morning virtually ordering the commander in chief to bring the army down, was unaware that Washington was actually moving the army away from him and across the Schuylkill. Wayne was going to be reinforced only by Smallwood's untrained, badly armed, and disgruntled militia, which barely managed to make it to Downingtown that evening.
Clearly the British outpost at Valley Forge was exposed, and after sizing up the situation, Howe decided to send the Guards there as reinforcements in the predawn hours of September 20. Under a bright full moon, the Guards marched up the Valley Forge Road to the Gulph Road, and then deployed on the north slope of Mount Joy between Valley Forge and Fatland Ford. The ford was located just over a mile northeast of the forge. Captain Montrésor, who had been reconnoitering the river fords along with other British engineers, wrote, “At 2 this morning the guards moved and posted themselves with the Light Infantry at the Valley Forge.”109 Capt. Archibald Robertson, who was also on reconnaissance, observed, “at Day Break The 2 Battalions of Guards took Post at Fatland Ford and Found the Rebels had likeways taken Post on the Opposite side where they shewed a Brass 6 Pounder.”110 Cantelupe noted, “Marched from Trydyffin at 3 in the Morning about 3 miles And hutted on the banks of the Schuylkill River. Several shots fired by the Rebels across the river.”111 Montrésor confirmed, “This morning 5 rebel centries fired on the Guards who took the whole. They slightly wounded one of our officers,” Capt. Charles Horneck of the 3rd Guards.112
The main Continental Army, now 7,000 men, marched sixteen miles from Reading Furnace that afternoon and crossed the Schuylkill at Parker's Ford that night. The river was still running high from the Battle of the Clouds storm, so the men linked arms and crossed the river in platoons. Once across, the Continentals headed to the Reading Road through Trappe, past Rev. Henry Muhlenberg's church and parsonage.
“The American troops marched through the Schulkiel, four miles from us, and came out on the road to Philadelphia at Augustus Church,” Muhlenberg wrote as the army flooded into Trappe. “They had to wade through the river up to their chests. His Excellency General W was himself with the troops who marched passed here to the Perkiome. The passage of the troops lasted through the night and we had all kinds of visitors, officers, etc.” His deepest sympathies were with the men and their condition, for “to get wet up to one's chest and then to march in the cold, foggy night while enduring hunger and thirst, etc. is hard for the poor men. It takes courage, health, etc.” He was disgusted, though, for foul mouths were still in evidence. “Instead of prayers, what one hears from many of them is the horrible national vice: cursing.” He noted, “At midnight a regiment camped on the street in front of my house. Some vegetables and chickens were taken, and a man with a flint came to my chamber, demanded bread, etc.”113
The army mostly camped along the Perkiomen Creek that night. The following morning, September 20, they moved another ten to fifteen miles to take up positions along the left bank of the Schuylkill on a nine-mile-wide front from Gordon's Ford to Swedes Ford, hoping to shield both Reading and Philadelphia. Washington established general headquarters at Thompson's Tavern and proceeded to reconnoiter along the river. He also yet again chastised the men for plundering
:
General Orders: It is with the utmost concern, that the General observes, a continual straggling of soldiers on a march, who rob orchards and commit other disorders; and that many officers pay little or no attention to prevent a practice attended with such mischievous consequences, notwithstanding the orders relative thereto. The officers are reminded that it is their duty, and the General expects, that for the future, they know precisely, the number of men in their division or platoon; and where the time will admit of it, take a list of their names, previous to their marching; and that on a march they frequently look at their division to see if it be in order, and no man missing.114
All day, from the heights of Mount Joy, the British could see hundreds of Continental troops moving into position on the low hills across the river from Mount Joy. “There was now between us & Philadelphia a fordable river, the Schuylkill,” Lt. Loftus Cliffe of the 46th told his brother Jack. “Mr. Washington detached a body of 1500 men under Gen: Wayne, to follow us & when to the hips in water in this ford to fall upon our rear; we were to cross over on the 21st and this body within 5 miles of us.”115 As the British consolidated their position at Valley Forge, Howe prepared to move the main army toward the Schuylkill. He also decided to strike hard at Wayne's force hovering behind him.
Wayne and his two brigade commanders, Col. Thomas Hartley of the 1st Brigade and Col. Richard Humpton of the 2nd Brigade, reconnoitered the British camp at Tredyffrin during the day on September 20 and planned to advance toward them when Howe broke camp. “I had the fullest and Clearest Advice that the Enemy would March that Morning at 2 OClock for the River Schuylkill,” Wayne wrote. “In Consequence of that Advice I had Reconnoitered a Road leading Immediately along the Right flank of the Enemy and that in Company with Coll. Humpton and Hartley and had the men laying on their arms to Move as soon as Gen. Smallwood should arrive.”116 That afternoon at four o'clock, Col. Daniel Brodhead of the 8th Pennsylvania noted, “The weather being Cloudy and threatening Rain we were Ordered to build Booths [wigwams] to Secure our Arms & go to Rest.”117
The intrepid Pennsylvania general was waiting for the Maryland Militia, which was supposed to join him any minute. “We marched 20 odd miles yesterday, which marching in brigade, made it a little severe on the men, and fagged them,” Capt. James Cox of the Baltimore Company wrote his wife from Downingtown on the twentieth. “We are now about marching, and expect to join General Wayne this day. Col. Gist has joined us, which makes us upwards of 2000 strong.” He told her, “The enemy are pushing for Philadelphia as hard as they can, but I hope they will not get there. Howe stole a march on Gen. Washington the night before last, which I fear will prove to his disadvantage. A few days will determine the fate of Philadelphia.”118
The British were aware that Wayne was somewhere between the Warren Tavern and the Paoli Tavern. Around the same time that Wayne was reconnoitering the British camp, “three Companies of our battalion were sent out under the command of Major Straubenzie to get all the information they could of the situation of General Wayne's encampment,” Lt. Martin Hunter of the 2nd Light Infantry Battalion wrote. “They returned about four o'clock in the evening, and as soon as it was dark, the whole battalion got under arms.”119
The British were preparing an unusual strategy: a silent surprise attack in the night, using bayonets and swords only. “This evening we visited some of our friends of the 2nd Batn. of L. Infantry who were encamped on a hill in the Rear,” James Parker wrote. “Ye Major had seen Genl. Weans Camp, had got a guide,” he revealed. “The lads were all in high spirits in hopes of a frolic that Night.”120
A force of 1,200 British troops, composed of the 2nd Light Infantry Battalion, the 42nd Royal Highlanders, the 44th Regiment, the remains of Ferguson's Rifle Corps, and a dozen troopers from the 16th Light Dragoons, all commanded by Maj. Gen. Charles Grey, assembled on the Swedes Ford Road by 10 P.M. and began to march silently toward the Admiral Warren Tavern, taking all civilians along the route with them to prevent an alarm. Another detachment, about 500 men of the 40th and 55th Regiments, commanded by Lt. Col. Thomas Musgrave of the 40th, a former light infantry officer, moved up another route toward the Paoli Tavern to block Wayne's escape in that direction.
Anthony Wayne received at least two warnings that he might be attacked. “In the Evening Mr. Bartholamew came up, and spoke of the vicinity of the Enemy and their Numbers,” Col. Thomas Hartley later testified. “An Old Man by the Name of Jones also visited us…. He had been down at the Paoli where he had seen a servant or some other Person who had been with the enemy, where the Soldiers had told him, that they would attack Genl. Wayne's Party that Night, that they would have done it the Night before had he not changed his Ground.” After an early supper, Wayne was again out of camp reconnoitering; when he returned around 9 P.M., “he received the foregoing Information from Messrs. Bartholamew and Jones—Mr. Bartholamew insinuated that our Situation was a little Dangerous.”121
The general mostly discounted the warning from old Mr. Jones, who had overheard a conversation at the Paoli Tavern that the camp might be attacked, though he did double the number of pickets and send out additional horse patrols. The camp had a total of six picket posts; most were a mile or so out of camp, four of them on the roads heading to Tredyffrin. Vedettes were sent up several main roads, and it was they who first spotted the British column on the Swedes Ford Road nearly two miles from camp.
Wayne never mentioned the other warning he received from “Mr. Bartholomew.” Thirty-year-old Lt. Col. John Bartholomew of the Pennsylvania Militia lived on Swedes Ford Road just down the hill from the camp. He was well known to Wayne and reliable, having been an active Whig in local politics for years. He also served in the Flying Camp during the New York Campaign in 1776. His brother Ben, a captain in the 5th Pennsylvania, was wounded at Brandywine.
Bartholomew convinced Hartley that an attack was imminent. While Wayne was out reconnoitering, Hartley wrote a letter at 6 P.M. to William Atlee in Lancaster. “This Division is now in the Post of Danger,” he said, “the Mayn [i.e. main part] of our army has crossed the Skookyl—I understand General Howe means to have us attacked to Morrow Mornng—perhaps he may do it—he will find Frost—thoo he may have Success.” Hartley went on to say, “This Manuovere of ours to get in their Rear—has surprized our Enemy's not a little—& especially as we have had the Impurtence [impertinence] to lie within long Cannon Shot of them—for two Days—General Smallwood will join Us to Night.”122
Since the assault on Wayne's camp was to be a midnight operation, the British troops were ordered to unload their muskets or remove the flints so the weapons would not fire, fix bayonets, and march in absolute silence. “It was represented to the men that firing discovered us to the Enemy, hid them from us, killed our friends and produced a confusion favorable to the escape of the Rebels and perhaps productive of disgrace to ourselves,” General Grey's aide Capt. John André wrote in his journal. “On the other hand, by not firing we knew the foe to be wherever fire appeared and a charge [of bayonets] ensured his destruction.” There would be a further bonus: “Amongst the Enemy those in the rear would direct their fire against whoever fired in front, and they would destroy each other.”123
Shortly before midnight, down in the valley two miles from camp, two American vedettes spotted Grey's column on the Swedes Ford Road near the Long Ford Road, the turnoff for the Warren Tavern. The dragoons challenged three times. The British did not answer, so the horsemen fired and fell back; one rode off to alert the camp. Turning right at the Warren Tavern and heading southwest up the road that ran by the camp's left flank, the dragoon warned Picket Posts #5 and #6 of the British approach. Picket #4, posted around a bend in the Lancaster Road at a notch in the hills called the Warren Gap, a few hundred yards east of the tavern, received no warning. This post guarded the upper Longfford Road, which ran up the hill and along the right flank of Wayne's camp.
“We knew nearly the spot where the Rebel Corps lay, but nothing of the disposition
of their Camp,” André wrote.124 On arriving at the Warren, the British were at a loss as to which way to turn on the Lancaster Road. “A little farther on the road there was a blacksmith's shop,” Lt. Martin Hunter recalled. “A party was immediately sent to bring the blacksmith, who informed us that we were close to the camp, and that the picquet was only a few hundred yards up the road.”125
Up in the camp, the vedette notified Wayne of the advance. After sending the dragoon back for confirmation, the general went out to alert the camp. “At about 12 o'clock Genl. Wayne came Riding along in the Rear of the 2d Brigade Calling out ‘Turn out my Boys, the Lads are Comeing, we gave them a push with the Bayonet through the Smoak,’” Maj. Francis Mentges of the 11th Pennsylvania recalled, hearing Wayne shout a favorite battle cry of his. “The Troops turned out as quick as Could be Expected and Formed by Platoons, in less than five Minutes.”126
Intermittent light rain began to fall as the British advance guard, made up of two dragoons, a company of light infantry and Ferguson's riflemen, approached Picket Post #4 on the Lancaster Road at the Warren Gap. This post was manned by Lt. Edward Fitz Randolph of the 4th Pennsylvania, with a sergeant, a corporal, and sixteen men who were spread out. “We had not marched a quarter of a mile when the enemy's picquet challenged, fired a volley, and retreated,” Hunter recalled.127 His friend Lt. Richard St. George wrote, “We then marched on briskly—still silent…a piquet fired upon us at a distance of fifteen yards miraculously without effect—This unfortunate Guard was instantly dispatched by the Riflemen's Swords.”128 André stated, “The sentries fired and ran off to the number of four at different intervals,” meaning that they fired and fell back to the main post. The main picket fired a volley, exposing its position in the dark, “and most of them [were] killed in endeavouring to retreat.”129
The Philadelphia Campaign Page 39
