For the two Indian divisions, they used this opportunity to train together as it was the first time they had fought alongside one another during the war. For ten days they conducted intensive mountain warfare training and shared information on enemy methods and the difficulties of the terrain, which proved to be of crucial benefit later. With little actual fighting taking place, propaganda also became a focus of activity for the besieging forces. Captain George Steer, Chief of Offensive Propaganda, produced everything from leaflets and loudspeaker ‘battle’ broadcasts to a local weekly Ethiopian-language newspaper.29 A South African who had been educated in Britain, he had been a journalist with The Times and had covered the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the Spanish Civil War and the Russo-Finnish conflict before arriving back in Africa in 1940 as a young officer in the British Army. He had a close family connection to Haile Selassie and, as he was skilled in psychological warfare, he played an important part in the battle.30 His aim was to weaken morale and his efforts proved so successful that widespread desertion followed, especially amongst the Ethiopian and Somali irregular troops fighting with the Italians; such were the numbers involved that the death penalty was abandoned for this offence. Instead, weapons were removed at night and the colonial troops barricaded into their defensive positions.31 Afterwards, 6,000 deserters were recorded as having surrendered or escaped before the battle’s final stages, nearly one-fifth of the overall garrison. The use of communications would have benefited from some greater thought; these remained fairly poor throughout the battle and there was still a great reliance on signal flags and lamps to send messages across the area held by the British and Commonwealth troops.32 Each brigade had just one wireless set, and these did not function very well despite telephone cables having been spread across all the hills.
With General Erwin Rommel and his Afrika Korps making an increasingly decisive impact following their arrival in the Western Desert, and the mounting requirements of the Greek campaign, by mid-March pressure was growing on Wavell’s generals to withdraw units from both the Sudan and East Africa to send north.33 The commander in Cairo once again had to make the decision about what level of overall risk he was prepared to accept but, despite the worsening situation facing him, he remained committed to the strategy devised the previous year. At Keren the combined divisional attack, designed to resemble ‘the snapping of a pair of pincers’, was allowed to proceed and began on 15 March, the Ides of March, one of the hottest days recorded in the entire campaign.34 Following another sultry morning, temperatures rose on this sticky day to reach 118°F in the shade, which added to the men’s fatigue.35 Thunder and a sandstorm rolled in later in the day to add to the misery.36 Yet, prior to the assault beginning, blankets had been rolled and stacked and greatcoats issued to provide some protection against the cold that would face the men as they climbed higher up into the mountains, where the temperature dropped quickly once night fell. Before the start there was a final check of the equipment that would be carried, and a fortifying ration of rum was issued to those who wanted it. With all the preparations completed, a massive artillery bombardment was launched at 7 a.m. and ‘an unbelievable concentration of shellfire’ marked the opening of what was to be the biggest battle of the East Africa campaign.37 One British pilot witnessed the initial artillery barrage, which ‘was so great that it all became a white mass of smoke, it was a white mass of cloud, the cloud formed, it was right along the top’.38 Below him he could see the British and Commonwealth troops, overlooked most of the time by the Italian positions as ‘they literally clawed their way to the top’. Brig’s Peak had been captured – and then lost – six weeks before by a single rifle company, but now almost two full divisions supported by the largest number of artillery pieces yet used against the enemy in Africa were deployed in an attempt to capture it and the positions beyond.
Men from 2nd Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment were involved in the initial assault directly the artillery fire had ended, following on from the Sikhs of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Mahrattas who were the leading element. The attackers were heading for Dologorodoc, which they approached from the west, but they were checked in the afternoon and had to spend hours sheltering in stifling heat as a new plan was deve-loped.39 During this time the British infantrymen fought off furious counter-attacks, ‘shouting their forthright battle cry’, and it was only once darkness fell that they were able to continue. Passing through the Indian positions, they headed towards the final objective.40 This was the fort just below the hill’s summit which was surrounded entirely by a concrete trench. The axis of the attack was so steep that hands as well as feet were needed to make the climb, and the troops up at the front discovered that metal shields were useful against the small Italian grenades, known as ‘red bombs’, that were thrown at them.41 When their turn came, the Indians charged up the final stretch of the hill with loud cries which could be heard far back in the brigade headquarters; once they had managed to pass beyond the range of the hand grenades, they pressed home their advantage.42 One discovery that had been made was that not only were the enemy’s bayonets rarely sharpened, they were also shorter than the combined length of a British rifle and bayonet. As one of those present put it, those Italians who were captured alive had to consider themselves fortunate as ‘sepoys, with their blood up’ had little time for an opponent who refused to hand over his gun.43 The Italians’ reluctance to part with their weapons was due to their desperation to hold onto the principal means of defending themselves both against the Patriots, whose presence was becoming known amongst the garrison, and against their own increasingly mutinous colonial troops. It took the intervention of British officers to explain these fears to their men, after which prisoners were once again sent back down the hills.
It had taken more than two hours to climb just under 700 feet but the defenders had been driven from the summit and the two prominent features referred to as ‘Pinnacle’ and ‘Pimple’ had been captured. Initial media reports were even more optimistic, with it being claimed that both the fort and Brig’s Peak had also been seized.44 But the success had come at a considerable cost: within the ranks of the attacking forces, there had been more than 1,000 killed or injured during the first twenty-four hours.45 All of the immediately available British and Commonwealth reserves had been used and, believing that a counter-attack might succeed, the senior British officers prepared to lead a charge with rifles in hand. The north of the road had been largely secured but, as further reinforcements from the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade were brought up to just in front of the fort, the attackers were halted. The position was completely overlooked on three sides and exposed to extensive artillery, mortar and small arms fire, and for many of the men caught in the open, conditions grew progressively worse. British and Indian troops remained here for the next ten days under scorching sun and shivering without blankets at night. As they ran out of ammunition and food and it became more difficult even to walk back down the hills, such was the amount of fire from the high ground, they became increasingly dependent on resupply by air drops which landed on the rocks surrounding them.46 The Scottish troops of the Highland Light Infantry, who were out in the open for an extended period, held on supplied by the RAF with their mail, army iron rations and whisky, and, according to one of the pilots, ‘seemed quite happy with that’.47 They broke through during the final attacks but at a roll call after the battle only twenty-seven men responded; the regiment suffered a worse casualty count than even the Camerons who lost eight officers and 250 other ranks throughout their time at Keren. An Indian battalion, the 3rd Battalion, 1st Punjab Regiment, which had fought at Agordat and then during the first two phases of the battle, was another to suffer huge casualties and, with more than 300 men killed or wounded, including one of the company commanders, it eventually had to be withdrawn.48 The Italian defenders were certainly offering a staunch defence and, after eight determined counter-attacks which left bodies strewn over the slopes, even the reports from the British and American journalists
embedded in Platt’s headquarters showed for the first time some grudging respect and an acknowledgement of the enemy’s fighting spirit.49 As for the commander of the northern advance, he later argued that this intensity had actually been to his advantage as ‘the Italians fought their side of the battle on the false principle that every acre was sacred and must be regained at any cost’.50 In the process they exhausted themselves and helped bring about their eventual defeat.
Efforts continued to be made to capture Brig’s Peak and Mount Sanchil but a further attack on 17 March once again proved unsuccessful and led to an almost complete withdrawal back to Cameron Ridge. Despite what the troops had to endure, their success in capturing and holding the fort at Dologorodoc was probably the key action, as this changed the course of the battle. Whatever happened, so long as this was held it gave them a position they could consolidate and from which they could eventually move forward. The gains had been slow and incremental but the defenders were being worn down. For now, however, the plan reverted to the use of intensive artillery shelling, including some additional medium guns which Wavell had sent up, and letting the Italians exhaust themselves with their increasingly desperate counter-attacks. Conditions for the British and Commonwealth forces nonetheless remained very difficult. For example, the two companies of Royal Fusiliers, who were part of the force that had attacked Mount Sanchil, were given breakfast prior to moving forward but then received nothing for the next thirty-six hours other than the rations they carried. The war diary noted ‘the hard work of climbing, the lack of shade and the heat of the sun reflecting off the rocks [making] the troops more thirsty than they could ever have imagined in time of peace’, and now twelve tins of water, some bully beef and biscuits and an orange for each man were carried up to them.51 Another account referred also to the worsening smell of a battlefield that had seen many weeks’ worth of action, as well as the flies and the lack of water, and the large numbers of men who had to be evacuated with dysentery.52 Virtually all of those involved in the battle for Keren were also suffering from desert sores by the end, and hardly anyone emerged without some form of injury or illness.
Whilst the extremely high level of losses Platt was suffering were clearly a key factor, the change in his plan was made in the knowledge that he now had complete control of the air. Reports after the battle referred to ‘the perfect co-operation of the two fighting arms’ and described how well the air and land components worked together.53 Without this, and with the increasingly grim situation facing the men on the ground, the stronghold could not have been taken at an acceptable cost.54 Air Commodore Leonard Slatter, Air Officer Commanding No. 203 Group, had prioritised the support of Platt’s force above all other tasks, ensuring that there were aircraft always available, despite his superiors in Cairo still believing this to be a waste of resources.55 The Hurricanes of No.1 Squadron, SAAF were also under his control and he used them to attack targets in both northern Ethiopia and Eritrea so that ‘air superiority and comparative comfort for the army were snatched from the Italians; they never recovered either’.56 This allowed the tempo of British ground operations to increase as the restriction of travelling only at night could be discarded, and the obsolescent bombers could be used. The pilots prepared for these missions by conducting detailed joint briefings, including discussions over large sand models of the mountain positions.57 For the final main attack, the RAF conducted a four-day preparatory bombardment, which allowed the troops on the ground to advance with minimum casualties; by the end of it more than 120 tons of bombs had been dropped on the targets.58 The constant hours spent on operations left them exhausted by their efforts; an American observer with the South Africans commented that towards the end they were ‘worn out, run down and sick with fever, dysentery, [and] veld sores . . . [but] they never gave up and their offensive spirit was matchless’.59 Keren actually marked the end of the Regia Aeronautica as an effective fighting force: the British, Rhodesian and South African pilots destroyed it in the air and on the ground, so that by 22 March, from a high point of 325 fighter and bomber aircraft, there remained only 37 aircraft of all types.60
Platt had also gained another advantage as he knew that his 7th Indian Brigade Group was in position to attack the enemy’s last defences to the north-east of the main battle. Troops under the command of Brigadier Rawdon Briggs had been advancing southwards from Karora to cut off the road to Asmara and leave the Italians isolated. The aim of what was called Briggs Force was to create a diversion from the main attack coming from the west by advancing on Massawa from the north. Within its ranks there was a Foreign Legion battalion and another from the Free French Brigade d’Orient, men from Chad and Senegal, under the command of Colonel Ralph Monclar who had fought previously in the Norwegian campaign.61 Briggs Force had landed on 10 February at Marsa Taclai, a small anchorage on the Red Sea coast, and from here it quickly pushed on south. The roads were non-existent and movement was virtually impossible while the intense heat and lack of water made it an extremely inhospitable area of operations, but the men made good progress. Advancing through Karora and Elghena they pushed on to the important Mescelit Pass, the first in yet another series of naturally strong defensive positions held by the Italians, and on 1 March this was captured within hours. Briggs was now just fifteen miles north-east of Keren and decided that, instead of marching towards the port, he would strike at the rear of the Italian fortress to support the main attack. At Cub Cub he was joined by British artillery and a company from the Sussex Regiment which had arrived as part of Wavell’s move of troops from North Africa. The battle here again lasted less than a day and resulted in the taking of nearly 500 more prisoners. With most of the supplies being brought in by camels, the troops were down to a maximum of only half a gallon of water per man per day, and the capture of a range of items, including tins of asparagus and even a portable gramophone with a good supply of Italian opera records, was welcomed.62 This flank march along the coast proved extremely important for Platt as, while it continued to make rapid progress, all the time the Italians were forced to move troops to try and halt the British, French and Indians – troops that were desperately needed elsewhere.63
6 Battle of Keren (the final phase).
Back at Keren, after twelve days of very hard fighting on both sides the final breakthrough by the British and Commonwealth forces was finally achieved, although not before some serious thought had been given to halting the battle. Throughout March 1941, the pressure on Wavell had been growing to an almost impossible level and he had now flown down from Cairo to review the situation in person. Arriving at the airfield at Agordat he was driven to a forward observation post where he viewed the terrain.64 As the events of the recent weeks had demonstrated, if the attack were not continued to a successful conclusion the positions below the hills held by his forces would not be suited for a long defence and he was thinking about pulling the men back. His real fear was that the Italians might be tempted into a major counter-offensive but Platt assured him that one last effort would succeed, and the authority was given to make a final attempt.65
Even now, and with all of the improvements that had been made and the work undertaken, for the last offensive one-third of the British and Commonwealth forces still had to be used for carrying supplies up and casualties back down the mountain.66 Nonetheless, the final assault was conducted with great determination and courage. In the early morning of 25 March Platt’s men launched a co-ordinated attack which included troops from 10th Indian Infantry Brigade who had been able to infiltrate Mount Sanchil from an unexpected position, a railway tunnel at its south-east corner. Despite everything that had happened in the previous six weeks, and the hugely impressive defence they had conducted, this move took the Italians by surprise and proved to be critical as, despite continuing their counter-attacks, they were unable to regain their lost ground.
Once an opening presented itself, part of the plan called for a force consisting of the Matilda tanks (which had been present throughout
the battle), along with around 100 personnel carriers which had been collected from the two Indian divisions, to break through and push on to Fort Keren. In order for this to take place, the roadblock which barred the way was first cleared during thirty-two hours of hard labour involving explosives, picks and shovels, allowing a track to be made. At first light on 27 March, three troops of tanks approached the obstacle, but it was discovered that the carriers could not ascend the steep gradient.67 The British armour drove on up through the gorge, one of those involved later recalling ‘an unforgettable sight and stench of dead, unburied, and bloated bodies’ that littered the road, and found Keren to be deserted.68 With the Italians’ defensive position broken by the capture of Mount Sanchil, and facing a threat to their potential escape route, a complete withdrawal had been ordered on the night of 26/27 March. With no opposition, two troops of the ranks moved off quickly down the Asmara road while the third stuck to the original plan: to destroy the Italian artillery that had been identified in advance by the RAF.69 This being done, the vehicles took a while to catch up with the others, but by mid-afternoon they were all pursuing the retreating Italians who were struggling in a complete state of disorganisation and who ‘looked like a crowd dispersing from a football match’.70 By the end of the day more than 4,000 prisoners and a large number of guns had been captured either in the town or on the hills surrounding it, and many more followed during the pursuit.71 When the final Keren battle was done, other than those troops already in the few remaining key garrisons, there were now fewer than three Italian battalions and a few batteries of guns between the British and Commonwealth forces and the sea.
The First Victory Page 21
