4. The Condemnation of Elaborate Funerals
Now the gentlemen on the world still doubt whether elaborate funerals and extended mourning are right or wrong, beneficial or harmful. Therefore Mo Tzu said: I have inquired into the matter. If the doctrines of those who advocate elaborate funerals and extended mourning are followed in the affairs in the country, it will mean that whenever a king, duke, or great official dies, there would be layers of coffin, the burial would be deep, the shrouding would be plenty, the embroidery covering would be elaborate, and the grave mound would be massive. . . . Mourners would weep in a confused manner to the point of choking, wear sackcloth on the breast and flax on the head, keep the snivel dangling, live in a mourning hut, sleep on straw, and rest their heads on a lump of earth. . . . All this is to last for three years.
If such a doctrine is followed and such a principle is practiced, kings, dukes, and great officials practicing it cannot go to court early [and retire late to administer their government, and attend to the] five offices and six departments48 and develop agriculture and forestry and fill the granaries, farmers practicing it cannot start out early and return late to plough and plant, artisans practicing it cannot build vehicles and make utensils, and women practicing it cannot rise early and retire late to weave and spin. So, much wealth is buried in elaborate funerals and long periods of work are suspended in extended mourning. Wealth that is already produced is carried to be buried and wealth yet to be produced is long delayed. To seek wealth in this way is like seeking a harvest by stopping farming. . . . (ch. 25, sptk, 6:7b-9a)
5. Elevating the Worthy to Government Positions
How do we know elevating the worthy is the foundation of government? The answer is: When the honorable and the wise run the government, the ignorant and the humble remain orderly, but when the ignorant and the humble run the government, the honorable and the wise become rebellious. Therefore we know that elevating the worthy is the foundation of government.
The ancient sage-kings greatly valued the elevation of the worthy and employed the capable. They did not side with their fathers and brothers. They were not partial toward people of wealth and high position. They had no special love for the good-looking. They raised and promoted the worthy, gave them wealth and high position, and made them leading officials. They demoted and rejected the unworthy, caused them to be poor and humble, and made them servants. In this way all people were encouraged by rewards and scared by punishment. They led one another to become worthy. The result was that many were worthy and few were unworthy. Such is the advancing of the worthy. . . .
Now, when kings, dukes, and great officials cannot make a coat, they will depend on an able tailor. When they cannot kill an ox or sheep, they will depend on an able butcher.. . . If kings, dukes, and great officials really want to put the state in order and make it permanent and secured, why do they not understand that elevating the worthy is the foundation of government? . . . (ch. 9, sptk, 2:4a-9a)
6. Agreement with the Superior
How is order brought about in the empire? There is order in the empire because the emperor can bring about a unified and agreed concept of right in the empire. If the people all agree with the emperor but not with the Heaven, then calamity still remains. Now, the frequent arrival of hurricanes and torrents are the punishment from Heaven upon the people for their failure to agree with Heaven. . . . (ch. 11, sptk, 3:3b)
How do we know that the principle of agreement with the superior can be used to govern the empire? Well, why not examine the theory of the origin of the government? In the beginning when man was created, there was no ruler. People existed as individuals. As they existed as individuals, there was one concept of right for a hundred men, a thousand concepts of right for a thousand men, and so on until there were a countless number of concepts of right for a countless number of men. All of them considered their own concepts of right as correct and other people’s concepts as wrong. And there were strife among the strong and quarrels among the weak. Thereupon Heaven wished to unify all concepts of right in the world. The worthy was therefore selected and made an emperor. The emperor, realizing his inadequate wisdom and ability to govern alone, selected the next best in virtue and appointed them as the three ministers. The three ministers, realizing their inadequate wisdom and ability to assist the emperor alone, divided the country into states and set up feudal lordships. The feudal lords, realizing their inadequate wisdom and ability to govern the land within the four borders by themselves, selected the next best in virtue. . . . Therefore, in appointing the three ministers, the feudal lords, the great officers, the prime minister, the village elders, and the heads of households, the emperor of old did not select them because of their wealth, high position, or leisure, but employed them to assist in bringing political order and administering the government. . . . When order prevails in the empire, the emperor further unifies all concepts of right as one in the empire and makes it agree with [the will of] Heaven. Therefore the principle of agreement with the superior can be applied by the emperor to govern the empire, by the feudal lords to govern the state, and heads of households to govern the family. . . . (ch. 13, sptk, 3:13b-18a)
Comment. Mo Tzu has been criticized for absolutism. The danger is certainly present. The requirement for conformity is strict. We must not forget, however, that the final authority is Heaven. In this sense, it is not essentially different from the Confucian theory of the Mandate of Heaven. In both cases, whether the Mandate of Heaven is fulfilled is determined by whether the people are happy and society in good order. Still Confucianists were thinking of moral obligations, while Mo Tzu was thinking of practical results.
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DEBATES ON METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTS: THE LOGICIANS
Practically all major ancient Chinese philosophical schools were greatly concerned with the relationship between names and actuality, whether for its social and moral significance (as in Confucianism), for its metaphysical import (as in Taoism), or for political control (as in Legalism). None of them was interested in the logical aspect of the problem. Hsün Tzu’s (fl. 298–238 b.c.) rectification of names comes close to it, but his objective was still moral and social. The only school that was primarily devoted to logical considerations was the Logicians, who constituted one of the smallest schools and exercised no influence whatsoever after their own time.
The name “Logicians” is used only to emphasize their intellectual character. Actually, they neither evolved any syllogism nor discovered any law of thought. They expressed themselves in dialogues, aphorisms, and paradoxes instead of systematic and cogent argumentation. Nevertheless, they were the only group devoted to such problems as existence, relativity, space, time, quality, actuality, and causes. Although the Chinese name for them is Ming-chia (School of Names), or Ming-pien (Scholars of Names and Debaters), they were not confined to the correspondence of names and actuality. Their metaphysical and epistemological concepts are primitive, but they represent the only tendency in ancient China toward intellectualism for its own sake. They subscribed to the Moist doctrine of universal love, and therefore may be considered to have gone into a discussion of concepts in order to support this doctrine. But if so, they must have detoured a long way to do so. There is every indication that their purely intellectual interest was genuine and primary. In this they were singular in Chinese history.
The group is not so easily identified as other schools such as the Confucianists or the Moists. It consisted of a number of minor thinkers. Among them Hui Shih (380–305 b.c.?) and Kung-sun Lung (b. 380 b.c.?) were the most prominent. They were not unanimous in their opinions. Hui Shih and his friend Chuang Tzu both believed that all things formed one body and that there was the great unit or great One. But Chuang Tzu sought to know these through mystical experience, whereas Hui Shih attempted to do so through rational knowledge. Hui Shih and Kung-sun Lung were opposed to each other at more than one point. To Hui Shih things were relative, but to Kung-sun Lung they were absolute. The
former emphasized change, while the latter stressed universality and permanence. These are also basic problems underlying the twenty-one paradoxes of the Debaters. A number of these paradoxes seem to side with Hui Shih in stressing the relativity of space and time, but others side with Kung-sun Lung in stressing universality and permanence.
The question is inevitably asked why the intellectual tendency of this school did not develop in China. The answer is to be found partly in the fact that the Chinese have not been interested in the science of logic, and partly in the fact that the period of upheaval in which the Logicians lived was not conducive to logical studies. Moreover, the common emphasis of the major schools on solving human problems, as well as the attempts of some thinkers to strive for social reform, made the Logicians look like idle debaters. As Chuang Tzu said of them, “They are able to subdue other people’s mouths, but cannot win their hearts. This is where their narrowness lies.”1
A.--THE PARADOXES OF HUI SHIH AND THE DEBATERS
Hui Shih had many tricks. His books filled five carts. His doctrines are contradictory and his sayings miss the truth. Referring to the nature of things, he said:
1. The greatest has nothing beyond itself; it is called the great unit.2 The smallest has nothing within itself; it is called the small unit.
Comment. Was Hui Shih thinking of the atom?
2. That which has no thickness cannot have any volume, and yet in extent it may cover a thousand li.3
3. Heaven is as low as the earth; mountains and marshes are on the same level.
4. When the sun is at noon, it is setting; when there is life, there is death.
5. A great similarity is different from a small similarity; this is called the lesser similarity-and-difference. All things are similar to one another and different from one another; this is called the great similarity-and-difference.4
6. The South has no limit and yet has a limit.
7. One goes to the state of Yüeh today and arrives there yesterday.5
8. Joint rings can be separated.
9. I know the center of the world: it is north of the state of Yen (in the north) and south of the state of yüeh (in the south).
10. Love all things extensively. Heaven and earth form one body.6
Comment. Chang Ping-Lin (Chang T’ai-yen, 1868-1936), fore-most modern scholar on ancient Chinese philosophy, especially on Chuang Tzu, regards paradoxes nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, and 9 as arguing for the theory that all quantitative measurements and all spatial distinctions are illusory and unreal, that nos. 4 and 7 are arguing for the unreality of time, and that nos. 5 and 10 are arguing for the unreality of all apparent similarities and differences between things.7 This seems to be a reasonable interpretation. Hu Shih (1891-1962), however, thinks the first nine paradoxes are intended to prove a monistic theory of the universe, which is expressed in the last paradox.8 Is this not reading too much modem philosophy into an ancient text?
Hui Shih considered these to be the great insights of the world and tried to enlighten the debaters. And they enjoyed it. [They said]:
1. The egg has hair.
2. A chicken has three legs.9
3. Ying (capital of Ch’u) contains the whole world.
4. A dog can be a sheep.
5. The horse has eggs.
6. The frog has a tail.
7. Fire is not hot.
8. Mountains produce mouths.
9. The wheel never touches the ground.
10. The eye does not see.
11. The pointing of the finger10 does not reach [a thing]; the reaching never ends.
12. The tortoise is longer than the snake.
13. The carpenter’s square is not square in shape and a compass cannot draw a circle.
14. The mortise does not surround the bit of a chisel.
15. The shadow of a flying bird never moves.
16. The arrow is flying so fast that there are moments when it is neither in motion nor at rest.
17. A puppy is not a dog.
18. A brown horse and a dark ox make three.11
19. A white dog is black.
20. An orphan colt has never had a mother.
21. Take a stick one foot long and cut it in half every day and you will never exhaust it even after ten thousand generations.
With these propositions the debaters argued with Hui Shih all their lives without coming to an end. (Chuang Tzu, ch. 33, nhcc, 10:38a-42b)
Comment. Hu Shih has grouped twenty of these paradoxes12 into four groups: nos. 3, 9, 15, 16, and 21 arguing for the unreality of distinctions in space and time; nos. 1, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14, and 17 arguing for the relativity of all similarities and differences; nos. 2, 7, 10, 11, and 18 discussing problems of knowledge; and nos. 4, 19, and 20 on names.13 Most students would agree. In any case, the similarity of nos. 16 and 21 with Zeno’s third and second arguments against motion should be obvious to students of philosophy.
B.--THE KUNG-SUN LUNG TZU14
1. On the White Horse (ch. 2)
A. “Is it correct to say that a white horse is not a horse?”
B. “It is.”
A. “Why?”
B. “Because ‘horse’ denotes the form and ‘white’ denotes the color. What denotes the color does not denote the form. Therefore we say that a white horse is not a horse.”
A. “There being a horse, one cannot say that there is no horse. If one cannot say that there is no horse, then isn’t [it] a horse?15 Since there being a white horse means that there is a horse, why does being white make it not a horse?”
B. “Ask for a horse, and either a yellow or a black one may answer. Ask for a white horse, and neither the yellow horse nor the black one may answer. If a white horse were a horse, then what is asked in both cases would be the same. If what is asked is the same, then a white horse would be no different from a horse. If what is asked is no different, then why is it that yellow and black horses may yet answer16 in the one case but not in the other? Clearly the two cases are incompatible. Now the yellow horse and the black horse remain the same. And yet they answer to a horse but not to a white horse. Obviously a white horse is not a horse.”
A. “You consider a horse with color as not a horse. Since there is no horse in the world without color, is it all right [to say] that there is no horse in the world?”
B. “Horses of course have color. Therefore there are white horses. If horses had no color, there would be simply horses. Where do white horses come in? Therefore whiteness is different from horse. A white horse means a horse combined with whiteness. [Thus in one case it is] horse and [in the other it is] a white horse. Therefore we say that a white horse is not a horse.”
A. [Since you say that] before the horse is combined with whiteness, it is simply a horse, before whiteness is combined with a horse it is simply whiteness, and when the horse and whiteness are combined they are collectively called a white horse, you are calling a combination by what is not a combination. This is incorrect.17 Therefore it is incorrect to say that a white horse is not a horse.”
B. “If you regard a white horse as a horse,18 is it correct to say that a white horse is a yellow horse?”
A. “No.”
B. “If you regard a white horse as different from a yellow horse, you are differentiating a yellow horse from a horse. To differentiate a yellow horse from a horse is to regard the yellow horse as not a horse. Now to regard a yellow horse as not a horse and yet to regard a white horse as a horse is like a bird flying into a pool or like the inner and outer coffins being in different places. This would be the most contradictory argument and the wildest talk.”
A. “[When we say that] a white horse cannot be said to be not a horse, we are separating the whiteness from the horse. If [the whiteness] is not separated from [the horse], then there would be a white horse and we should not say that there is [just] a horse. Therefore when we say that there is a horse, we do so simply because it is a horse and not because it is a white horse. When we say that there is a horse, we do not mean tha
t there are a horse [as such] and another horse [as the white horse].”
B. “It is all right to ignore the whiteness that is not fixed on any object. But in speaking of the white horse, we are talking about the whiteness that is fixed on the object. The object on which whiteness is fixed is not whiteness [itself]. The term ‘horse’ does not involve any choice of color and therefore either a yellow horse or a black one may answer. But the term ‘white horse’ does involve a choice of color. Both the yellow horse and the black one are excluded because of their color. Only a white horse may answer. What does not exclude [color] is not the same as what excludes [color]. Therefore we say that a white horse is not a horse.” (sppy, 3b-5b)
2. On Marks (chih) and Things (ch. 3)
All things are marks. But marks are no marks [for themselves]. If there were no marks in the world, nothing could be called a thing. If there were no marks, can things in the world be spoken of as marks? Marks are what do not exist in the world, but things are what do exist in the world. It is incorrect to consider what does exist in the world to be what does not exist in the world.
[If] there are no marks in the world, things cannot be called marks. What cannot be called marks are not marks. Not being marks, all things are marks. [To say that if] there are no marks in the world things cannot be called marks, does not mean that there are [things] without marks. There not being [things] without marks means that all things are marks. All things being marks means that marks are not marks. That there are no marks in the world is due to the fact that all things have their own names which do not serve as marks. To call them marks when they do not serve as marks, is to consider them all as marks for another and really no marks. It is incorrect to consider what is not a mark as a mark.
A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy Page 29
