Comment. For several hundred years Neo-Confucianists had regarded physical nature as the source of evil. Yen threw this theory overboard. He still had to explain the origin of evil, of course, and he ascribed it to attraction and agitation from outside. These have to come through physical nature, and therefore it can be said that he is not entirely different from the Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianists. However, to them physical nature itself is the cause for evil. To Yen, on the other hand, it is only the means.
Originally Chu Hsi understood nature, but he was influenced by Buddhists and mixed up with the bad habits of people of the world. Had there been no doctrine of physical nature advocated by Ch’eng I (Ch’eng I-ch’uan, 1033-1107) and Chang Tsai (Chang Heng-ch’ü, 1020-1077),6 we would surely distinguish man’s nature, feeling, and capacity, on the one hand, and attraction, obscuration, and bad influence, on the other, and the fact that man’s nature, feeling, and capacity are all good and that evil originates later would be perfectly clear. But as these former scholars inaugurated this doctrine, they forthwith ascribed evil to physical nature and sought to transform it. Have they never thought that physical nature is a concentration of the two material forces (yin and yang or passive and active cosmic forces) and the Four Virtues (Origination, Flourish, Advantage, and Firmness)?7 How can we say that it is evil? Evil is due to attraction, obscuration, and bad influence. . . .
Comment. In saying that evil is due to bad influence and so forth, Yen is practically repeating Mencius. In fact, in his whole concept on human nature, he went directly back to Mencius. Later, Tai Chen did the same.
Scholars often compare human nature with water, material force with earth, and evil with turbidity.8 They regard physical nature, which is the loftiest, as the most honorable and the most useful endowment given to man by Heaven and Earth, as if it were a burden to his human nature. They did not realize that if there were no physical nature, to what will principle be attached? Furthermore, if physical nature were discarded, then human nature would become an empty principle without any function in the world. . . .
Master Ch’eng Hao (using water as an analogy) said, “Although they differ in being clear or turbid, we cannot say that the turbid water ceases to be water.”9 Does this not mean that although good and evil are different, it is incorrect to regard evil not as nature? Is this not precisely to regard evil as the property of physical nature? Let me ask: Is turbidity the physical nature of water? I am afraid that clearness and calmness are the physical nature of water and that what is turbid is a mixture with earth which is originally absent from the nature of water, just as human nature is subject to attraction, obscuration, and bad influence. Turbidity may be of high or low degree, and may be of great or small quantity, just as attraction, obscuration, and bad influence may be heavy or light and deep or shallow. If it is said that turbidity is the physical nature of water, then it would mean that turbid water has physical nature but clear water is without it. How can that be?. . . . (Ts’un-hsing pien, or Preservation of Human Nature, 1:1a-3b, in Yen-Li ts’ung-shu or Yen Yüan and Li Kung Collection, 1923 ed.)
2. THE IDENTITY OF PRINCIPLE AND MATERIAL FORCE
The nature of the ten thousand things is an endowment of principle, and their physical nature is a consolidation of material force. What is balanced is this principle and material force, what is unbalanced is also this principle and this material force, and what is mixed is none other than this principle and this material force. What is lofty and bright is this principle and this material force, and what is lowly and dark is also this principle and this material force. What is clear or sturdy is this principle and this material force, and what is turbid or slight is also this principle and this material force. The long and the short, the perfect and the imperfect, the penetrating and the obstructed, are none other than this principle and material force.
As to man, he is especially the purest of all things, one who “receives at birth the Mean of Heaven and Earth (balanced material force).”10 The two material forces and the Four Virtues are man before his consolidation, and man is the two material forces and the Four Virtues after their consolidation. As the Four Virtues are preserved in man, they are humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom. They are called the nature with reference to the internal existence of origination, flourish, advantage, and firmness. When externally manifested, they become commiseration, shame and dislike, deference and compliance, and the sense of right and wrong. These are called feelings with reference to the application of the Four Virtues to things. Capacity is that which manifests one’s nature in feelings; it is the power of the Four Virtues. To say that feeling involves evil is to say that the Four Virtues before manifestation is not the same as the Four Virtues after manifestation. To say that capacity involves evil is to say that what is preserved is the Four Virtues but what can be aroused into action is not the Four Virtues. And to say that physical nature involves evil is to say that the principle of the Four Virtues may be called the Way of Heaven but the material force of the Four Virtues may not be so called. Alas! Is there in the world any material force without principle, or principle without material force? Are there principle and material force outside of yin and yang and the Four Virtues? (ibid., 2:2b-3a)
3. LEARNING THROUGH EXPERIENCE
Knowledge has no substance of its own. Its substance consists of things. It is similar to the fact that the eye has no substance of its own; its substance consists of physical forms and colors. Therefore although the human eye has vision, if it does not see black or white, its vision cannot function. Although the human mind is intelligent, if it does not ponder over this or that, its intelligence will find no application. Those who talk about the extension of knowledge today mean no more than reading, discussion, questioning, thinking, and sifting, without realizing that the extension of one’s knowledge does not lie in these at all. Take, for example, one who desires to understand the rules of propriety. Even if he reads a book on the rules of propriety hundreds of times, discusses and asks scores of times, thinks and sifts scores of times, he cannot be considered to know them at all. He simply has to kneel down, bow, and otherwise move, hold up the jade wine-cup with both hands, hold the present of silk, and go through all these himself before he knows what the rules of propriety really are. Those who know propriety in this way know them perfectly. Or take, for example, one who desires to know music. Even if he reads a music score hundreds of times, and discusses, asks, thinks, and sifts scores of times, he cannot know music at all. He simply has to strike and blow musical instruments, sing with his own voice, dance with his own body, and go through all these himself before he knows what music really is. Those who know music this way know it perfectly. This is what is meant by “When things are ko (investigated, reached, etc.), true knowledge is extended.”11. . . . The word ko is the same as that in the expression, “Ko (submit and kill) fierce animals with one’s own hands.” (Ssu-shu cheng-wu, or Corrections of Wrong Interpretations of the Four Books, 1:2b, in Yen-Li ts’ung-shu)
Comment. Several important points are indicated in these simple statements: Learning is an active pursuit through personal experience. The object of knowledge is not ideas but actual and concrete things, and knowledge and action form a unity. Without saying, he selected only those experiences that would support his case, but if his logic is defective, his outlook is extremely modern. As to his interpretation of ko, he comes close to Ssu-ma Kuang (1019-1086) and is diametrically opposed to Ch’eng I and Chu Hsi.12
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TAI CHEN’S PHILOSOPHY OF PRINCIPLE AS ORDER
In eighteenth-century China, the rationalistic Neo-Confucianism of Chu Hsi (1130-1200) was still influential, but the tide had turned against it. The movement, inaugurated by Ku Yen-wu (1613-1682) and Yen Jo-ch’ü (1636-1704), to search for objective truth and shun speculation had by this time become strong and extensive. Scholars refused to accept anything without evidence, and their sole interest was to get at the truth through concrete facts. Conseq
uently, the movement has been called “Investigations Based on Evidence.” Although their center of interest was still the Confucian Classics, they were deeply engaged in studying such concrete subjects as philology, history, astronomy, mathematics, geography, collation of texts, and the like. They revolted against the abstract learning of the Sung dynasty (960-1279) of which rationalistic Neo-Confucianism was the major product, and looked to the earliest studies of the Classics during the Han (206 b.c.–a.d. 220) for evidence. For this reason, the movement is also known as Han Learning. It is characterized philosophically by a revolt against Chu Hsi, and methodologically by objective, inductive, and critical methods. The towering figure in this whole movement was Tai Chen (Tai Tung-yüan, 1723-1777).
Actually Tai was better known as a Great Master of Investigations-Based-on-Evidence than as a philosopher. But his investigations and philosophy are really inseparable, for they reinforce each other. He was an expert in mathematics, astronomy, water-works, phonetics, collation of texts, and textual criticism, in which he employed critically the inductive and comparative methods. Unlike his contemporaries who pursued investigation-based-on-evidence for their own sake, he regarded them as primarily a means to reveal truth. At the same time, because of his method and concrete studies, he viewed truth as an order, a systematic arrangement of concrete, ordinary daily matters and human affairs. Obviously a thinker of this frame of mind would not entertain an abstract, transcendental concept of principle (li), which, he said, the Neo-Confucianists of Sung and Ming (1368-1644) looked upon “as if it were a thing.” To him, principle was nothing but the order of things, and by things he understood “daily affairs such as drinking and eating.”
The concept of principle as order goes back to Han times and so Tai was not original in this respect. But none had developed the idea as fully as he and none had pushed it more forcefully. With such a concept of principle as the premise, it follows that the way to investigate principle is not by intellectual speculation, as in the case of Chu Hsi, or by introspection of the mind, as in the case of Wang Yang-ming (Wang Shou-jen, 1472-1529), but by a critical, analytical, minutely detailed, and objective study of things.
His concept of principle led him also to oppose vigorously Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianists with regard to human feelings and desires, which he thought they had undermined. In his belief, principle can never prevail when feelings are not satisfied, for principle consists of “feelings that do not err.” In point of fact, Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianists never condemned feelings and desires as such, only selfish and excessive ones, which are no different from those that err. It cannot be denied, however, that while Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianists contrast principle as good and desire as evil, Tai would not tolerate such an opposition. In this he drew support from Mencius’ doctrine of the original goodness of human nature, and explains error in terms of selfishness. Since he maintained that principle is feelings that do not err, he had to postulate an unalterable, objective, and necessary principle as the standard. This is what he meant by “necessary” moral principles. He did not reject universal truth after all, except that he insisted that these are definite and inherent in concrete and ordinary things.
In another respect he perpetuated a major doctrine of Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianists but again interpreted it in terms of order. To him as to Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianists, the universe is an unceasing process of production and reproduction.1 However, this process is not just a universal operation. In addition, it is a natural order, an order in which basic moral values can be seen.
Tai was perhaps the greatest thinker in the Ch’ing period (1644-1912). He was a poor man and never passed the higher civil service examinations.2 He did not attack Chu Hsi until his late years. It was then that he wrote the Meng Tzu tzu-i shu-cheng (Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in the Book of Mencius), from which the following selections are made. It is his most important work and one that contains his most philosophical ideas. But for a hundred years it did not exert any influence, partly because his doctrines are not really profound and partly because interest in philosophy during the whole Ch’ing dynasty was very slight. In the twentieth century, however, he has suddenly become popular, undoubtedly because his philosophy suits the temper of the age.
COMMENTARY ON THE MEANINGS OF TERMS IN THE BOOK OF MENCIUS3
1. On Principle (Li)
Sec. 1. Li is a name given to the examination of the minutest details with which to make necessary distinctions. This is why it is called the principle of differentiation. In the case of the substance of t0hings, we call it “fibre in muscle,” “fibre in flesh,” and “pattern and order” (wen-li).4 When the distinctions obtain, there will be order without confusion. This is called order (t’iao-li). Mencius called Confucius a complete concert,5 saying, “To begin the order (harmony of an orchestra) is the work of wisdom, and to terminate the order is the work of saceness.”6 Sageness and wisdom reached their height in Confucius merely in the sense that order was attained. The Book of Changes says, “With the attainment of ease and simplicity all principles in the world will obtain.”7 Ease and simplicity are mentioned here but not humanity (jen) and wisdom because the principle of ch’ien (Heaven) and k’un (Earth) are under discussion. The principle of ch’ien knows through the easy” means that it knows that humanity, love, justice, and altruism are the same. And “the principle of k’un accomplishes through the simple”8 means that it accomplishes in such a simple way that nothing seems to happen. “He who attains to this ease will be easily understood. . . . He who is easily understood will have adherents. . . . He who has adherents can continue long. . . . To be able to continue long shows the virtue of the worthy.”9 One who answers to this description is a man of humanity. “He who attains to this simplicity will be easily followed. . . . He who is easily followed will achieve success. . . . He who achieves success can become great. . . . To be able to become great is the heritage of the worthy.”10 One who answers this description is a man of wisdom. When events and situations in the world are distinct in their order and clear in their details and one responds to them with both humanity and wisdom, can there even be the slightest error? The Doctrine of the Mean says, “Pattern, order, refinement, and penetration enable him (the perfect sage) to exercise discrimination.”11 The Record of Music says, “Music is [the sound of the human mind] penetrating the order (li) of human relations.”12 In his annotation Cheng K’ang-ch’eng (Cheng Hsüan, 127-200) said that “li means to differentiate.” In the preface to his Shuo-wen chieh-tzu (Explanation of Words and Elucidation of Characters), Hsü Shu-chung (Hsü Shen, fl. a.d. 100) said, “[The inventor of the script] knew that [from the traces of birds and animals] patterns and order (fen-li) can be distinguished and differentiated.” What the ancients understood as li was never anything like what is understood by latter-day scholars.
Sec. 2. Question: What did the ancients mean when they speak of the Principle of Nature (T’ien-li)?
Answer: Principle consists of feelings that do not err. Principle can never prevail when [correct] feelings are not satisfied. When one does something to others, one should examine oneself and think quietly to see whether he could accept if others did the same thing to him. When one gives some responsibility to others, one should examine himself and think quietly to see whether he could fulfill it if others give the same responsibility to him. When the measure of the self is applied to others, principle will become clear. The Principle of Nature (T’ien-li, Principle of Heaven) means natural discrimination.13 With natural discrimination, one measures the feelings of others in terms of one’s own, and there will be no injustice or imbalance. . . . When feelings are balanced and just, this means that like and dislike are in proper measure. It means accord with the Principle of Nature.14 What the ancients understood as the Principle of Nature was never anything like what is understood by latter-day scholars.
Comment. Tai’s relentless attack on the doctrine of the Principle of Nature was partly motivated by the fact that the Yung-cheng emperor (r. 1723-17
35) used it as justification for his oppressive measures.
Sec. 3. Question: If one measures the feelings of others by one’s own without error, one will surely be in accord with principle in his deeds. What is the difference between feeling and principle?
Answer: Feelings are the same in oneself as in others. They become principle when they are neither excessive nor deficient. The Book of Odes says, “Heaven produces the teeming multitude. As there are things, there are their specific principles. When the people keep to their normal nature, they will love excellent virtue.”15 Confucius said, “The writer of this poem indeed knew the Way (Tao).”16 Elaborating on the poem, Mencius said, “Therefore as there are things, there must be their specific principles, and since people keep to their normal nature, therefore they love excellent virtue.”17 Specific principle means to regard keeping to [normal nature] and holding on to it as the standard, principle means to be in accord with the distinction in each case, and excellent virtue means to demonstrate concretely in words and action. A thing is an affair or event. When we talk about an event, we do not go beyond daily affairs such as drinking and eating. To neglect these and talk about principle is not what the ancient sages and worthies meant by principle.
Sec. 10. Question: From the Sung dynasty on, those who talk about principle have maintained that what does not issue from principle issues from desire and what does not issue from desire issues from principle. They have therefore clearly drawn the line between principle and desire, and held that this is where the superior man and the inferior man are distinguished. Now, however, you hold that principle is feelings that do not err. This means that principle is contained in desires. Is it, then, wrong to have no desire?
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