by Eckart Frahm
At the end of his reign, Iranzu’s situation deteriorated. In 719 he relied on Sargon II for military assistance against the encroachment of his most dangerous Mannean rival, Metatti, the king of Zikirtu, who was allied with the Urartians. When Iranzu died, his son and successor Aza soon fell prey to his ambitious brother Ullusunu, who first seized the throne by force with Urartian assistance but changed sides immediately when Sargon II attacked him in 716 and became Assyria’s most valuable eastern ally. Ullusunu’s ruthless machinations triggered off two years (715–714) of fierce fighting, in which Assyria and Mannaya/Izirtu stood against Urartu and the Mannean kingdoms of Zikirtu, Andia, and Wišdiš. Eventually, the Urartian king Rusa suffered a major defeat and lost his former influence in Mannea, while his former allies Zikirtu and Andia made their peace with Sargon. The true winner was, of course, Ullusunu, whose position was now indisputable and stronger than ever.
Shortly before 700 the situation changed, when warrior groups, first of Cimmerian and subsequently of Scythian origin, appeared in western Iran. In the time of Sennacherib the hitherto good relations between Izirtu and Assyria must have come to an end. Aḫšeri, the next king of Zikirtu known from our sources, closely cooperated with the Cimmerian and Scythian newcomers, and soon he and his barbarian friends raided Assyrian territory. Esarhaddon tried by every means to stop this nuisance. His troops fended off raiding parties and killed the Scythian leader Išpakaya; his diplomats negotiated with Cimmerians in order to isolate Aḫšeri from his allies; and he even considered giving his daughter to the Scythian king Bartatua in marriage. In 676, however, an attack against Aḫšeri’s kingdom failed and in spite of all his efforts Esarhaddon was unable to solve his Mannean problem.
It was not before 663, perhaps even later in the reign of Assurbanipal, and only after Aḫšeri’s Cimmerian and Scythian protectors had left western Iran, that the Assyrians dared to send an army against Izirtu once again. The campaign as such met with rather modest success, but soon afterwards Aḫšeri was murdered “by his own servants.” In his weakened position, his son and successor Walli made peace with Assyria and came to a lasting accommodation with Assurbanipal. As late as in 616, Mannean auxiliary troops fought on Sîn‐šar‐iškun’s side against the Babylonians in the Euphrates valley.
Mannea and Media were separated by two rather mysterious regions: Gizilbunda, of which almost nothing is known, appears as a loosely organized kingdom at the end of the ninth century, only to reappear in the sources at the end of the eighth century as a politically divided region. The rulers of Bit‐Abdadani usually were on good terms with Assyria. For that very reason virtually nothing is known about them or their land, since the Assyrian sources mostly report on enemies but only rarely on friends.
By far the largest and most important population group on the Iranian plateau were the Medes. Their huge numbers and the vast area they inhabited seem to have caused some anxiety among the Assyrians, but up to the very end of the seventh century, there is no mention of any Median activity outside Media proper, which must have comprised most of the Iranian plateau between the Zagros and the Alborz mountains.
Apart from the horses bred by the locals in great numbers, this vast area offered nothing of interest. Settlements comparable to the contemporary urban centers of Mesopotamia or the Levant did not exist and the widely spread population seems to have been rather poor. According to the Assyrian sources of the eighth and seventh centuries the Medes (like the people of Gizilbunda, see paragraph (2) above) were ruled by a bewildering multitude of “community lords” (bēl āli), a term used for uncivilized petty rulers too unimportant to be called kings. In 713 Sargon II received tribute from no fewer than forty‐five “community lords,” but the total number of Median rulers might have been even higher. And there were differences between them: in 737, rulers from Gizilbunda and Media each delivered between thirty‐two and 300 horses to Tiglath‐pileser III, indicating that the richest “community lords” were ten times wealthier than the poorest. Since some settlements had not one but two lords ruling side by side, the political organization of the Medes was probably quite unique and not strictly monarchical as in Assyria (Fuchs 1994: 122f., 191–4; Tadmor and Yamada 2011: 86, ii 30’–44’).
Campaigning in Media posed no particular challenge to the Assyrian military. Constantly at odds with each other and surprisingly unable to organize themselves, the Medes were virtually defenseless even against Assyrian armies of smaller size. Fortified settlements, if defended at all, were captured easily, but apart from the horses, the booty taken was never worth mentioning.
Assyria conquered only a tiny part of Media’s western fringes, and was satisfied to keep the vast remainder under indirect control. From 716 onwards, the situation in Media was carefully watched by the Assyrian governors residing in Ḫarḫar and Kišesim, who doubtlessly made full use of the intrigues and mutual backstabbing of their Median neighbors. For more than a century nothing changed – even the temporary presence of Cimmerian and Scythian warrior groups in the first half of the seventh century only added to the chaos already existing. A certain Median “community lord” named Kaštaritu caused some trouble in the time of Esarhaddon, but never posed a serious threat.
It was near the very end of the seventh century that the situation in Media changed most dramatically. Unfortunately, no contemporary sources are available to explain in detail what happened: A leader called Umakištar in the Babylonian sources and Cyaxares by the Greeks somehow managed to set up some sort of a Median kingdom and brought together an extremely powerful army. By taking the lead in the complete annihilation of Assyria between 615 and 610, he established the place of the Medes in world history.
The kingdom of Ellipi (or: Ellibi) controlled most of what is now called Luristan. Situated between the Assyrian Zagros provinces, Media, and Elam, Ellipi managed to stay independent for quite some time thanks to its difficult terrain and relative inaccessibility: it was surrounded from all sides by high mountain ranges.
As early as in 843, “Barû the Elippaean” came with gifts to meet Shalmaneser III, when the latter campaigned in Namri. The next contact with Assyria is recorded a hundred years later, in 744, when king Dalta came to terms with Tiglath‐pileser III. Towards the end of the century Ellipi faced a series of domestic troubles and lived through several Assyrian invasions. In 713, a full scale military intervention by Sargon II was necessary in order to restore Dalta’s rule, which seems to have been at the brink of collapse. After Dalta’s demise in 708 his nephews Išpabara and Nibe fought for the throne. With Sargon’s help, Išpabara defeated Nibe and his Elamite auxiliaries and conquered the throne in 707, only to conspire against Assyria immediately afterwards. In response, Sennacherib invaded Ellipi in 702, but he was unable to capture Išpabara or even to depose him. In 691, warriors from Ellipi fought side by side with the Elamites against Sennacherib in the battle of Ḫalule. It is, however, unclear if at that time the kingdom of Ellipi as such still existed, since it seems to have fallen apart at last: In the seventh century, Ellipi was no longer ruled by kings, but by “community lords” (bēl āli), like those in Media, some of whom were dependent on Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal. Just how many “community lords” coexisted within the territory of the former kingdom is unknown.
Elam and Anšan
From the third millennium BCE onwards, Elam had been a major power in Western Asia. With Babylonia between them for most of the second millennium, Assyria and Elam usually shared no common border and had accordingly no trouble with each other. Only the temporary Babylonian breakdowns in the late 13th and again in the middle of the 12th centuries led to direct clashes between the two powers. At the very end of the ninth century, after the near total collapse of Babylonia and the conquests of Šamši‐Adad V, Assyria and Elam became direct neighbors once again. In the meantime, the splendor of the glorious days of the “kings of Susa and Anšan” had gone: disastrously defeated by the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar I (1123–1102), Elam suffered a long perio
d of weakness and obscurity. Eventually, the whole land of Anšan (approximately the modern Iranian province of Fars) was lost under unknown circumstances. Thus reduced in size to the land of Susa (modern Khuzestan), the kingdom was left with no more than just the western half of its former territory.
For 350 years, up to the middle of the eighth century, sources for matters Elamite are almost completely lacking. Even the Assyrian inscriptions are all but talkative. In 815, Šamši‐Adad V identified warriors from Elam among his defeated enemies, and in the following year he reached the Elamite border. Moreover, envoys from Elam are known to have visited the Assyrian court in Kalḫu in the early eighth century. However, until 743 not a single Elamite king is mentioned (Potts 1999: 262f., Waters 2000: 10f.).
From the Elamite point of view, the uneasy relationship with Assyria was tolerable as long as the kings of Ashur did not go further than Šamši‐Adad V. The real trouble began when Tiglath‐pileser III resumed Assyria’s expansion and made efforts to gain direct control over Babylonia. If he succeeded, the Elamites must have thought, in absorbing the numerous tribes and cities of southern Mesopotamia into his realm, Elam would have to stand alone against the fearsome Assyrian juggernaut in future conflicts. So it seemed better to act in time rather than wait for the enemy to attack later, when the conditions might have changed even more in his favor.
Seriously reduced in strategic depth through the loss of Anšan, the Elamites had to keep the war at a safe distance from their own territory and did all they could to keep the enemy busy elsewhere. So they instigated and supported local rebellions against Assyrian rule in neighboring Babylonia and offered refuge to rebels who had suffered defeats in Babylonia and were on the run from the Assyrians.
Elam’s resilience in the conflicts with Assyria was remarkable. Even in its weakened state, this kingdom was still the most formidable military power east of Assyria, technologically on par with the enemy, and able to field large armies, which were both well organized and well equipped. For more than a century, Elamite troops, supported by allied contingents of Chaldean, Aramaean, and Babylonian origins, challenged the Assyrians time and again. In 694 Sennacherib’s crown prince was captured and extradited to the Elamites, and in 691 king Ḫuban‐nimena (692–688), side by side with his numerous allies from Iran and Babylonia, fought an epic battle against the Assyrian main army in Ḫalule. Assyria was, however, by far too big to fail at this point. Moreover, the long war against Sennacherib must have put a terrible strain on Elam, with defeats, mounting losses, and the general lack of success making the position of its kings vulnerable to rival members of the ruling family. Between 699 and 692 no fewer than three Elamite kings were assassinated or killed in revolts.
Initially, however, the Elamite worries about being doomed to become the powerful neighbor’s next victim proved unfounded. It is true that both Tiglath‐pileser III and Sargon II imposed their rule over Babylonia against Elamite resistance and it is also true that they devastated Elam’s border regions, but neither of them attacked the core area around the capital cities of Susa and Madaktu. Sennacherib built a fleet and raided Elam’s seacoast in 694, but his one and only attempt to attack Madaktu (in 693) was terminated because of bad weather and never repeated. During Esarhaddon’s reign and in the first years of Assurbanipal the Assyrians were at pains to coexist peacefully with Elam, to the extent that even occasional outbursts of Elamite violence against Assyrian territory went without sanctions. From the Assyrian point of view, the Elamites had to be kept out of Babylonia, but a conquest of Elam was not on the agenda.
After a period of uneasy coexistence (691–664), the situation worsened dramatically when in 664 king Urtak was murdered by his brother Teumman, who seized the throne and killed many of his rivals within the royal family. As a result, Elamite princes fled in droves to Assurbanipal, providing the Assyrian king with appropriate candidates for the throne of Elam. At first, both sides refrained from breaking the peace, but tensions increased, and in 653 Elam and Assyria were at war again. When the armies clashed on the western bank of the river Ulay, near Til‐Tuba, not far from Susa, Teumman was killed and his army was virtually annihilated. It was a complete military disaster, from which Elam was never to recover.
Immediately afterwards, Assurbanipal chose Ḫuban‐nikaš (II) among the many Elamite princes who had sought asylum at Nineveh and installed him as king of Elam. Already by the very next year, however, the Assyrian plan to transform the once powerful, now defenseless Elamite neighbor into a mere puppet state was ruined by the revolt of Šamaš‐šumu‐ukin. From 652 up to 648 Assyria’s military power was fully engaged in Babylonia, and for these five years Assurbanipal was reduced to the role of a mere spectator of the drama unfolding in Elam, where murderous infighting between the different branches of the royal family caused the kings to follow each other in rapid succession: Ḫuban‐nikaš II, Assurbanipal’s own protégée, soon turned against his master and even tried – albeit in vain – to support the rebels in Babylonia. He was murdered together with his whole family by his cousin Tammaritu, who in turn was forced into Assyrian exile by a certain Indabibi, yet another usurper, who was a mere “servant” of his predecessor, i.e. not of royal descent. The loss of the ruling dynasty’s hitherto exclusive claim to the throne paved the way for political adventurers, and soon the breakdown of the traditional order went hand in hand with territorial disintegration.
In 647, when Assurbanipal had his hands free again, Indabibi too had been killed in a revolt. Meanwhile, Elam had been broken up into at least four parts, whose rulers, mere warlords, all fought against one another. The most important among them, Ḫuban‐ḫaltaš III, who was in control of the city of Madaktu, negotiated with the Assyrian king, but his overtures were turned down most arrogantly. Instead, Assurbanipal sent in his army in order to reinstall the exiled Tammaritu in the city of Susa – only to have him deposed and arrested immediately afterwards, when it was brought to his attention that his new protégée criticized him in an all too outspoken manner.
The support for Tammaritu was Assurbanipal’s last attempt to reach a constructive solution, and when it failed, Assurbanipal decided to destroy what obviously could not be brought under control. In 646 Elam was ravaged by another Assyrian campaign, which was excessively brutal and destructive even for Assyrian standards. Susa, Elam’s religious center and the very heart of Elamite culture, was mercilessly plundered and devastated. The Assyrian troops looted the royal palaces, destroyed the ziggurat, and deliberately desecrated temples, holy precincts, and the tombs of the Elamite kings. The Elamite warlords, too weak to check the onslaught, abandoned their people to their own fate, as they had done in 647. They hastily retreated before the advancing Assyrians in order to preserve their small armies for the more important fight against their local rivals.
Further Assyrian incursions followed: Ḫuban‐ḫaltaš III was captured at last, and Pa’e, one of the numerous Elamite warlords, gave up and went into Assyrian exile. As for the events after 646, however, the reports become increasingly sketchy. It seems as if Assurbanipal’s scribes were no longer interested in the details of what happened in wretched Elam, leaving us with the impression of an utterly ruined land.
* * *
And what had happened in Anšan, Elam’s former eastern half? Here two new kingdoms had emerged, whose fate could not have been more different. Whereas the mysterious land of Ḫudimeri (probably near the coast of the Persian Gulf) is mentioned in the reign of Assurbanipal only and vanished afterwards without trace, the other one was to leave a lasting impression on the history of Western Asia: the land of Parsu(m)aš, Elam’s eastern neighbor (not to be confused with the Assyrian province of Parsuaš in the central Zagros), appears in the Assyrian sources already in 707, when the king of Elam negotiated with the ruler of Parsumaš to receive auxiliary troops from him (Fuchs and Parpola 2001: XXXIIIf.). Later, in 691, troops from “Parsuaš and Anzan” were indeed part of the coalition force, led by the king of Elam, that fought
against Sennacherib’s army in the battle at Ḫalule. Direct contact with Assyria was established only after the downfall of Elam, at around 640, when “Kuraš, the king of Parsumaš,” sent his eldest son Arukku to Nineveh in order to reach an agreement with Assurbanipal. There is no direct evidence for the dynastic affiliations of this Kuraš, but there can be no doubt that his kingdom of Parsumaš was the nucleus of the later Persian empire. In the middle of the sixth century BCE, five generations after the peace mission of Kuraš’s son at the court of Nineveh, another Kuraš, better known to us as the Persian king Cyrus II, grandson of Cyrus I, initiated a series of breathtaking conquests, from which emerged a new superpower, a world empire four or even five times the size of Assyria.
References
Curtis, J. (ed.) 1995. Later Mesopotamia and Iran: Tribes and Empires 1600–539 BC, Proceedings of a Seminar in Memory of Vladimir G. Lukonin, London: British Museum Press.
Fuchs, A. 1994. Die Inschriften Sargons II. aus Khorsabad, Göttingen: Cuvillier‐Verlag.
Fuchs, A. and Parpola, S. 2000. The Correspondence of Sargon II, Part III: Letters from Babylonia and the Eastern Provinces, State Archives of Assyria 15, Helsinki: The Neo‐Assyrian Text Corpus Project.
George, A R. 2003. The Babylonian Gilgamesh Epic: Introduction, Critical Edition and Cuneiform Texts, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grayson, A.K. 1991. Assyrian Rulers of the Early First Millennium BC I (1114‐859 BC), The Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia, Assyrian Periods 2, Toronto: Toronto University Press.
Lanfranchi, G.B. and Parpola, S. 1990. The Correspondence of Sargon II, Part II: Letters from the Northern and Northeastern Provinces, State Archives of Assyria 5, Helsinki: Helsinki University Press.
