The Poetics of Sovereignty

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The Poetics of Sovereignty Page 16

by Chen Jack W

However, what underlies this odd rhetorical antithesis is the recent mem-

  ory of Sui Yangdi, who terrorized his court and indulged himself in ex-

  —————

  77. See Wechsler, “T’ai-tsung (Reign 626–49) the Consolidator,” pp. 200–202.

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  On Sovereignty and Representation

  travagant pleasure excursions. Taizong, by recalling the Confucian sense

  of “roaming,” is both providing a critique of Yangdi’s tyranny and affirm-

  ing his own virtuous conduct. When Taizong speaks of roaming, he in-

  vokes the complex history of that term, and his choice to go roaming

  metaphorically through the past not only shows his fidelity to the words

  of Confucius, but also signals the ever-present possibility of tyranny that

  was embodied in Yangdi.

  Taizong’s meditation on historical texts may be seen as a kind of Hege-

  lian sublation ( Aufhebung) of Yangdi’s sensuous excursions, negating and

  translating the physical act of roaming into a spiritual one. Within He-

  gel’s philosophy, sublation names the central operation of consciousness

  as it progresses towards a higher state of self-knowledge, unfolding in a di-

  alectical manner, in which the initial term or thesis is both negated and

  preserved in its negation. For Hegel, this progression of consciousness

  takes place both in terms of the subjective and of the historical, so that it

  is not only the individual mind that experiences this kind of dialectical

  transformation, but also epochs of human civilization. 78 What may be

  understood by the term sublation, however, is not just the progression of

  consciousness through a metaphysical history, but precisely the dialectical

  form of a logic that simultaneously preserves what is negated. It is this log-

  ic that underlies Taizong’s historical revisionism and tropological con-

  sciousness insofar as Taizong envisions his own role through a complex

  awareness of past models that he seeks to overcome in the course of mak-

  ing his own claims of sovereignty. Throughout the “Golden Mirror,” he

  makes mention of virtuous rulers, such as the sage-kings Yao, Shun, and

  Yu 禹, and contrasts them to tyrants such as Jie (the last ruler of the Xia

  dynasty) and Zhou (the last ruler of the Shang). Though Taizong con-

  cludes that the Heaven-endowed natures ( xing 性) of the sage-kings were

  good and those of the tyrants not good, any determinism is balanced by

  the essay’s insistence on constant self-examination and reform. His own

  self thereby becomes the prism through which the past must be compre-

  —————

  78. The concept of Aufhebung is present throughout Hegel’s writings. A succinct discussion can be found in Hegel’s “Preface” to his Phenomenology of Spirit, § 59–66. See Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 36–41. A sublative logic also underlies the description of epochal historical development in Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction, pp. 124–31.

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  On Sovereignty and Representation

  85

  hended; he is the Hegelian synthesis in the dialectical operation of his-

  torical consciousness.

  Just as both sage-king and tyrant are aspects of the sovereign, Taizong

  recognizes that the imperial body is simultaneously the microcosm of em-

  pire and empire’s potential destruction, that it is both sovereign and lo-

  cust. As Taizong notes, the very supremacy of the sovereign is what also

  poses the greatest dangers:

  The sovereign of men resides in an honored and lofty position and wields the

  power over reward and punishment. Using the capacities and the might of the

  people, what could he undertake that would not be completed? What could he

  seek that would not be obtained?

  人君處尊高之位,執賞罰之權,用人之才,用人之力,何為不成,何

  求不得?

  Praise for the sovereign’s power is haunted by the knowledge that power

  can always be abused. The Warring States thinker Xunzi 荀子 (ca. 313–

  238 bc) once argued that in a world of unlimited desires ( yu 欲) but lim-

  ited material resources ( wu 物), there had to be a means by which the in-

  evitable chaos could be controlled. This was the function of ritual (li 禮),

  which apportioned things according to social hierarchy, thus allowing de-

  sires and resources to co-exist in equilibrium.79 While Xunzi describes the

  portions and insignia allotted to the sovereign within the ritual order, he

  does not acknowledge the more basic problem of how the sovereign can

  be limited within this order. What Taizong understands is that the sover-

  eign is the one figure whose limitless desires can always be realized, since

  the whole world is, in a sense, his portion.

  For Taizong, the only solution is the vigilant practice of imperial self-

  restraint. The sovereign may use “the capacities and might of the people,”

  but this also makes him absolutely dependent upon his subjects for the la-

  bor and the revenue that constitute the foundations of his power. The re-

  lationship between sovereign and subject is supposed to be a closed econ-

  omy of reciprocity, one in which the resources contributed by the empire

  are managed wisely by the sovereign and reinvested for the welfare of all.

  To waste the contributions of the empire in order to satisfy private desires

  would be to lead the empire to ruin. It is at this point that Taizong turns

  —————

  79. See the opening passage of “Discourse on Ritual” 禮論篇, in Xunzi jijie, 13.19.346.

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  On Sovereignty and Representation

  to the contrast between the example of the tyrant and that of the sage.

  Here is his description of tyrannical rulership:

  If he were to build numerous ponds and viewing towers, and seek faraway for rare

  treasures, then the menfolk would not get to till and weed, and the womenfolk

  would not get to raise silkworms and weave. The fields would grow wild, liveli-

  hoods would be abandoned, and the common multitudes would die out. If he

  could see their hunger and cold and not sorrow for them, or gaze upon their toil

  and suffering and not be moved by them, then he is a sovereign who makes his

  people suffer, not a ruler who governs his people.

  多營池觀,遠求異寶,民不得耕耘,女不得蠶織,田荒業廢,兆庶凋

  殘。見其饑寒,不為之哀,睹其勞苦,不為之感,苦民之君也,非治

  民之主也。

  Taizong then continues with his description of sagely rulership:

  However, if he were to reduce taxation and lighten mandatory labor, all

  households would have enough to sustain them. From above, there would

  be no harsh orders of exaction; from below, there would be the singing of

  ballads in praise. Repressing the desires of the [ruler’s] one body would de-

  light the people of the world. The
ruler who worries over his state is the sov-

  ereign who delights his people.

  簿賦輕徭,百姓家給。上無暴令之徵,下有謳歌之詠。屈一身之欲,

  樂四海之民,憂國之主也,樂民之君也。

  Both of these models are framed by discussions of the economic and social

  impact of the imperial pleasure. As with the anecdote of Taizong’s en-

  counter with the locusts, it is the agricultural life of the people that is at

  stake. In the example of the tyrant, Taizong relates excessive expenditures

  to the ruination of the people’s livelihood. He then shifts to the subjective

  response of the sovereign who has inflicted such hardships upon his peo-

  ple: if he is able to look upon his suffering people and feel no sympathy on

  their behalf, then what he does cannot be said to be “governing” ( zhi 治).

  The good ruler, on the other hand, makes sure that state exactions do not

  result in famine and toil. Again, Taizong turns from the socioeconomic

  order back to the sovereign’s subjective response: if the sovereign worries

  ( you 憂) over his state, then he will ensure the happiness of his

  people.

  We now come upon the central point of the argument: “Repressing

  the desires of the [ruler’s] one body would delight the people of the

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  On Sovereignty and Representation

  87

  world.” The only solution to the fundamental inequality of sovereignty is

  to restrain the sovereign’s singular body (literally, his yishen 一身), an act of imperial askēsis. The very limitlessness of sovereign power is what requires the sovereign to impose such strict limits upon himself; these limits

  cannot, after all, be imposed from without. In this way, the imbalance be-

  tween the sovereign and his subjects would be corrected and the empire

  allowed to flourish. Taizong’s logic here is very similar to the two exam-

  ples quoted above from recorded speeches. There is a suspicion that the

  sovereign must contain himself in order for the empire to survive and

  prosper, that the locus of danger to the world resides in the very body of

  the ruler.

  Following the discussion of the body, Taizong returns to the topic of

  employing capable officials who will advise the sovereign, bringing up

  once again the necessity of a strong court that could counter any imperial

  tendencies towards partiality and self-deception. The problem is that even

  worthy men are never entirely good and the vicious never entirely evil,

  which complicates the job of the sovereign in selecting the best person for

  each office. The capacity to appreciate talent and to judge character is one

  of the qualities that the sovereign is supposed to possess, as his singular

  position situates him above the factions and interests of the court. At the

  same time, however, this state of exceptionality has other implications:

  As for the hardness and softness of temperament, each person is different; and in

  terms of nature, some are crooked and some are straight. In the rushing course of

  history from ancient times to the present, the noble and the base were not ranked

  together. How then could filiality for the one above be the same as that for those

  below? The one above rectifies the state and settles the household, setting his

  mind on preserving reverence and ritual, while those below wear expressions of

  delight and charm, only preserving respect and nurture [for their parents].

  夫人剛柔之情各異,曲直之性不同。古今奔馳,貴賤不等,為上之

  孝,與下豈均?上則匡國寧家,志存崇禮,下則承顏悅色,止存

  敬養。

  To speak of all filial virtue as the same is to ignore the complex tensions

  engendered by the political situation of kinship. The sovereign’s subjects

  are supposed to honor their parents, and although moral conflicts may

  arise if, for instance, one’s father decides to commit a crime, these are

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  On Sovereignty and Representation

  problems that can be resolved by choosing either loyalty to the sovereign

  or filiality to the parent.80 Taizong argues that the sovereign, by contrast,

  has no power of choice, since the welfare of the empire and its inhabitants

  is his only priority—he must always act in the public interest, regardless of

  the consequences in his private life.

  Taizong goes on to discuss both historical figures who had transgressed

  the bounds of conventional morality in service to their sovereigns. These

  are examples of heroic loyalty and despicable toadying, ostensibly to high-

  light the difficulty of the sovereign’s responsibility in employing worthy

  men at court. However, following the discussion of filiality, it is clear that

  Taizong also has another motive, one that becomes all the more obvious

  when he gives as his first example the Duke of Zhou. Taizong writes,

  “Grating against the ruler’s ears in order to tread the Way, he slew ‘those

  he cherished’ for the sake of pacifying the state—this was the Duke of

  Zhou” 逆主耳而履道,戮孔懷以安國,周公是也.81 Taizong is refer-

  ring to the succession crisis of following the Zhou conquest of the Shang.

  After the Duke of Zhou took the regency, his elder brother Guanshu

  Xian 管叔鮮 and his younger brother Caishu Du 蔡叔度 rebelled in the

  name of the Shang. The Duke of Zhou put down the rebellion, killing

  Guanshu Xian and banishing Caishu Du.82 The parallel to Taizong’s per-

  sonal history and the Xuanwu Gate Incident is clear, even if Taizong’s ac-

  tions do not precisely echo those of the Duke of Zhou. That is to say, by

  conventional definitions, Taizong may not have behaved with filiality or

  fraternity, but since his mind was set on the welfare of the empire, his acts

  were, in fact, exemplary in their virtue.

  Taizong returns to the theme of the sovereign’s hardships, claiming

  that no matter what the sovereign does, he will be criticized by the people

  for his failures and perceived weaknesses. He writes,

  If he turns his back on the Way and goes against the rites, not only will he injure

  himself, but moreover, will be the laughingstock of worthy men. If he humbles

  —————

  80. See the discussion of this issue in Rui Zhu, “What If the Father Commits a Crime?”

  81. The locus classicus of the phrase konghuai 孔懷 is “Dwarf Cherry” 常棣 (Poem 164) in the Classic of Poetry, which thematizes the love among brothers: “Death and loss is so dreadful / Only brothers will cherish one another” 死喪之威,兄弟孔懷. See Mao Shi

  zhengyi, 9.2.140b, in Shisanjing zhushu, pp. 407–408.

  82. See Shi ji, 4.132.

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  On Sovereignty and Representation

  89

  himself and carries out his tasks assiduously, he truly will be a superior man, but

  he will be sneered at by undistinguished men.

  背道違禮
,非惟損己,乃為賢人之所笑。卑身勵行,實為君子,又為

  庸夫之所譏。

  Taizong goes on to enumerate other examples of inevitable fault-finding

  by the emperor’s subjects, with the point that the sovereign may occupy

  the place of supreme power, but he is also the constant object of his sub-

  jects’ gazes. The watchful attention of the sovereign, who looks for talent

  and ability among his subjects, finds that his gaze is in fact thrown back

  upon him, that as he is evaluating his officials’ performances, they are also

  evaluating his own performance. It is this passage that speaks most clearly

  to Taizong’s consciousness of the imperial role, which traps the sovereign

  in a kind of public unfreedom by elevating him above all other men.

  Moreover, the power of the sovereign becomes the very source of his

  anxieties, as the decisions that he has to make are often decisions bound in

  dilemma. Taizong writes,

  Of the lands within the Four Seas, “none are not the king’s lands.”83 The outlying

  wildernesses are like branches and leaves, while the kingly domain is the root and

  trunk. The ancients said that if the skin is not preserved, on what will the hair

  depend?84 One should make the trunk firm and let the roots grow deep, and en-

  trust matters to the palace councilors—and so Yi Yin and Fu Yue were the sort

  that people hoped to encounter.85 When it comes to subjugating the frontiers of

  ice and keeping hold on the borderlands of flying snow, then Wei Shang and Li

  Mu are rarely met in these days.86 One may have to send forth men to pacify

  —————

  83. This line alludes to the poem “North Mountains” 北山 (Poem 205) in the Classic of Poetry. See Mao Shi zhengyi, 13.1.195b, in Shisanjing zhushu, p. 463. This particular verse is quoted throughout classical literature as an expression of sovereign power. See, for example, Mengzi 5A.4 / Mengzi zhengyi, 18.637–38. Taizong returns to this image often in his own writings.

  84. For the source of this phrase, see Zuo zhuan, Duke Xi 僖公, 14th year / Chunqiu Zuo zhuan zhu, p. 348.

  85. Yi Yin 伊尹 was the minister of Tang, the legendary founder of the Shang dynasty.

  See Shi ji, 3.93–99 passim. Fu Yue 傅說 was minister to Wuding 武丁, the first historical ruler of the Shang. Supposedly, Wuding dreamt that he had obtained the services of a sage, and when he searched for this man, discovered him to be a convict-laborer. See Shi ji, 3.102.

 

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