In deference to the Gandhian code, no Congressman bothered the Raj with disobedience during the Christmas season. However, by the summer of 1941, nearly 15,000 had been arrested. Intentionally moderate, the campaign did not go beyond dramatizing the urge for freedom.
Transferred within days to Trichy jail, C.R. found that he was being locked up each night. Interviews were infrequent and brief — twenty minutes was the limit. Intelligence men heard each conversation. A letter arrived from Gandhi:
I know you don’t need a letter from me. Letters are meaningless when hearts can speak to each other. I know you are doing your duty there as we are trying to do ours outside. Do keep well and complete your Hindi learning.14
C.R. devoted a few spells to Hindustani in the Urdu script, studied the Ramayanas of Valmiki, Kamban and Tulsidas, and shared his insights. As one of the Trichy ‘family’ would later recall:
Soon after breakfast every morning a group of us read Valmiki’s Ramayana . . . C.R. would sit in an easy chair, with about 15 to 20 of us sitting on a carpet spread on the floor in front of him.15
C.R. also held classes on the Gita, the Kural and Shakespeare, and attended a course on Carnatic music conducted by a fellow- prisoner, K. Varadachari. Other jailmates would afterwards recall that C.R. ‘explained some of the situations [in a couple of the Shakespearean tragedies] in a masterly manner,’ ‘carefully took 1 1/2 ounces of rice for his meal,’ was ‘continuously involved in study’ and ‘spent his time busily but with ease and joy.’16
From Edinburgh, Professor Tait had sent a volume of Scott’s Journal. Mindful of Tait’s illness, C.R. asked Narasimhan, who received the fortnightly letter that C.R. was allowed to send, to add to a note of thanks the hope that the professor was ‘safe and going strong in some good and well-protected place.’17
It was noticed by the Trichy ‘family’ that when C.R.’s brother Srinivasachar, who was the manager of P. Subbaroyan’s farm, visited the jail to see Subbaroyan, the former Premier denied himself a bonus interview with his brother.18
Kripalani, the Congress General Secretary, whom Gandhi had exempted from the satyagraha, was allowed to meet C.R. in Trichy. The prisoner told Kripalani that he wished to see greater numbers filling the Raj’s jails. But the Mahatma had ruled out mass disobedience.
Months went by in study — and thought. C.R. wondered — unthinkable idea! — whether Congress should not concede what he had only some months earlier dismissed as ‘diseased’, the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan. Alternatively, should not Congress abandon disobedience, which in any case was petering out, and make a fresh offer to the Raj?
Modest-sized hope flickered for a moment. Kasturi Srinivasan, editor of The Hindu, came to Trichy Jail and showed C.R. a message that Sikander Hyat Khan, the Unionist Premier of the Punjab, wanted to send to Amery, the Secretary of State, with whom Sikander had cordial relations. It suggested a way for Amery to conciliate both Congress and the League.
If C.R. approved of the draft, said Srinivasan, Sikander would send it to Amery. C.R. said it was acceptable. Srinivasan conveyed C.R.’s reaction to Sikander, but the initiative was aborted by British civil servants close to the Punjab Premier.
Learning of the C.R.-Srinivasan interview, and its purpose of narrowing the gap between Congress and the League, Linlithgow reproached Hope, the Madras Governor, for having allowed it:
Perhaps you would let me know whether Srinivasan was allowed to see Rajagopalachariar alone or whether anyone was present. I do not want to go too far in the direction of facilitating formulations of policy or of tactics . . .19
After the Srinivasan interview, politicians or intermediaries were no longer permitted to meet C.R., who wondered and waited and sought to enrich his mind and spirit. Outside, Hitler had attacked the Soviet Union. Tagore had died. And some days before C.R.’s term was to end, Doraiswami, 25, and Rajagopal, 22, sons of his brother Srinivasachar, died of typhoid. Both the boys had been brilliant, winning gold medals.
On 6 October 1941, his term over, C.R. was released.
14
Rebellion
1941-44
With shrewd suspicion, the Mahatma wrote to C.R., ‘All eyes are on you including mine!’ C.R. had indeed come up with fresh ideas. After consoling his shattered brother, he showed up in Sevagram. However, Gandhi was cool to C.R.’s proposal of another offer to the British.
Holding that Britain was unlikely to respond positively, the Mahatma also found it difficult to support the Congress’s involvement in the War. A month later he and C.R. met again, and talked for over five days. This time Vallabhbhai also joined in the discussion. Like C.R., Patel had just come out of jail. Patel declared himself wholly with the Mahatma.
Released, along with Azad, on 4 December, Nehru wrote in his diary, ‘I am afraid C.R. is going to be troublesome.’ Jawaharlal added that he was glad that ‘Bapu is firm as a rock.’1 However, C.R. enlisted the Maulana’s support and sought that of the rank-and-file.
His hands were strengthened after 7 December, when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and commenced its sweep across the Pacific, and the USA joined the Allies as a belligerent. Making public his differences with Gandhi, C.R. said in a convocation address at Lucknow University (The Hindu, 14.12.41):
I have worked with Gandhiji these 22 years and feel a just pride of having helped him to develop and put into action his principles and methods. Many are the ties that bind me to him. It is not a pleasure to discover a difference and recognise it as leading to a parting of ways . . .
We keep our face turned steadily in the direction of ahimsa but cannot make the mistake of killing the principle itself by opposing it to commonsense or reality. The defence of India is a case to be treated as an exception.
Meeting in Bardoli towards the end of December, the Congress Working Committee adopted C.R.’s line, recognized ‘the new world situation,’ and offered cooperation to the Allies if India’s freedom was declared.
Sensing his colleagues’ mood, Gandhi did not press his views. C.R. wrote about him to Devadas (1.1.42):
He is wonderfully good to me. But what wonder really? He was ever that. Well, events have taken an unexpected turn. Still, nothing may come out of it. What even then? I have done the right thing and have the satisfaction of having done it against heavy odds.2
Meeting at Wardha to consider the Working Committee’s resolution, Gandhi urged the AICC not to disown its leaders, his own views notwithstanding. Added the Mahatma:
That nothing is to be expected from the Government is probably too true. Only the resolution puts the Congress right with the expectant world . . . It is no longer open to the Government to say that the Congress has banged the door to negotiation on the impossible ground of nonviolence. (Harijan, 25.1.42)
If Gandhi’s words helped C.R. at the AICC, C.R.’s 75-minute speech, delivered ‘amidst repeated applause’ also helped. In this speech C.R. answered Patel and Prasad, who had dissented from his proposal, and Nehru, who had said that C.R.’s was ‘a primrose path’ (The Hindu, 18.1.42). Others had asked if it was wise to invite Japan’s antagonism, and some suggested that C.R. was hunting for office and betraying the Mahatma; Simon Peter and the cock were mentioned.
Pointing out that Indian soldiers enlisted by the Raj were already in combat against Japan, C.R. added:
Are you going to tell Japan that the Indian soldiers were forcibly taken out of India and made to fight? Our cooperation is available if the British do the right thing.
Supposing the central government is placed in my hands, then I would take it. But if the Madras government is given to me without control of the centre, I would not touch it . . . If I am a hunter, please credit me with being a big game hunter (The Hindu, 18.1.42).
The Bardoli line was endorsed at Wardha, where, in a significant move, Gandhi designated Jawaharlal as his successor. Fifteen years earlier, he had spoken of C.R. as his successor. Now, at Wardha, Gandhi said:
Pandit Jawaharlal and I have had differences f
rom the moment we became co-workers, yet I have said for some years and say it now that not Rajaji, not Sardar Vallabhbhai, but Jawaharlal will be my successor.3
Had C.R. paid for advocating a rejection of the Mahatma’s stand, and for having referred, in Lucknow, to ‘a parting of the ways’? Was Jawaharlal being rewarded for his attachment to Gandhi? He had said at Wardha that Congress was the Mahatma’s ‘creation and child and nothing can break the bond,’ and Gandhi had responded by noting that Nehru’s ‘love for and confidence in me peep out of every sentence referring to me’ (Harijan, 25.1.42).
We know, however, that C.R.’s personal attachment to Gandhi was as deep as Nehru’s. The truth was that Nehru’s popularity was wider than C.R.’s ; in particular, he attracted the youth and the Left in a measure that C.R. could not match.
Again, his lack of faith in negotiations with the British was more in accord with the public’s mood than C.R.’s willingness to keep trying. ‘As a preliminary,’ C.R. said in a speech at about this time, ‘I shall trust the Britisher more than he (Nehru) does.’4 Moreover, having failed to master Hindi, C.R. was not in a position to achieve a rapport with the vast North Indian masses. Gandhi realized that the nation as a whole was more likely to turn to Nehru than to C.R.
Finally, Gandhi recognized a philosophical bond, in the broadest sense of the term, between himself and Nehru. ‘I know this,’ the Mahatma said, ‘that when I am gone, he (Nehru) will speak my language’ (Harijan, 25.1.42).
The philosophical ties between Gandhi and C.R. were more obvious; C.R. was independent and sharp, he had courage, his wit was arresting, as was his integrity, and he drew fair crowds. But he lacked Nehru’s charisma. Desiring a successor who would be a magnet as well as a kin in thought, the Mahatma picked Jawaharlal.
If C.R. felt cheated or hurt by Gandhi’s pronouncement, he did not show it. In any case, Japan and its advance were now his chief concern. Hong Kong, the Philippines and Malaya fell; Indonesia and Thailand accepted Japan’s overlordship; on 15 February, the citadel of Singapore surrendered, and British troops were on the run in Burma. Soon, it seemed, the attackers would be on Indian soil, probably in South India. Detesting the notion of an exchange of masters, C.R. spent the first three months of 1942 in an impassioned, ceaseless bid to prepare a defence against Japan, while continuing to demand freedom from the British.
The C.R. of this period comes across as a patriot on fire, not only willing but eager to be a War leader and convinced that he could be one if the Raj and Congress came to terms — if the Raj yielded the substance of freedom. His speeches are numerous, the crowds huge, the cheers loud and prolonged.
Madras, 21.1.42: Today the battle-fronts include bazaars, the houses of civilians, plantations, fields and factories. Is it good, in such a situation, that there should be division between government and soldiers on the one hand . . . and tremendously popular organisations like the Congress and the Muslim League on the other, over whom such illustrious persons as Mahatma Gandhi and Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah preside?
I do not want to surrender to the Japanese. Why should I? I am not carried away by mere hatred [of the British].
Madras, 23.1.42: We want now and at once a government of the nation, in charge of everything. This is the way to turn on the switch in India and make the 400 million lamps glow.
You will have to tell me how many are prepared to join the army, the navy, the workshops, the civil defence . . .
If . . . Britain fails to do her duty . . . [there] must be voluntary government throughout the country.
The Premier of Britain is dogged, calm, stubborn, and we must take our hats off to him for that. But he does not seem to have imagination . . . His friends have not the courage to stand up to him; they are frightened when they see his bull- dog mouth and cigar.
Madura, 29.1.42: While Mr Churchill is asking for a vote of confidence in Parliament, I will ask you if you repose confidence in me. (The vast audience raises hands.)
Hospet, 6.2.42: Because we are tired of our present rulers, let us not make the mistake of welcoming rulers who will be ten times worse.
Virudhunagar, 9.3.42: If we resist, the Japansese will find themselves without food after a few days.
Tirunelveli, 10.3.42: There are a few morbid-minded persons who are imagining that I am anxious to become a Minister once again, and that is why I am engaged in this propaganda . . . In modern war, even Ministers would be bombed, and these morbid-minded people may feel some satisfaction in that . . .
Whenever the people of India demand freedom, they are told that there is a quarrel between Hindus and Muslims . . . It seems as though the British should rule wherever there is a mixed population by some chance.5
What the Raj thought of C.R.’s campaign is best conveyed by Governor Hope’s words to the Viceroy (22.3.42):
Rajagopalachari has been touring a great deal and has done good in telling the people that India has nothing to gain from the Japanese. On the other hand, his attitude that Britain can no longer defend India and that if ‘freedom’ were granted the nation would miraculously be able to defend itself is causing a lot of harm.6
While, as we have seen, C.R. significantly spoke of Gandhi and Jinnah in the same breath, he also blamed the League leader for taking ‘an impossible stand.’ Thereupon Jinnah challenged C.R. to present a concrete offer:
If Mr Rajagopalachari will define some basis, some common ground, and then find the Muslim League taking an impossible attitude, it may lie in his mouth to accuse me (The Hindu, 23.2.42).
Churchill had disliked and resisted pressures from Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-Shek for moves towards an Indian solution, but the fall of Rangoon on 8 March forced his hand. On 11 March he announced that his Cabinet colleague Sir Stafford Cripps was taking new proposals to India.
At first sight the proposals he brought were not without appeal. They offered full Dominion Status after the War, with the right of secession from the Commonwealth; a constituent assembly whose members would be elected by provincial legislatures or nominated by the princes; and, immediately, a national government composed of representatives of the leading political parties.
However, provinces wishing to stay out of the projected dominion could do so when the time came. Included to obtain Jinnah’s acceptance, this clause seemed to open the door to Balkanization. Although Congress’s leaders disliked this provision as well as the right given to the princes to nominate delegates to the constituent assembly, they did not, Gandhi excepted, make a major issue of either.
Their objection lay elsewhere. Azad, the President, accused Cripps of going back on his word after first indicating that the new government would function like a cabinet and not be subject to the Viceroy’s veto. Concurring with Azad’s charge, Linlithgow would tell Wavell: ‘Cripps did not play straight over the question of the Viceroy’s veto and Cabinet responsibility and did make some offer to Congress.’7
Congress objected, moreover, to the provision that defence would, in substance, remain the charge of the British Commander- in-Chief.
For a moment it looked as if a compromise worked out by a group that included Cripps, C.R. and Colonel Louis Johnson, Roosevelt’s emissary in India, transferring some, though not all, crucial subjects to an Indian defence minister, would overcome the ‘defence’ hurdle. However, resenting American interference, Churchill cabled Cripps that he would accept no arrangement regarding defence that did not have the full agreement, directly communicated to him, of Linlithgow and Wavell, the C-in-C. The latter two made it clear that they did not approve of the Cripps-C.R.-Johnson formula, and the Cripps mission collapsed.
C.R.’s first reaction had been to suggest acceptance of the Cripps proposals, but, as Prasad would later recall, C.R.’s opinion changed ‘when it became clear that the Viceroy was not willing to relax his special powers.’8 Explaining the breakdown of the talks, C.R. told the Press:
We were proceeding all along under an impression that . . . the Governor-General would accept the advice of the
Ministers, and that the only reservation was the authority of the C-in-C and of the British War Cabinet . . . We were aghast when we were told that all the new members of the government would only function like the present Executive Council members.9
At the present moment, defence is practically the whole of government . . . If defence is to be strictly reserved [in British hands], the popular attitude of apathy if not hostility towards the British cannot be transformed (The Hindu, 6.4.42).
As a last ploy, Johnson proposed to the White House that Nehru and C.R. be flown to America to talk with Roosevelt, but, chary of annoying Churchill further, the American President asked Johnson to drop the move.
In April, while Cripps was still in India, Japanese bombs were dropped on two of the South’s coastal towns, Coconada and Vizag. The Raj ordered the evacuation of several coastal habitations. The seeming imminence of a Japanese attack on South India and the failure of the Cripps mission combined to trigger new ideas in C.R.’s mind.
On 15 April he asked America and Britain to ‘place at our disposal at once the crudest weapons in the line of small arms,’ (The Hindu, 16.4.42). Eight days later, modifying his analysis of the failure of the Cripps initiative, he said, ‘I cannot tell you who is to blame’ (The Hindu, 24.8.42).
Those in the Congress who disliked the British and looked forward to deliverance by an Asian power now formed one pole. C.R. led the opposite pole by pointing to the Japanese menace as India’s primary concern. Taking on two adversaries, Britain and the Muslim League, had proved frustrating. Now the Japanese had opened a third and by far the most dangerous front. As C.R. saw it, Congress now had no choice except to settle with the League and with the Raj.
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