Rommel heads back to his headquarters late that afternoon.
1Generalmajor Erwin Sander, commanding.
Saturday, April 8
Fortresses.
Again, the subject plagues Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt’s mind and fouls his mood. This damned problem has been a thorn in his side for months now. He personally thinks these monstrosities are archaic and not worth the effort to build and maintain, especially with limited resources.
Hitler of course feels differently. He wants the entire coast stiffly defended, utilizing a series of citadels to be established and strengthened. And while he is not particularly fond of prepared fortifications in the field, he is an avid disciple of steel and concrete bunkers in principle, and thus simply enamored of the concept of the impenetrable fortress. To him, they imply resolute bastions that can be relied upon to hold indefinitely against any determined enemy.
Von Rundstedt does not agree at all, but unfortunately, OKW does (naturally). So the directives have gone out. Because of these, von Rundstedt must cover selected portions of the coast that are either immediately threatened or considered by him to be likely targets for a landing.
One such area is obviously the Straits of Dover. Closest to England and a straight shot into the industrial Ruhr Valley, it naturally invites some type of enemy landing, even if diversionary. Besides, that is the area where the new V-1 and V-2 rocket sites are being located. Surely the enemy through their photographic reconnaissance would know about them by now.
The estuaries of the Seine and Somme Rivers—these too are likely targets. Also considered vital are the many large French ports being used by the Kriegsmarine for their soon-to-be-revitalized U-boat campaign: Bordeaux, Lorient, St. Nazaire, La Rochelle, and Brest, all in the Seventh Army Sector. These main harbors have also been designated by the Führer to be “fortresses” and now have to be reinforced as such. Also in Seventh Army sector are Cherbourg and St. Malo.
In the Netherlands sector are Ijmuiden and the Hook of Holland. In the Fifteenth Army sector, there are the vital ports of Dunkirk, Boulogne, and Le Havre. And of course, the politically critical but militarily useless Channel Islands.
Hitler over time has re-emphasized the importance of strengthening all these ports. He has started to refer to them with pride as his powerful fortresses within his grand Festung Europa. Clearly, the man is infatuated with the term. And even “Marschall Bubi” has picked up the tune. Army Group B has added Vlissingen, Ostende, and Calais to the list.
Well, the hell with them all. He has already argued a number of times with OKW against expanding them. In his opinion, fortresses are just a waste of time and limited resources. Have those idiots already forgotten how they outflanked and neutralized the Maginot Line in May of 1940? Have they forgotten that those monstrous, intricate French bunker positions ended up being little use to the enemy? Or what
Frederick the Great (whom his ancestors had served valiantly) once said: “He who defends everything defends nothing.” Well, this is a classic case.
But this is different, they counter. These would be along the coast, against an amphibious landing. A fortress would stop the enemy from establishing a nearby beachhead.
Sure it would, he thinks sourly. A halfway-intelligent enemy would just land a bit down the coast from one (or drop an airborne detachment behind the lines), cut the fortress off, and either take it from the landward side, or besiege it until it surrendered. His staff have a standing joke about these land elephants. If a commander wants to improve the defense of a particular position, all he has to do is designate it a “fortress.” The sad part is that this is to a certain extent true. Redefining a port as a fortress means that it will now automatically have extra supplies and reinforcements allocated to its garrison, resources that could go to better fortify retaliating units.
According to OKW, each fortress is to have garrisoned within its walls one to two infantry divisions. Ha! Reine Wahnsinn! (“Pure madness!”) He will be lucky to find two or three coastal battalions to defend each one. Unfortunately, as far as OKW is concerned, the shortage of troops does not affect the responsibilities of the garrison commanders. Each has been personally appointed by the Führer. As a fortress commandant, each had to sign a sworn affidavit stating that he would hold his fortress to the last man, no matter what orders he received from a higher command, or how woefully inadequate his defense force might be. The penalty for disobeying was of course, implied in the very nature of the affidavit.
To make matters worse, each commandant quickly found out that controlling his own fortress units was difficult. His authority over his charged area was somewhat limited, since the navy, air force, and of course, the SS also had some control over their units under him, even if their power was only administrative. Thus, if a matter of discipline arose with one of these units, the respective service higher authority had to be coerced into taking action. Naturally, if an enemy force engaged the garrison, the commandant had the authority to assume all facets of command for every unit within his garrison. Of course by then, it would be too late to do anything more than just try to hang on and hope for a rescue.
Over the last four months, OB West has tried to strengthen the fortresses with additional detachments. Dubbed “alarm units” (Alarmeinheiten), they were supposed to assist in training and augment a fortress’s defense during an invasion. In reality, they were little more than inexperienced dock workers, poorly armed but in uniform.
Any way you looked at it, a fortress commandant was in a tricky position.
Von Rundstedt is at least thankful about one thing. Despite all their differences in defensive theories, Rommel firmly agrees with him that the independent fortress concept is a bad idea. They both believe that each fortress should remain under the command of the local division rather than become autonomous organizations. Militarily this is common sense, but naturally, the Führer will not relent. He wants his fortresses independent and directly under OKW control. Another chain-of-command problem that must be worked out. Another example of Hitler diluting, dividing, and confusing the authority chain below him.
Amateurs…
Sunday, April 9
GeneralOberst! Alfred Jodl reports to the Führer about concrete shortages for defensive works on the Atlantic Wall. When Hitler grouses that OKW should have apportioned enough allotments in the first place, Jodl points out (is his tone perhaps a bit smug?) that it was the Führer himself who had picked the target figure of 1.3 million cubic meters of concrete last year. Since the war conferences were by then being meticulously recorded by stenographers (Jodl reflects on their wild run-in back in September of 1942), 1 the number picked is of course available for review. Fuming, Hitler tells him to appropriate special measures to get more concrete.
Jodl makes a note to inform Heeresgruppe B.
***
Although it is Easter, today is a busy day at La Roche-Guyon. An early communiqué comes in from OKW concerning Holland. OKW has given them permission to move any mobile formations in that area (including the still still-forming 12th SS Hitlerjugend) forward. Local SS detachments are not to be worried about because, should any landing occur nearby, they will automatically move against the enemy. Permission to use the Hermann Göring Panzer Regiment, currently reorganizing in Tuscany but slated to move to France, will of course, have to come from the Reichsmarshal himself.
Günther Blumentritt shows up for a noontime conference. The topic for discussion is the rapid deployment of the mobile units—again, the panzer reserve issue. Where to put both the 12th SS and the 2nd Panzer, which has been recently refitted?2
In the afternoon, General Baron Geyr von Schweppenburg arrives to talk to Rommel.3 Actually, with few panzers left in France, he finds himself with hardly any large units to train for inland maneuvers. But about strategy—the question of placing panzer units close to the sea—well, Rommel would just have to see the light.
Unfortunately for the baron, he has picked the wrong day to try to chan
ge the field marshal’s mind. Rommel is not in a good mood. And since Rommel’s senior staff members have seen a confrontation coming for a while now, harsh words are likely.
Both men have impressive backgrounds, their war deeds impressive. Rommel though is a field marshal; von Schweppenburg is a General der Panzertruppen. Still, Geyr is a prime example of the Western Theater Command. Perhaps his aristocratic Brandenburg demeanor and General Staff training lead him to feel that he has an edge over this common Swabian who had been somewhat lucky in remote, primitive North Africa against limited Allied forces. Or perhaps it is his experiences on the Eastern Front, something the so-called “Desert Fox” lacks entirely. Geyr also considers his experience under von Rundstedt (a close friend), and his present command role, qualifications to be able to freely exchange theories with the field marshal. In any case, Geyr could be in for a small shock.
Rommel has long known the score regarding Allied naval and air capabilities in paralyzing armored movement, and has experienced too many air raids himself, often in an open, uncomfortably prone position. So he is in no mood to listen to this upstart.4 Although aware of the many panzer divisions lost against Russia, he is also tired of hearing from these Eastern Front veterans about the great capabilities of powerful mobile reserves. These fellows do not know what they are up against. Effective air power will knock the stuffing out of their columns long before they reach their targets. He knows. He has lived through it, with men sometimes getting hit right next to him.
Gause ushers Geyr into Rommel’s office. The baron wastes no time and begins stating his case on why the panzers have to be moved inland and grouped for maneuvers.
Rommel, ready for the worst, listens to the general begin his arguments, but he does not pay attention for long. Geyr only gets to expound his generally accepted theories for a few minutes, mentioning what experiences have taught panzer commanders in Russia, when the field marshal loses his temper.
“Listen,” he snarls in a frustrated tone, interrupting the baron in mid-sentence. “I am an experienced tank commander too. You and I do not see eye to eye on anything. I refuse to work with you anymore.”
After a moment of silence, he snaps, “I propose to draw the appropriate conclusions.” Had he been able to, Rommel would have fired him then and there.
Cut short by the field marshal, Geyr, obviously dismissed, is speechless with rage. Gathering what little ego he has left, he salutes the field marshal sharply, does an about face and marches out of the room. On the way out he repeats in his mind that he will never let himself be insulted like that by Rommel again. And he will never again speak to the field marshal, unless he absolutely has to.
Rommel’s summary in the war diary of the incident is a dry and laconic remark:
Strong difference of opinion, with no positive result.
That night, Rommel has dismissed the incident and his mood has improved. He writes:
An endless amount of work must be done around here in order that we are 100 percent ready when the battle starts. Many weak points will have to be strengthened by then.
Yesterday I was boar hunting. We shot four sows and one fox. The former will improve our rations.
Today General Marcks, commanding the 84th Corps in Normandy, writes to his mother, telling her that he is well and hopes she is too. He sends her a small photo of himself posing with Rommel. The field marshal is not smiling, and Marcks explains to her:
As you can see in the small picture, Rommel does not usually look friendly. He is usually very serious, and if someone displeases him, he becomes quite coarse in his rude, pigheaded Swabian way.
1See Prelude.
2According to Nafziger’s detailed volume on German panzer formations, the 2nd Panzer was taken out of combat in the middle of January 1944, refitted (including conversion of one panzer battalion to Panther Mark Vs), and made operational again by the end of February.
3Irving wrote that this meeting took place on March 29. Ruge also thoroughly documented Rommel’s itinerary for March 29 in his book, and Geyr von Schweppenburg does not appear anywhere in it. There are though, confirmed accounts of a visit by General Hermann Geyer, who had stopped by to say goodbye to Rommel. Irving probably got the names (and thus the dates) mixed up, which is understandable. Admiral Ruge wrote that although Rommel and von Schweppenburg indeed had two such conferences; one around March 16 and the other on April 9; he suggests that this particular conference took place on April 9. This is reinforced by the fact that the two had only just briefly met each other in March.
4Geyr had only just turned 48, and although he had experience on the General Staff, his combat command had never been higher than a panzer corps—the 24th, the 20th, and finally the 58th—all on the Eastern Front.
Monday April 10
Rommel and Gause leave to meet with von Rundstedt and Blumentritt at their bunker headquarters in St.-Germain-en-Laye. They start off by discussing the disposition of their troops. Then, with Baron von Schweppenburg present, Rommel relates the details of their frustrating meeting yesterday, and an intense argument ensues. The old Prussian, bemused by “the young cub’s” complaints, listens casually, nodding occasionally. Finally, the old man replies that while he understands Rommel’s point of view, he nevertheless agrees with Geyr’s theories of holding back the panzer reserves.
This does not make Rommel happy. He braces himself, and immediately goes over to the map table. Rommel now having been officially given command of the 2nd Panzer, he says that he has thought about it, and suggests that he put the 2nd Panzer both sides of the Somme River, near its mouth. That way, no matter which side of the river the invasion begins, half the division will be able to move immediately against it, while the other half struggles to find means to cross the river.
Von Rundstedt just frowns. It is bad enough that Rommel has wrangled another panzer division out from the shrinking mobile reserve, but now the fool proposes to position it straddling a river, like some fearful bull embarrassingly hung up on a fence.
“You know, my dear Rommel,” he begins with a sneer, “I’m too old for these things,” referring to their periodical conflicts. “But once upon a time, we old timers learned a little bit too.”
“I take it you object,” Rommel says coldly. He adds, “I have my orders from the Führer.”
“Ah,” the old man snarls and, losing his temper, he curses—something he rarely does in front of his surprised chief of staff.
He angrily walks over to the map table and points to Rommel’s proposed position for the 2nd Panzer. “This set-up at Abbéville—half a division on the right, and half on the left bank... It’s just no good. It ought to be there,” he barks as he points to Amiens, “further inland.”
Rommel silently looks at the map.
“But as far as I’m concerned, you do your own damned business in your own damned way.” The old Prussian angrily turns away from Rommel.
Rommel glances at von Rundstedt, and then departs himself.
Returning to his headquarters irritated, Rommel finds out that the Allies naturally are doing their share to make his day miserable. In addition to air strikes against their communications infrastructure, they are now bombing critically important positions along the coastline day and night. A good-sized raid just today has knocked out the large Octeville naval battery, just north of Le Havre.
As a remedy against these attacks, Rommel borrows a common trick from his North African days. He has ordered his construction gangs to build a number of Scheinbatterien—dummy batteries. Using cheap or natural materials, they begin to set up false positions, chosen by him, at various key locations around the coast.
While construction of these fake targets takes a degree of time and resources away from the real defensive work that is being done, the results prove worthwhile. A number of bombing raids are diverted to these worthless positions, and as a result, fewer real batteries are hit.
Before retiring that evening, Rommel shares his thoughts on today’s meeting. F
irst in a letter to Alfred Jodl, he writes:
In my view, any strategic airborne landing by the enemy is doomed to disaster sooner or later, PROVIDED we succeed in sealing the coast.
Then he writes to Lucie:
Today I went to see Rundstedt. Things have not turned out the way I had believed they would on 21 March. One does not want a cabinet crisis1 here, and I have to give in. Nevertheless, I’m going to have my own way in the essentials…
***
The subject of the invasion of Europe is again discussed at length during Hitler’s daily main conference. In an April 9 report from Fremde Heeres West, Roenne reports:
With the weather situation now favorable too, the general picture is rounded off in the previously reported sense of the launching of a major attack being possible at any moment. The timing of the attack is strongly influenced by political considerations, and despite countless rumors, pertinent concrete information has not become available.
A few more recent reports at different levels again suggest that the invasion might not even come this year. An aide to Propaganda Minister Goebbels today writes:
The question whether the Allied invasion in the West is coming or not dominates all political and military discussion here.
Goebbels is afraid that the Allies dare not make the attempt yet. If so, that would mean for us many months of endless, weary waiting which would test our strength beyond endurance. Our war potential cannot now be increased, it can only decline. Every new air raid makes the petrol position worse.
1Rommel was informed of a communiqué that von Rundstedt had sent to OKW. He had told Hitler essentially that if the Führer and OKW did not allow him to command in the West his own way, then he would most likely “quit.” Whether that meant tendering his resignation, asking to be relieved on conditions of bad health, or just plain retiring, was not made known. One thing was sure—Hitler was not prepared at this time to relieve the old man. So he rethought his decision to give Rommel the reserve panzers, the concesion that he had magnanimously made back at the March conference.
Countdown to D-Day Page 44
