by Chen Jack W
should be noted that Jiyou’s poisoning of Shuya is less excusable than the
Duke of Zhou’s actions). The veritable records no longer exist, but the
fact that the Jiu Tang shu uses the normative term zhu 誅—which means
“to execute,” or “to kill with moral sanction”—does indicate that Tai-
zong’s intervention did have some effect.49
Despite the influence probably exerted by Taizong on the historiogra-
phy of his reign, there was little that could be done to whitewash the
transgressive violence of the Xuanwu Gate Incident. Even Sima Guang,
who seems to have accepted the official account of Taizong’s role in the
Taiyuan rebellion, nevertheless found common ground with his near-
contemporary Cheng Yi. I quote in full the Song historian’s comment:
Your servant Guang says: “To establish the eldest son as one’s heir is correct rit-
ual. However, the reason why Gaozu won the empire was entirely due to Tai-
zong’s deeds. The Yin Crown Prince [Jiancheng] placed mediocre and inferior
men at his right hand; when the situation became critical, they naturally could
not support one another. If Gaozu had had the insight of King Wen [who set
aside his eldest son for the future King Wu 武王 (r. 1049/45–1043 bc)],50 if the Yin
Crown Prince had had the sageliness of Taibo [who ceded the kingdom to his
younger brother],51 if Taizong had had the principle of Zi Zang [who refused the
offer of a kingdom],52 then how could this disorder have occurred? Even though
—————
49. See the capsule account of this incident in Jiu Tang shu, 2.29.
50. See Shi ji, 35.1563.
51. See Shi ji, 31.1445.
52. See Zuo zhuan, Duke Cheng 成公, 15th year / Chunqiu Zuo zhuan zhu, p. 873.
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Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
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it could not be like that, at the outset Taizong could have waited for their first
strike and afterwards responded. In this fashion, the incident would not have
been to seize his own advantage, and even that would have been better. As it was,
he was pressed by his subordinates, resulting in the bloodshed at the palace gates
and the turning of weapons against his own kin. This has earned him the sneers
of all time—what a shame! Now a sovereign who founds a dynasty and leaves a
legacy will be the model for his sons and grandsons. In the successive reigns of
Zhongzong, Minghuang [Xuanzong], Suzong, and Daizong, wasn’t there some-
one they were imitating, as their excuse?53
臣光曰：立嫡以長，禮之正也。然高祖所以有天下，皆太宗之功；隱
太子以庸劣居其右，地嫌勢逼，必不相容。曏使高祖有文王之明，隱
太子有泰伯之賢，太宗有子臧之節，則亂何自而生矣！既不能然，太
宗始欲俟其先發，然後應之，如此，則事非獲已，猶為愈也。既而為
群下所迫，遂至蹀血禁門，推刃同氣，貽譏千古，惜哉！夫創業垂統
之君，子孫之所儀刑也，彼中、明、肅、代之傳繼，得非有所指擬以
為口實乎！54
While Sima Guang believes that it is ritually correct to appoint the eldest
son as heir, he concedes that Shimin possessed greater merit than Jian-
cheng. The historian is alluding to the dilemma posed in the legends of
the sage-kings, wherein succession by primogeniture is contrasted with
succession by virtue.55 Looking back to the Zhou dynasty, Sima Guang
provides a series of exemplary models: first, King Wen of Zhou, who
passed over his eldest son, Bo Yikao 伯邑考; then Taibo 泰伯, who gave
up the throne in favor of his younger brother Wang Jili 王季歷 (the fa-
ther of the future King Wen); and finally, Zi Zang 子臧 (Zang Xibo 臧
僖伯), who refused the state of Cao 曹 despite the desire of the assembled
aristocracy to make him king.
In each case, the actions of Gaozu and his sons fall short of the sagely
examples of the past, and yet it is not simply the failure of the present
leaders to learn from the mirror of the past that concerns Sima Guang.
From the moment of the incident, the historian looks forward to the suc-
cessive reigns of the Tang, noting that the violence of the father would re-
—————
53. For the history of coups in the Tang, see Twitchett, “T’ang Imperial Family,” pp. 19–34.
Victor Xiong describes the coups of Taizong, Zhongzong, and Xuanzong, all of which
took place at the Xuanwu Gate, in his Sui-Tang Chang’an, pp. 65–66.
54. Zizhi tongjian, 191.6012–13.
55. See Allan, Heir and the Sage.
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Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
turn in the sons and grandsons of the Tang imperial house: Zhongzong
中宗 (r. 684, 705–10), Xuanzong 玄宗 (r. 712–56), Suzong 肅宗 (r. 756–
62), and Daizong 代宗 (r. 762–79). The fact that the coups of Zhong-
zong and Xuanzong both took place at the Xuanwu Gate was not lost on
the Song historian, who saw the repetitions of violence within the Tang
dynastic house as the result of Taizong’s originary violation of kinship,
the foundational moral code of Chinese civilization.
The “Good Government of the Zhenguan Reign”
Despite this inauspicious beginning, Taizong’s reign has been praised by
historians as the “Good Government of the Zhenguan Reign” ( Zhenguan
zhi zhi 貞觀之治).56 What exactly constituted the merits of the Zhen-
guan reign is a question that has attracted much scholarly attention, not
least of all because of the way Taizong’s reign has served as a political
model both in China and throughout East Asia.57 The historian Cen
Zhongmian summarizes the key attributes of the reign as follows: (1) a
welcoming and accepting attitude to criticism from his officials; (2) a de-
sire to promote talent and the knowledge of how to recognize and to em-
ploy the talents of others; (3) a constant vigilance towards possible dan-
gers despite the peace and prosperity of the era; (4) a conservative policy
towards the issuing of laws and ordinances; (5) a refraining from the mi-
cro-managing style of rulers such as Sui Wendi 隋文帝 (r. 581–604); and
(6) a de-emphasis on punishment in the governance of the people.58
Of these, it is the image of Taizong’s willingness to entertain the moral
remonstrances of his officials that has been most closely associated with
the “Good Government of the Zhenguan Reign,” and of his officials, it
was the minister Wei Zheng who, in the minds of later historians, most
—————
56. While the Zhenguan period was already being praised during the Tang dynasty, I am not certain when the encomium Zhenguan zhi zhi was first used. A relatively early instance appears in a discussion on Tang Taizong between Emperor Lizong of the Song 宋
理宗 (r. 1224–64) and the minister You Si 游似 (d. 1252). See Tuotuo (Toghto) 脫脫
(1313–55), ed., Song shi, 417.12497.
57. A certain amount of caution is necessary her
e, as there is sometimes a tendency to credit Taizong with policies that actually had originated with Tang Gaozu or during the Sui.
As an example of this bias, see Han Guopan, “Lun Tang Taizong,” pp. 4–7.
58. Cen, Sui Tang shi, pp. 112–13.
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Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
33
exemplified the spirit of unyielding morality. Yet, as Howard Wechsler
has pointed out, while Wei Zheng remains the best-known official of the
Zhenguan reign, he was neither the most influential nor the most inti-
mate of Taizong’s advisers.59 The reason why Wei Zheng has been so
closely identified with the Zhenguan government has much to do with
Wei Zheng’s portrayal in the Zhenguan zhengyao, as the very first passage
of the work shows:
In the second year of the Zhenguan reign, Taizong asked, “What would you call
an ‘enlightened sovereign’ and a ‘benighted sovereign’?” Zheng said, “What
makes a sovereign enlightened is being equally receptive [to all the opinions of his officials]. What makes him benighted is blind trust [in the views of favored officials]. In the Classic of Poetry, it is written, “The people of old had a saying, / ‘Ask among the grass-cutters and wood-gatherers’ [meaning that even the humblest of
subjects might have worthwhile advice].60 In the past, the way of Tang and Yu
was ‘to open the gates of the four quarters, and to gain illumination from the eyes
of the four quarters, and to gain understanding from the knowledge of the four
quarters’.61 In this way, there was nothing the sages did not illuminate, and thus
the followers of Gong[gong] and Gun could not impede them,62 and those who
‘when at rest brag but when employed prove untrustworthy’ could not deceive
them.63 The Second Emperor of the Qin hid himself away, cutting off the ties
[between himself and his officials]. He placed blind trust in Zhao Gao, so
—————
59. Wechsler, Mirror to the Son of Heaven, p. 87.
60. The quotation is from the poem “Awry” 板 (Poem 254) in the Shi jing 詩經 ( Classic of Poetry), which is cast as a remonstrance to the king in a time of calamity. See Mao Shi zhengyi, 17.4.281b, in Shisanjing zhushu, p. 549.
61. See Shang shu zhengyi, 3.18a, in Shisanjing zhushu, p. 130.
62. Gonggong 共工 and Gun 鯀 are both figures associated with floods in ancient China
and usually identified as rivals or failed ministers of the sage-kings. Wei Zheng mentions them here because in one account (from the Guoyu 國語 or Discourses of the States), they are depicted as attempting to stop flooding by blocking up the waterways, instead of the sagely method of opening up all channels so that even the swamps are linked to the seas.
See Lewis, Flood Myths of Early China, pp. 40–43.
63. Wei refers to Yao 堯 and his criticism of Gonggong, which is in this case the official title of the minister of works. In the “New Text” version of the Classic of Documents, this would be from the “Canon of Yao” 堯典. Taizong’s court, however, would have used the
“Old Text” version, in which this would belong to the subdivided section of the “Canon of Shun” 舜典. See Shang shu zhengyi, 2.10a, in Shisanjing zhushu, p. 122.
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Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
even when the empire was ruined and in revolt, he did not hear news of it.64
Liang Wudi placed blind trust in Zhu Yi, and when Hou Jing raised troops and
approached the capital watchtowers, even then he did not learn of it.65 Sui Yang-
di placed blind trust in Yu Shiji, and when all the rebels attacked and carved up
the cities, he did not get to know of it.66 For this reason, when the sovereign of
men is equally receptive and accepting of his subordinates, then powerful officials
will not get to block the channels [of communication], and the feelings of those
below will certainly be able to reach those above.” Taizong very much approved
of these words.
貞觀二年，太宗問魏徵曰：“何謂為明君暗君？”徵曰：“君之所以
明者，兼聽也；其所以暗者，偏信也。《詩云》：‘先民有言，詢於芻
蕘’。昔唐、虞之理，‘闢四門，明四目，達四聰’。是以聖無不照，故
共、鯀之徒，不能塞也；‘靖言庸回’，不能惑也。秦二世則隱藏其身，
損隔踈賤而偏信趙高，及天下潰叛，不得聞也。梁武帝偏信朱异，而
侯景舉兵向闕，竟不得知也。隋煬帝偏信虞世基，而諸賊攻城剽邑，
亦不得知也。是故人君兼聽納下，則貴臣不得壅蔽，而下情必得上通
也。”太宗甚善其言。67
This passage is exemplary of the Zhenguan zhengyao’s underlying motive,
foregrounding the theme of good relations and open channels of commu-
nication between the sovereign and his ministers. Indeed, the truly en-
lightened sovereign, according to Wei Zheng, is not simply one who pos-
sesses great virtue or ability, but instead is one who maintains impartiality
toward the court and understands the importance of faithful, loyal offi-
cials.
—————
64. The eunuch Zhao Gao 趙高 (d. 207 bc) helped Qin Ershihuang 秦二始皇 (Second
Emperor of the Qin; r. 210–207 bc) seize the throne after the First Emperor’s death; he rose from being the Second Emperor’s legal tutor to his most trusted adviser and prime minister, and in the end, his assassin. See Shi ji, 6.264–75.
65. The Liang military commander Zhu Yi 朱异 (483–549) dismissed the warlord Hou
Jing 侯景 (d. 552) as a credible threat to the Liang and did not bother to report Hou Jing’s advance upon the capital to the throne. See Yao Cha 姚察 (533–606) and Yao Silian 姚思
廉 (557–637), comps., Liang shu, 56.841. Also see Pearce, “Who, or What, Was Hou Jing?”, p. 57.
66. Yu Shiji 虞世基 (d. 618) was the most powerful official of Yangdi’s court. In the last days of the Sui, rather than risk upsetting the emperor (who had fled to Jiangdu) with bad news, Yu kept the news of the widespread rebellions concealed. See Sui shu, 67.1573. Also see Xiong, Emperor Yang of the Sui Dynasty, p. 68.
67. See Zhenguan zhengyao, 1.2–3. This exchange is recorded somewhat differently in Zizhi tongjian, 192.6047.
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Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
35
Wei Zheng’s argument turns on a set of problems relating to the collec-
tion, management, and retrieval of information in a complex system. The
ruler may stand as the single person to whom Heaven has entrusted abso-
lute authority, but his very singularity is also his limitation: as one man,
there is no way for him to know first-hand the exact conditions of the en-
tire empire except through the reports of his officials. A sage would ask the
grass-mowers and firewood-gatherers, who possess true first-hand knowl-
edge of the conditions of the empire, and so the sovereign should at the very
least heed the advice of his ministers without favoritism. Wei Zheng con-
cludes by reminding Taizong of the examples of the Second Emperor of the
Qin, Liang Wudi 梁武帝 (r. 502–549), and Sui Yangdi, each
of whom fa-
vored the counsel of a single adviser and paid dearly for their partiality.
We find demonstrations of how Taizong learned this lesson throughout
the anecdotes preserved in both official and unofficial historical accounts
of the period. Typically, Taizong and his ministers enact a scene of instruc-
tion in which Taizong errs and then accepts the correction of his court. For
example, the Zizhi tongjian contains the following episode from 637:
In the eighth month, on the jiazi day, the emperor made an announcement to
the officials in attendance, saying: “Those who have submitted sealed memorials
to me have all said that We go on hunting expeditions too frequently. At present
the empire is without trouble, but military preparations cannot be forgotten.
From time to time We go hunting with Our entourage in the Rear Park; this
causes not an iota of bother to the people, so what harm is there in this?” Wei
Zheng said, “The former kings only feared that they would not hear of their
faults. Since Your Majesty has had the officials submit sealed memorials, You
have only treated with arrogance what they have related to You. If their sugges-
tions are worth adopting, then they indeed may benefit the state; if their words
are not worth adopting, then there is no harm in them.” The emperor said,
“What you, sir, have said is right.” Thus all the officials dedicated themselves to
dispatching recommendations.
八月，甲子，上謂侍臣曰：“上封事者皆言朕遊獵太頻。今天下無
事，武備不可忘，朕時與左右獵於後苑，無一事煩民，夫亦何傷。”
魏徵曰：“先王惟恐不聞其過。陛下既使之上封事，止得恣其陳述。
苟其言可取，固有益於國；若其無取，亦無所損。”上曰：“公言是
也。”皆勞而遣之。68
—————
68. Zizhi tongjian, 195.6131.
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36
Reading the Reign of Tang Taizong
The imperial hunt was the subject of much ministerial concern in impe-
rial China because the emperor hunted not for economic necessity but for
