Wavell also never lost sight of the importance of the Red Sea and saw protecting his crucial communication route as ‘the most urgent task of the Services’.13 To this end, shortly after arriving in Cairo, when it was anticipated that Italy would join the war at the earliest opportunity, he had tried to secure support for an immediate surprise bombing attack on the key port of Massawa on the Eritrean coast.14 It was to be launched simultaneously from Egypt, the Sudan and Aden using all available bombers, and the general was prepared to accept that, at least temporarily, this would leave him unable to carry out any other attacks against Italian troops in the Western Desert. There was little support from within the Royal Air Force, however, who pointed to the wide range of tasks facing them, the lack of available aircraft and their concerns about any ‘spectacular Italian initial success in Egypt’.15 The Royal Navy was also reluctant to attack particularly if there was no offer of air support, so these plans came to nothing. But the commander had shown that the security of his maritime supply routes held a particular significance for him, and he would return to it later.16
In many respects Wavell’s real problem at this point was that, although theoretically there was a war to be won, the conflict barely extended beyond northern Europe and there was little real rigour in thinking about activities elsewhere. On 30 August 1939 Middle East Command had received instructions reiterating the earlier position: even with a state of war between Britain and Italy, only defensive measures were to be taken and these should be as non-provocative as possible.17 As it was, Prince Amedeo of Savoy-Aosta, who two years before had become the third Viceroy of Italian East Africa following on from Badoglio and Graziani, had no desire to challenge this position. Referred to more commonly as the Duke of Aosta – although more popularly sometimes also as ‘the Prince of the Sahara’ – as a young man he had attended Eton and Oxford University and won a medal for valour in the First World War, fighting on the same side as the British. He had subsequently become ‘the most popular member of the [Italian] royal family’ and, still only forty years old when war broke out again in Europe, he was firmly opposed to being on Germany’s side.18 A British officer who met with him in March 1938 noted that, aside from his youth, height and athleticism, he appeared ‘to think like an Englishman’.19 Churchill was therefore perhaps rather unfair when he later wrote that at the outbreak of the war the viceroy was ‘lacking in ruthlessness and commanding military ability’, an assessment which ignored such considerations and also overlooked the significant weaknesses undermining Aosta’s position in eastern Africa. Despite the apparent overwhelming advantages in troops and equipment he appeared to hold, Aosta’s conclusion was that if there was a fight with Britain and France, his isolation from Italy would leave the territory he governed vulnerable. And his position was made worse by a lack of clear direction from Rome, where Mussolini prevaricated about his overall wartime strategy.20
Nor did it help that Aosta’s British opposite number had a much clearer vision of how he could proceed despite the handicaps he faced. Within his vast command area Wavell saw victory in East Africa as an essential prerequisite for victory in North Africa and this determined the course of what followed. Rather than view the two areas as separate theatres he considered the first simply as his left flank and the enemy forces there as a threat that had to be removed. It was a visionary approach, recognising the importance of a region that to the vast majority of senior military and political observers who surrounded him was of minimal significance. In his initial detailed notes on potential operations to be conducted against Italian East Africa, produced in early October 1939, he outlined a range of options for defeating the existing threat to his southern flank.21 In so doing he was adamant that in addition to local air superiority and properly organised transport and supply routes, there would need to be sufficient numbers of suitably trained troops to cope with the conditions and local climate. His outline plan contained some brief reference to subsidiary operations moving northwards across the Kenyan frontier from Moyale in the direction of Negelli, advancing from the Sudan into Eritrea heading towards the mountains and Keren, and even carrying out a possible landing on the Red Sea coast at Assab. Mention of the last two highlighted Wavell’s continuing focus on maritime security as, if the Italian garrison at the obscure fortress could be defeated, the road to Massawa would potentially be opened. It was also clear from this appreciation that the focus for any action would have to be Jibuti or the Sudan with their potentially better communications, and their ports and railways that could maintain supplies for the attacking forces. This had not actually changed from the approach agreed at the discussions earlier in the year, and French Somaliland, with its well-defended base and good lines of communication, was still the key point.
There was, however, an additional possibility for the British to explore. Whilst the size of Aosta’s forces broadly remained much the same as they had been since the initial invasion of Ethiopia, the colonial policing role had had a debilitating effect on the Italians’ fighting power as they struggled to control a rebellion within their new imperial frontiers.22 Following the victory in 1936, and the atrocities they had committed against the civilian population during their conquest, the occupied country had become a ‘simmering cauldron’ where a rebel movement awaited Haile Selassie’s return to lead them on to victory.23 Although the Italians invested considerable manpower and resources in halting the growing insurgency, a visit to the Gojjam plateau three years later by one of the emperor’s senior staff along with an agent from the Deuxième Bureau, the French external intelligence agency, confirmed there was still a great deal of anger. A report provided full details of the situation and confirmed that the northern, eastern and southern provinces had been largely pacified but there remained a serious problem for the Italians in western Ethiopia, where large numbers of troops were still being used to maintain internal security.24 The viceroy had himself admitted as much the previous year during a meeting with a visiting British officer, although the stubborn resistance was being brought under control.25 Drawing on this and information from other sources, the headquarters in Cairo identified the Gojjam plateau as the focus for British resources, and it was decided that an attempt would be made to ‘raise the tribes’.
In February 1933, Wavell had let it be known when lecturing at the Royal United Services Institute in London that he was not averse to using irregular warfare. In his presentation he had declared that a good soldier should be a combination of ‘cat burglar, gunman and poacher’, a description he defended as being used ‘to draw attention to the value of low cunning in war’ which, he then believed, was the weak point of the British infantryman.26 He later wrote a very well received biography of General Allenby and his First World War campaign, and throughout the inter-war period had conducted a correspondence with T.E. Lawrence, who had led the Arab forces in their insurgency against the Turks. During his period in Palestine, the British general had used locally raised unorthodox units, and now, lacking manpower and resources, he concluded there was great merit in encouraging a rebellion.27 At least initially Wavell had to make his plans in secret as the operations he was considering were in direct contravention of the Bon Voisinage or ‘good neighbour’ agreement which had been signed in April 1938 between the governments in London and Rome. This had referred specifically to the maintenance of friendly relations between the two countries and, at least in theory, it prevented the general from having any contacts with the rebels operating in Ethiopia.28 Nonetheless he later confirmed in his official dispatch that ‘the fomentation of the patriot movement in Abyssinia offered with the resources available the best prospect of making the Italian position impossible and eventually reconquering the country’. It was clear that he invested considerable energies into making this work.29
This was because, at least initially, this course of action was the only one that Wavell was able to identify that might really disrupt Italian plans, although there were considerable challenges to overcome. Even dur
ing the initial planning discussions it was concluded that the Eritreans and the Somalis would be unlikely to join, and so if it were to be successful it would depend upon those Ethiopians anxious to restore Selassie to his throne and recover their independence from Italian occupation. It was therefore decided that the force would be termed Arbegnoch, which translates loosely as ‘patriots’, a name probably chosen to depict the nobleness of the cause and to give the recruits a sense of being ‘freedom fighters’.30 These men had the classic advantage enjoyed by the insurgent throughout history in that they were familiar with the terrain of the battlefields and could mingle with the local population, allowing them to operate well inside enemy lines. Once the war in Europe began the Chiefs of Staff in London were enthusiastic in their support for the Italians being kept distracted within their own boundaries, and agreed that this was a sound strategy to pursue.31
Wavell had adopted an aggressive approach in an attempt to identify potentially decisive advantages, but there remained those within his command and back in London who were still opposed to any thoughts of military action. In October 1939 the Joint Planning Staff in Cairo had been asked to consider what could be gained by attacking the Italians first in order to prevent them from using naval and air bases to target shipping in the Mediterranean and Red Sea.32 Not only did the response question such a move, it extended to a more general challenge to the view that anything would be gained by going on the offensive in Italian East Africa. This assessment also held that there were no special obligations in terms of restoring independence for the Ethiopians, who were described as ‘neither a united nor admirable people’. Instead the recommendation was that the Italians should be kept guessing about possible action against them while another review was conducted with the French about how best to proceed. Similar views were apparently prevalent in the War Office in London, where the firm conclusion was that the enemy’s overwhelming military advantage meant the Red Sea could be closed for a time and British and Commonwealth forces would not be able to use it to maintain their positions in Egypt.33 Were this to happen, alternative overland routes would have to be used even though these could not efficiently handle the volume of supplies that were transported by ship which were needed by the Allied troops. Wavell’s concerns about being able to keep his already limited forces adequately equipped were also apparently not universally shared. It seems clear that in both London and Cairo the least regarded of his various commands was East Africa, although this was not an assessment with which he concurred.
Given the apathy that existed, it was important to ensure that the right officer was in charge in wartime Nairobi, but Wavell did not have any say in this selection. Best suited for this role was Giffard but he had been sent back to the War Office for a brief period before being moved on again, temporarily, to become General Officer Commanding in Palestine.34 His replacement as Inspector General, African Colonial Forces was Major-General Douglas Dickinson, who had been Commandant of the Nigerian Regiment for the previous two years.35 He was qualified for his role as he had previously gained a good knowledge of African troops and some of the more general issues affecting the region’s security. About a week before war was declared it had been decided in London that Dickinson would fly out to Nairobi to carry out an inspection tour, with a brief visit to Cairo to meet with Wavell and a stop in Khartoum for discussions with the British senior commander in the Sudan, Major-General William Platt. He eventually arrived in Kenya on 22 August, establishing himself at Kenton College alongside the headquarters of the KAR’s Northern Brigade, the same day as the initial ‘Stand By’ message had been received warning that war now seemed likely.36 With selected personnel of the KAR reserves and the Kenya Regiment already beginning to be called up, and having received a telegram on the final day of August confirming his appointment as General Officer Commanding in East Africa, Dickinson’s brief war was about to begin.
The new East African commander lacked real support and had little equipment to get his headquarters up and running; at first he had just one regular officer with any experience to lead it and very few trained personnel who could make it function effectively. Fortunately Alec Bishop, despite only recently having been promoted from major to lieutenant-colonel, had accompanied Giffard on all of his tours as his chief staff officer and was a most able assistant. He had remained in this role when Dickinson had taken charge and a great deal of responsibility fell upon him. Aside from seven officers sent from England on 1 September 1939 to provide advice on technical issues, Bishop had to rely upon veterans of the last war then living in Kenya, and even women who were recruited as clerks.37 There was no shortage of enthusiastic retired military volunteers but many were lacking in staff training or experience and had little current knowledge of military affairs. Nonetheless, in most cases they provided good service until such time as sufficient trained staff officers could be sent from Britain. Sir Donald Mackenzie Kennedy, the Governor of Nyasaland, was appointed as a liaison officer and offered political advice to the military commander. This was an important role, as the colony’s civilian affairs rested largely in the hands of a governor-general, appointed by the Colonial Office in Whitehall to represent the interests of the British authorities. Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, who had retired in 1936 as an air chief marshal in the Royal Air Force to take on the role, was still in the post when Dickinson arrived but had already announced his return to military service. Sir Henry Monck-Mason Moore, who had served before the war as Governor of Sierra Leone and had also held senior roles in the Colonial Office, arrived in Kenya a few months later to become the senior British representative and remained in Nairobi for four years before being posted to the same role in Ceylon.
At the time when Dickinson was assuming his new role, Kenya’s strategic position was bleak. Thinking was dominated by the Northern Frontier District, and its 600-mile frontier which faced Italian territory. The first decision taken was to evacuate its northernmost portion once war was declared, the conclusion being that the small garrisons there would be quickly lost if any attack followed.38 Although Italy actually chose not to join with Germany at the outbreak of the Second World War, this important ground was still given up, albeit in error. Evacuations took place from Moyale, Wajir and Mandera and it was two weeks before they were re-occupied, by which point there had been much looting and some local damage to British prestige.39 More broadly the intention was to use the terrain and hold for as long as possible the general line of the Tana and Uaso Nyiro rivers in an attempt to retain the edge of the Kenyan highlands and the vital water supplies that ran to its north. This would also include trying to prevent an advance through the Lokitaung area around Lake Rudolf. Dickinson’s small planning team concluded that, to the east, the absence of roads and the total lack of water between the Juba and Tana rivers made military operations almost impossible. The defending garrison would therefore need to watch closely the approaches towards Garissa and along the Coastal Belt. These initial assessments pointed to this as being where the enemy would most likely advance heading south from Italian Somaliland and down the coast towards Mombasa.40
Drawing upon local skills and materiel was a feature of the initial planning stages and remained a constant factor in the conduct of the region’s defence. A general paucity of military resources across the British Empire meant that what was available was given to those regions that had been identified by the inter-war reviews as being most important. Eastern Africa was not one of these, and remained a low priority for both men and equipment.41 In fact, just about the only area in which there was no real concern for Dickinson was rations, which were described as excellent by the troops who arrived as reinforcements; while they were stationed within Kenya’s frontiers they enjoyed fresh fruit, vegetables and meat. All of the eastern African colonies were self-sufficient and the exporting of their foodstuffs would later become one of their major contributions to the overall Allied war effort.42 In terms of everything else it was fairly desperate, with very limited supplies of wea
pons and small arms ammunition, and authority was given to requisition every vehicle in Kenya which could be of military use. Even with this, the lack of anti-tank guns or anti-tank mines meant that in theory any attacking Italian armour could advance into the colony or any of its neighbours almost unopposed. In response the men of the Kenya and Uganda Railways Workshops devoted much of their energy to producing basic mortars and other weapons. With no trained engineers, work was also carried out by civilians from the Public Works Department to construct defensive lines along the likely route of any Italian advance down the coast, and to prepare bridges for demolition.43
The domestic response was impressive but there was still no other choice than to send out urgent appeals for help across the British Empire. General Headquarters India responded quickly and sent large amounts of military clothing, including coats for the cold nights in the Kenyan highlands and web equipment as well as radio sets and even tents.44 Bishop was meanwhile sent to Southern Rhodesia to ask the government in Salisbury to give whatever assistance they could; even though the pilot of his aircraft got lost on the way – the result of having been forced to use a map of Africa contained in the Philips’ School Atlas on a scale of 600 miles to the inch – his mission was a success and it was confirmed that, in addition to aircraft and crew that were already being sent north, the pre-war offers of other manpower and equipment would be made available as quickly as was possible.45 In the short term, however, Dickinson would have to continue to look closer to home to fill the gaps. Wilson Airways, a small civilian airline named after its owner, Mrs Wilson, and based in Nairobi, was taken over and given military status by being incorporated into the Kenya Regiment.46 Its light aircraft had previously been used for charter flights but now they carried out coast-watching duties and, due to the shortages of radios and communication equipment, transported important messages. A limited maritime presence was even raised, largely at the behest of a British torpedo officer on HMS Gloucester, who addressed a meeting of the Victoria Nyanza Sailing Club shortly before the war broke out and encouraged its members to offer their support.47 A naval training centre and a Royal Navy Volunteer Supplementary Reserve were subsequently formed at Kampala and stationed at Lake Victoria, 800 miles from the Indian Ocean.48 Finally, there were the various locally raised coastal defence units who served alongside police and volunteer reserves. These were armed mostly with vintage rifles, or nothing at all, but, between them, they covered the territories of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia and the Nyasaland Protectorate, all of which fell under Dickinson’s control.
The First Victory Page 5
