8. Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, book 2, The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954–1955, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Sylvana Tomaselli (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988), 222. We quote also the following: “So the notion of libido is a form of unification for the domain of psychoanalytical effects” (ibid.).
9. Ibid.
10. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, book 2, Le moi dans la théorie de Freud et dans la technique de la psychanalyse, 1954–1955, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1978), 260.
11. Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (New York: Harcourt, 1999), 40.
12. SE 14:120–121.
13. Damasio, Feeling of What Happens, 76.
14. Antonio Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (New York: Harcourt, 2003), 174.
15. Ibid, 59.
16. Damasio, Feeling of What Happens, 169.
17. Ibid., 170.
18. Ibid., 154.
19. Marcel Gauchet, L’inconscient cérébral (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1992), 37.
20. It is necessary to signal here the existence of those remarkable neurons called “mirror neurons,” which activate in perceiving activity engaged in by another, coding the movement in the same manner as if it had been executed by the observing subject itself. See Marc Jeannerod, Le cerveau intime (Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob, 2002), 189.
21. And this contra the statements of Freud himself which affirm that “we know two kinds of things about what we call our psyche (or mental life): firstly, its bodily organ and scene of action, the brain (or nervous system) and, on the other hand, our acts of consciousness, which are immediate data and cannot be further explained by any sort of description. Everything that lies between is unknown to us, and the data do not include any direct relation between these two terminal points of our knowledge. If it existed, it would at the most afford an exact localization of the processes of consciousness and would give us no help towards understanding them” (SE 23:144–145).
22. Mark Solms and Oliver Turnbull, The Brain and the Inner World: An Introduction to the Neuroscience of Subjective Experience (New York: Other Press, 2002), 110.
23. SE 19:26.
24. Damasio, Feeling of What Happens, 189.
25. Ibid., 154.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 191.
28. SE 14:187.
29. Ibid., 296.
30. Damasio, Feeling of What Happens, 144–145.
INDEX
Page numbers refer to the print edition but are hyperlinked to the appropriate location in the e-book.
The Accidental Mind (Linden), 176
activity and passivity, 15, 22–23, 37–41
adequate and inadequate causes and ideas, 37, 38, 44
affectio and affectus, translation of, 4–5
Affective Neuroscience (Panksepp), 176–77, 186–87
affective structures (Affektbildungen), 110–13, 116, 157–58, 212
affects, xv–xviii; “affect” as positive term for a negative x, 209–10; as aftereffects of interactions of signifiers, 123, 135; and Agamben’s zoē-bios distinction, 193–94; as always affects of essence (Spinoza’s conception), 35–36, 43–44; anxiety as the sole or central affect (Lacan’s conception), 147–48, 151, 213; complex and enigmatic nature of, 134, 137–38, 146–47; and conatus, 37–41, 217; deceptive nature of, 206–9; defined, 4–5, 38, 41–42; detachment from (see affects, detachment from/absence of); displacement of, 124, 127, 137, 138, 155; distinction between affects and emotions/feelings (Lacan’s conception), 151; doubts raised about during analysis, 140–41, 147–48, 151–52; and the face, 46–48; and false connections, 103–4, 107, 122, 128, 145; and gap between the biological and the more-than-biological, 190; and homeostatic regulation, 31, 50–51, 217–18; and immediacy, 85–86, 134–35; impact of language on, 163, 189–90, 200; imprecise vocabulary for, 198–200, 207; as modifications, 5; modulation by intellectual, linguistic, and representational configurations, 163; as natural ontological phenomena, 36; origin of, 4, 6, 21; potential, 114–16; quota of (Affektbetrag), 109–10, 112–13, 214–16; and repression, 205; as signifiers, 205–10; and syncope, 23–24; three stages of processing (Damasio’s conception), 164–66; two-way modulation between affects and signifiers, 200; unconscious (see affects, unconscious); and warfare, 132; without subjects, 6–7. See also anxiety; emotions; feelings; Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis; Freudian metapsychology of affects; generosity; guilt; hatred; joy; Lacan-inspired metapsychology of affects; love; passions; sadness; shame; wonder; specific philosophers, psychoanalysts, and neuroscientists
affects, detachment from/absence of, 7–8; and brain damage, 58–60; Damasio and, 33–34, 58–60, 64; Elliot case, 11, 59–60; impaired capacity for wonder, 10–11; and lack of concern, 59–60, 71; “L” case, 60; Phineas Gage case, xii–xiv, 57–58; Sacks and, 71
affects, unconscious, xvii, xviii; Copjec’s denial of, 155; Damasio and, 163–65; distinguished from potential affects, 114–16; and false connections, 107, 122; Fink and, 122; and Freud’s Affekte/Gefühle/Emfindungen terminology, 112–13; Freud’s vacillations over, xvii, 75–80, 88–101, 105–13, 118, 119, 155, 212; Harari and, 122; Lacan’s denial of, 76, 84, 111, 119, 122, 129, 134, 149, 212–13; as misfelt feelings, 94–95; and neurobiology, 87; and pleasure and pain, 166–67; as potential-to-feel, 108–9; Pulver and, 113–17; and resistance to attempts to reconcile psychoanalytic theory with neuroscience, 81–82; and shame, 162. See also feelings, misfelt; guilt
Les affects lacaniens (Soler), 82
affectuation (Lacan’s neologism), 141, 146–47, 208
Affektbildungen, 110–13, 157–58, 212
Affekte, 111–14, 119, 212
agalma, 70–71
Agamben, Giorgio, 192–93
All About Eve (film), 11
alterity, xvi, 6, 9, 10, 17, 24, 64, 221
Alzheimer’s disease, xiii, xiv
amygdala, 218
anger, 13, 186
animals, 151, 170, 182, 186, 187, 189, 192
animal spirits, Descartes and, 13–14, 17, 46
anosognosia, 33, 60, 71. See also brain damage
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (Kant), 196
antinaturalism, xi, 172, 180–84, 187–88, 190, 193, 197, 204
Anton’s Syndrome, 60
anxiety: and bodily movements, 13; Freud and, 89–90, 99–100, 110; and gap between cognitive and emotional abilities, 174; guilt felt as, 89–91, 99–101, 110, 212–13; Harari and, 134–35; and hysteria, 87; Lacan and, 82, 133, 139–40, 151–52; and obsessive disorders, 89–90; relationship to doubt, 151–52; and repression, 110; as a signal, not representing itself, 134–35; as sole or central affect, 147–48, 151, 213; Žižek and, 172, 174
autoaffection, xvi; autoaffection as temporality as the origin of all other affects (Heidegger’s concept), 6; cerebral autoaffection, 221–23; Damasio and, 31, 33–34, 51, 64; deconstruction of, 7; defined, 5–6, 21, 221; Deleuze and, 45, 48–49; Deleuze’s reading of Descartes and, 46; Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza and, 36, 45; Derrida and, 19–25, 63; and feeling of existence, 6, 20; Heidegger and, 5–6; and homeostasis, 31, 64; impaired mechanism for, 34 (see also brain damage); and imprecise vocabulary for affects, 199; and the “inner voice,” 20, 21; and mapping between affects and concepts, 42; as mutual mirroring of mind and body, 55; and neurobiology, 26; nonsubjective autoaffection, 55; and plane of immanence, 45–46; and self-touching, 19–21, 63; and spatiality, 46; term origin, 5–6; and types of knowledge, 45; and the unconscious, 221–23; and wonder, 9–11, 63–64
autobiographical self, 31–33, 169–70
auto-heteroaffection, 55
Badiou, Alain, 175
beauty, 160–61
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud), 77–78
big Other, 173–75, 188, 200, 206
bios, 192–93
blood circulation,
13–14
body: bodily movements, 13–15, 37–38, 40, 46–48; delocalization of, 68–69. See also organism
body-mind connection: and conatus, 38; Damasio and, 29–30, 164–66; Derrida and, 21–23; Descartes and, 12–15, 18, 21–22, 30; emotions and physiological processes, 164–67; and generosity, 18; Green and, 202–3; and inadequacy of brain events, 29–30; and linguistic mediation, 201; mind and body as expressions of the same substance, 36, 51; mind as the idea of the body, 51, 53, 166; and “organism” term, 55; and passions “in” the soul, 12–15; and pineal gland, 14–16, 21–23; and spatiality of the soul, 21–23; Spinoza and, 36, 38, 51, 53; substance of Descartes’ error, 30
brain: and autoexcitation, 216–19; and bodily movements, 13–14; cerebral autoaffection, 221–23; Changeux and, 195–98; computer model of, 27; Damasio and, 26–34, 163–70, 187, 217; Descartes and, 16, 30; and drives, 213–16; as “electrical center” (Breuer’s conception), 213–14; and evolution, 175–76, 180–83, 187–89, 201; Freud and, 60–62, 214–16, 255–56nn7,21; hardwired absences of hardwiring, 201–2; as hodgepodge of modules without overall coherent function, 175–77; interconnectedness of, 177, 194, 200; and language, 177, 195–201; and language acquisition, 195–96, 199–200; and learning, 195–98; LeDoux and, 175–79, 187–88; Linden and, 176; location of cerebral sites producing emotion, 218–19; mirror neurons, xi, 256n20; and mortality, 223–24; neural plasticity, xi, 26–28, 56–58, 190–91, 194, 202; Panksepp and, 176–77, 190–91; and perception, 27, 166–67; Pommier and, 197; self-mapping, 164–67; and subjectivity, 28; substance of Descartes’ error, 30; and symbolic activity, 213–14, 216, 219–23; trinity of cognition, emotion, and motivation, 163, 176, 177; and the unconscious, 71, 219–21
The Brain and the Inner World (Solms and Turnbull), 27–28, 57, 186
brain damage, xii–xiv, 56–62, 71; and damaged subjectivity, 28, 33–34; and detachment from one’s own affects, 7–8, 33, 58–60; and dreaming, 62; Elliot case, 11, 59–60; “L” case, 60; and loss of wonder, 11, 33, 60; and neuropsychoanalysis, 29; Phineas Gage case, xii–xiv, 57–58; and plasticity of the brain, 56–58; and role of emotions in reason, 8; and transformation of personality, xiii–xiv, 57–61
Breuer, Josef, 213–14, 218
care for self and others: CARE emotional system, 186; relationship between feelings, emotions, and care for self and others, 51
cathexes, 110, 125, 131
La causalité psychique: Entre nature et culture (Green), 202–3
causes. See adequate and inadequate causes
Chalmers, David, 202
Changeux, Jean-Pierre, 165, 195–97
Cinema I (Deleuze), 46
civilization, 132, 184
Civilization and Its Discontents (Freud), 95–98, 100–101, 184
class consciousness, 86
cognition: differences between cognition and emotion, 194; entanglement of emotional and nonemotional dimensions, 177–78, 190–91, 194, 200; trinity of cognition, emotion, and motivation, 163, 176, 177. See also rationality; thought
cognitive games, 195–96
conatus, 6, 217; affects and variability of conatus, 37–41, 54; defined, 38; and definition of emotions, 41–42; feelings, emotions, and self-attachment, 51; and joy and sorrow, 39–40; and origin of personal identity, 52; and self-preservation, 52; and wonder, 40–41
conscience, 77–79, 91–92, 95. See also guilt
consciousness: as awareness of a disturbance caused by an external object, 30; and dupery, 208; LeDoux on, 188–89; link between consciousness and emotion, 30–31; as outgrowth of self-mapping dynamics, 164–67; as two-sided instance (speaker/listener etc.), 20. See also mind; psyche; self; soul; subjectivity; specific philosophers, psychoanalysts, and neuroscientists
conscious-preconscious-unconscious triad, 69–70, 78, 92
conversion, conversion symptoms, 103–4
Copernicus, Nicolaus, 83, 148
Copjec, Joan, 154–55
core self, 31–32, 169–72
Corpus (Nancy), 23–24
criminality, 72, 78, 92–93
Critique of Judgment (Kant), 53
Critique of Pure Reason (Kant), 5–6
Damasio, Antonio, xvi, xviii; and autoaffection, 31, 33–34, 51, 64; and brain damage, 33–34, 58–60, 71–72; and debate between naturalism and antinaturalism, 180–84; definition of emotion, 51; Descartes and (see Damasio’s reading of Descartes); distinction between pain and emotion caused by pain, 65–66; distinction between public emotions and private feelings, 163–64, 166, 179–80; and Elliot case, 11, 59–60; and evolution of the brain, 187; feelings-had and feelings-known, 165, 167–69; and Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis, 165–66; and heteroaffection, 34, 65–66; importance of emotions and feelings for survival, 50–53; importance of emotions in neural regulation, 7, 217; and “L” case, 60; and loss of wonder, 11, 33, 64; and mental images/ideas, 54; and nonconscious affects, 163–65; and Phineas Gage case, xii–xiv, 57–58; Spinoza and (see Damasio’s reading of Spinoza); structure of the self, 31–33, 169–74, 217, 219–20, 222–23; three stages of processing in affective life, 164–66; and the unconscious, 163–68, 179–80; and wonder, 11, 32–33, 64; Žižek’s critique of, 162–63, 165, 169–74, 179–84, 190
Damasio’s reading of Descartes, 7; and body-mind connection, 29–30; Cartesian mind as a “disembodied” mind, 22; and inadequacy of brain events, 29–30; and link between consciousness and emotion, 30–31; and neural plasticity, 26–28; substance of Descartes’ error, 30
Damasio’s reading of Spinoza, 7, 50–55; and body-mind connection, 53; differing readings of Damasio and Deleuze, 36; emotions, feelings, and conatus, 50–53; and mapping, 51–55; and self-preservation, 52–53
Darwin, Charles, 83
Davidson, Donald, 200–201
death, 159–61; death drive, 172, 181–82; and the unconscious, 223
deceptive nature of affects and signifiers, 206–9
decision making, 7, 30
defense mechanisms, xviii, 76, 87, 127, 155; Damasio and, 168–69; and doubt and anxiety, 152; Freud and, 103–10, 115, 131; and shame, 162. See also repression
In Defense of Lost Causes (Žižek), 172
Deleuze, Gilles, xvi; affect term definition, 4–5; and conceptual personae, 48; and delocalization of the natural body, 68–69; Descartes and (see Deleuze’s reading of Descartes); and different concepts of affects and autoaffection, 48–49; and heteroaffection, 65, 68–69; and nonmetaphysical concept of philosophy, 48–49; and perception, 67; and plane of immanence, 45–46, 48, 64, 67; privileged metaphor of the face, 64; Spinoza and (see Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza); and touch, 66–67; and wonder, 47–48, 64, 71
Deleuze’s reading of Descartes, 7, 45–48, 229n1; and facial expressions, 46–48; two possible readings of Descartes, 48–49; and wonder, 47–48
Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza: and affects as affects of essence, 36, 43–44; and affect term definition, 4–5; and autoaffection, 45; differing readings of Damasio and Deleuze, 36; and God/Nature, 41–42; and heteroaffection, 65; and joyful and sorrowful affects, 39–40; and nonsubjective autoaffection, 36; and touch, 66–67; and types of knowledge/ideas, 44–45, 66–67; and variability of conatus and the power of acting, 41–42
denaturalized subjectivity, 172–74, 178, 180–84, 187–88, 202. See also antinaturalism
Derrida, Jacques, xvi, xvii; and autoaffection, 19–25, 63; and delocalization of the natural body, 68–69; Descartes and, 19–25; and generosity, 24–25, 64; and heteroaffection, 7, 19, 20–21, 24, 25, 58, 64–65, 68–69; and pineal gland, 21–23; privileged metaphor of the graft, 64; and sense of touch, 21–24, 64, 69; and spatiality of the psyche, 69; tribute to Jean-Luc Nancy, 23; “two lovers” text, 64–65; and wonder, 11, 23–25, 64, 71
Descartes, René, xvi; and body-mind connection, 12–15, 18, 21–22, 30; definition of passions of the soul, 6, 13; Derrida’s interpretation of, 19–25; Descartes-Spinoza conflict, 7, 37–38; external signs of the passions (facial express
ions etc.), 45–48; and functions of the soul, 15; and generosity, 13, 17–18, 25; and immediacy, 85; Irigaray and, 226n15; and nonmetaphysical concept of philosophy, 48–49; passions “in” the soul as consequences of bodily movements, 13–15; passions “of” the soul as related to the soul alone, 15–16; and perception, 14–15; and pineal gland, 14–16, 22; repudiation of Descartes’ equation of the mental with the conscious, 85; and wonder, 8–9, 16–18, 25. See also Damasio’s reading of Descartes; Deleuze’s reading of Descartes
Descartes’ Error (Damasio), 4, 7–8, 26–28, 57, 59–60, 189
desire: and agalma, 70–71; Lacan and, 124; as one of six primitive passions (Descartes’ conception), 9, 12; and power of acting, 40; SEEKING emotional system, 186, 201. See also conatus; drives
Le discours vivant (Green), 106–7
doubt: and deceptive nature of signifiers and affects, 210; doubts raised about affects during analysis, 140–41, 147–48, 151–52; relationship to anxiety, 151–52
dreaming, 62
drives: and the brain, 213–16; and confusion caused by translations of Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, Vorstellung, and Repräsentanz, 125–32; Damasio and, 164, 165, 167; death drive, 172, 181–82; Descartes and, 226n15; Freud and, 105–6, 109, 127, 131, 213–16; Lacan and, 125–32; Leclaire and, 136; and SEEKING emotional system, 201; and sexuality, 214–15
dupery, 207–8
ego: and “ego ideal,” 92, 95; and the protoself, 222; and spatiality of the psyche, 69; structural dynamics between ego and superego, 92–93, 99–101; and the unconscious, 92. See also id-ego-superego triad
The Ego and the Id (Freud), 78, 88, 91–94, 101, 113, 212, 222
Elliot (Damasio’s detached patient), 11, 59–60
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