Wilhelm II now thought he had gained what he wanted most of all—a great diplomatic triumph without a shot fired. Once again the Czar would be rebuffed; once again the Austrian alliance would have been cemented by faithful German support. This time, at least, his reputation in German military circles for firmness could be under no reproach. Regicide Serbia would be chastened in due course with the acquiescence of the Powers. There need be no war. He expressed himself ready to negotiate on the basis of a temporary Austrian occupation of Belgrade. He wrote at once to Jagow: ‘I am convinced that on the whole the wishes of the Danube monarchy have been acceded to. The few reservations that Serbia makes in regard to individual points can in my opinion well be cleared up by negotiation. But it contains the announcement orbi et urbi of a capitulation of the most humiliating kind, and with it every reason for war is removed.’16
If these words had been written twelve hours earlier, they would certainly have stopped the War. But now they were too late. At eleven o’clock on this same morning, Tuesday 28th, almost while the Kaiser was writing his minute and congratulating himself that the danger was passed, Count Berchtold telegraphed to Belgrade that ‘the Royal Serbian Government not having answered in a satisfactory manner the note of July 23, 1914, presented by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade… Austria-Hungary consequently considered herself henceforward in a state of war with Serbia.’
There can be no doubt that the German Chancellor and Foreign Minister, led up to a certain point by the Kaiser, had made up their minds to bring about a state of war between Austria and Serbia, with the intention of confronting the Powers of the ‘Triple Entente’ with an issue on which they must fight or fall apart. They believed and also no doubt sincerely hoped that their rivals would choose the latter alternative. They had braced themselves however for the worst contingencies. They knew the impulsive character of the Emperor. They knew his fear of War. They did not intend to give him the opportunity of back-sliding at the critical moment. Hence the routine formality and inexplicable delays at Berlin; hence the decision, speed and energy at Vienna. But there must have been some special art practised to keep the text of the Serbian reply from the Kaiser till the sands had run out. It is on this point that William II should speak. He was by no means supine in the transaction of business. On the contrary he discharged his duties with punctilio and super-abundant energy. Now if ever was the moment in his reign when these qualities were required. This, of all of the innumerable documents he had dealt with in his reign, was the one which deserved them. How was it that the contents of the box delivered by messenger at Potsdam on the night of the 27th did not meet his eye till a further fatal twelve hours had passed? Confidential secretaries, personal aides-de-camp, Court officials—someone—must have been pressed into the service of the Wilhelmstrasse. Was the Kaiser a victim of the same manipulation which in different forms was applied to both his brother autocrats in Russia and Austria? The searchlights of post-war inquiry, which have lighted more brightly the events of this week than any period in history, should be directed to this dark and carefully-shaded spot. The facts remain that the Serbian reply was not read by the man on whose decision the fate of the world still hung, until nearly sixty hours after it had been delivered at Belgrade; and that before he could act upon it, the irrevocable declaration of war had gone forth from Vienna.
The Austrian declaration of war upon Serbia ended the first phase of the outbreak of Armageddon. The griefs and hatreds of these two countries against each other could now obtain satisfaction by arms. The second phase was the dispute between Germany and Russia about the mobilization of their armies. The first quarrel was petty but real; the second measureless but technical. Until the Austrian cannon bombarded Belgrade, the control of German policy lay with the Kaiser and his Ministers. Once fighting had begun even in this obscure corner of Europe, the German and Russian General Staffs predominated. Military reasons cut across and ruptured every diplomatic situation. Moltke and Falkenhayn towered above Bethmann-Hollweg and Jagow, just as the warlike Grand Dukes and Generals at St. Petersburg took charge of the Czar. Henceforward the prescribed war plans of the German and Russian empires and the execution of the successive stages of their mobilizations became the over-powering theme in both countries. Kaiser and Czar alike felt themselves morally gripped by firm seconds who led them remorselessly to the duelling-ground, cautioned them against betraying weakness or nervousness on the field of honour, handed them the pistols and gave the signal to fire upon each other to their mutual destruction. This second phase occupied four days. It ended at 6 p.m on August I when Germany declared war upon Russia.
During this period immense efforts, led by Sir Edward Grey, were made to retrieve the situation. Nearly all the Ambassadors in all the great capitals strove earnestly for peace. As this movement developed a spontaneous force, it affected both Bethmann-Hollweg and Jagow. When it became increasingly plain to them from the reports of the German Ambassador in London, that a general war would find the British Empire ranged with France and Russia, both lent themselves to action which a few days earlier would have dispersed the crisis. The Kaiser now desperately shaken by the imminence of the explosion, and the Czar sincerely clinging to peace, interchanged a series of personal telegrams unique in the story of nations. But neither they, nor their Ministers, nor all that Grey might do, could regain control of the purely technical measures and counter-measures which the chiefs of armies demanded and took. The first war, between Austria and Serbia, was about a murder. The second war, which absorbed it, was a war between Germany and Russia about precautions. The third and greatest of all wars, beside which the others were but trivial, the war between Germany and France, was merely consequential and happened almost as a matter of form. The German plan for this third war required the invasion of Belgium, and the invasion of Belgium brought the British Empire united to the field. Nothing in human power could break the fatal chain, once it had begun to unroll. A situation had been created where hundreds of officials had only to do their prescribed duty to their respective countries to wreck the world. They did their duty.
War having broken out on the Danube, various levers of precaution or preparation were pressed throughout Europe. At five o’clock we ordered the whole British First Fleet, comprising our thirty-eight best capital ships, to its northern war-station at Scapa Flow. It left Portland at 7 a.m. on the morning of the 29th, passed the Straits of Dover during darkness with all precautions, and by midday on the 30th was safely through the narrow seas and in blue water. This movement, which was kept secret, till accomplished, from all except the Prime Minister, was in no way provocative. The Fleet was actually steaming farther away from Germany. Nobody could object to that; but it made us quite secure whatever might come. We were in the fortunate position that the one essential step which our own safety required, while it increased our diplomatic influence, did not endanger the immediate safety of others.
Up till this stage it had not been certain that Germany and Austria would not gain another bloodless victory such as had rewarded Aerenthal five years before. But on this occasion Germany found herself almost immediately in the presence of a sombre fatalism in the ‘Entente’ Powers. There was a feeling in Paris and London that Germany meant to have war and meant to have it now. If she did not, it was easy to find half-a-dozen solutions. Grey indefatigably proposed a conference of the Powers and begged all parties to be reasonable. France abstained from every form of provocation. But there the British and French governments came quite definitely to the end of their resources. If Germany intended war, nothing could stop her. If she was bent on so directing events that the long-threatened, long-dreaded hour must strike, then she would have her way. There could not, for instance, be any question of France begging Russia to give in for the sake of peace, or of Great Britain telling France or Russia that they would certainly be left alone if they chose to fight. The two great western Powers felt that if Germany would relieve them of all responsibility and would of her own initia
tive and at her own moment bring successively Russia, France and Great Britain into one united front against her, they could not help it. They must face whatever was coming to them. Believing themselves about to become the objects of deliberate aggression, and seeing their all-powerful opponent putting himself hopelessly in the wrong, the one thing they would not do was to repudiate each other. To do this might avert the war for the time being. It would leave each of them to face the next crisis alone. They did not dare to separate. They awaited with bated breath but stern hearts the further steps that Germany might choose to take.
The scene must now be shifted to St. Petersburg. We have seen how nicely Berchtold had timed his ultimatum so as to make sure that President Poincaré should have sailed before news of it arrived in Russia. Monsieur Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, had however a premonition. Instead of going to bed after the leave-taking he drove to the Foreign Office, where he learned that a most important despatch from Vienna was being deciphered. It was the ultimatum.
The next morning found Russia and Austria face to face. The deepest feelings of the Slav race were aroused. The wounds of the Bosnian crisis five years before still ached. The visit of the French President, gone but yesterday, gave confidence. Russian society, military and political, was gathered in the capital and large numbers of notables thronged the court at Tsarskoe Selo. Nevertheless, the decisions of the Ministerial Council held on the 24th were studiously restrained. No military steps were taken; but the Minister of War was authorized to prepare in case of necessity orders for a partial mobilization against Austria. A manifesto was published declaring that Russia could not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia; and Vienna was earnestly asked to extend the time-limit of forty-eight hours to enable discussion to proceed. The German Ambassador, still Pourtalès of the Bosnia crisis, informed Sazonov that Austro-Hungary ‘could not accept interference in her differences with Serbia, and Germany also on her side could not accept a suggestion which would be contrary to the dignity of her Ally as a Great Power.’ Sazonov rejoined: ‘We shall not leave Serbia alone in her struggle against Austria.’ The next day arrived the Austrian refusal to extend the time-limit. On this the Czar, presiding over his Council of State, ordered immediate proclamation of the preparatory state, corresponding to Germany’s drohende Kriegsgefahr (‘threatening danger of war’) and to our own ‘precautionary period,’ and of martial law in fortresses and on the frontier. He also authorized his Foreign Minister to issue, when he deemed it necessary, the orders already in preparation for partial mobilization against Austria.
But now occurred one of those technical difficulties of which statesmen should be better informed beforehand. The Russian General Staff was horrified at the form of partial mobilization sanctioned by their Government. They exclaimed that it would derange their plans for general mobilization if, as they believed, war with Germany as well as with Austria should ensue. Even against Austria alone, the Southern Districts would provide thirteen corps only, instead of the sixteen their war-plans required. In particular the mobilization of the Warsaw region not hitherto ordered must be included in any coherent precautions against Austria. They complained vehemently that the partial mobilization which had been approved was a political measure which bore no relation to military requirements; it would confuse their railway movements and be deeply injurious should the supreme danger supervene. General Yanushkevich shook Sazonov with his solid arguments. He was supported by all the principal Staff Officers and by the Quarter-Master General,2 Danilov. It was agreed that two ukases should be prepared for the Czar to sign—one for partial, the other for general mobilization—and that final decision which to use should be held in suspense. On this Yanushkevich warned Jilinski, the commander at Warsaw, that July 30 would be announced as the first day of Russian general mobilization.
On the expiry of her ultimatum and the departure of Baron Giesl from Belgrade on the evening of July 25, Austria had ordered the mobilization of eight corps—half the Imperial Army—against Serbia, with the 28th as the first day of mobilization. Although this measure was aimed solely at Serbia, it affected military districts in the north of the Empire like Prague, from which troops were to move to the Serbian frontier.3 Thus the Russians had grounds for believing that preparations were also on foot against them. The Austrian declaration of war following these disturbing reports determined Sazonov to act upon the discretion accorded him three days before. He therefore sanctioned the partial mobilization, and informed the German Government, with many disclaimers of any hostile intent towards them, that the Odessa, Kiev, Moscow and Kazan military areas would begin to mobilize on the 29th. Jagow had stated on the 27th both to the British and Russian Ambassadors in Berlin, that ‘if Russia mobilized only in the south, Germany would not mobilize, but if she mobilized in the north or if Russian troops entered Austrian territory, Germany would have to do so too.’ Thus Sazonov had not only reason to take precautions against Austria, but the right to believe that these would not involve Germany in counter-measures.
Meanwhile the temperature was rising fast. On the afternoon of the 29th the news that the Austrian monitors had begun the bombardment of Belgrade roused Russian public and official opinion to fever heat. About the same time the German Ambassador Pourtalès informed Sazonov ‘that further continuance of Russia’s measures of mobilization would force Germany to mobilize, and that a European war could then scarcely be prevented.’ The situation of the Russian minister was painful in the extreme. Austria had rejected all his proposals. Germany forbade all pressure upon her Ally. Every word of encouragement or comradeship had been studiously avoided by England. The military chiefs, on whom the life of Russia might depend in a few days, were unanswerable in their technical sphere. Germany had retracted her promise to remain impassive if the Russians mobilized only against Austria. The guns were firing on the Danube, and the attack upon Serbia had actually begun. M. de Sazonov resisted the military men no more. There remained only the Czar.
Late on the night of the 28th the Czar had sent his personal telegram to the Kaiser:
‘Am glad you are back. In this most serious moment I appeal to you to help me. An ignoble war has been declared to a weak country. The indignation in Russia shared fully by me is enormous. I foresee that very soon I shall be overwhelmed by the pressure brought upon me and be forced to take extreme measures which will lead to war. To try and avoid such a calamity as a European war, I beg you in the name of our old friendship to do what you can to stop your allies from going too far. NICKY.’17
On the morning of the 29th he received a telegram from the Kaiser sent independently a little before his own, saying that the Kaiser fully understood how difficult it was for the Czar and his government to face the trend of public opinion. Therefore
‘with regard to the hearty and tender friendship which binds us both from long ago with firm ties, I am exerting my utmost influence to induce the Austrians to deal straightly to arrive at a satisfactory understanding with you. I confidently hope you will help me in my efforts to smooth over difficulties that may still arise. Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin, WILLY.’18
Both these telegrams were in English. They seemed to offer a new hope of peace. But even this intimate tie of the sovereigns, each with his throne and dynasty at stake, could not withstand the hourly increasing strain of the military measures. Some time during the morning of the 29th both ukases for mobilization, partial and general, were presented to the Czar by General Yanushkevich. It seems probable though not certain that after long and strenuous arguments the Czar signed both. At any rate, Dobrorolski, the Chief of Mobilization, during the afternoon of the 29th obtained the signatures of the various high authorities as prescribed by the Russian constitution to an order for general mobilization approved by the Czar. This task was not completed till eight o’clock, and the General having cleared the telegraph lines was about to give the decisive signal, when he received a definite order from the Czar cancelling general mobilization and author
izing only partial mobilization.
Nicholas II was still struggling for peace. He had telegraphed again to the Kaiser thanking him for his conciliatory and friendly messages, and ending ‘it would be right to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Conference. Trust in your wisdom and friendship.’ At 9.40 p.m. on the 29th the reply of the Kaiser to the Czar’s first telegram arrived. It suggested that Russia should ‘remain a spectator of the Austro-Serbian conflict, without involving Europe in the most horrible war she ever witnessed.’ He advocated a direct understanding between the Russian and Austrian governments and promised to promote it. Although this was no concession at all by Germany on the main issue, it had affected Nicholas II sufficiently to induce him to countermand the general mobilization. He even tried to stop the partial mobilization; but both Sazonov and Yanushkevich convinced him that this was impossible. At 1.20 a.m. he replied to the Kaiser:
‘Thank you heartily for your quick answer…. The military measures which have now come into force were decided five days ago for reasons of defence on account of Austria’s preparations. I hope from all my heart that these measures won’t in any way interfere with your part as mediator which I greatly value. We need your strong pressure on Austria to come to an understanding with us.’19
None of these internal Russian perturbations were apparent to Berlin. The German General Staff had full and punctual information of most of what was being done in the various Russian military districts. Although the formal order even for partial mobilization was not dispatched till midnight on the 29th, the commanders concerned, warned informally by the General Staff, in their professional zeal and lively expectation of war, were already making all kinds of preparations in anticipation of the order which they expected momentarily to receive. All such preparations were reported to Berlin. They involved, for instance, the Warsaw area, as well as the southern commands of which Germany had been officially informed by the Russian Government. Since the 29th Moltke had urged the sending of an ultimatum to Russia, and Falkenhayn had demanded the proclamation of ‘drohende Kriegsgefahr.’ When on the 30th the Russian formal announcement of the partial mobilization was received, the Kaiser agreed to this. ‘Threatening danger of war’ was proclaimed. This measure was virtually equivalent to the first two days of general mobilization, that is to say it set in motion a vast number of processes that would in any case have been taken upon a decree of general mobilization. It must not be supposed, however, that the military commanders throughout Germany had remained inert during the last three or four days. Like their Russian counterparts each wished to be forward in every preparation, and all the military centres were humming with activity. Reports of all this, carried back to Russia, decided Sazonov and the military authorities that general mobilization could be delayed no longer. By an immense concerted effort they prevailed upon the Czar at 4 p.m. on July 30 to sign a new ukase of general mobilization, and an hour later all the military centres were so informed.
The World Crisis Page 11
