COUNTDOWN TO D-DAY:
THE GERMAN PERSPECTIVE
COUNTDOWN
TO D-DAY
The German Perspective
PETER MARGARITIS
Philadelphia & Oxford
Published in the United States of America and Great Britain in 2019 by
CASEMATE PUBLISHERS
1950 Lawrence Road, Havertown, PA 19083, USA
and
The Old Music Hall, 106—108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JE, UK
Copyright 2019 © Peter Margaritis
Hardback Edition: ISBN 978-1-61200-769-4
Digital Edition: eISBN 978-1-61200-770-0
Mobi ISBN: 978-1-61200-770-0
A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
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Back cover: Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-719-0247-17A
Contents
Foreword
Prelude: 1943
PART I:Der Atlantikwall
1December 1943
2January 1944
3February 1944
4March 1944
PART II:Les Sanglots Longs
1Spring
2April 1944
3May 1944
4June 1944
Epilogue
Glossary
Notes
Bibliography
Foreword
Nearly two decades ago, as part of an email discussion group on World War II, I came across a series entitled “We Remember.” Overseen by William L. Howard, it chronicled key events that occurred on each particular day in World War II. At the time, I had started developing a book detailing activities of the German High Command on the Western Front in the months leading up to the Normandy invasion.
Wanting to contribute this point of view in the spirit of Howard’s work, I began a subseries to the daily log, entitling it D-Day Countdown: The German Perspective. It depicted a day-by-day summary of the activities of the German military leaders in Occupied France and in the German Supreme Command as the Allied invasion drew near. My email series addition to the discussion group originally began on December 8, 1999 and ended June 7 the next year.
My daily postings were short and spotty. They were often hastily written in the evening and sketchy on specifics (I was a fulltime technical writer during the day). Thus, they were sometimes not completely accurate. Still, many in the email group found them informative and enlightening.
Strangely, as I wrote them, I found myself slipping into a strongly anecdotal style that increasingly began taking over the details as I delved deeper into the lives of these men. I realized with pleasure that this development made the daily log theme flow much better. And writing the daily particulars in the present tense highlighted the experience even more. As interesting to me were the new individual facts that I discovered from one day to the next as I researched each day to make my postings richer in detail.
The email series was quite a rewarding experience for me, and when it was over, I felt a sense of accomplishment as I went back to my original book, tentatively entitled Heeresgruppe B. Unfortunately, an intense technical writing career and American Legion activities over the next decade substantially slowed the development of that work.
It had been styled originally as another history book written in the classic chronological format so prevalent in the thousands of volumes on military history, and so common in the few hundred that had so far been written on the Normandy invasion. Some twelve years later, though, armed with a good deal of additional research (historical and personal information), and using the contributions of many other authors and their fine works, I found myself coming back to the idea of writing, initially as a companion to my main work, a daily log counting down to the invasion as seen from the German side, and focusing as much on the minutiae of the officers’ lives as on the military events that they undertook.
As the idea of focusing more on minor personal details again took hold, I began updating, editing, augmenting, and in general revamping the previous material that I had originally submitted in emails, a bit of which by now had made its way to the Internet. Thus, although it follows a conventional chronological layout, this story is somewhat different than the usual yet not ineffectual accounts of the invasion. It is told exclusively from the viewpoint of the Germans, in a similar vein to (and borrowing elements from) Paul Carell’s Invasion! They’re Coming! (Sie Kommen!). I tried, though, to mold some style along the lines of Cornelius Ryan’s great classic, The Longest Day (his exhaustive notes for which I was fortunate enough to mine extensively).
I was intrigued by all the missing personal details regarding what the Germans were doing in those critical months when the Allies were finalizing their operational plans. I hope this work fills in many of those gaps. Unfortunately for Rommel, he was asleep at home in Germany when the invasion began. Still, his part in the story is more critical than anyone’s, because he was in operational command, and it was his plan that was at stake: would it be followed, or not?
Joseph E. Perisco wrote in the introduction to his excellent book, Nuremberg— Infamy on Trial, about the style of his account. I considered this writing style somewhat similar to my own, so it bears repeating:
My treatment of [this story] is intended for the lay reader and general student of history more than for the academic or legal historian. For that reason, I have chosen a strongly narrative style… The style does not influence the factual foundations of the book… When I have described subjects of the present work as thinking, saying, or doing something, I have drawn from their own writings, letters, oral and written histories, and from other books, archival documents, contemporary press accounts ... [and] interviews... The account is narrative supported by historic fact.
Like him, I chose a strong narrative style, although I have kept it strictly within the bounds of historical accuracy. Everything that people in this book do, say and think is based on factual sources. By choosing this style of writing, I hope to present an accurate account, bringing to life characters that, in the last few decades, have become dry figures who lived some seventy years ago during a long-past war. These people, good or bad, right or wrong, were still living human beings with human failings, caught up in a world war that they had helped create through their own shortsightedness and hubris, embroiled in a conflict that now threatened to destroy their country, their families, and ultimately, their own lives.
While this book is, first and foremost, a chronicle of German lives and deeds, I have at times briefly described what the Allies were up to on a particular date.
I believe this is helpful sometimes to add context and to make sense of German responses to Allied operations. Passages set in italics refer to the Allies’ movements.
My wife often accuses me of being “wordy” (“I am a tech writer dear,” I point out with a smile), and this effort seems to underscore that statement (I am sure my publisher would agree). As further narratives were added to the countdown and my interest in this approach grew, w
ith a substantial part of the added information coming from my original work, Heeresgruppe B, the relatively short 180-page countdown grew expansively. I finally realized that my countdown, especially when I added maps and photos, had overtaken the original work and become the final outcome.
I hope though that, in the end, this just makes for better reading. Most of the original information herein is now clearer and much more accurate, and a huge amount of new detail gives the log a much more complete image of the German day-to-day events of the time. I also strove to give the narrative that strong slant towards the personal experiences of those involved, if for no other reason than to make the account more personable and realistic, and not come off as yet another dry history book. After all, the history of the invasion has been recounted time and time again. This account centers exclusively on the day-to-day activities of the German officers as the huge, impending, inevitable enemy invasion loomed ever nearer.
Peter Margaritis, January 30, 2019
Prelude: 1943
Status of the West
By the late fall of 1943, World War II had dragged into its fifth year. Germany, once by far the dominant force in the war, was now struggling hard to defend its Third Reich. Though its forces had once been augmented by Italy and several Eastern European allies, the Reich now stood alone. Its armies, still strong but now beleaguered, braced against many powerful enemies arrayed against them on several fronts.
In the East, the Reich faced a constantly strengthening Soviet Union, a phenomenon that baffled a German High Command that had at once considered the Russians inferior and on the brink of defeat. In collapsed Italy, German divisions defended themselves halfway down the peninsula against a modern American army and a British army, both of which were well supplied by sea and air.
At sea, Germany’s dwindling naval assets were bottled up in various harbors, often in the process of repair, owing to either breakdown or enemy attack. The once majestic Italian Navy was now a ghost fleet. In the Atlantic, the U-boats battled feebly against numerically and technologically superior Allied naval task forces. Hunter-killer carrier groups sailed everywhere and rendered every patch of sea dangerous for submarines. In the skies over occupied Europe, the once-powerful Luftwaffe now struggled savagely, desperately, against an Allied bombing campaign that pummeled the Reich’s industry by day and by night.
All the while, the German High Command worriedly eyed Western Europe. The buildup of forces in England continued intermittently, but relentlessly, as the Western Allies developed their plans for the long-expected invasion of Europe. This was the major campaign that the Russians grumbled was two years overdue. Still, everyone knew it would inevitably come, and strategists on both sides believed that if successful, it would signal the beginning of the end for the Third Reich.
The German fronts were divided geographically, with titles mostly given from a sense of direction. Each front had an assigned top commander, usually a field marshal. He was responsible for the coordinated operations of all services in that area. Field Marshal Kesselring, for instance, was Oberbefehlshaber Süd, the Mediterranean Theater commander. The vast Eastern Front had at any one time at least three front commanders. In Western Europe, the title of Oberbefehlshaber West (OB West) gave full command of all German forces there.
Although each commander was directly responsible for his area, his multi-force total command authority was in reality quite limited to in-theater regular, reserve, or training Army units, and very limited operational aspects for units of other services, such as marine battalions, SS units, Schnelleboote squadrons, Luftwaffe squadrons, airborne units, police or odd service battalions. Direct aspects of authority over these non-army units were retained by their service commands, including occasional command aspects from special high administrative authorities of that service or political branch. And of course, overall control came from the German High Command and the Führer himself. These muddled lines of authority often resulted in unwieldy, confusing, and ineffective command chains.
The current Oberbefehlshaber West was 66-year-old Generalfeldmarschall Gerd Von Rundstedt. By the time he had been reappointed OB West in March of 1942, he had become a legend in the Wehrmacht.1 He had led Germany to victory over Norway and the Low Countries in the spring of 1940, and subsequently in May and June, over longtime rival France. After his wildly successful blitzkrieg across that country had forced the stunned, humiliated French to surrender, he had been promoted to field marshal on July 19. He was then immediately tasked with planning Operation Sealion (Seelöwe), the invasion of Great Britain. However, the Luftwaffe never could gain control of the skies over England, and in mid-September, the Führer reluctantly decided to postpone the invasion. On October 10 though, instead of being able to retire, von Rundstedt was appointed Oberbefehlshaber West and given command of the forces in Western Europe. He was tasked with developing a defensive barrier all along the coast. He did very little though to build up defenses in those five and a half months, his excuse being a shortage of materials. Besides, the downfall of England seemed just a matter of time.
At the beginning of April 1941, he had relinquished command of the Western Theater2 to become, reluctantly, one of the major architects of Unternehmen (Operation) Barbarossa. His assigned command became Heeresgruppe Süd.3 This epic invasion of Russia, initially a magnificent success that started in late June, had however stalled by December as a harsh Russian winter set in. The field marshal became embroiled in a dispute with the Führer over whether to withdraw his spent units and regroup. Angry and fed up with this upstart leader, von Rundstedt had angrily demanded, and was granted, permission to be relieved, his excuse being his health. Hitler soon realized, though, that he had been wrong in their quarrel and had lost a valuable leadership asset. So eventually, he forced himself to swallow his pride and persuaded the field marshal to serve yet again the next spring, this time coming back again as the overall commander of the forces on the Western Front.
Now back again as OB West, von Rundstedt made sure that coastal defenses were always a point on his agenda. Still, in the spring of 1943, after a short rest at the Bad Tölz spa, he traveled to the Berghof in Bavaria4 for a war conference. There he was to confer with the Führer55 on a number of subjects, mostly the defense of the West, which he had outlined in War Directive No. 40, dated March 23, 1942. It was his major concern, even though he still monitored the situation in the East.
During that April trip to the Berghof, von Rundstedt’s operations chief, Oberst! Bodo Zimmermann, 6 briefed him on what to say there. Zimmermann, a pleasant fellow of medium build and height, with a short, clipped mustache, had been sent to Bad Tölz at the last minute by Günther Blumentritt, the OB West chief of staff, on a special mission. Zimmermann was to convince the old man to use this opportunity to convince the Führer that construction of defenses in the West was lagging, and that they needed help.
At the subsequent meeting with the Führer, von Rundstedt expressed his dissatisfaction with the existing level of defenses. He complained about a lack of materials, and shortages of manpower. Also, units coming to France stayed only long enough to recuperate before they were off to the East.
Hitler’s response held a general lack of interest. To him, the West was a backwater theater, and thus a low priority. All of his attention was on the grave, situation in the East. Stalingrad had fallen to the surprisingly ferocious Soviet Army a couple months before, and Hitler, still bristling from the defeat and the surrender of his entire élite Sixth Army, was hell-bent on revenge, impatient for the spring thaws to come. Then the Reich would initiate a mighty, vengeful counteroffensive in what he was sure would end up a decisive victory over those “Russian mongrels.” He bragged glowingly about how in a few months, his smashing attack with some two thousand panzers would wipe out over 90 Russian divisions.
Hitler then spoke somewhat cynically about Italy. Things were not good there politically or economically, and getting worse by the day. Mussolini would probably soon be thro
wn out and the Italians would then turn against the Reich.
“And if that happens,” he continued with a frown, “I’ll have to disarm the Italian Fourth Army and take over its area with our own troops... Our own troops...” he trailed off. Then there were the units in Greece...
Perhaps sensing at that point that von Rundstedt was getting ready to launch into a speech about his own area, Hitler suddenly ended the discussion by thanking him and wishing him a safe trip back. Thrown off balance, von Rundstedt clumsily thanked him for his time. Hitler then bid him farewell and the field marshal was politely but unceremoniously dismissed to go back to Paris and somehow deal with his problems. He confusedly mumbled his goodbyes and left. The problems in the West would just have to wait.
On the return trip to France, the field marshal bitterly reflected on Hitler’s callous dismissal of his problems. An aristocratic Prussian, von Rundstedt had never believed the Führer to be a brilliant strategist, not even way back in 1940. And he hated to be around that Bohemian corporal7 when his cutthroat, toady, fanatical, uncouth, cacophonous Nazi minions were present. Von Rundstedt had once confided to his chief of staff, Günther Blumentritt, that he wanted no part of the New Order’s high command. He just wanted to be head of the Heeres, to be in parades, and to ride his horse around in Potsdam. After all, at 67 years of age, he could easily retire if he wanted to.
So why did he continue to serve?
“The Fatherland is in danger,” he had once groused, “and like an old cavalry horse, if I stayed at home, I would feel ashamed.” He certainly was not still in uniform for any riches or decorations, or even for rank. He already had plenty of each. “One cannot be higher than a field marshal!” he had once boasted.
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