Self and Emotional Life

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by Adrian Johnston

114. Ibid.

  115. Soler, Lacan, l’inconscient réinventé, 29–32; Soler, Les affects lacaniens, 84, 103, 106–107.

  116. Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 10, 91–92, 252–253; Jacques Lacan, “Introduction to the Names-of-the-Father Seminar,” ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman, in Copjec, Television/A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment, 82; Žižek, The Parallax View, 229.

  117. Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 18, 104.

  118. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, book 17 151.

  119. Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 10, 24.

  120. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, book 17, 144.

  121. Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 10, 91–92; Jacques-Alain Miller, “Introduction to Reading Jacques Lacan’s Seminar on Anxiety,” trans. Barbara P. Fulks, Lacanian Ink 26 (Fall 2005): 63–64; Jacques-Alain Miller, “Introduction to Reading Jacques Lacan’s Seminar on Anxiety II,” trans. Barbara P. Fulks, Lacanian Ink 27 (Spring 2006): 22.

  12. EMOTIONAL LIFE AFTER LACAN: FROM PSYCHOANALYSIS TO THE NEUROSCIENCES

  1. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 10, L’angoisse, 1962–1963, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2004), 93; Adrian Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations: The Cadence of Change (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2009), 144–156.

  2. Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 10, 92.

  3. Ibid.

  4. Ibid.

  5. Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, book 11, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, 1964, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), 35, 44; Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 12, Problèmes cruciaux pour la psychanalyse, 1964–1965 (unpublished typescript), session of June 9, 1965; Adrian Johnston, Time Driven: Metapsychology and the Splitting of the Drive (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005), 62, 64–65, 70, 279–280.

  6. Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, book 17, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 1969–1970, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Russell Grigg (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007), 180–183, 192–193.

  7. Jacques-Alain Miller, “On Shame,” ed. Catherine Bonningue, trans. Russell Grigg, in Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis: Reflections on Seminar XVII, ed. Justin Clemens and Russell Grigg (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 13, 15, 23–24, 26–27; Paul Verhaeghe, “Enjoyment and Impossibility: Lacan’s Revision of the Oedipus Complex,” in Clemens and Grigg, Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 47; Dominiek Hoens, “Toward a New Perversion: Psychoanalysis,” in Clemens and Grigg, Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 96–97; Éric Laurent, “Symptom and Discourse,” in Clemens and Grigg, Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 234.

  8. Jacques Lacan, “Impromptu at Vincennes,” trans. Jeffrey Mehlman, in Copjec, Television/A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment, ed. Joan Copjec (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), 117–128; Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, book 17, 181.

  9. Adrian Johnston, “Lacanian Theory Has Legs: Structures Marching in the Streets,” South Atlantic Review 72, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 100–105.

  10. Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, book 20, Encore, 1972–1973, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998), 3, 7–8; Adrian Johnston, Time Driven: Metapsychology and the Splitting of the Drive (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005), xxxvii–xxxviii, 295–299, 331, 335–337.

  11. Joan Copjec, “May ’68, The Emotional Month,” in Lacan: The Silent Partners, ed. Slavoj Žižek (London: Verso, 2006), 91.

  12. Johnston, “Lacanian Theory Has Legs,” 100–102.

  13. Copjec, “May ’68, The Emotional Month,” 92–93, 96.

  14. Ibid., 93.

  15. Alenka Zupančič, “When Surplus Enjoyment Meets Surplus Value,” in Clemens and Grigg, Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 155, 158.

  16. Copjec, “May ’68, The Emotional Month,” 92–93.

  17. Ibid., 91–92.

  18. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 17, L’envers de la psychanalyse, 1969–1970, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1991), 209–210, 223.

  19. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 8, Le transfert, 1960–1961, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2001), 213–214; Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 11, Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse, 1964, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1973), 166.

  20. Johnston, “Lacanian Theory Has Legs,” 103.

  21. Copjec, “May ’68, The Emotional Month,” 91–92, 111; Joan Copjec, Imagine There’s No Woman: Ethics and Sublimation (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), 216–217.

  22. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 6, session of December 10, 1958.

  23. Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 8, 213–214.

  24. Jacques Lacan, “Le signification du phallus,” in Écrits (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1966), 692; Jacques Lacan, “The Signification of the Phallus,” in Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 581; Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 5, Les formations de l’inconscient, 1957–1958, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1998), 384; Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 8, 213–214.

  25. Lacan, “The Signification of the Phallus,” 581; Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 21, Les non-dupes errent, 1973–1974 (unpublished typescript), session of March 12, 1974.

  26. Lacan, “The Signification of the Phallus,” 581.

  27. Ibid.

  28. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 4, La relation d’objet, 1956–1957, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1994), 155–157, 165–166, 194, 271–272, 357; Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 5, 384; Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, book 11, 103, 111–112; Adrian Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2008), 34–35, 138–139.

  29. Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 6, session of June 3, 1959; Jacques Lacan, “Préface à L’Éveil du printemps,” in Autres écrits, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2001), 562; Colette Soler, Les affects lacaniens (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2011), 91.

  30. Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology, 24–25.

  31. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 16, D’un Autre à l’autre, 1968–1969, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2006), 315.

  32. Copjec, “May ’68, The Emotional Month,” 91.

  33. Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, book 7, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959–1960, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Dennis Porter (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), 216–217.

  34. Ibid., 260–261.

  35. Ibid., 295.

  36. Ibid., 247.

  37. Ibid., 298.

  38. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 7, L’éthique de la psychanalyse, 1959–1960, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1986), 345.

  39. Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 21, session of March 12, 1974.

  40. Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 8, 364.

  41. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, book 7, 299.

  42. Ibid.

  43. Johnston, Time Driven, 234–241.

  44. Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 12, session of May 19, 1965; Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 22, R.S.I., 1974–1975 (unpublished typescript), session of March 11, 1975.

  45. Slavoj Žižek, “Da Capo senza Fine,” in Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (London: Verso, 2000), 256.

  46. Žižek, “Da Capo senza Fine,” 256.

  47. Antonio Dam
asio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (New York: Harcourt, 2003), 159–160.

  48. Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (New York: Harcourt, 1999), 27, 228, 297; Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 184.

  49. Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Avon Books, 1994), 185, 187–189; Damasio, Feeling of What Happens, 36–37, 279–281, 283–284.

  50. Damasio, Feeling of What Happens, 37.

  51. Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 149–150, 159, 163–164; Damasio, Feeling of What Happens, 35, 57, 218–219, 311; Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 71, 78–79.

  52. Paul Thagard, “Mental Mechanisms,” in Hot Thought: Mechanisms and Applications of Emotional Cognition (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2006), 7–8, 10; Paul Thagard and Josef Nerb, “Emotional Gestalts: Appraisal, Change, and the Dynamics of Affect,” in Hot Thought, 55–56, 63; Paul Thagard, “How Molecules Matter to Mental Computation,” in Hot Thought, 127.

  53. Damasio, Feeling of What Happens, 42–43; Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 27; Antonio Damasio, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010), 109–110.

  54. Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 7, 28.

  55. Ibid., 30, 80, 101.

  56. Damasio, Feeling of What Happens, 37.

  57. Ibid., 11, 20–22; Damasio, Self Comes to Mind, 63–64, 89–90, 187.

  58. Damasio, Self Comes to Mind, 10, 72.

  59. Ibid., 319.

  60. Ibid., 283–284.

  61. Ibid., 150.

  62. Ibid., 36, 279–281.

  63. Jean-Pierre Changeux, The Physiology of Truth: Neuroscience and Human Knowledge, trans. M. B. DeBevoise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 76.

  64. Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology, 89.

  65. Ibid., 256–257.

  66. Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 12; Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, ed. James Gutmann (New York: Hafner Press, 1949), 89–90, 101–102.

  67. Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 29.

  68. Ibid., 33.

  69. Ibid., 55, 60–61; Damasio, Self Comes to Mind, 143, 275.

  70. Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 143, 145–146, 159; Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 85, 91; Damasio, Self Comes to Mind, 75–76, 101.

  71. Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 85.

  72. Ibid., 85–86.

  73. Ibid., 88.

  74. Ibid., 109.

  75. Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 162–163.

  76. Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 72.

  77. Johnston, Time Driven, xxvii, 46, 63, 140.

  78. Damasio, Feeling of What Happens, 30–31, 282, 285, 313.

  79. Ibid., 88–89, 100, 107–109, 113, 121–123, 125–127, 154, 172–173, 175, 177, 185–186, 191, 198, 200, 217–219, 222, 226–230.

  80. Slavoj Žižek, “Descartes and the Post-Traumatic Subject,” Filozofski Vestnik: Radical Philosophy?, ed. Peter Klepec, 29, no. 2 (2008): 23, 26–27, 29; Johnston, Time Driven, 83–84, 107; Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology, 11–12, 21–22, 196, 210, 218–220, 231–232.

  81. Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), 226–227.

  82. Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology, xxiii–xxiv, 218–220, 284–286; Adrian Johnston, “Slavoj Žižek’s Hegelian Reformation: Giving a Hearing to The Parallax View,” Diacritics: A Review of Contemporary Criticism 37, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 12–13.

  83. Damasio, Feeling of What Happens, 107–108, 185–186.

  84. Ibid., 198.

  85. Ibid., 218–219, 222.

  86. Ibid., 200, 228–230.

  87. Ibid., 22, 172, 175, 177; Damasio, Self Comes to Mind, 190, 202–203.

  88. Žižek, The Parallax View, 227.

  89. Ibid.

  90. Slavoj Žižek, In Defense of Lost Causes (London: Verso, 2008), 440.

  91. Adrian Johnston, “The Weakness of Nature: Hegel, Freud, Lacan, and Negativity Materialized,” in Hegel and the Infinite: Into the Twenty-First Century, ed. Clayton Crockett, Creston Davis, and Slavoj Žižek (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 159–179.

  92. Žižek, In Defense of Lost Causes, 435, 442; Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology, 171, 174, 194, 207–208, 272, 286–287; Johnston, “Slavoj Žižek’s Hegelian Reformation,” 18–19; Adrian Johnston, “Conflicted Matter: Jacques Lacan and the Challenge of Secularizing Materialism,” Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy 19 (Spring 2008): 172–176, 185–188; Johnston, “The Weakness of Nature,” 159–179; Adrian Johnston, “Second Natures in Dappled Worlds: John McDowell, Nancy Cartwright, and Hegelian-Lacanian Materialism,” in Umbr(a): A Journal of the Unconscious—The Worst, ed. Matthew Rigilano and Kyle Fetter (Buffalo: Center for the Study of Psychoanalysis and Culture, State University of New York at Buffalo, 2011), 81–85.

  93. Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology, xxiii, 176, 270–273; Adrian Johnston, “What Matter(s) in Ontology: Alain Badiou, the Hebb-Event, and Materialism Split from Within,” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 13, no. 3 (April 2008): 38–39, 42.

  94. Adrian Johnston, A Weak Nature Alone: Prolegomena to Any Future Materialism, vol. 2 (unpublished manuscript).

  95. Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 79–80; Damasio, Self Comes to Mind, 63, 93, 124, 269–271.

  96. Žižek, The Parallax View, 226–227.

  97. Ibid., 228.

  98. Joseph LeDoux, Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (New York: Penguin, 2002), 197–198.

  99. Damasio, Self Comes to Mind, 288.

  100. LeDoux, Synaptic Self, 203–204.

  101. Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), 106–107.

  102. LeDoux, Synaptic Self, 31.

  103. Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 105.

  104. Ibid.

  105. Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 185.

  106. Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 2005), 140.

  107. Damasio, Feeling of What Happens, 331; Damasio, Self Comes to Mind, 314.

  108. Damasio, Self Comes to Mind, 250–251.

  109. David J. Linden, The Accidental Mind: How Brain Evolution Has Given Us Love, Memory, Dreams, and God (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 6.

  110. Ibid., 245.

  111. Ibid., 2–3, 5–7, 21–24, 26, 245–246.

  112. Ibid., 235–246.

  113. Gary Marcus, Kludge: The Haphazard Evolution of the Human Mind (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2008), 6–16, 161–163.

  114. François Jacob, “Evolution and Tinkering,” Science 196, no. 4295 (June 10, 1977): 1161–1166.

  115. LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 16, 106, 127.

  116. Jaak Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 353.

  117. Ibid., 147.

  118. Ibid., 70.

  119. Ibid., 75–76.

  120. LeDoux, Synaptic Self, 322–323.

  121. Keith E. Stanovich, The Robot’s Rebellion: Finding Meaning in the Age of Darwin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 12, 13, 20–21, 21–22, 67, 82–83, 247.

  122. Žižek, The Parallax View, 229.

  123. Ibid.

  124. François Ansermet and Pierre Magistretti, Biology of Freedom: Neural Plasticity, Experience, and the Unconscious, trans. Susan Fairfield (New York: Other Press, 2007), 33–34; Gérard Pommier, Comment les neurosciences démontrent la psychanalyse (Paris: Flammarion, 2004), 215.

  125. LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 29–30.

  126. Damasio, Feeling of What Happens, 228.

  127. Ibid., 228–230.

  128. Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 130, 185, 187–188; Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 72.

  129. Johnston, Time Driven, xxvii, 140.

  130. Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 139; Damasio, Feeling o
f What Happens, 42–43; Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 27–29.

  131. Adrian Johnston, “‘Naturalism or anti-naturalism? No, thanks—both are worse!’: Science, Materialism, and Slavoj Žižek,” in “On Slavoj Žižek,” special issue, La Revue Internationale de Philosophie (2012).

  132. Žižek, The Parallax View, 231.

  133. Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology, 105, 109, 180–194, 209–210, 222–223, 236–238.

  134. Slavoj Žižek, “From objet a to Subtraction,” Lacanian Ink 30 (Fall 2007): 138.

  135. Žižek, “From objet a to Subtraction,” 139.

  136. Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology, 241; Johnston, “Slavoj Žižek’s Hegelian Reformation,” 4.

  137. Johnston, “The Weakness of Nature,” 159–179.

  138. SE 21:97, 112, 114, 122–124, 143, 145.

  13. AFFECTS ARE SIGNIFIERS: THE INFINITE JUDGMENT OF A LACANIAN AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE

  1. Adrian Johnston, “The Weakness of Nature: Hegel, Freud, Lacan, and Negativity Materialized,” in Hegel and the Infinite: Into the Twenty-First Century, ed. Clayton Crockett, Creston Davis, and Slavoj Žižek (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 159–179.

  2. Jean-Pierre Changeux, The Physiology of Truth: Neuroscience and Human Knowledge, trans. M. B. DeBevoise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 81–82; Benjamin Libet, Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 28, 56, 66–67, 70–72, 107–109, 120–122, 208; Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), 48–51.

  3. Adrian Johnston, “What Matter(s) in Ontology: Alain Badiou, the Hebb-Event, and Materialism Split from Within,” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 13, no. 3 (April 2008): 28–44; Adrian Johnston, “Conflicted Matter: Jacques Lacan and the Challenge of Secularizing Materialism,” Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy 19 (Spring 2008): 177–182; Adrian Johnston, “Slavoj Žižek’s Hegelian Reformation: Giving a Hearing to The Parallax View,” Diacritics: A Review of Contemporary Criticism 37, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 4–14, 16–17; Johnston, “The Weakness of Nature,” 159–179; Changeux, The Physiology of Truth, 33, 207–208; Antonio Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (New York: Harcourt, 2003), 162–164, 173–174; Douglas Hofstadter, I Am a Strange Loop (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 31; Eric R. Kandel, “Psychotherapy and the Single Synapse: The Impact of Psychiatric Thought on Neurobiologic Research,” in Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and the New Biology of Mind (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2005), 21; Eric R. Kandel, “A New Intellectual Framework for Psychiatry,” in Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and the New Biology of Mind, 42–43, 47; Eric R. Kandel, “Biology and the Future of Psychoanalysis: A New Intellectual Framework for Psychiatry Revisited,” in Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and the New Biology of Mind, 94, 97–98; Joseph LeDoux, Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (New York: Penguin, 2002), 2–3, 5, 12, 20, 66–67; Libet, Mind Time, 5; Catherine Malabou, Que faire de notre cerveau? (Paris: Bayard, 2004), 27–28, 30–31, 84–85, 156, 161–163; Catherine Malabou, La plasticité au soir de l’écriture: Dialectique, destruction, déconstruction (Paris: Éditions Léo Scheer, 2005), 19; Thomas Metzinger, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 115; Lesley Rogers, Sexing the Brain (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 2–3, 5, 20, 23–24, 47–48, 68, 97–98; Mark Solms and Oliver Turnbull, The Brain and the Inner World: An Introduction to the Neuroscience of Subjective Experience (New York: Other Press, 2002), 64, 218, 244, 271–272.

 

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