As the ships tied up at their various docks in Bakharitza and Smolny Quay in Archangel, the disembarking companies of 4,344 men and 143 officers were ordered to take part in a parade through the streets of the city. It was a gloomy September day, with drenching rain; with the immediate concerns for the sick and the dying, the parade was called off. It gave the regiment a chance to unload the sick, to transfer them to quarters that were barely habitable, let alone hospitable, and to seek medical supplies and assistance. So the American soldiers of the 339th Infantry patiently waited for the next move, some on the docks, some still on ships, and some in sick quarters.
Because of the effects of the epidemic, some men found themselves on ships back to England without really spending much time in Russia. Many of the sick who recovered were still not fit for field duty, and a slow trickle of men began to be evacuated to England, then to the United States. Pvt. John Oudemuller of Holland, Michigan, was one of the first to leave. He was hospitalized on September 6, the day he arrived, and was taken to Murmansk by ship on October 27. After several delays, he boarded the busy U.S. cruiser Olympia with Ambassador Francis and the wounded Seaman Perschke, late of Force B. He was taken off in Scotland, then made the rounds of hospitals in Britain before being shipped home and discharged January 13, 1919, just seven months after he enlisted.12 Many of those who died from the flu in September had been in the army less than ninety days. On November 26, fifty-two men were ordered back to England from the Archangel hospitals, including Golden C. Bahr of Marilla, Michigan.13
The 339th was commanded by Lt. Col. George Evans Stewart, who had replaced the regiment’s popular commander Col. John Craig at Camp Custer. According to Army chief of staff General March, Stewart was sent a copy of Wilson’s Aide Memoire to make sure he understood the government’s position; however, it is doubtful that Stewart ever received his copy. As soon as his troops were ashore, he virtually lost control of the regiment. Stewart had been instructed to report to British general Poole for orders, and Poole lost no time in rushing two American battalions into the Russian interior.14 As soon as the troops disembarked, they were ordered south. Some thought the situation might have been different if the 339th had been led by their old commander, Colonel Craig. Lt. Harry Costello later wrote, “Col. Craig would not have stood supinely by while his outfit was stolen. . . . Today in Detroit’s Own Regiment Colonel Craig’s name is revered, the man himself is worshipped by all those he ever came in contact with.”15
The whole North Russian expedition was engulfed in confusion—miscommunications, misunderstandings, and blatant misuse of the Americans. For this, President Wilson was primarily responsible. After he circulated his Aide Memoire, he had little more to say to the Allies, despite his knowledge of actions that flagrantly violated his whole concept of the Intervention. As Americans were drawn into battle with Bolsheviks, word was transmitted to Washington on a regular basis. Ambassador Francis, who had been one of the strongest advocates of actually fighting the Bolsheviks, was the senior American official in Archangel. One historian described the conflict: “Indeed, the government record of cable communications between the [State] Department and Ambassador Francis during the month of September gives somewhat of the impression of two deaf persons carrying on a conversation while their hearing aids operate only intermittently.”16 On September 11, 1918, Francis cabled Washington that Poole had already sent two American battalions into action. However, on September 13, a State Department cable to Francis repeated the instructions that activity was to be only defensive, guarding stores in Archangel and surrounding areas. A covering message also repeated that Stewart was under Poole’s command. Faced with conflicting instructions, Francis interpreted these instructions according to his own philosophy. In those early days, he was in complete agreement with the ambitious British general Poole in his attacks on Bolsheviks.
Poole’s plan was to send Force A four hundred miles down the railroad to Vologda before winter set in. Force C would also go south, three hundred miles up the Dvina River as far as Kotlas, from there to move south to meet with the Czech forces, which would presumably be arriving from the east. The ill-fated Force B would go up the Dvina, disembark and cross to attack Obozerskaya, while a small force would be sent to Onega to protect the Murmansk-Archangel line and Force A.
All of these strategies were totally unrealistic. Vologda was already heavily occupied by Bolshevik troops, as was Plesetskaya, north of Vologda. On the Dvina, shallow-draft Red gunboats were able to pass over the shallows of the upper Dvina, while Allied boats, with a deeper draft, were unable to navigate those shallows. In addition, the Czechs never intended to move north to join Archangel forces, even had the Supreme War Council advised the legion to make that effort. And Force B was routed before the other campaigns could get fully underway.
Poole’s optimism, plus a lack of knowledge of true conditions, led him to make these aggressive, but totally unrealistic, moves. As the two forces moved south, they were getting farther and farther away from each other; had they been successful in their missions, they would have found themselves separated by three hundred miles of Red-controlled territory.
Another weak link in Poole’s plan, and other Allied plans as well, was the expectation that the Russians themselves would support Allied movements into the interior, even supplying troops to fight with an Allied force. Experience soon taught them that Russian peasants had no inclination to join any such operations.
Eventually, the British High Command in London learned of the ineptitude of the Archangel commander; Poole was allowed to take leave and returned to London on October 14. He was replaced by Maj. Gen. Sir Edmund Ironside, a giant of a man who turned out to be more popular, and more conservative, than his predecessor. Surprisingly, Ironside was told that the Supreme War Council had decided to conduct a winter campaign in North Russia even if Germany surrendered.17 This information had not been communicated to the Allied officers in the Archangel area. While Poole briefed Ironside on the situation before he left, Ironside was puzzled by two facts: (1) that Poole was convinced that his forces would be substantially strengthened soon, and (2) that all of Poole’s orders had been verbal and there was virtually no record or knowledge of Poole’s troop placements. However, Ironside took up his duties with vigor, visiting his fronts frequently, a routine that Poole had ignored.
On September 5, 1918, with Poole still firmly in control, the Third Battalion of the 339th, Companies I, K, L, and M under Maj. Charles Young walked down the gangplank and off the troopship. Immediately, they boarded ferries for the cross-river trip to the train depot at Bakharitza and filed into the tiny Russian railway cars. The Second Battalion debarked at Smolny Quay, headed for barracks and duty in Archangel as security forces. First Battalion, Companies A, B, C, and D stayed on the ships until September 7, when they debarked and headed up the Dvina River on barges. Some of the companies would not see each other again until they departed Russia nine months later.
Action began almost immediately on the railroad front as the Third Battalion moved to support embattled French forces and attempted to rescue the lost Force B, silent since late August and supposedly lost in the bogs of North Russia.
5
On the Railroad Front
Somewhere deep in the forest beyond that skyline of pine tree tops a handful of French and Scots and Americans were battling the Bolos for their lives.
—Joel E. Moore
AS the American Third Battalion headed south down the Vologda-Archangel Railroad, rattling along in their Russian version of the French “40&8s,” they stopped at a small village, waiting for a northbound train to pass. There they saw their first Bolos, guarded by sailors. The sailors were most likely part of the Force B Olympia contingent, en route back to their ship, although they were not recognized as such at the time.
General Poole’s Railroad Force, Force A, was vulnerable, tied as it was to the tracks. Poole soon placed two flanking forces on either side of the railroad, the Onega Force to the west and the Seletsko
ye Force on the Emtsa River to the east. The three forces were designed to operate together, but seldom did.
Just outside Obozerskaya, recently captured by Force A, the Reds had blown a bridge with artillery fire. Here the American battalion detrained from their “side-door Pullmans” and formed up in column of twos. They were tired and hungry from poor food at sea and on the dingy train cars; many were still sick from the flu, but afraid to be hospitalized; and worst of all, they were virtually untrained in the art of warfare. Yet, they plunged into their strange war prepared to do their very best.
American battalion commander Maj. Charles Young was not one of the favorites of the regiment; he had a reputation as a stickler for regulations and had a great concern for his own personal safety. As the column of men from I and L Companies stood in ranks near the rail station, Major Young called for an officers’ meeting. As they congregated, a French officer approached excitedly, gesturing and shouting in French. Finally it dawned on the major that the shell holes and destroyed bridge indicated the place had been under Red artillery fire recently:
[He] shooed the platoons off into the woods. The area was one big swamp, and as the men dispersed, they wound up in water knee deep. When the Americans met their French guides, they noticed the poilus had built fires to dry their soggy clothes, but Major Young stuck to the book. There would be no fires for the doughboys on their first night under combat conditions.1
In Obozerskaya, Poole’s original Force A was made up of French poilus, with some Russian Slavo Battalion Allied Legion (SBAL) troops, all led by British colonel Guard, who was later replaced by Colonel Sutherland. Their objective was to take Vologda, three hundred miles away from Archangel. Companies I and L were immediately sent into Obozerskaya to relieve the French who had been fighting steadily since August 31. Then began a significant buildup of the Allied defensive position. There were British armored cars, which proved to be almost useless, breaking through bridges and burying themselves in mud, and an armored train with naval guns, sandbagged and protected by a collection of machine guns. There were even a few western front airplanes flown by the Royal Air Force (RAF).2 Part of the work done by the engineers was the leveling of a primitive landing strip for these aircraft, which were sometimes as dangerous to Allied troops as to the Reds. The airplanes played a role on the railroad front, but their bombing was inaccurate. Frequent mention was made of aircraft involvements, but weather and equipment combined to keep them from being a major factor.
As the defenses improved, Railroad Force commander British colonel Sutherland gave his instructions, “We are fighting an offensive war, and not a defensive one, although for the time being it is the duty of everybody to get the present area in a sound state of defense.”3 The men kept busy doing just that, with only patrol action forcing any contact with the Reds.
Units of the Third Battalion were separated further on September 7, when Colonel Sutherland ordered Company K to drive east to look for Force B. Company K left Obozerskaya and moved toward the town of Seletskoye. On the way they discovered carts, supplies, weapons and even fresh graves, evidences of Force B, but no sign of the men. (Actually, by this time Force B was located in Kholmogorskaya, some twenty miles north of Obozerskaya.) Later, on September 11, two platoons of Company L led by 1st Lt. Charles Lennon left Obozerskaya to join Company K, leaving one platoon of Company L still near Archangel and one platoon in Obozerskaya.4
Inevitably, fighting began. On September 11 at about 9:30 A.M., a two-platoon patrol from Company M, working its way south from Obozerskaya, ran into a sizeable Bolshevik patrol. After some skirmishing, the Bolos withdrew, leaving the Yanks in possession of the tracks as far as the bridge at Verst 464.5 The action was brief but intense; there were no known American casualties.6
Major Young was involved in another episode on September 15 outside Obozerskaya. A unit of Company I had been ordered to shoot at any airplane that approached the area. When a plane appeared, Lt. Albert May gave the command to fire. Major Young became upset when the plane was hit and crashed nearby. Young ran toward the downed aircraft, yelling, “Don’t shoot, we’re Americans!” The Bolshevik pilot blasted away with his machine gun and Young dived headfirst into the mud while the pilots escaped into nearby woods. Afterward, in the ranks, men would occasionally call out, “Don’t shoot, we’re Americans!” which always brought a chuckle.7
Clashes increased between Third Battalion and the Bolsheviks. On September 16, the Reds launched their first real attack on the American positions, against the line held by Companies I and L near Verst 464. Their offensive was made with fierce artillery and machine gun fire, but both American companies held firm, and the initial attacks were beaten off. In the action, however, two platoons of Company I under Lt. Gordon B. Reese became separated from the fight in the heavy woods where they were attacked by a Red unit. The doughboys fought until they virtually ran out of ammunition. Reese surprised even himself by ordering a bayonet charge reminiscent of the trench warfare of the western front. His surprise charge confused the Bolsheviks, who suddenly broke and ran.8
The little battle was a victory of sorts for the Americans. The official report was brief:
On morning of September 16th the enemy attacked our outpost position at VERST 464 with machine gun and shrapnel, and was beaten off by “L” Company, supported by two platoons of “I” Company, and artillery of Allied armoured train.
Casualties—Americans—3 Killed
2 wounded9
Those three killed were mechanic Ignacy H. Kwasniewski and Pvt. Anthony Soczkoski, both of Company I, and Pvt. Philip Sokol of Company L. They were buried in a little cemetery in Obozerskaya beneath wooden crosses fashioned by their solemn comrades. Since there was no chaplain on the front, services were performed by a local Russian Orthodox priest. It was a moving final service:
With the long-haired, wonderfully robed priest came his choir and many villagers, who occupied one side of the square made by the soldiers standing there in the dusk to do last honors to their dead comrades. With chantings and doleful chorus the choir answered his solemn oratory and devotional intercessions. He swung his sacred censor pot over each body and though we understood no word we knew he was doing reverence to the spirit of sacrifice shown by our fallen comrades. There in the darkness by the edge of the forest, the priest and his ceremony, the firing squad’s volley, and the bugler’s last call, all united to make that an allied funeral.10
Colonel Stewart was in Obozerskaya on one of his infrequent visits to the front at that time. Several versions of his behavior were recorded: one says he was at the site, but read a magazine during the service; another says he left hurriedly before the service began.11 It appears he could have attended, but chose not to. This caused deep resentment among the Third Battalion soldiers.
For the next two weeks, reports indicate only intermittent shelling by Bolshevik armored trains and limited patrolling. Unexpectedly, on September 28, British general R. G. Finlayson, Poole’s field commander of both the Dvina River Force and the Railroad Force, appeared in Obozerskaya. Finlayson ordered Colonel Sutherland to prepare for an attack toward Plesetskaya, beginning immediately. The charge was to be launched on Bolsheviks at Versts 458 and 455. The order caught Sutherland by surprise, but it was Sutherland’s task to prepare and execute the order.
One of the problems facing the force was a lack of knowledge of the area and a shortage of maps. Sutherland’s hastily contrived plan was simple on paper, but was doomed from the start. He ordered Major Young to make two flanking movements: Company M and half of Company I under Capt. Joel Moore were to take the woods on the west side of the tracks, while the other two platoons of Company I, plus half the Headquarters Mortar Battery took the other flank on the east side under Lt. Albert May.12 But there were no knowledgeable guides for either force and no maps, except very sketchy outlines of the terrain. Off the tracks on either side of the railroad, heavy woods and swamp covered almost every inch of the ground. Between the two flanking units,
the French with one section of American machine gunners and the rest of Headquarters Company (lately and hastily trained on the French Stokes mortars) were to move down the railroad tracks.
The attack was scheduled for 5 A.M. on September 29; the larger flanking units under Captain Moore left around 5 P.M. on September 28 to get into position. Their instructions were:
We must follow the blazed trail of an east-west forest line till we came to a certain broad north-and-south cutting, down which we were to march so many verst posts till we were past the enemy’s flank and then attack him in the rear. Lt. Chantrill, the pleasant British interpreter, was to act as guide, although he himself had no acquaintance with the area.13
Company M immediately found itself in trouble; they encountered swamp and forest, and darkness fell as they left on their march. Platoons became separated, and men strayed, forcing the column to pause to keep men together. Getting lost was a death sentence in that hostile bog.
Meanwhile, the two platoons of I Company on the other flank under Lieutenant May were having more problems. Lieutenant May had asked for maps but was told that two British officers would lead him, so maps were not necessary. May wrote, “About 2 A.M. the two British officers left us out in the woods, stating they had to get back, and handed me this map and said, ‘Go this many paces straight ahead and this many paces to the right and you will be in position.”’14
The mortar crews, carrying their heavy weapons, stumbled and crashed through the swamp, trying to keep up with May, but he was soon out of sight. Instead the mortars found one line of the Bolshevik entrenchments and fired away at them, driving them back. May’s platoons of I Company managed to get back to the original line of departure as the mortars wound up in their own little skirmish. The mortarmen were not only forced to abandon their position under heavy Bolo fire, but they also left their three mortars, base plates, elevating stand, and six shells. Lieutenant Keith, the battery commander, reported, “The mortars in this event would have proved themselves very valuable. They are, however, with their excessive loads of both mortars and shells rather immobile in a swampy country.”15
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