CHAPTER XVI
THE BATTLE OF LODZ
On the morning of November 8 General von Falkenhayn in his new headquarters at Mezières consulted the Chief of the Field Railways upon the transport of important forces from the western to the eastern front. Colonel Groener informed him that it was possible to transport upon the four double tracks across Germany four army corps simultaneously. Each corps would require 40 trains daily and would arrive at its destination 4½ days later. The corps would have to be drawn two from the right wing, one from the centre and one from the left of the fighting front. In case of necessity he could even transport a fifth in the single sweep; but no doubt it would not be possible to withdraw so many units simultaneously from the line. The whole railway operation could be repeated in cycles as often as was desired.
There was certainly the gravest need for reinforcing the Eastern theatre. The repulse of the German army from Warsaw could only be the prelude of a Russian onslaught on the largest scale. The Austrians were in the depths of dejection and disorganization, and Conrad was unceasing in his reproaches for lack of help and even for breach of faith. HL had done wonders with their limited forces and would still strike many a shrewd, fierce blow; but the odds against them seemed overwhelming. From the third week in October when the retreat in South Poland was known to Supreme Headquarters, Falkenhayn had been left in no doubt of their need, and he felt it acutely. But meanwhile he was himself deeply involved in the endless battle of the Yser. He had curtailed his ambitions till they now flew no higher than the capture of Ypres. This would not be a strategical or even a tactical gain; it might indeed even be more advantageous to leave that shell-trap in enemy hands. But some definite indisputable event was required before the disastrous attempt against the Channel ports could be broken off. The capture of Ypres and the descent of winter would afford an indispensable pretext for closing down in the West. Ypres then it must be; and thereafter Groener’s trains could carry at least four army corps to sustain and indeed restore the balance in the East.
But Ypres was stubborn. Haig and the 1st British Army Corps, long bombarded and tormented, held every point with constancy. The four new German Corps with their youthful volunteers had broken themselves in vain upon what seemed to be an inexpugnable defence. The German chief could not know how thin was the unyielding line of rifles, or how straitened their store of shells. Very nearly at Gheluvelt on October 31 had Falkenhayn gained the consolation prize. On that afternoon when for a time his front was actually broken, Sir Douglas Haig, there being no troops to send, had found it necessary to mount his horse and ride with half-a-dozen officers and his flag slowly forward amid the shells along the Menin road. On that, or a similar day, the survivors of a German company, penetrating a gap occupied only by the dead, had found themselves some distance inside the British front. They heard the battle going on behind them and conceived themselves in the midst of the hostile army. Their officer, forlorn, looked for some authority to whom to surrender. Eventually he laid down his arms to a sergeant and some hurriedly-armed cooks, and as the prisoners proceeded to the rear, he asked ‘But where is your army? Where are your reserves?’ His captors were too few to afford to tell him the truth!
But all Falkenhayn knew was that the young corps had been bloodily stopped. Now the best troops must be employed. A fresh Army Corps, containing a division of the Prussian Guard, was to make the decisive assault on the 10th (eventually the 11th) as a part of the final offensive in which 22 Divisions would march. That would finish with Ypres and then—‘Eastward Ho!’ So on this 8th day of November, having heard the report of his railway director, he despatched a trusted agent from Mezières to the Austro-Hungarian Headquarters at Cracow with an important message for Conrad.
We have heard of this agent before. He is the same Colonel Hentsch whose journey along the German line on September 9 had produced the general retirement which signalled the immortal end of the Marne. Here is the proof that Hentsch had not exceeded his authority on that occasion. We find him again, at the vital centre of affairs, charged with the most delicate and responsible duties. But this time his orders are in writing.
‘Proceed at once to the Austro-Hungarian Headquarters and report the following by word of mouth to General Conrad von Hötzendorf. “I deeply regret that the whole course of our offensive in the West has only permitted me to send three cavalry divisions and 40,000 troops as reinforcements to the East. Any further weakening in the West would react very unfavourably on our condition without bringing about a decision in the East. Nevertheless I hope in about a fortnight to make five or six army corps available for the East. They must naturally be employed in the most effective direction, that is, …along the Vistula in co-operation with strong detachments of the German Eighth and Ninth armies. The first condition for the success of this operation is that the Austro-Hungarian army, together with the German forces fighting at its side, must hold the Russian armies on the left bank of the Vistula… and draw more forces towards it.”’40
Colonel Hentsch arrived at Conrad’s headquarters on the afternoon of November 10. What he said was recorded.
‘General von Falkenhayn knows well how important it is to obtain a decision in Russia. But the whole German army is spread out from the Vosges to the coast, 100 to 200 yards from the enemy. The Germans want Ostend in order to make a war harbour there for U-boats. It is therefore important for the Supreme Command to drive the Allies back to Dunkirk. The Belgians have made inundations as a result of which the IIIrd Reserve Corps had to retire. We wish to take Ypres. If we do that, the English and French must go back. If the attack does not have the desired success, General von Falkenhayn will relieve certain forces and send them to the East. In this case, Germany would be leaving France the initiative. The German forces must therefore be grouped in depth, and the armies must have reserves behind them, in order to prevent a break through. The taking up of this formation in depth requires time. General von Falkenhayn hopes to be able to send five or six corps at latest in a fortnight. He thinks, moreover, that the Eighth Army, which has already parted with two corps, might give up some more, even at the cost of leaving East Prussia open. He hopes that the operations starting from the direction of Thorn with twelve Prussian army corps may bring about a decision.’41
Conrad asked when the German corps could be in the East. Hentsch replied: ‘That would be about November 22. We can detrain four corps simultaneously.’
Conrad then said that the date of the advance of the German Ninth Army was already fixed for November 11. The question was whether this offensive should be carried out or whether it should wait until the German reinforcements arrived. Hentsch replied that his chief was still without knowledge of the offensive planned by the ‘High Command East’ (HL); but the Supreme Headquarters had thought of engaging five or six extra corps in the neighbourhood of Thorn in order to throw back the Russians towards the south-east by pressure from the north. ‘It must be,’ he opined, ‘the same operation which the Ninth Army now wanted to make alone with thirteen or fourteen divisions. In these circumstances he could only inform General Ludendorff that in about a fortnight five or six corps would arrive with reinforcements, and leave it to him entirely whether to wait for them or not.’
The conversation shows either that Falkenhayn had not informed Hentsch of the ‘already-decided and about-to-start manœuvre,’ or that HL had kept their secrets to themselves. It shows also that once again Hentsch had been sent on a mission the wrong way round. In September he should have visited Kluck before Bülow. In November he should have seen Hindenburg before Conrad.
On November 9 HL begged the Supreme Command for reinforcements to carry out their new offensive. Hentsch was told to return via Hindenburg’s headquarters, and discuss the situation. Falkenhayn replied on the same evening: ‘I hope in a fortnight to make four more active corps available in the East. In the meantime,’ he added inconsequently, ‘any partial successes possible would be of great value.’ HL had now to decide whether
they would march unaided the next morning or wait a fortnight for a far more decisive operation with the promised reinforcements. The question was nicely balanced. Falkenhayn’s telegram clearly placed the burden of decision on them. It must have been tempting to wait for the extra corps. By the time they arrived the Russians would have completely filled the bulge in the Polish salient and would probably already have penetrated some distance into Silesia. Any inertia by the Ninth Army would only encourage the Grand Duke in feeling that the Germans had been decisively beaten in the East. The whole impulse of the Russian army would be to press forward on to hostile soil, and in this mood they might well forget or put in the shade the perils they would run by a German counter stroke from the northern bastion. All the weight of the argument was in favour of delay till the enemy was more deeply involved and the strength of the German forces had doubled. But supposing they waited for the fortnight and the four corps did not arrive or only arrived piecemeal, then the inroad of the Russians would have become most serious. They would have established themselves in positions protecting their right flank. They would perhaps have interrupted some of the railways between Posen and Cracow. The danger would be all the greater and possibly the means of coping with it might be practically unimproved. Anyhow HL had timed their new offensive to start at daybreak. They decided to pursue unsupported their original plan. Events were to prove that they were wise to do so.
The final assault of the campaign of 1914 in the West took place on November 11. The Germans attacked the whole front from Bethune to the sea. The main force of the attack was concentrated upon the three sides of the Ypres salient. Twenty-two divisions converged upon the Ypres salient from Bixschoote to Frelinghien, supported by the greatest artillery fire yet heard. The Prussian Guard headed the onfall astride of the Menin road. Side by side twelve allied divisions, seven British and five French intermingled at many points, withstood the shock. Night fell upon severe losses but with the line virtually intact. This battle produced a change in Falkenhayn’s outlook. He was forced to recognize that his campaign in the West must now end, and end in failure. His reaction however was no longer to send as many troops as possible to the East; on the contrary, he seems to have been apprehensive of his own weakness on the Western Front. His reports to the Kaiser at this time show that he regarded the German army as having sustained at least a moral defeat of the first order.
It was the duty of General von Plessen to summarize Falkenhayn’s reports daily for the Kaiser. He has recorded his own impressions in his diary.
On November 14 His Majesty is in a very depressed mood. Is of the opinion that the attack on Ypres has failed and come to grief and with it the campaign. At any rate the report of General von F [alkenhayn] that there are only six days’ ammunition left, which means that to-day there are only four days’ left, is absolutely overwhelming. If we leave this place without a decision in our favour it is a moral defeat of the first class, a very bad situation which will be made worse by our recent heavy losses!
November 16. The Imperial Chancellor called me up. He is concerned about the enormous loss at Ypres. Wishes me to use my influence to stop further attempts to break through the position by main force…. I am of the same opinion. F. however will not abandon the attack on Ypres until the last heavy shell has been fired. Then four or five corps will be sent to the East.42
But HL, now at grips, requested precise dates for the arrival of the promised corps. Their telegrams of November 14 and 18 compelled Falkenhayn to come to a clear decision. On November 18 he wrote to Hindenburg a letter pregnant with consequences, revealing the change in his views. After rehearsing the reinforcements he had already sent, he said that the decision to send forces from West to East would be made easier ‘if there was a well-founded hope that the arrival of fresh forces would, as far as could be foreseen, bring about a final decision in the East.’ At present this hope seemed to have no foundation. In the most favourable circumstances the enemy might be drawn back behind the Narev and Vistula line and compelled to evacuate Galicia. This, although ‘of great political importance,’ would not be decisive. It would be of no value whatever if in the meantime their western enemies succeeded in driving the German forces back, or even in compelling them to give up the coast. ‘For our most dangerous enemy is not in the East, but England, with whom the conspiracy against Germany stands and falls.1 We can only injure her if we maintain our contact with the sea. Similarly Germany could only hold France in check if she maintained her present positions in the West. The injurious influence of even the smallest revival of French hopes had been shown after the German retirement in September, which was in the main ascribed to the weakening of the Western army in favour of the East.’ The Chief of the Staff concluded with the assertion that ‘the Supreme Command had decided in spite of the above objections to bring forces from the West… but they could not be sent simultaneously and must arrive one after the other.’43 Such was the reaction upon the Eastern Front of the successful defence of Ypres. These second thoughts found HL in the heart of a desperate battle.
The indefatigable German Corps opened their offensive into North Poland on November 10. Mackensen, whose conduct in the South Poland battles had retrieved any laurels lacking at Gumbinnen, was now placed in command of the whole Ninth Army. He advanced with his left hand on the Vistula, as if it were a balustrade. The impingement of the front was oblique, and the Russians, whose units of the Second and Fifth armies were streaming forward towards Silesia, suddenly found their right shoulders violently assaulted from the direction of Thorn. In three days Mackensen captured over twelve thousand prisoners and threw back, in much disorder, the Russian right, whose divisions, and even brigades, were encountered in detail by the German advance from this unexpected quarter. On the 15th and 16th the Vth Siberian, VIth Siberian, the IInd Corps of the First Army were all engaged and lost heavily, leaving, according to the German claim, twenty-five thousand prisoners in the enemy’s hands. All these defeated troops fell back on and towards Lodz. Around this Cottonopolis of Central Europe a battle of extraordinary complication now impended. The Grand Duke disposed of numbers so superior that the Germans found themselves matched and baffled by the enormous masses directed and manœuvred, though with primitive mechanical efficiency, by a Headquarters’ brain whose knowledge of the military art was not surpassed in Europe.
We shall now descend from the movements of armies and the sphere of strategy to a more detailed view of this remarkable battle.
The unexpected rapidity of HL’s advance brought their main forces into contact with the Second Russian Army during November 15. The Ist Reserve Corps and the Cavalry Division pierced the front of this Army, as a swimmer might strike out with a breast-stroke. The other four corps—namely, XIth, XVIIth, XXth, and XXVth (Res.)—swinging to the right, were, by the evening of the 16th November, facing almost south towards Lodz. Here was the real break through, so long to be sought for on the Western Front. The front of the enemy is broken; the flanks are exposed on each side of the gap; while the intruding force prepares to rip and roll up the whole of the front. All the 17th and 18th November the Germans marched and fought in both directions; and two struggles developed on each side of the gap. With the northerly, and lesser, we need not much concern ourselves; the crisis was fought to the southward. By the end of November 18 the Germans had encircled Lodz, and perhaps a hundred and fifty thousand Russians defending it, on three sides. They were hopefully preparing to close their net, within which there struggled at least four Russian corps. The whole of these troops were, on the night of November 18, confined in an area about sixteen miles long by eight broad. Their destruction seemed imminent. It looked, to General Knox, as if Sedan and Tannenberg were to be repeated.
But meanwhile, amid the confusion of these unforeseeable events, and in spite of being continually beaten in each locality by much smaller numbers of Germans, the brain of the Russian High Command continued to function clearly and resolutely. The Grand Duke, on the night of Novem
ber 17, while the climax was still impending, ordered the whole of the Fifth Army, which stood in the Russian line to the southward, to face about, counter-march and rescue the Second Army by driving back the left of the encircling Germans. The Fifth Army, therefore, marched north-eastward during the whole of November 19 and 20; they traversed the only unenclosed side of the oblong space in which the Second Army was imprisoned. During the 21st they came into heavy action with the German XXVth Reserve Corps, which formed the extreme point of the encircling movement. The Germans stood with their backs to Russia, and the Russians with their backs to Germany. On this day if a spectator had received a safe conduct to travel from north to south across the armies, he would in a journey of twenty-five miles have passed through eight separate fighting lines, back to back or face to face. Military authorities have pithily likened the situation to a Neapolitan ice. On the 19th November the Stavka heard from the Second Army ‘that its right wing was completely enveloped and the enemy in possession of several localities south-west of Lodz; that the Second Army was on the defensive in every direction and all its reserves had been thrown in.’ Thereafter all communication failed. The silence which enwrapped the Stavka left them the prey to terrible forebodings.
At the same time that the Grand Duke had ordered the Fifth Army to counter-march, General Ruzski, who commanded the North-West Front, had detached 3½ divisions from the left of his First Army to march south upon the backs of the Germans encircling the Second Army. This force—known as ‘the Lovitch Force’—moved tardily and disjointedly. Its commander was changed the same evening that it started, and changed again next day. Nevertheless, by the afternoon of November 21, its leading division (the 6th Siberian) began to press upon the rear of the XXVth Reserve Corps at the same time that large masses of the Russian Fifth Army were attacking them from the opposite quarter. The position of the XXVth Reserve Corps and the 3rd Guard Division seemed now to be as fatally compromised as the Russian Second Army around Lodz had been on the night of November 18. General Scheffer, who commanded, found that instead of enveloping and encircling the Russian masses in Lodz, he was himself surrounded and in the midst of enemies. The audacious German turning movement was not only attacked by superior forces in its front, but it was cut off from the rest of the Ninth Army and attacked in the rear by four Russian divisions who barred every avenue of retreat. The tables were thus completely turned. The stakes for which the Germans had played were the highest known in war. They had not succeeded, and when darkness fell on November 21, it looked as if the grim forfeit would be exacted.
The World Crisis Page 24
