by Ling Zhang
3 Hartman in Chaffee and Twitchett (2015: 29).
4 For the political and military history of early Song, see Twitchett and Smith (2009: 206–246) and Chaffee and Twitchett (2015: 214–249).
5 For the Song–Liao relationship, see Rossabi (1983) and Tao (1988). For a discussion on the Song's military weakness, see Lorge (2005: 30–44).
6 For the early Song state's survivor's mentality and the political culture of excessive caution, see Deng (2006).
7 SHY, “Fangyu,” 8: 2a–b and 8: 2b. See Cheng Long's (2012) studies on Hebei's military and strategic geography.
8 XCBSB, 3xia: 141.
9 For spatial deployment of Hebei's military, see Cheng (2012: 60–77).
10 XCB, 49:1072 and 166: 3997.
11 Ouyang Xiu, “Lun Hebei caichan shang shixiang shu [Letter to Chancellors on Hebei's wealth],” OYXQJ, 118: 1825–1828. For more about Song's military system, see Wang (1983), Cheng (2012: 60–77), and Wang Tzeng-yu and David Wright in Chaffee and Twitchett (2015: 214–249).
12 Zou (1993: 153–157).
13 For example, in 1002, the Nan and Shuiwen rivers in Zhenzhou prefecture were diverted southeastward into Zhaozhou prefecture. In 1004, the water of the Tang River was diverted over a length of 33 li to the prefectural seat of Dingzhou, and through a 62-li-long newly dug canal it was connected with the Sha River; the entire flow ran through the Bianwu Pond and eventually converged with the Juma River. In this way, a water system supporting an uninterrupted transport route came into shape across frontier prefectures. XCB, 21: 483; 22: 489; 56: 1228.
14 Chikusa (2006) closely studies the first two emperors of the Northern Song in terms of their backgrounds, personalities, and military and civil governance. Chen (2010) examines the formation of the political philosophy in the early Song government, which pursued the centralization of the state's military power. Also see Hartman's chapter on Song politics in Chaffee and Twitchett (2015: 19–138).
15 For iron production, circulation, and consumption in the Song period, see Wang Lingling (2005).
16 QSW, 694: 2–3.
17 For more of Song's military history, see Wang (1983) and Wang and David Wright in Chaffee and Twitchett (2015: 214–249).
18 For a detailed analysis of the military policies in the early Song, see Lau Nap-yin and Huang K'uan-chung in Twitchett and Smith (2009: 215–220).
19 For the rising prominence of scholarly officials in the Song government and their dependence on the state rather than on their own power bases, see Liu (1962: 137–152) and Bol (1992: 148–175).
20 See Wang (1983), Deng (2006), and Hartman in Chaffee and Twitchett (2015: 29). For the social composition of the Song bureaucracy and the increasing significance of the examination system in bureaucratic recruitment, see Chaffee (1995: 49–65).
21 QSW, 2227: 535.
22 Mostern (2011: 121).
23 Part of this section having to do with ponds appears in an article in The Medieval History Journal, see Zhang (2011: 21–43).
24 To compare the state's management of Hebei with that of other regions, readers may refer to the existing scholarship about the Song's spatial expansion toward south China, such as Shiba Yoshinobu's works on the lower Yangze delta, Robert Marks on the Pearl delta, and Richard von Glahn and Paul J. Smith on Sichuan. These studies show that, for various southern regions, the state followed the mass migration of population, collaborated with local powers and played supervisional roles instead of military dominance and multi-dimensional managerial roles as it did for Hebei. Indeed, the state maintained tight military control over other northern frontier regions like Shaanxi and Shanxi, where the Song shared borders with the Liao and the Xiaxia and where most military conflicts between these states took place. But these regions remain understudied; the limited scholarship focuses on the state's military and diplomatic handling of the non-Chinese states. We know very little about what these regions (their environments and human societies) went through. Due to the scarcity of historical sources and scholarship about these northern regions, we may suspect that the kind of multi-dimensional (military, strategic, political, environmental, and economic) appropriations the state conducted in Hebei was unique and incomparable.
25 These underground tunnels, named as “zhandao (戰道, lit., battle paths)” by modern scholars, are unseen in any Song documents. For more studies, see Wang (1991: 332–334) and Liu (2000: 27–42).
26 Jiu wudaishi, 29: 401, and XCB, 50: 1102.
27 XCB, 34: 756 and 51: 1111.
28 XCB, 34: 747.
29 SS, 279: 9478. See Lorge's (2008: 59–74) discussion on the military, strategic significance of the ponds. But we must be aware that such significance was an assumption of Hebei's military commanders, not a tested result based on any wartime situation. Historical geographer Cheng (2012: 34–53) provides an in-depth discussion on the transformation of natural geography around these ponds.
30 SHY, “Shihuo,” 17: 2b and 3a. SS, 279: 9478. XCB, 122: 2887.
31 XCB, 82: 1880.
32 XCB, 55: 1214 and 56: 1234.
33 XCB, 93: 2151; 65: 1455; 55: 1214; 65: 1455; and 93: 2151.
34 XCB, 117: 2761.
35 XCB, 50: 1102 and 51: 1111.
36 XCB, 55: 1212.
37 See Tian Xi's memorial, XCB, 51: 1113.
38 XCB, 59: 1307
39 XCB, 59: 1309, 1318, 1326; and 62: 1384.
40 XCB, 67: 1505.
41 SHY, “Shihuo,” 69: 38a. XCB, 62: 1383.
42 XCB, 62: 1388.
43 SHYBB, 675a.
44 XCB, 58: 1294; 72: 1630; and 59: 1307.
45 Song (1981: 63–69).
46 SHY, “Shihuo,” 1: 17b.
47 XCB, 59: 1314.
48 SHY, “Shihuo,” 1: 18a.
49 SHY, “Shihuo,” 39: 9b.
50 XCB, 59: 1321. SHY, “Shihuo,” 1: 21b–22a and 70: 7b. For Song's taxation system, see Wang Shengduo (1995) and Bao (2001).
51 XCB, 47: 1017 and 1019; 48: 1045, 1046, and 1052; 51: 1126; 52: 1134 and 1140; 54: 1182; 56: 1248; 58: 1296; 60: 1345; 63: 1406; 65: 1455; 71: 1590; 72: 1630, 1634, and 1639; 76: 1726, 1730, and 1733; 77: 1758, 1759, and 1762; 79: 1807; 80: 1831; 81: 1843 and 1852; 82: 1883; 83: 1901; 84: 1914; 87: 2003 and 2006; 88: 2011, 2017, 2019, 2020, and 2027; 89: 2040; 90: 2089; 94: 2140; 96: 2206; 99: 2305; 104: 2410 and 2411; 105: 2443 and 2447; 106: 2463, 2473, and 2478; 107: 2498; 108: 2518; 112: 2622; 113: 2633; 114: 2663; 115: 2703 and 2711; 118: 2790; and 122: 2887. Also see sources from various chapters in the SHY and SS.
52 XCB, 114: 2661 and 115: 2705.
53 For instance, residents in Binzhou and Dizhou in southeastern Hebei and those in the northern frontier received tax exemptions from the government (SHY, “Shihuo,” 70: 161a). Residents in southern Hebei received disaster relief (XCB, 76: 1733).
54 Wu (2000: 28–29 and 34–44). These policies were applied to most of the Song territory, not only within Hebei.
55 See cases of land ownership disputes in 1021 (SHY, “Shihuo,” 1: 19b) and in 1028 (SHY, “Shihuo,” 1: 24a). Also XCB, 91: 2108.
56 According to some quantitative data in the 1080s, Hebei's government fields were 3.41 percent of its entire arable land, a rate higher than in any other provinces. The situation was most likely similar in the first four decades of the eleventh century. See Liang (1980: 290).
57 SHY, “Shihuo,” 37: 5a.
58 Liang (1980: 133–134).
59 XCB, 70: 1567. According to Hino (1993: 456–466 and 19–74), the ratio of price between millet grain and its kernel was 1: 0.6. Also see his discussion about straw and grass, their usages, measurements, and prices in the Northern Song period.
60 XCB, 77: 1752. SHYBB, 601a.
61 XCB, 104: 2410 and 2411; 106: 2463 and 2478; 107: 2498, 2499, and 2506; and 108: 2518. Also SHYBB, 603a.
62 XCB, 133: 3183.
63 See Cheng Lin's report in 1034, in XCB, 114: 2675.
64 The shortage and disease of cattle were reported in 1004, 1005, 1009, and 1015,
see XCB, 58: 1294; 59: 1314; 72: 1630; and 85: 1940.
65 Hartman in Chaffee and Twitchett (2015: 22).
3
The 1040s
On the Eve of the Flood
Before we move on to the next chapter to investigate the state's hydraulic policies and practices involving the Yellow River, let us first build upon the previous chapter and take a look at the effects of many of the Song's state-building efforts toward the middle of the dynasty. By curbing the decentralizing forces like the Hebei region to consolidate the state power and prolong the state's rule, what had the Song state become and what did the society look like under its rule? Had the state building process successfully led to a prosperous, powerful imperial regime, shortly before the Yellow River's catastrophic crash into Hebei? Had the state gotten rid of the existential crisis it experienced during its adolescence and become confident in its control of its territory and subjects? The following survey of changing circumstances of the state, the society across China and that of Hebei, and the broad environmental conditions in north China in the decade of 1040s gives an immediate context to the outbreak of the environmental change in 1048.
Before the Yellow River invaded Hebei in 1048, the Northern Song state had just entered its middle age. Its ruler, Emperor Renzong 仁宗 (1010–1063), the fourth emperor of the dynasty, was now a mature adult in the middle of his forty-year-long reign (1022–1063). The analogy of a middle-age man for the state does not derive merely from our retrospective knowledge that the 1040s fell exactly in the middle of the state's duration from 960 to 1127. It comes more from the state's own perception of its growth, fluctuating fortunes, and new challenges, which were quite different from what it faced as a youthful, insecure regime in the previous decades.
By now, both the Song state and the society had achieved many successes. Peace, stability, and economic prosperity, which had long been absent in China, were now firmly established across the empire. While historians now celebrate the Song's many achievements, we must acknowledge that the state building process had also sunk into a multifaceted mid-dynasty crisis. Military impositions of the Xixia Tangut and the Khitan, swollen military and bureaucratic apparatuses, the widening disparity of wealth in the society, strained state finances, failed attempts at top-down political reform, as well as burgeoning environmental disasters throughout the empire, all together imposed on the state a strong sense of crisis. Many of these problems were evident in the land of Hebei and affected the livelihood of people there.
3.1 State and Society in the “Festive Era”
In 1041, Emperor Renzong designated the coming years as a new reign era, Qingli 慶歷 (1041–1048), the name of which meant a time for festive celebration. Indeed, there were many things that the state could celebrate. Now in its eighth decade, far beyond the lifespan of its five short-lived predecessors, and appearing to be stable and strong, the Song demonstrated the potential to last much longer. Perhaps it could even match the longevity and glory of the Tang Dynasty. By 1042, the Song's skirmishes and territorial disputes with the Tangut Xixia and the Khitan Liao had been settled by diplomatic means. By bribing these nomadic regimes with gifts of silver and silk every year, the state purchased peace for its northern borders. The annual gifting was humiliating to the state; yet, pragmatically speaking, it cost much less than any war expenditure and was in fact only a tiny fraction of the state revenue.
The long-term peace had made those who lived along the frontiers like in Hebei “ignorant of battles and weapons.” Instead of worrying about their safety and migrating to escape war as people did in the previous centuries, now subjects of the Song state were peacefully settled and could tend their businesses and raise families. Over the previous eighty years, families had welcomed three to four generations, which had increased the overall population of the empire. During the decade between 980 and 989, the state had 6,499,145 registered, taxable households. Shortly before 1048 when the Yellow River's course shift inflicted heavy damage on Hebei, the state encompassed 10,723,695 registered households, which was a 65-percent increase over sixty years.1
In the course of this phenomenal population growth, the major issue facing average peasants had switched from obtaining basic security to managing a subsistence lifestyle and competing for more resources. By the early 1040s, most of the arable land in northern China, including in Hebei, was turned under the plough. Agriculture had been revived even in deeply war-damaged regions like Hebei. To obtain new land to accommodate the ever-growing population, Han Chinese farmers pushed farther south, where mountainous terrains, frequent rainfall, excessive surface water, and tropical and subtropical climates were barriers to settlement. In the face of these challenges, northern immigrants brought in advanced agricultural tools and invented new tools and farming technology to adapt to the resource-rich new environments. Water-abundant Hunan, mountain-covered western Sichuan, and the malaria-plagued Pearl Delta in south China were gradually populated by settlers from all over the country.2 These regions slowly developed agricultural colonies that not only produced enough food to feed their regional populations but also made increasing contributions to the state revenue.
China's key economic areas were shifting toward the southern half of the country.3 The lower Yangzi valley adopted early-ripening rice, whose growing season was short enough to guarantee the plantation of an additional crop after the first harvest in mid-summer. By investing enormous labor and time and by managing flood control and irrigation, these regions reduced various kinds of uncertainty inherent in the land. By the middle of the eleventh century, farmers could predictably produce two crops of rice every year.4 Slightly north, in regions like Henan, Shandong, and Jiangsu south to the Yellow River, winter wheat was widely planted. This winter crop was sown in late autumn and harvested in early summer; it made use of the wintertime when most other crops failed to grow, and thereby dramatically expanded the use of the land throughout the four seasons. Hence, many fields of the North China Plain could produce three crops in two years, rather than one crop per year as in the past. As these high-yield crops spread over China to increase crop rotations on a given swath of land, the growing season of a field was significantly extended. In order for the land to support such a long growing season, farmers took various measures to improve land fertility. By using human night soil and animal manure, as well as planting nitrogen-enriching legume crops like soybeans, they restored nutrients to their fields fairly quickly and thus shortened the fields’ fallow period.
These technological improvements and their wide application – an “agricultural revolution” in Mark Elvin's words – increased the production of staple food all over the empire. The resultant abundance of food supported the growth in the human population. It provided many at least a subsistence lifestyle, reduced the rate of poverty, and enhanced living standards for the general populace. It is most likely that Song people, in comparison with their eleventh-century contemporaries in the rest of the world, ate better and lived a healthier life.
The growth in agriculture provided a solid foundation for the multi-dimensional Chinese “Medieval Economic Revolution,” in which the commercial boom was a major component.5 Enormous agricultural surpluses entered markets at all levels. For instance, the government taxed farmers on their grain and also purchased additional grain from the markets in the Yangzi valley every year. Of this grain, six and half million dan were shipped to the capital to feed the giant bureaucratic body and the military.6 Much of this long-distance trade was conducted by private merchants. Ordinary people, especially those in urban and suburban areas, could access markets and buy goods relatively easier than in the past, thanks to the bounty of goods and their wide circulation. Many people purchased their daily food supply from local urban centers or market towns along roads and waterways, without the need to produce everything themselves.7
With the excess production came a diversification of labor, as some peasants no longer needed to till the land. They invested their time in other kinds o
f specialized, high-income production, such as sericulture, tea plantation, and ceramics production. These non-farming sectors of the economy with their high profits, again, attracted more people to leave traditional farming and become skilled workers. The self-sufficient manorial economy that had dominated medieval China broke down. Producers in various occupations no longer worked mainly to meet their personal needs. A weaver did not weave to dress herself; a porcelain-making family used only one set of earthenware for their meals; and a gardener living in the vicinity of a town focused on planting vegetables not just to put on his family's dining table. A great portion of their production was oriented toward the market. They distributed their goods locally to satisfy consumers close by or sold their goods to long-distance merchants who carried them into nationwide circulation and even into international markets. Hebei, for instance, had become a major producer of high-quality silk, internationally renowned porcelain, iron, and sea salt in the 1040s.
