The most intelligent function of ether that can be shown by evidence is the brain in the case of man. . . and electricity in the case of empty space. Electricity is not confined to space, for there is nothing which it does not integrate and penetrate. The brain is one of the instances in which electricity assumes physical form and solid substance. Since the brain is electricity with physical form and solid substance, then electricity must be brain without physical form or solid substance. Since men know that it is the power of the brain that pervades throughout the five sense organs and the hundred bones and makes them one body, they should know that the power of electricity pervades throughout heaven, earth, the ten thousand things, the self and the other, and makes them one body. . . . Electricity is everywhere. It follows that the self is everywhere. Erroneously to make a distinction between the self and the other is to be without humanity. . . . Without humanity, the same body would be like different regions. . . . Therefore the distinction between humanity and inhumanity lies in whether there is penetration or obstruction. The basis of penetration or obstruction is simply humanity or inhumanity. Penetration is like electric lines reaching out in all directions, and there is nowhere which they do not reach. This means that different regions are like one body. . . . Unless I can penetrate heaven, earth, all things, myself and other selves as one body, I shall have no way to appreciate the knowledge of that which penetrates and I would regard it as strange. Actually, if there is penetration throughout the self, which knows all, there is nothing strange at all. The difference between having knowledge and having no knowledge depends on whether there is humanity or not. There is only humanity in the universe; there is no wisdom to speak of. (ibid., 4a-6a)
Comment. Here T’an departs from K’ang. Instead of equally emphasizing humanity and wisdom, as K’ang did, T’an stresses humanity exclusively.
If humanity is violated, will ether become extinct? Answer: There is no extinction. Not only does ether not become extinct; humanity does not, of course. None can extinguish them and they cannot become extinct in any case. To violate it or to extinguish it means not to follow the order which it possesses. Who can arbitrarily make an existing thing nonexistent? By the same token, none can arbitrarily make a nonexistent thing existent. Since none can arbitrarily make a nonexistent thing existent, even a person as perfectly humane as Heaven cannot augment humanity by any degree. And since none can arbitrarily make an existent thing nonexistent, even a person as inhumane as beasts cannot diminish it by any degree. It cannot be augmented because there is no production, and it cannot be diminished because there is no extinction. Knowing that there is neither production nor extinction, we can then talk about human nature. . . . Nature is a function of ether. Since ether possesses the power to cause things to perfect each other and to love each other, therefore we say that human nature is good. (ibid., 8a)
2. The Principle of Nature and Human Desires
Ordinary society and petty scholars regard the Principle of Nature (Tien-li) as good and human desires as evil. They do not realize that without human desires there cannot be any Principle of Nature. I therefore feel sad that the world has erroneously made a distinction between them. The Principle of Nature is good, but human desires are also good. Wang Fu-chih (Wang Ch’uan-shan, 1619-1692) said that the Principle of Nature is within human desires and that without human desires the Principle of Nature cannot be revealed.6 This agrees with the Buddhist doctrines that the Buddha and all sentient things are identical and that ignorance (avidyā) and Thusness (Tathatā, True Reality)7 are the same.
Let us prove it. Function has been called evil, it is true. But a name is only a name and not an actuality. Function is also a name and not an actuality. How did names originate? When did function begin? Names are given by men and function is given its name by men. They are all products of men. “Function” is only one of many names. Why do we say this? Sexual intercourse is called lust. “Lust” is but a name. This name has been followed for long since the beginning of man, and has not been changed, and therefore people have customarily called lust evil. But suppose from the beginning of man there had been the custom of considering this lust as a great institution in imperial audiences and public banquets, practicing it in imperial temples, in cities, and in the midst of large crowds, like kneeling and bowing low in China and embracing and kissing in the West, and being followed as a tradition up to the present, who will know that it is evil? Somehow it was called evil and as a result people have considered it evil. (ibid., 8b-9a)
Comment. T’an was the first one to have launched such a frontal attack on Confucian moral dogmas. This is extraordinary, for he was essentially a Confucianist.
3. Neither Production nor Extinction
Is there any evidence that there is neither production nor extinction? Answer: You can see it everywhere. For example, take the principles of chemistry already referred to. Even if we study them to the utmost, they involve no more than analyzing a certain number of physical elements to divide and synthesizing to combine them. All we do is to make use of what elements there already and necessarily are and take into consideration their attraction or repulsion at the time, and adjust their proficiency or deficiency, and call the product this or that thing, that is all. How can we eliminate a physical element or create another one? (ibid., 12b-13a)
4. Daily Renovation
What is seen by our eye or heard by our ear is not the real object itself. The eye has a lens. When the shape of the thing enters it, it makes an image. . . . By the time the image is made, the shape of the thing has long been gone. Furthermore, the image depends on the brain to be known. By that time the image itself has become a past image and the true image cannot be seen. . . .
When we view things in the opposite direction from those that are gone, we have what is called daily renovation. Confucius said, “The symbolism of the ko (change) hexagram means to cast away the old and the ting (caldron, symbolizing reform) hexagram means to take on the new.”8 He also said, “Its (the Way’s) virtue is abundant because it renovates things every day.”9 Good reaches its limit when it is daily renewed, and evil also reaches its end when it does not daily renew. If heaven does not renew itself, how can it produce things? If the earth does not renew itself, how can it revolve? If the sun and moon do not renew themselves, how can they be bright? And if the four seasons do not renew themselves, how can there be the cold and warm seasons?. . . If ether does not renew itself, all the elements of existence in the three realms (the threefold world of sensuous desire, of form, and of formless world of pure spirit, that is, our world) will become extinct. . . .
Comment. The idea of daily renovation is a traditional one. In quoting Confucius about casting away the old, T’an is hinting at the idea of renovation not only as a new phase but as reform or even revolution, for that is what the caldron symbolizes. Unfortunately T’an did not develop this idea.
On what is daily renovation based? It is based on the activating power of ether. Have you not heard thunder? There is nothing in the vast and quiet empty space. Then suddenly cloud and rain meet, involving two charges of electricity. As there are two charges, there are the positive and the negative. As there are the positive and the negative, there are similarity and difference. Because of difference, there will be mutual attack, and because of similarity, there will be mutual attraction. Thus fleeting lightning and roaring thunder burst out. . . . Sweet rain follows and gentle wind moves back and forth. . . . As a result, all kinds of things flourish and thus grow and mature. Is this not because of the activity of ether which goes on indefinitely? This may be said to be the beginning of humanity. . . . Do those who govern the world well not follow this way? They advance and change, lead the people and work hard, create and promote things, raise what is neglected, and replace what is worn out. . . . (ibid., 23a-b)
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CHANG TUNG-SUN’S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
Not since the third century b.c. have there been “one hundred schools” of
thought contending in China as in the twentieth century. The combination of Western thought and revolt against traditional heritage caused many intellectual currents to run in all directions. The introduction of modern Western philosophy began with Yen Fu’s (1853-1921) translation of Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics in 1898. His translation of works of Mill, Spencer, and Montesquieu soon followed. At the turn of the century, ideas of Schopenhauer, Kant, Nietzsche, Rousseau, Tolstoi, and Kropotkin were imported. After the intellectual renaissance of 1917, the movement advanced at rapid pace. In the following decade important works of Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, James, Bergson, Marx, and others became available in Chinese. Dewey, Russell, and Dreisch came to China to lecture, and special numbers of journals were devoted to Nietzsche and Bergson. Clubs and even schools were formed to promote a particular philosophy. Almost every trend of Western thought had its exponent. James, Bergson, Eucken, Whitehead, Hocking, Schiller, T. H. Green, Carnap, and C. I. Lewis had their own following. For a time it seemed Chinese thought was to be completely Westernized.
But that was not to be the case. Simultaneously with the propagation of Western thought, efforts were made to revive and reconstruct Chinese philosophy. We have already seen the attempt by T’an Ssu-t’ung (1865-1898). The great rebel Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) himself incorporated part of Confucian ethics into his political ideology. In 1921, Liang Souming (1893-1962) championed Confucian moral values and aroused the Chinese to a degree seldom seen in the contemporary world. Both Ou-yang Ching-wu (1871-1943) and Abbot T’ai-hsü (1889-1947) promoted the revival of the Buddhist Consciousness-Only philosophy for many years. While Liang created a strong current in reevaluating and revitalizing Confucianism, he did not develop a philosophy of his own. Neither Ou-yang nor T’ai-hsü added anything really new to Buddhist philosophy in spite of the latter’s attempt to synthesize it with Western thought and modern science. The two outstanding philosophers who have achieved concrete success in reconstructing traditional philosophy and establishing a system of their own are Fung Yu-lan (1895—) and Hsiung Shih-li (1885-1968) who will be the subjects of the next two chapters. Significantly, they have derived their philosophies from the two major Neo-Confucian tendencies, the rationalistic and the idealistic, respectively.
The number of scholars advocating Western philosophy has been far greater than those oriented toward Chinese thought, although they cannot match the latter group either in originality or in influence until Marxism overcame China. Pragmatism, introduced and advocated by Hu Shih (1891-1962), vitalism, materialism, and new realism were particularly strong. But these were but Western philosophy transplanted on Chinese soil without any fundamental change. Chin Yüeh-lin (1894—), an expert in logical analysis and much influenced by T. H. Green, has developed his own system of logic and a metaphysics based on it. The one who has assimilated the most of Western thought, established the most comprehensive and well coordinated system, and has exerted the greatest influence among the Western oriented Chinese philosophers, however, is indisputably Chang Tung-sun (1886-1962).1
Chang is a self-educated man. From editor of newspapers and magazines, he rose to be a professor and dean of several universities. He has never been to the West but has translated Plato’s Dialogues and Bergson’s Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution, among others, into Chinese, and has read more of Western philosophy than perhaps any of his Chinese colleagues. He has written thirteen books, in which he has developed a system which may be called revised Kantianism, epistemological pluralism, or panstructuralism.
Chiefly formulated between 1929 and 1947, Chang’s philosophy is derived from Kant but he rejects Kant’s bifurcation of reality into the manifold and unity and the division of the nature of knowledge into the given and the innate. To him knowledge is a synthetic product of sense data, form, and methodological assumption. Perception, conception, mind, and consciousness are all syntheses or “constructs,” and constructs are products of society and culture. He said that he has combined Western logic with modern psychology and sociology, but that his system is his own. He shows not only the influence of Kant and Hume, but also that of Dewey, Russell, and Lewis.
During World War II he shifted more and more from metaphysics to the sociology of knowledge and thus was drawn closer to Marxism. This is a far cry from his anti-Marxian stand in 1934 when he edited a symposium mostly critical of dialectical materialism. But his theory of concepts as products of culture made it easy, if not inevitable, for him to accept the Marxian philosophy.
The following selections are from his two most important philosophical works, the Jen-shih lun (Epistemology), Shanghai, 1934, and the Chih-shih yü wen-hua (Knowledge and Culture), Chungking and Shanghai, 1946.
SELECTIONS
In my theory, the knowing cannot be absorbed by the known, nor can the known be absorbed by the knowing. But my theory is different from epistemological dualism, for it only recognizes the opposition of subject and object, which seems to me to be too simple. Of course my theory is also a kind of epistemological criticism. . . . For example, critical realism is a tri-ism, for it holds that apart from mind or the knowing and matter or the known, there is also what is called “meaning as essence.” The critical philosophy of Kant still resorts to bifurcation, although not obviously, for he separates sense data and form, except that the latter can advance progressively. My epistemological pluralism may be said to follow Kant’s path generally. But there are important points of difference, and that is that I do not consider form as a subjective construction. Unlike Kant, I do not regard the external world as without order, or regard sense data as material for knowledge. I hold that sensation cannot give us orderly knowledge. Although I agree with Kant in this, I disagree with him in that I hold that order cannot be entirely the product of the synthesizing power of the mind. For this reason I hold that there is order in the external world and that there is also construction in the internal world. The construction in the internal world is further divided into two, namely, the a priori form of intuition and the a priori form of understanding. As to sensation, it is not really an existent. Therefore there are several aspects in my theory and I have therefore called it pluralism. (Jen-shih lun, pp. 45-46)
Comment. Aside from these technical differences from Kant, Chang also thinks that Kant’s theory of knowledge is within the limits of the Western type of knowledge and therefore has no universal validity. Since Chang’s approach is fundamentally sociological, it is inevitable that he looks upon Kant’s epistemology as having been conditioned by his time and culture.
As to the origin of knowledge, an epistemological pluralist thinks that it should not be generally discussed. Knowledge is a synthetic product of sense data, form, and assumption. There is no knowledge apart from sense data, form, or assumption. But as there are sense data, there must be an order behind them. . . . Therefore with respect to the nature of knowledge, we can hold the view that between two ends there is the middle section. At the one end is the knower, and at the other end the known.. . . At the end of the knower, there are external things which are absolutely unknowable but there is also an external world that is relatively knowable. At the end of the known there is the self which is absolutely unknowable but also an internal world which is relatively knowable. . . . Although epistemological pluralism adopts the theory of functionalism, nevertheless it does not hold that knowledge is produced only because of action. To regard knowledge as an instrument of action is an extreme of functionalism. Although knowledge cannot be separated from action or even restricted by it, nevertheless knowledge itself is not the product of action nor does it exist solely as an instrument of action. I hold that knowledge and action are intimately related but do not admit that action can absorb knowledge. . . .
In short, our universe has no substance of its own. It is only a construct. The process of construction is not entirely natural, and there must be the part of our knowing activity in it. For we cannot cast aside knowledge and see the true nature of this construct. Although in our k
nowledge this construct is not what it is originally, nevertheless it certainly does not deviate too much from its original nature. We can therefore say that the universe is a construct, (ibid., pp. 123-133)
Scholars have generally divided knowledge into two general types. One is called direct acquaintance and the other indirect comprehension.. . . Of course we also accept this general distinction and use the common terms of sense perception and conception, but we prefer to regard one as perceptual knowledge and the other as interpretative knowledge. For example, when I see a lump of black stuff moving, accompanied by some rumbling noise, I immediately know that it is a train. For us adults this recognition is instantaneous. Surely we do not “see” it and at the same time do not “know” what it is. For the sake of analysis, however, we assign what appears as a dark lump that moves to “acquaintance” and the recognition that it is a train to “discrimination.” Some hold that the former is the material for knowledge while the latter is the faculty of knowledge. Without material there is nothing for the faculty to work with and without the faculty material cannot function even if it was there. The former is sensation, whereas the latter is conception induced by sensation. Therefore this distinction between direct acquaintance and indirect discrimination is merely a kind of analysis. They are not two different independent parts. . . . Although (direct) acquaintance merely exists in (indirect)2 discrimination, nevertheless there is no necessary relation between them. . . . There can be different understandings of the same perception. It seems that this point has been overlooked by the sensationistic empiricists. They think that all kinds of knowledge can be reverted back to direct acquaintance, thus wiping out all explanations and discriminations. In this way it is very difficult to explain why there is error. We must realize that there is error only because perception and thought do not agree. If our knowledge always depends on direct acquaintance and is in accord with its face value, then the question of error cannot be answered. It is because of this that new realism has been criticized.. . . In short, direct acquaintance and discrimination cannot be separated. There is no direct acquaintance which is not involved in discrimination, and there is no discrimination which does not involve direct acquaintance. . . .
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