Friction between Graves and the State Department continued, with Graves particularly disturbed when he found that the president was relying on information from State Department representatives in Russia, rather than the War Department.6 When Graves questioned Army chief of staff General March, asking if his reports were faulty or inadequate, March reassured him that he was sending exactly the kind of information the War Department needed.7 Graves repeatedly telegraphed the War Department about the deterioration of relations with other Allies and with the Russians themselves. As early as March 1919, he requested new instructions from Washington, saying:
Japan and the United States are in Siberia with the same announced purpose and are following opposite courses relative to taking part in internal troubles. This has made it seem advisable to me to ask if my policy, in considering the Bolshevik trouble in Siberia, entirely an internal trouble, in which I should take no part, is the policy the Department desires me to follow.8
The message was forwarded to the president, who did not reply. Therefore, General March told Graves to follow the only policy set forth, that of the Aide Memoire, until further direction came from Wilson. March ended by saying, “Keep a stiff upper lip, I am going to stand by you until ___________ freezes over.”9
On June 27, Major Johnson reported that there was information about bomb making and bomb threats against Horvat and spectators along a parade route during a celebration of the Czech takeover the previous year. It was reported that the bomb parts were coming from Tethue, north of Vladivostok on the coast, and some were being stored at Olga. Graves requested the navy to move troops to those areas to stop the partisan activity. On July 31, the USS New Orleans picked up 175 men from Company B, Thirty-first Infantry, under Capt. H. W. Lee and sailed to the coastal towns, three hundred miles up the coast. The infantrymen, joined by Russians, landed one hundred yards offshore and waded into the town of Tethue.10 The soaking wet doughboys were somewhat disgruntled when the ship managed to off-load fifty Marines on the dock; but since it was pouring rain, everyone was soaked before long. Ashore, they spent the night outdoors in the rain, then moved inland, with the Marines leading the way, following narrow-gauge tracks that supposedly led to a mine. At noon they stopped for lunch while the Russians went on ahead. Snipers began firing and five Russians were killed.
The Marines went back to the ship, but the Russians and doughboys went on toward the mines. That night as they camped, a Bolshevik turned himself in. Pvt. E. V. Hockett wrote, “He claimed to be a Lt. Col. in the Bolshevik army. We turned him over to the Russians and they made him dig 6 graves the 6th grave was for him.”11 Another member of Company B on that expedition, Clifford Catlin, wrote, “We did capture a Bolshevik major, who had been in the American army. Our first sergeant knew him—they had gone to the Philippine Islands together.”12
The next day they reboarded the ship and sailed back to Vladivostok. Eichelberger wrote that he was highly disappointed not to be on that raid. “I have had a lovely grouch on since I learned that I couldn’t go on this expedition up country on the New Orleans. It is the most ridiculous proposition I have ever heard of to send an expedition out under a boy of two years service. The navy men are sore about it.”13 Not much was written of the Olga expedition, except that one hundred men of Company K joined a Russian force to land in Olga. Graves reported no resistance and the landings were completed as scheduled.14
In July Graves was ordered to join Ambassador Rowland Morris for a fact-finding trip to Omsk to assess the situation there. The U.S. government had no diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, and Morris, ambassador to Japan, was the senior diplomat in the Far East. The Allies in Omsk felt that the general’s exposure to just the Far East prejudiced his thinking about the government in the interior. Morris and Graves had worked reasonably well together before the trip to Omsk; on that trip, their relationship deteriorated. Graves was reluctant to go, as noted by Eichelberger in a letter to his wife July 10, 1919: “The Ambassador came today enroute to Omsk. Gen. Graves has been ordered to accompany him much against his will. They probably will not find any government when they get there.”15 The diplomats still pushed for recognition of the Kolchak government and a commitment that American units would enter the fight against the Reds. Morris and Graves spent two months in western Siberia, witnessing numerous defeats of White forces, the firing of Gaida, and the mass movement of west Russian refugees. By the time Graves returned in September, Wilson had made it clear that the United States would not recognize Kolchak, and Britain was withdrawing support as well.16
The trip gave General Graves assurance that his estimates had been right. In a visit to the front west of Omsk, he found few Kolchak troops and scant enthusiasm for the fight. On his return trip, he heard from U.S. RRSC men more reports of Semenov’s killing sprees. Yet, despite all of the evidence, Ambassador Morris was convinced that recognition of Kolchak was the only solution. From then on, Graves and the ambassador found little common ground.17 Graves would be proved right, as the Kolchak government, under pressure from advancing Bolshevik forces, was forced to flee Omsk in mid-November.18 Western Siberia became a scene of total confusion and turmoil with the government, the Czechs, and refugees all seeking a way east. The already troubled Trans-Siberian Railroad became chaotic.
Numerous incidents kept the Americans off balance in all areas in the fall of 1919. In Spasskoye, the Kolchak government appointed a new chief of garrison, Colonel Staripalov, who was openly anti-American. He found numerous ways to show his disdain for the Americans based in the area. An episode on September 2 added to American humiliation. Capt. Lindsay Johns of the Twenty-seventh Infantry was ordered to search for the deserter Karachun, now a wanted man for his role in various Red raids. The captain took with him Cpl. Benjamin Sperling of Company F, Thirty-first Infantry, who reportedly knew Karachun before he deserted. Their target was reported to be near Iman, well north of Spasskoye. Iman was the headquarters for a Kalmykof detachment, plus a Japanese and Chinese contingent.
As the two Americans explained their mission to the Cossacks, they were asked to produce passports. Captain Johns produced his military papers, but that was not sufficient, according to the Cossacks, and the Americans were confined to the railroad station in Iman as prisoners. Two days later, Captain Johns escaped and hopped a train back to the American zone headquarters in Spasskoye, where he told of Corporal Sperling’s predicament.
Major Shamotulski was in command of the Twenty-seventh Infantry units at Spasskoye; he started a train from the southernmost end of his sector, picking up every trooper he could find in full combat gear. As the train jolted to a stop in Iman, the doughboys jumped off; yelling and brandishing their automatic weapons, they scattered over the entire town. The Japanese told Shamotulski they would fight on the side of the Cossacks if the Americans wanted a fight; it appeared as if another incident was imminent. Shamotulski said he intended to rescue Sperling, and if that included a fight, he was ready.19 The Japanese then explained that Sperling had been taken to Khabarovsk, and a clash in Iman would accomplish nothing. Shamotulski decided to retreat, but not without assurance of Sperling’s release. That assurance took the form of three hostages, Cossack horsemen who were taken with the retreating Americans, despite threats and protests from both Cossacks and Japanese.20
Graves was outraged; he protested to Horvat, demanding Sperling’s immediate release. He was released several days later, after having been badly beaten by Cossack officers while on the train and again at the Khabarovsk station.21 Although Graves believed the Japanese to have engineered the affair, he demanded an apology from General Rozanov, then head of White Army forces in Siberia, but received no reply. Warnings then went out to the Americans along the railroad to be doubly alert. This had been a humiliating series of events: sneak train raids, an attack led by a deserter, and an American soldier whipped and beaten with no apology, reprimand, or explanation. Unfortunately, the situation would only worsen.
As Graves and Morris lef
t Omsk on August 20 to return to Vladivostok, conditions in the Lake Baikal area were unsettled, not because of Bolsheviks, but because of Cossacks. The Twenty-seventh Infantry had its headquarters and units of the Third Battalion in the Baikal area at the time. Graves visited some of these units on his return from Omsk. Lt. Benjamin A. Dickson, regimental transportation officer, wrote from Verkhne-Udinsk on August 31, “This day is memorable for the presence of the Commanding General, William S. Graves and Ambassador to Japan Morris in our camp.”22 Dickson found a fellow West Pointer, William Chapman, Class of 1917, who was an aide to General Graves. Chapman made little comment beyond that it was not an especially interesting trip. Dickson mentioned that he was expecting the winter quarters for the Twenty-seventh Infantry to be at Beresovka, a location he visited and found not wholly to his liking.23
Those units based in the Baikal area were uneasy about the Kolchak government and its army. More and more evidence indicated that the White Army west of Baikal was in disarray and retreating, leaving the Bolsheviks to take over abandoned areas. When Graves visited the Ural front in August, he found the Kolchak reports of proposed offensives were highly inaccurate. The White Army west of Omsk had meager support from Semenov or Kalmykof, who, with their Japanese support, continued to harass and intimidate the people in their areas of Baikal and Ussuri. While the American dignitaries were in Omsk, the White Army was retreating in turmoil. Gaida, who had enjoyed a measure of respect from the Americans, had been dismissed, and Kolchak was relying increasingly on his lawless Cossacks. Graves and Morris arrived back in Vladivostok in September, and the ambassador returned to his duties in Japan.
In October there was another incident involving an arms shipment. Lt. Albert Ryan was in charge of a shipment of fifteen thousand rifles to be taken across Manchuria and delivered to Kolchak in Irkutsk. On October 24, when Ryan was in Chita with his loaded train, he was confronted by a Cossack lieutenant who demanded that the rifles be turned over to Semenov. Ryan’s response was that he had orders to deliver the rifles to Irkutsk and that was where they would go.
The American consul in Chita, Henry Fowler, became involved in the negotiations, which included Colonel Morrow, General Graves, Japanese General Oi, and Semenov. On October 25, Graves telegraphed Ryan, “Do not give arms to Semenof.” Ryan wired Morrow, “Semenof has given until 11:00 A.M. this date when he will take rifles by force.”24 Morrow repeated Graves’s instructions that the rifles were not to be released, then telegraphed Semenov, “Urgently request you take no action against small American echelon now at Chita.” He emphasized that Kolchak should decide who should receive the rifles.
As Morrow was wiring Semenov, he was also ordering his troops to be ready to move. Ryan telegraphed that a Semenov armored train was opposite his train, but he had barricaded his train and was ready to fight. Apparently, the Japanese put pressure on Semenov; the 11:00 A.M. deadline passed with no action. Finally, Ryan reported at 2:45 P.M. that the Russian armored train was moving out; he was told to be ready to leave at 3:00 P.M. A final note came to Morrow from Semenov himself: “Dear Colonel We understand each other I see Don’t worry I shake your hand.” Morrow replied, “Thank you for your courteous message its spirit and its understanding.”25 Once again the threat of a fight had forced Semenov to back down.
Ryan did not leave until 10:15 P.M.; with stops at Verkhne-Udinsk and the Twenty-seventh Infantry’s winter quarters at Beresovka, he made it to Irkutsk on October 27 and turned the rifles over to the Kolchak authorities. It was a hollow victory; the Japanese later told Graves that the rifles had gone straight to Semenov. A puzzling end to the rifle story came in Vladivostok in early 1920. Graves discovered that those same rifles were sitting in four rail cars in the Vladivostok rail yards. Eventually, he persuaded the Japanese to turn the cars over to him; he counted fifty-nine hundred rifles still in their boxes.26
In November 1919 Lieutenant Dickson in Missovaya wrote about the approaching Red Army. “The Reds are going on a rampage now that Omsk has fallen,” he said, “and we of the 27th are in for a dance and a song. The last British pulled out Friday.”27 He reported that Semenov’s armored trains were at the front, as was a battalion of Japanese troops. He seemed happy to be in the midst of such turmoil, “I am glad I came to Missovaya, whether I ever leave it or not.” Dickson became increasingly disenchanted with the mission, his assignment, and his regiment, as the winter progressed.
Problems in other American sectors of Siberia continued to mount. Not only had the quality of the troops suffered by the rotation of veteran soldiers, but numbers had decreased as well. Graves’s report indicated that on July 1, 1919, the AEFS had a total of 8,367 officers and men. By December 31, that number was down to 7,293.28 General Rozanov, who had replaced General Ivanoff-Rinoff in Vladivostok, was a constant source of irritation to Graves. While Ivanoff-Rinoff had been ruthless to the Russians in his territory, his tactics were benevolent compared to Rozanov’s. Graves said of him, “Rozanov proved to be the third worst character known to me in Siberia, although he could never quite reach the plane of Kalmikoff and Semeonoff [sic].”29
Graves was warned in October that Semenov and Kalmykof were planning to attack American outposts. On October 7, he consolidated the small units stationed along the railroad at Spasskoye, and no attacks were made. On November 2, he spread his men out again to their old locations.30 But with a hostile chief of garrison, Colonel Staripalov, in Spasskoye, the uncontrollable Rozanov in Vladivostok, the Suchan mines shut down, and the two Cossack Atamans roaming the rails with their armored trains, the prospect for winter was bleak for the general and his expedition. Two men were shot by Russians in September in Vladivostok; one was an American private, James Long, the other a Czech. As a result the Allies demanded that Rozanov remove his troops from the area. Graves reported to Washington, “This demand was not complied with, due to the attitude adopted by Kolchak and the Allied representative in Omsk.”31 More clouds were forming over Vladivostok as the cold weather set in.
General Gaida had been fired from his job with the Kolchak army and had no status in the Czech ranks, but he had a burning ambition. He believed that Rozanov should be deposed, and he considered himself the likely replacement. He began discussions with the many factions in Vladivostok, planting the seeds for a revolt. General Ivanoff-Rinoff, when appointed commander of all Russian armed forces in the Russian Far East in 1918, declared the whole territory to be under martial law.32 This gave him and his successor, Rozanov, life-and-death powers over the people in his territory. By November 1919, Gaida was ready to organize the many factions of anti-Bolshevik, anti-Kolchak, and anti-Japanese to begin a revolution within a revolution. Gaida was asked to join a group called the Siberian National Directorate, which included Pavel Yakushev as president with Colonels Morovsky and Krakovetsky as vice presidents. It was an invitation the ambitious Czech welcomed; he became the pivotal member and the military commander.33
Convinced that the Kolchak reverses and evacuation of Omsk in mid-November were the precursors of the Kolchak decline, Gaida made his move on Monday, November 17, 1919. He opened a recruiting station in the Vladivostok railroad yards within sight of Rozanov’s office and proceeded to enlist all of the dissatisfied citizens and Rozanov soldiers he could find. At first the results were encouraging, but later, about 2:00 P.M., a few shots broke the calm. It is uncertain who fired them, but they started an open fire fight between the Rozanov forces and the Gaida recruits. As the day passed with more and more firing in the yards, the Allied Council met to decide what role it should play. Most members were sympathetic to the overthrow of Rozanov, but they hesitated to take sides openly. Eventually, they decided to stay neutral. They assigned Maj. Sam Johnson additional troops for his police force from the Allied units, but his role was simply to maintain order and confine the fighting to the railroad yards.
The yards, surrounded by hills, were under artillery fire from the high ground. The harbor came virtually up to the station itself; government naval
ships lobbed shells from gunboats, so Gaida’s troops in the station or the yards were at a considerable disadvantage. With the Allied decision not to take part, but to keep the fighting in the yards, Gaida’s small contingent was in peril from the start. Shells began coming from artillery on the hills, Russian gunboats began firing point-blank at the yards, and as evening wore on, the Rozanov forces located in the station pinned the rebels down under the railroad cars. At midnight, Gaida rushed the station and drove out the Russians. So far, his losses had been small, with only six killed, but the Rozanov troops now could concentrate all their fire on the station.34 The firing from the Russian ships began again at midnight, aided by the searchlights of the New Orleans, Brooklyn, and a Japanese cruiser. The fighting ended by 9:00 A.M., and the revolt was over. Gaida was captured, slightly wounded, and Rozanov lost no time in executing the men who had fought against him.
Although the Americans took no part in the revolt, scores of soldiers, sailors, Red Cross workers, and others, were witnesses. George Miller, a sailor on the USS Brooklyn anchored out in the bay, was a member of a team sent on board the New Orleans, which was tied up at the dock, close to the fighting. Miller reported Russian destroyers and torpedo boats firing at the station, but the Brooklyn threatened to fire on them unless they moved away from the dock area.35 The Brooklyn’s log recorded that Marines were sent ashore to protect the consulate, while a tug brought two wounded Russians aboard the ship for medical help. The log also noted that a number of shots from shore hit the ship. One of the stray shots struck Sailmaker’s mate, Theodore Williams Rowland, on the New Orleans; he died the next day, the only American casualty.36
Russell Miller of the Twenty-seventh Infantry was on a train en route to the ship that would take him home; he arrived in Vladivostok the night of November 17. He was roused from his sleep in a boxcar and taken up the hill to waiting trucks as the revolt began, relieved to have no part in the battle. Colonel Eichelberger wrote his wife that he was convinced the Russian cadets from Russian Island, who were trained by the British and brought into the fight on Rozanov’s side, were the deciding factor in the fight. The Red Cross stepped in to help the wounded; by Tuesday night fifty-six wounded had been treated.37 The only Americans involved were a handful of men under Major Johnson, who were asked to go into the heavy fire in the railroad yard to rescue Kolchak’s lieutenant general Romanovsky and his family, caught by the rebels and trapped in their railroad car under guard. Majors Graves and Johnson took a number of men and crawled across bodies, track, and rubble to find the general and his family. They were eventually rescued with a great deal of risk to the Americans and a bayonet wound to Major Johnson.38 All members of the rescue party were awarded the DSC for their valor.39
Russian Sideshow Page 34
