by Hugo Mercier
prob lem with threat information, since, if we take the threat se-
riously, we should avoid it, and thus never figure out if it was a
genuine threat: I’ve never found out whether or not any “Dan-
ger High Voltage” sign was accurate. The attribution of compe-
tence to people who circulate threats is—as was suggested in
chapter 10— one of the main reasons people spread false rumors,
many of which mention some threat.
Besides threats, there are other types of information that can
be deemed useful without ever being seriously tested, such as
justifications. Someone who provides justifications for actions
people want to engage in anyway can be rewarded by being seen
as more competent. However, this reputation credit can be ex-
tended in defi nitely if the actions are never seriously questioned,
and the justifications never tested.
This loophole in the way we attribute competence is, in the
vast majority of cases, of little import. Maybe we will think
a friend who warns us about the dangers of such and such
exotic food a bit more competent than they actually are, but we
have other ways of more accurately estimating our friend’s
228 ch ap t er 14
competence. The real prob lem dawns with the rise of special-
ists: people whom we don’t know personally but through their
communications in a specific domain.
Nowadays, some news sources specialize in the provision of
threatening information. A prime example is the media network
of conspiracy theorist Alex Jones: the InfoWars website, radio
show, YouTube channel, and so forth. Most stories on the
InfoWars front page are about threats. Some are pretty generic
threats: a lethal pig virus in China that could strike humans,
a plane pi lot on a murder- suicide mission.23 Many stories are
targeted: mi grants from Islamic countries are responsible for
most sex crimes in Finland, Turkey “announces launch of
worldwide Jihad,” Eu rope is committing suicide by accepting
Muslim mi grants.24 Even a non- directly threat- related piece on
George Soros’s fight with the Hungarian government is accom-
panied by a video warning against the dangers of power ful
communists such as Barack Obama (!), Richard Branson (?!),
and Jeff Bezos (??!!).25
Presumably, few in Jones’s audience live in Finland, or in close
proximity to sick Chinese pigs. As a result, the readers are un-
likely to find out whether the threats are real, and Jones can keep
the reputation credit he earned from all these warnings. He is
then able to leverage this perception of competence in a variety
of ways, for instance, by sel ing expensive yet useless nutritional
supplements whose very names remind the reader of constant
threats— “Survival Shield X-2 - Nascent Iodine”—or a variety of
“preparedness” products, from emergency survival food (one-
year supply!) to radiation filters.26
Turning to justifications, we observe a similar dynamic in the
case of Galen. The Roman physician provided a complex theo-
retical apparatus as a rationale for the relatively intuitive prac-
tice of bloodletting. Doing so made him appear more competent
sh a l l o w g ur us 229
(note that there were other, better reasons to deem Galen com-
petent). As a result, physicians might have heeded Galen’s ad-
vice even when it departed from the most intuitive forms of
bloodletting. For instance, he advocated bloodletting for a far
wider range of ailments than was usual.27 He also had rather id-
iosyncratic views on which veins should be cut open— the
thumb of the left hand to cure the spleen, say— when in most
cultures bloodletting is practiced near the ailing body part (e.g.,
on the temple for headaches).28 On one point Galen appears to
have been particularly influential: the quantity of blood drained.
My reading of the anthropological and historical lit er a ture sug-
gests that, in most times and places, only a tiny amount of blood
was removed through bloodletting. By contrast, Galen boasts of
sometimes draining two liters of blood from his patients, bleed-
ing them until they faint.29 More or less directly, Galen’s recom-
mendation may well have precipitated an untold number of
deaths, including that of George Washington, who was bled 2.5
liters (84 ounces) before he died.30
On a much larger scale, there may be a similar dynamic af-
fecting religious creeds, with the search for justification bringing
in its wake an assortment of weird beliefs. Cognitive scientist
Nicolas Baumard and his colleagues have argued that many
of the teachings of the great world religions are intuitively ap-
pealing, at least for people in the right environment.31 In their
model, as the material environment becomes less of a constant
and immediate threat, people start yearning for diff er ent moral
norms that emphasize “moderation, self- discipline, and with-
drawal from excessive greed and ambition.”32 Leaders emerge who
promote religious justifications for these new norms, with god(s)
that care about human morality, and a world imbued with cos-
mic justice. This is a remarkable departure from previous religious
worldviews where, for instance, Zeus and his ilk displayed no
230 ch ap t er 14
superior sense of morality. The leaders who are able to articu-
late religious creeds fitting these changing moral intuitions are
rewarded with deference. One of the effects of this deference,
arguably, is to help spread other ideas, ideas born of the reli-
gious specialists’ striving for a more intellectually coherent
system. These ideas don’t have to be particularly intuitive, or
to be of any use as justifications for most of the flock. For ex-
ample, few Christians care deeply about what happens to the
soul of people who lived before Jesus and thus couldn’t be
saved by the sacraments (the unlearned). Yet theologians had
to ponder the issue, and made this part of the official creed:
for example, in Catholicism the unlearned are stuck in the
“limbo of the fathers” until the Second Coming.33 More sig-
nificantly, the theologically correct version of the Christian
god— the omni- everything version—is the result of a slow
elaboration over the ages of scholars attempting to reconcile
vari ous doctrines.34
This account distinguishes two broad sets of beliefs within
the creeds of world religions. The first set comprises beliefs that
many people find intuitively compelling— for example, re-
wards and punishments in the afterlife for good and bad deeds.
The second comprises beliefs that are relevant only to the theo-
logians’ attempts at doctrinal coherence. We find both catego-
ries in world religions besides Chris tian ity. Crucially, the first set
of beliefs is quite similar in every world religion, while the sec-
ond varies widely. For example, in Buddhism the concept of
merit plays a central role, so that those who do good deeds have
better luck in their next lives. But we also find in Buddhism
counterintuitive ideas that play little useful justificatory role
and have no parallel in Chris tian ity, such as the precise status
of the Buddha in relation to humans and gods, or the cycle of
reincarnation.
sh a l l o w g ur us 231
Trickle- Down Science
Being wil ing to give people the benefit of the doubt and grant
them a good reputation on credit, because they warn us about
threats we will never face or provide justifications that will
never get tested, cannot explain the widespread ac cep tance of
counterintuitive scientific theories. For one thing, scientific
theories are nearly all counterintuitive, so scientists can’t surf
on a wave of easily accepted theories to make the public swallow
the rest.
Frankly, I’m not quite sure why so many people accept coun-
terintuitive scientific theories. I’m not saying they shouldn’t,
obviously, merely pointing out that the popularity of such coun-
terintuitive ideas, even if they are right, is on the face of it quite
puzzling. It is true that people accept scientific beliefs only re-
flectively, so the beliefs interact little with other cognitive mech-
anisms. But, stil , why accept these beliefs at all? Very few people
can properly evaluate scientists’ claims, especially when it
comes to novel discoveries. A small group of specialists under-
stands the content of new results, can interpret them in light of
the lit er a ture, and knows the team that produced them. Every-
body else is bound to rely on relatively coarse cues. The further
removed we are from the group of relevant experts, the coarser
the cues.
There are numerous cues people use to ascertain how “scien-
tific” something is. One is mathematizing: if math is used, then
the outcome is more likely to be thought of as good science. In
an experiment conducted by psychologist Kimmo Eriksson, par-
ticipants, all with postgraduate degrees, had to evaluate some
social science results. Half of the participants read abstracts in
which a sentence with mathematical symbols had been in-
serted.35 The sentence itself made no sense, yet it boosted the
232 ch ap t er 14
positive evaluations of the abstract. Another coarse cue is prox-
imity to the hard sciences. Psychologist Deena Weisberg and
her colleagues asked participants to evaluate explanations of wel -
established psychological phenomena.36 Some explanations
were purposefully circular, but some of these poor explanations
were supplemented with useless information about the brain
areas involved. The addition of irrelevant neuroscience data made
participants less critical of the useless explanations. Reassuringly,
genuine experts weren’t fooled either by the fancy math or by the
neuroanatomical babble.
An even coarser cue is the prestige of a university. A jour-
nalist reporting on two studies, one conducted at Harvard
and the other at Bismarck State College, would likely stress
the former affiliation more than the latter.37 The effect of uni-
versity prestige is even vis i ble in that most dramatic demon-
stration of deference toward science: the Milgram obedience
experiments.
The standard narrative surrounding these experiments is
that Milgram showed how two- thirds of U.S. participants were
wil ing to shock someone almost to death, if ordered to do so.38
These results have been taken as support for Hannah Arendt’s
contention, based on the be hav ior of many Germans in World
War II, that “in certain circumstances the most ordinary decent
person can become a criminal,” suggesting that people would
obey just about any orders from any person in a position of
authority.39 However, this narrative ought to be substantially
revised in two ways.
First, the two- thirds figure is inflated. It was only obtained in
one variant of the experiment. Other versions, with minor
changes such as a new experimenter, yielded lower rates of com-
pliance.40 More impor tant, many of the participants— nearly
half of them— expressed doubts about the real ity of the whole
sh a l l o w g ur us 233
setup.41 Those who didn’t express such doubts, who presumably
really thought they were shocking someone, were vastly less
likely to comply: only a quarter of them went all the way to the
highest voltage.42
Second, Milgram’s experiments demonstrate only that people
defer to science, not to anyone barking orders at them. The par-
ticipants, most of whom had quite modest backgrounds, were
invited to the prestigious Yale University, welcomed by a lab
coat– wearing scientist, and given an elaborate scientific rationale
for the experiment. Participants followed the experimenter’s re-
quest only when they believed in the study’s scientific goal.43 By
contrast, straight-up orders, such as “You have no other choice,
you must go on” tended to have the opposite effect, prompting
participants to rebel and refuse to take further part in the experi-
ment.44 Removing some of the cues that made the experiment
appear more scientifically respectable— for instance, carry ing it
out in a generic town rather than at Yale— decreased the com-
pliance rate.45
The Milgram experiment illustrates the dangers of an overreli-
ance on coarse cues to evaluate scientific value. Other examples
abound. Pseudoscientists, from creationists to homeopaths, use
credentials to their advantage, touting PhDs and university ac-
creditations they gained by professing diff er ent beliefs.46 Stil , on
the whole coarse cues play a positive role. After all, they do re-
flect reasonable trends: mathematization vastly improves sci-
ence; the hard sciences have progressed much further than the
social sciences; someone with a PhD and university accredita-
tion is likely to be more knowledgeable in their field of exper-
tise than a layperson.
234 ch ap t er 14
The Guru Effect
Jacques Lacan relied on these coarse cues to boost his stature.
He had the proper credentials. He made extensive use of math-
ematical symbols.47 Stil , even knowing this, I suspect few are able
to plow through his seminars, and those who do, instead of being
impressed by Lacan’s depth, are more likely stunned by his ab-
struseness. How could prose so opaque become so respected?
More obscure statements require more effort to be under-
stood; as a result, every thing else being equal, obscurity makes
statements less relevant.48 Take the following example: instead of
reading, “In the event of an impact where the airbag is deployed,
the inflator part of the airbag may ignite in such a manner that
it creates excessive internal pressure. As a result the metal infla-
tor casing may rupture, causing metal fragments to be propelled
through the airbag and into the vehicle,” people would rather be
told, “Your airbag might expl
ode and kill you with shrapnel” (yes,
this is a real example).49 As a rule, when hard- to- understand con-
tent spreads, it is not because it is obscure but in spite of being
obscure, when there is no easier way to get the content across.
Yet the success of Lacan, and other intellectuals of his ilk,
suggests that obscurity sometimes helps, to the point that
people end up devoting a lot of energy to deciphering nonsensi-
cal statements. Dan Sperber has suggested that, in unusual cir-
cumstances, obscurity can become a strength through a “guru
effect.”50
Imagine Lacan in 1932. He has attended the best schools; has
been mentored by the best psychiatrists; and his noted doctoral
dissertation reflects a broad mastery of the psychiatric, psycho-
analytic, and philosophical lit er a tures. He promotes the idea
that mental illnesses are not necessarily deficiencies but merely
diff er ent ways of thinking, which should be understood in their
sh a l l o w g ur us 235
own terms.51 His thesis might be right or wrong, but it is under-
standable, controversial, and in ter est ing. Lacan makes a name
for himself in Pa ri sian intellectual circles, where he is, for broadly
justifiable reasons, perceived as an expert on the affairs of the
mind.
To maintain his status, Lacan should keep developing new and
in ter est ing theories about the mind. But this is rather difficult
(believe me on this). Fortunately, there is a way out. He can rely
on increasingly vague concepts, concepts that were already part
of the zeitgeist. Here is an excerpt from a pre sen ta tion Lacan gave
in 1938: “The first case [a patient] shows how the symptoms were
resolved as soon as the oedipal episodes were elucidated, thanks
to a nearly purely anamnestic evocation.”52 It takes a bit of effort,
and some familiarity with psychoanalytic jargon, but it is pos-
si ble to make sense of this statement, which broadly says, “The
patient’s symptom subsided when he was able to remember hav-
ing sexual desire for his mother” (a likely mistaken conclusion,
but that’s another issue).
Lacan’s work confirms his mastery of the most complex psy-
choanalytic theory and suggests that decoding his dense prose
is worth people’s while. Because they assume Lacan to be an ex-
pert, his followers devote growing amounts of energy and imag-
