33. Ibid., pp. 375–376.
34. Levitt, Global Footprint, pp. 336–339.
35. Ibid., p. 338.
36. Thomas M. Sanderson, “Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines,” SAIS Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter-Spring 2004, p. 52.
37. Martin Ewi, “A Decade of Kidnappings and Terrorism in West Africa and the Trans-Sahel Region,” African Security Review, Vol. 19, No. 4, p. 68.
38. Gail Wannenburg, “Organised Crime in West Africa,” African Security Review, 2005, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 10.
39. Levitt, “Hezbollah Threat in Africa.”
40. Douglas Farah, “Digging Up Congo’s Dirty Gems,” The Washington Post, December 30, 2001, pp. A1–A16.
41. Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances: Funding the Party of God,” The Washington Institute, February 2005.
42. Douglas Farah, Blood from Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror, New York: Broadway Books, 2004, pp. 33–34.
43. Eric Denece and Alain Rodier, “The Security Challenges of West Africa,” in OECD, Global Security Risks and West Africa: Development Challenges, OECD Publishing, 2012.
44. James Cockayne and Phil Williams, “The Invisible Tide: Towards an International Strategy to Deal with Drug Trafficking Through West Africa,” New York: International Peace Institute, October 2009, p. 4.
45. Levitt, Global Footprint, p. 320.
46. Ibid., p. 227.
47. Ibid., p. 250.
48. Ibid., pp. 258–261.
49. Ibid., p. 12.
50. Some of these private charities include the Al Aqsa International Foundation, the Martyr’s Organization, the Institute of the Palestinian Martyrs, and the al Mabarrat Charity Association.
51. For more on this so-called shadow war, see Yaakov Katz and Yoaz Hendel, Israel vs. Iran: The Shadow War, Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2012.
52. Seymour Hersh, “Iran and the Bomb,” The New Yorker, June 6, 2011; on Jundallah, see William Lowther and Colin Freeman, “US Fund Terror Group to Sow Chaos in Iran,” The Telegraph, February 25, 2007.
53. Charlie Savage, “Iranians Accused of a Plot to Kill Saudis’ U.S. Envoy,” New York Times, October 11, 2011.
54. Daniel Byman, “The Lebanese Hezbollah and Israeli Counterterrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 34, No. 12, p. 936.
55. ICG Report, “Rebel without a Cause,” p. 4.
56. Graham E. Fuller, “The Hezbollah-Iran Connection: Model for Sunni Resistance,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1, Winter 2006–2007, p. 143.
57. Robert Grace and Andrew Mandelbaum, “Understanding the Iran-Hezbollah Connection,” United States Institute of Peace, September 2006.
58. Joby Warrick, “Attack on Israeli Tourists Prompts Fears of Escalating ‘Shadow War,’ ” Washington Post, July 19, 2012.
59. Norton, “The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics,” p. 482.
60. Judith Harik, “Syrian Foreign Policy and State/Resistance Dynamics in Lebanon,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 249–265.
61. Andrew Exum, “Hezbollah at War: A Military Assessment,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #63, December 2006, p. 7.
62. Steven Erlanger and Richard A. Oppel, “A Disciplined Hezbollah Surprises Israel with Its Training, Tactics and Weapons,” The New York Times, August 7, 2006.
63. Ibid.
64. Cragin, Aptitude for Destruction Volume 2, p. 49.
65. Thomas M. Sanderson, “Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines,” SAIS Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 2004, p. 52.
66. Exum, “Hezbollah at War,” p. 6. From Figure 1, “Weaponry Used by Hezbollah During the July War.”
67. Thannassis Cambanis, “Stronger Hezbollah Emboldened for Fights Ahead,” New York Times, October 6, 2010.
68. Frederic Wehrey, “A Clash of Wills: Hezbollah’s Psychological Campaign Against Israel in South Lebanon,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2001, p. 54.
69. Ibid.
70. Ron Schleifer, “Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2006, p. 5.
71. Clive Jones, “ ‘A Reach Greater Than the Grasp’: Israeli Intelligence and the Conflict in South Lebanon, 1990–2000,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 16, No. 3, p. 10.
72. Ranstorp, “Hezbollah Training Camps in Lebanon,” pp. 256–257.
73. Ibid., p. 260.
74. Ibid., p. 254.
75. Ibid., p. 251.
76. Ibid.
77. Cragin, Aptitude for Destruction Volume 2, p. 51.
78. Byman, “Lebanese Hezbollah and Israeli Counterterrorism,” p. 931.
79. Steven Erlanger and Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “A Disciplined Hezbollah Surprises Israel with Its Training, Tactics, and Weapons,” New York Times, August 7, 2006.
80. “European Union Must Respond to Hezbollah’s Attack in Bulgaria,” The Washington Post, February 5, 2013.
81. For more on the tri-border area, also known as the triple frontier, see Angel Rabasa, et al., Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2007; and Enrique Desmond Arias, “Understanding Criminal Networks, Political Order, and Politics in Latin America,” in Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, eds., Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in Era of Softened Sovereignty, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010, pp. 115–135.
82. In addition to the tri-border region, Hezbollah operatives have enjoyed sanctuary in Panama and Venezuela. Levitt, Global Footprint, p. 103.
83. “Hezbollah: Financing Terror Through Criminal Enterprise,” Testimony of Matthew Levitt, Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, United States Senate, May 25, 2005, p. 7.
84. “Fighting Terrorism in Africa,” Testimony of Douglas Farah, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, United States House of Representatives, April 1, 2004.
85. Frederic Wehrey et al., Dangerous but Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2009, p. 88.
86. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is also known as the Pasdaran (Persian for “Guards”). For more information, see Frederic Wehrey et al., The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2009.
87. Magnus Ranstorp, “The Hezbollah Training Camps of Lebanon,” in James J.F. Forest, ed. The Making of a Terrorist, Volume II: Training, p. 244. Of the 1500 IRGC members sent to Lebanon, 800 were deployed in Baalbek and the remaining 700 were spread throughout villages and town in the eastern Bekaa region, mostly in Brital, Nabisheet, and Ba’albek. The Guards headquarters was located in the Syrian border village of Zebdani.
88. Cragin and Daly, Dynamic Threat, p. 68.
89. Cragin, Aptitude for Destruction Volume 2, p. 47. The BGM-71 TOW is a tube-launched, optically tracked and wire-guided anti-tank missile. It is American made and has a maximum range of 3.75 kilometers. According to Cragin, this weapon most likely came to Hezbollah from Iran via Damascus and likely included some initial training by the IRGC in how to use the weapon effectively. In an interesting historical twist, Richard Norton has alleged that the TOWS used were originally supplied in the 1980s to Iran by Israel as part of the Iran-Contra deal. See Norton, “Hezbollah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, Autumn 2000, p. 30.
90. Ranstorp, “Hezbollah Training Camps,” p. 246.
91. Ibid., p. 47.
92. In Chapter 2 of their study The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World, Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly construct an assessment framework for evaluating both the intentions and the capabilities of various terrorist and insurgent groups, including Hezbollah. According to the capabilities portion of
the framework, Hezbollah did not follow a linear development and indeed was able to “skip a number of steps” that other insurgents groups suffer through. They credit the training provided by the IRGC as being one of the key factors enabling this rapid development.
93. Ranstorp, “Hezbollah Training Camps,” p. 255.
94. Ibid.
95. Norton, Hezbollah, p. 116.
96. “Hizbollah: Rebel Without a Cause?” International Crisis Group Middle East Briefing Paper, July 30, 2003, p. 2.
97. Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion, London: Pluto Press, 2002, p. 43.
98. Joe Klein, “The Hezbollah Project,” New York Times, September 30, 2010.
99. Klein, “The Hezbollah Project.”
100. Wehrey, “Clash of Wills,” p. 55.
101. Magnus Ranstorp, “The Strategy and Tactics of Hezbollah’s Current ‘Lebanonization Process’, ” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, Summer 1998, p. 121.
102. Ranstorp, “Lebanonization,” pp. 121–122.
103. Noe, Voice of Hezbollah, p. 23.
104. Wehrey, “Clash of Wills,” pp. 59–60.
105. Ibid.
106. Norton, Hezbollah, pp. 117–118.
107. Jerrold Green, Understanding Iran, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2008, p. 120.
108. Joseph Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program, Leiden: Amsterdam University Press, 2006, pp. 13–15.
109. Ranstorp, “Hezbollah Training Camps,” p. 249.
110. Ranstorp, Hizb’Allah in Lebanon, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997, pp. 34–35.
111. Adam Shatz, “In Search of Hezbollah,” The New York Review of Books, April 29, 2004.
112. Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004, p. 71.
113. Norton, Hezbollah, p. 17.
114. As’ad Abu Khalil, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, July 1991, pp. 390–403.
115. Norton, Hezbollah, p. 35.
116. Hajjar, “Hezbollah: Terrorism, National Liberation, or Menace?” p. 10.
117. Norton, Extremist Ideals vs. Mundane Politics, p. 12.
118. Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion, pp. 16–17.
119. Hajjar, “Hezbollah: Terrorism, National Liberation, or Menace?” p. 11.
120. The ummah is the global Muslim community.
121. Shatz, “In Search of Hezbollah.”
122. Norton, Middle East Policy, Vol. 5, No. 4, January 1998, p. 152.
123. Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004.
124. Ranstorp, “Hezbollah Training Camps,” p. 254.
125. Ibid., pp. 257–259.
126. Norton, Hezbollah, p. 6.
127. Mohamad Bazzi, “Lebanon: Hezbollah’s Way,” Global Post, August 7, 2010.
128. Simon Haddad, “The Origins of Popular Support for Lebanon’s Hezbollah,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2006, pp. 21–34.
129. Alexus G. Grynkewich, “Welfare as Warfare: How Violent Non-State Groups Use Social Services to Attack the State,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 31, 2008, p. 363.
130. Ilene R. Prusher, “Through Charity, Hezbollah Charms Lebanon,” Christian Science Monitor, April 19, 2000.
131. Martin Kramer, “The Moral Logic of Hezbollah,” in I. Cronin, ed., Confronting Fear: A History of Terrorism, New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, pp. 282–293.
132. S. T. Flanigan, “Charity as Resistance: Connections between Charity, Contentious Politics, and Terror,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 29, 2006.
133. Ibid., pp. 646–648.
134. Jaber, Born with a Vengeance, p. 147.
135. Ibid., 149–150.
136. Gabriel Weimann, “Hezbollah Dot Com: Hezbollah’s Online Campaign,” New Media and Innovative Technologies, Ben-Gurion University Press, 2008, p. 5. See also, A. Jorisch, “Al-Manar: Hezbollah TV, 24.7,” Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2004, pp. 17–31.
137. Ibid., p. 7. To put Al-Manar’s budget in perspective, the PIRA’s entire operating budget was $15 million a year until the 1990s. Horgan, “Playing the Green Card Part I,” p. 10.
138. Ron Schleifer, “Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2006, pp. 11–12.
139. For more on Hezbollah’s all-around technology use, see A. J. Dallal, “Hezbollah’s Virtual Civil Society,” Television and New Media, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2001, pp. 367–372.
140. Weimann, “Hezbollah Dot Com,” p. 11.
141. Elisabeth Ferland, “Hezbollah and the Internet,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 4, 2010.
142. Hillary Hylton, “How Hezbollah Hijacks the Internet,” Time, August 8, 2006.
143. Levitt, Global Footprint, p. 157.
144. Ibid., pp. 102–103.
145. Ibid., p. 119.
146. Ibid., pp. 317–318. The scheme was run out of Toledo, OH, by a Dearborn, MI, resident named Ali Nasrallah.
147. Doug Philippone, “Hezbollah: The Organization and Its Finances,” in Michael Freeman, ed., Financing Terrorism: Case Studies, Surrey: Asghate, 2012, p. 58.
148. Author interview with Matthew Levitt, December 2014.
149. Addis and Blanchard, CRS Report, January 3, 2011, p. 22.
150. Juan Zarate, Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare, New York: Public Affairs, 2013, p. 118.
151. James Kanter and Jodi Rudoren, “European Union Adds Military Wing of Hezbollah to List of Terrorist Organizations,” New York Times, July 22, 2013.
152. Philippone, “Organization and Finances,” in Freeman Case Studies, p. 59.
153. Wiegand, “Support of a Terrorist Group,” p. 674.
154. Naim Qaseem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, trans. D. Khalil, London: Saqi, 2005, p. 190.
155. Bilal Y. Saab, “Rethinking Hezbollah’s Disarmament,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2008, p. 96.
CHAPTER 5
1. There is some confusion about the various Palestinian militant organizations and how these groups have evolved over time. Fatah is the largest guerilla organization, the group once headed by Yasser Arafat and formed in early 1960s as part of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was an umbrella organization that brought together all of the various guerilla groups, including Fatah, the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and several other smaller and lesser known groups. The PLO was established by Egyptian leader Gamel Abdel Nasser in an attempt to exert some form of control over the Palestinian militant groups that were proliferating at the time. The Palestinian Authority (PA) was established in the wake of the Oslo as a civilian organization to rule over Gaza and the West Bank, since many of the aforementioned guerilla groups were too closely associated with violence. Arafat was the first President of the PA, followed by Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) in 2005.
2. When Hamas first emerged, it was viewed by Israel as “a temporary nuisance with no real capacity to present a threat, and with little popular legitimacy.” Beverley Milton-Edwards, “Islamist versus Islamist: Rising Challenge in Gaza,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2014, p. 261.
3. Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, pp. 23–24.
4. For more, see Sara Roy, Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.
5. Daniel Byman, A High Price: The Triumphs & Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 102.
6. Helena Lindholm Shulz with Juliane Hammer, The Palestinian Diaspora: Formation of Identities and Politics of Homeland, London: Routledge, 2003.
7. Thomas M. Sanderson, “Transnational Terror and Organized Crim
e: Blurring the Lines,” SAIS Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter-Spring 2004, p. 53.
8. Are Knudsen, “Islamism in the Diaspora: Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon,” Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2005, p. 223.
9. Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 162.
10. Matthew Levitt, “Could Hamas Target the West?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 30, No. 11, 2007, pp. 928–929.
11. Levitt, Hamas, pp. 38–39.
12. Beverley Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell, Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010, p. 164.
13. Levitt, “Target the West?,” pp. 930–931.
14. Levitt, Hamas, p. 57.
15. Louise I. Shelley and John T. Picarelli, “Methods Not Motives: Implications of the Convergence of International Organized Crime and Terrorism,” Police Practice and Research, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2002, p. 311.
16. Levitt, Hamas, p. 59.
17. Levitt, “Target the West?,” p. 932.
18. Levitt, “Target the West?,” p. 933.
19. Levitt, Hamas, pp. 70–71.
20. Levitt, Hamas, p. 44.
21. Patrick Poole, “Mortgage Fraud Funding Jihad?” Front Page Magazine, April 11, 2007.
22. Frank S. Perri and Richard G. Brody, “The Dark Triad: Organized Crime, Terror and Fraud,” Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2011, p. 53.
23. Gregory F. Treverton et al., Film Piracy, Organized Crime, and Terrorism, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2009, p. 23.
24. Edward F. Mickolous and Susan L. Simmons, The Terrorist List, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2011, p. 67.
25. Mathew Levitt, “Palestinian Authority Minister of Economy Tied to Hamas?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch No. 496, March 4, 2005.
26. Jodi Vittori, Terrorist Financing and Resourcing, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 73.
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