To Platt, having returned to Khartoum and his pre-war headquarters, the final operations were of little direct interest. While the Ethiopian capital was being liberated, rapid advances were, however, also being made from the north to link up the British and Commonwealth forces. Two companies of Sudanese troops supported by a mechanised cavalry regiment pursued the retreating Italians down the Via Imperiale in the direction of Addis Ababa which was 700 miles distant.27 Arriving at Adi Ugri on 2 April they found a prison camp which had been used for the 187 men captured in British Somaliland; amongst those released was Eric Wilson, who was in excellent health, and who had already been told that he was believed to have been killed in action and had been awarded the Victoria Cross. Continuing to move forward in a single rapid column, the next day both Agidrat and Adowa were rolled over. As the armoured cars entered the first of these they found buses drawn up in the main street and two battalions of heavily armed Italian troops preparing to board.28 Simply driving in front of them was enough to induce their surrender and the prisoners were marched into an open space in the middle of the town where they laid down 1,500 rifles and many machine guns. The conquering force was counted as seventy SDF other ranks, highlighting how much of their opponent’s fighting spirit had disappeared. The 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was following behind as this southward march reached Amba Alagi, which had to be captured to open up the road north and to allow its use by troops being withdrawn to join the fighting elsewhere in the Middle East. It had also been the site where in 1892 an Italian officer, Major Toselli, and a force of 3,000 men were surrounded and eventually massacred; hence it was referred to by the Italians as the ‘Toselli Pass’. A very large battle had also been fought there during the more recent Italian invasion when the defending Ethiopian troops had held out for nine months before finally succumbing to poison gas. It was now to be the scene of the last major battle of the campaign.
It was an even better defensive position than Keren: twice the height, at 11,200 feet, the last 300 feet of which took the form of a pyramid crowned with a small chapel. It was described by one of those who saw it as being ‘very like a star-fish’, radiating a series of spokes and ridges running off in various directions.29 As had been the case at Keren, it was surrounded by several other hills also in excess of 10,000 feet, making it ideally situated to conduct a long defence. The garrison had carried out a great deal of work to strengthen it, adding another fort along with the usual assortment of dugouts, shelters and covering gun emplacements. A subsequent inspection of the captured position confirmed its impressive nature: it had around forty artillery pieces and a battery of naval anti-aircraft guns including some of the latest types, all of which had been well dug into the rock, along with ample ammunition and stores kept in galleries.30 What the defenders did not have was any supporting airpower; as had been the case ever since the RAF and SAAF had gained control of the air, this was a critical weakness. The greatest challenge for the Italians, however, was that, with a front of nearly ten miles to defend, the position actually required a much larger garrison than had been assembled.31 The defenders consisted of the last three remaining regular battalions from the Savoia Grenadiers along with a few other odd detachments of troops, making a total of around 9,000 men. Even so, there were initially eight Italians for every one of the attacking force, and, as one account concluded, if ‘such an unrealistic scheme at the Staff College [had been proposed], one would immediately [have] been sent down to the bottom of the class’.32
Some weeks after the battle Cunningham flew up over Amba Alagi. Later his aide wrote that it was ‘the most terrific stronghold. We flew round it and saw the holes in the side of the mountain side where the Wops hid during the short battle. It looks as though nothing could have taken it even after years of siege, and only Wops could have given it up after such a short fight.’33 Aside, once again, from its tone, this was a far from accurate, or indeed fair, assessment but it certainly appeared to have been an even more difficult objective than Keren. The mountain could only be attacked in two ways, and both from the front: either along steep slopes which were dominated by machine gun and artillery fire or by advancing from the high ground where there were ridges protected by barbed wire and further gun positions.34 The British commander, Major-General Mosley Mayne, who had previously led the 9th Indian Infantry Brigade before taking over the divisional command from Heath, had wanted to commit his entire division to the attack but had been forced to leave four battalions behind in Asmara and Massawa for ‘internal security’.35 Some reinforcements were sent forward and these included troops who had been involved in the pursuit from Keren along with additional guns and the men of 51 (Middle East) Commando. The latter were described by a war correspondent in his account of the campaign as ‘one of those units of shock troops, which were a secret at the time’.36 Armed with American tommy guns and knuckle-dusters, what was most remarkable about the unit was that, though it included British officers, it was largely made up of Jews and Arabs from Palestine who fought alongside one another as well as various refugees who had escaped from Nazi Germany. Even with these additions, Mayne later wrote that he would have liked more men and aircraft for what he thought would be ‘a very stubbornly defended’ position and he concluded that he would need to build up his strength further before launching any attack.37
When his men reached the forward outposts approximately five miles north of Amba Alagi, they halted, and the first fortnight was spent repeating the process that had taken place at Keren: preparing dumps of ammunition and supplies. Even during this initial preparation phase, the division was still using 20,000 gallons of petrol a day, and in the three weeks prior to the launch of the final attack a total of 1,120 tons of ammunition and artillery rounds was also fired.38 With transport again at a premium, around 800 donkeys were collected from the surrounding countryside to keep the troops who were massing in the foothills below the main feature supplied, though a typical round trip took ten hours.39 A further difficulty was the lack of maps; the best available was on a small scale and finished a mile or two short of the position. This meant that, at the same time as assembling the forces, considerable attention was also being given to working out lines of advance, all without attracting the enemy’s attention. Mayne developed a methodical plan which kept the Italians constantly uncertain where the next attack would come from, and while his troops and guns were safely moved forward, their casualties mounted and morale fell.
This was another battle that was fought largely on ridges and slopes and so, once again, a variety of names were used by the attackers to refer to these features, amongst the most significant of which were Sandy Ridge, Castle Hill, Khaki Hill, Whale Back and the Pyramid. The first of these was actually the start position for the eventual battle but it required a six- to eight-hour climb to reach it, while the last of them, again typical of the terrain the attackers faced, consisted of a belt of sheer rocky cliffs that looked impossible to assault, especially under fire. Yet, when it was ultimately attacked by the Sikhs, the speed at which they climbed took the enemy almost completely by surprise. To distract the defenders the British general had also decided to create a diversion on the left flank: Fletcher Force, which was similar to the now disbanded Gazelle Force, and again centred around Skinner’s Horse. This was supported by the commandos, Sudanese machine-gunners and Sikh infantrymen, and after some initial success and in advance of the main attack, on 3 May it was sent south-east towards the Falaga Pass, forcing the Italians to reinforce their troops in that area. Another move the following day, to the west of the main road leading to Amba Alagi, created further doubt as to which direction the main attack would come from. This also captured a number of important local features, which helped confine the Italians here to a much-restricted area which was susceptible to artillery bombardment. The barrage that followed lasted for several days, but, as at Keren, there were once again considerable challenges for the gunners because of the steepness of the terrain.40 This made it extremely difficul
t to achieve any degree of accuracy, while very rapid changes in wind and temperature caused further problems. Even so, the defences were slowly worn down, and after six days the Italians on the dominating peak, known as Tongue, surrendered.41
With the men on both sides finding themselves battered by rain and icy winds, it was not just the relentless assault that undermined morale.42 The hilltops were very cold, and continuous heavy rain showers added to the discomfort; during the siege the weather deteriorated further, with dense mists, heavy thunderstorms and cold temperatures making conditions more trying. According to one of those involved, if the Italians had been able to hold out for another two weeks, the attackers would have had to withdraw to Asmara and wait for the end of the rainy season.43 Once again the incessant tempo of attack combined with a lack of tangible defensive spirit and some good fortune to allow the capture of a key position that should never have been lost, but which surrendered after a short battle. With the Falaga Pass captured, the attackers continued their advance towards Amba Alagi and the South Africans now made a decisive contribution.
After leaving Addis Ababa, Pienaar’s men had been moving north clearing the road to the ports of Massawa and Port Sudan so that the troops could be embarked for Egypt.44 In the process they forced their way through the Combolcia Pass and besieged and captured Dessie on 22 April, taking more than 8,000 prisoners and huge amounts of equipment and supplies.45 Described by South African writers as ‘the battle that counted’ and the ‘longest and toughest of all those fought by Cunningham’s forces’, despite the grandiose nature of such claims this six-day engagement certainly proved the now considerable fighting capabilities of the attackers.46 Orders followed to provide support to Mayne and the South Africans established themselves on the far side of Amba Alagi and turned their guns on the Italian positions from the rear.47 On 12 May their assault began which effectively closed the circle, meaning that the artillery bombardment could now have the fullest effect. The defenders knew that they could no longer link up with their colleagues at Gondar as the only possible route for retreat had been cut. With the Patriots increasingly controlling territory around them, there was no chance of escape. The capture of the position referred to as Triangle by a mixed Indian and South African attack three days later pushed the Italians back farther still and, as one British officer put it, ‘with the multitude now herded together there, and the rotting dead bodies, existence was becoming rather insanitary even for our foes’.48 What is often termed ‘the friction of war’ worsened the situation: a burst from an artillery shell hit a fuel dump and the leaking oil contaminated the only source of drinking water.49 It was perhaps this more than anything else which finally forced the Italian decision to surrender.50
Plans for a final assault were nearly complete when, at 7 a.m. on 16 May, envoys arrived at Mayne’s headquarters asking for an armistice and an opportunity to evacuate casualties. They also proposed that the garrison be allowed to keep their arms and retain their positions until the war’s end, but this was rejected out of hand.51 The general sent back verbal terms that would allow Aosta to ‘surrender with honour’, agreeing that his forces could march off the hill a few miles from the battlefield to hand over their arms and equipment. In return the Italians provided complete details of the mines and booby traps they had prepared and agreed not to sabotage or destroy any of the equipment or other reserves that remained. The armistice began six hours later, at which point the garrison almost immediately began moving around freely, giving away their positions to the observers below.52 Early the following morning a white flag was seen to be raised in the Toselli Pass and another envoy, General Volpini, a close personal friend of Aosta, was sent down by him. He was attacked on the way by locals from the surrounding villages and killed. This led Mayne, who was appalled generally by much of the behaviour he had seen from the irregular forces scattered around the battlefield, to order that a delegation be sent up the mountain to continue the discussions.53
At 11 a.m. on 19 May the remaining garrison of about 5,000 men, including five other generals, marched past Mayne and his brigadiers before moving down the hill to hand in their arms and be evacuated. Various detachments from the 5th Indian Division presented arms as they passed and the pipe band of the Transvaal Scottish piped them past the saluting base. According to one eyewitness ‘they were a sorry sight, overloaded with kit and unable to keep up their places or step’. The native wives joined in the procession led by a small Eritrean soldier with a saucepan slung around his neck, and one Italian officer who appeared to have forgotten his trousers.54 Despite having fought one another for several months, there was apparently little animosity between the European soldiers. This was evident from the observations made by one of those watching British officers that the Italians ‘were very friendly and pleased with themselves as they felt they had put up a fine show, although outnumbering us by three to one, and they entertained our officers to dinner in the evening’.55 The following morning, Aosta, accompanied only by three officers of his personal staff, surrendered to Mayne with a guard of honour provided by men from the Worcestershire Regiment.56 Although these were not the last Italian troops to capitulate, this defeat effectively marked the end of the major fighting in East Africa.57 After pausing briefly at a little cemetery in which were buried some of the Italian officers who had died in the battle, the now former viceroy was shortly afterwards handed on to Platt at the divisional headquarters and from there escorted to Adi Ugri where he spent the next three weeks living with his staff in the Duke of Ancona’s house.58 He was next moved to Kenya, where he unexpectedly died of tuberculosis the following March and, with Platt in attendance, was buried with full honours at the military cemetery in Nairobi.59
As the final Italian stronghold in the north was being subdued, Cunningham’s strategy, following his occupation of Addis Ababa, was driven by Wavell’s direction to secure the main routes out of the capital leading to ports or rail routes that could be used to move men and equipment north to Egypt.60 The role played by Pienaar’s brigade in clearing the road to Asmara was part of this, but at the same time the British general also set about isolating those remaining Italian troops who had not yet surrendered.61 His aide had written home in late April to say that they were fighting rather well in the mountains; he attributed this to the German success in Greece and North Africa having ‘put [guts] into them’.62 He also thought this sustained the Italians’ belief that their allies were going to intervene in East Africa to save them and it would be only a couple of weeks before they were back in charge.63 Although Blewitt was not normally very favourable in his assessment of their fighting qualities, he also reluctantly recognised that the Italians had learnt throughout the course of the campaign. This meant they had retired to the outlying districts ‘in order to be of nuisance value’, and it was clear to him, and presumably those around him, that the fighting would continue. Indeed, as they took advantage of the change in the weather there was the first hint of doubt as to whether the campaign might drag on into mid-May with a race ‘between us and the rains’ as the back roads deteriorated and the rate of the advance slowed.64 It would in fact require most of Cunningham’s two remaining divisions and the rest of the year to secure the final surrender.
When Aosta had moved his headquarters to Amba Alagi for his final battle, the remainder of the Italians who were able to withdraw from Addis Ababa either joined him in the strongholds to the north, between the capital and Eritrea, or headed for the southern province of Galla-Sidamo. With the headquarters of the Supreme Command having been moved to Gimma, this was the left flank of what was termed the Lakes district and within it there were still seven Italian divisions and 40,000 troops of varying qualities. As Cunningham’s forces had advanced along two roads – one from the capital and the other from Soddu – heading for their new objectives, the West African troops were tasked with destroying or capturing those remaining forces west of the River Omo.65 The swift river, which was about six feet deep and flowed along
terrific gorges up to 100 yards wide, was compared to ‘the Thames at Maidenhead in flood’ and its eventual crossing only proved possible in large part because the Italians did not think it could be done.66 They had relied upon a ferry and a cable to transport men and equipment across and in flood after the rains the river was extremely hazardous. There was, however, a sharp bend and a relatively shallow area with some calmer water and it was here that the infantry of the KAR and the Nigerian Regiment eventually managed to cross after ‘titanic and often heroic efforts’.67 Later, on seeing the Italian defences on the opposite bank, Cunningham concluded that it could have been held ‘if manned by a company of machine gunners with guts’; his assessment was not improved when it was discovered that the Italian artillery had not started firing until much later in the battle because their observer had been captured asleep.68
This brief phase of the campaign was perhaps rather grandly later described as the Battle of the Lakes; during it, ‘division after division of the Italian army’ surrendered ‘to a few armoured cars and infantry’.69 By this stage of the campaign there was even some suggestion from Wavell that it might be best to leave the enemy forces that still remained in southern Ethiopia as to fight them would result in ‘a fresh commitment in the way of prisoners of war and civilians to protect’.70 When Gimma was eventually reached on 21 June, 8,000 Italians surrendered; as Blewitt later wrote, ‘the place was lousey with Wops both prisoners and civilians’, who were giving themselves up wherever they could.71 Among those captured were a colonel and two staff officers who came down from the town to see what was going on and wandered straight into an enemy patrol, a reminder of the ‘despicable fighting qualities of the Wops’, but half were women and children. Although he had done the opposite on every other occasion, Cunningham now refused to divert his fighting forces to guarantee their security, in an attempt to force the final Italian forces to surrender. One of the retreating Italian divisions subsequently found itself surrounded by lightly armed Patriot forces and sent an appeal to be saved, leading to the capture of 1,100 men along with some armoured cars and even tanks.72 Accompanying the West Africans was a small contingent of Belgian troops, one of the more curious groups fighting on the British side. They reportedly had never adapted their technique to fighting in Africa nor did they appreciate the degree to which the Italians were fearful of any threats to their rear.73 A typical attack consisted of them advancing along the main road until they met the enemy positions, then being fired upon by the defending forces and made to retire.74 They were, however, able to claim ‘the glory of having finished the campaign’ when, on 3 July, General Gazzera, the toughest Italian commander Cunningham had encountered, finally capitulated. There were at this point five weak battalions remaining; he had begun with seven divisions, and the Belgians were the only enemy troops he could find to take his surrender.75 It was an abject end.
The First Victory Page 25
