Analogously, the reason we may observe, say, hotness, in Anaxagoras’s view of our previous example, is that the object’s state of existence before the observation is a mix that includes a portion of hotness and a portion of coldness, but with the hotness portion being the highest.
But Anaxagoras is even bolder than the Copenhagen interpretation, a fact that brings me to their difference. He insists that the notion of the simultaneous existence of all qualities (opposite ones, too) is true all the time, even after an observation. Hence, in Anaxagoras’s view, the cat is still both dead and alive (or the electron still spins in both directions, or the object is both hot and cold) even after we observe the cat to be only alive (or the electron to spin only clockwise, or the object to be only hot). But in the Copenhagen view, after an observation the cat is only alive (or the electron spins only clockwise, or the object is only hot). Thus, although we observe only one quality, and so the cat appears only alive (or the electron is detected to spin only clockwise, or the object to be only hot), for Anaxagoras the other qualities never cease to exist; he insists on this because he does not want to violate the Parmenidean thesis that if a quality ceased to exist, it would mean that that part of Being became Not-Being. Now, can Anaxagoras be somehow right on this, too? Can the cat somehow be both dead and alive even after we observe it to be only alive?
Anaxagoras and the Many-Worlds Interpretation
Fascinatingly, yes! According to the second-most popular interpretation of quantum theory, the many-worlds view, even though we observe the cat to be alive (or the electron to spin clockwise), in another universe (world, reality) the cat is dead (or the electron spins counterclockwise)! That is, an outcome that is possible but does not occur in our universe still occurs in another universe. In general, every outcome that could have occurred in our present reality (universe) but did not branches off as an alternative reality (it gets realized) in a parallel (i.e., separate) universe; each parallel universe thus has its own unique reality that consists of events that could have happened in our universe but did not.5
Hence, the many-worlds view is in closer agreement than the Copenhagen view with both Anaxagoras’s theory as well as the Parmenidean thesis. For, Parmenidean Being (being everything that there is) can easily be interpreted to include every possible outcome of an observation. Then, in the view of many-worlds, it is not only before an observation that all possible outcomes (even the opposite ones) coexist in a mix and are part of Being (as is also required by the view of Anaxagoras), but all such outcomes, in a sense, continue to coexist and are thus still part of Being even after an observation (also as required by the view of Anaxagoras); for each possible outcome occurs in its own parallel universe even when such outcome is not observed to occur in our own universe. Whereas on the other hand, in the view of the Copenhagen approach, though before an observation all possible outcomes coexist in a mix and are part of Being (as also required by the view of Anaxagoras), after an observation only what is observed to occur continues to exist (to be part of Being), and what is not observed no longer exists, as if part of what once existed, part of Being, became Not-Being (a situation in clear violation of both the view of Anaxagoras and the thesis of Parmenides). With the Parmenidean thesis in mind, one might then say that the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory is more accurate than the Copenhagen.
Fractal Forerunner
Anaxagoras is the forerunner of the idea of fractals.6 His philosophy of “in everything there is a portion of everything” together with “an object is those things of which it has the most” implies that if we could zoom in on some particular object, say a golden object, at any length scale (at any magnification), we would always observe the same repeating pattern (structure). It would be so because all materials (milk, honey, gold, etc.) coexist simultaneously and in the same proportional manner throughout the golden object. For example, in a golden object the material gold is the same proportion more than all other materials at all length scales. In general, Anaxagoras’s theory of matter entails that any portion of an object (however small) looks the same with its bigger self—like the Matryoshka dolls. This universal self-similarity—of some particular pattern persisting at all length scales—is of course the defining characteristic of fractals.
An example of a fractal is a coastline. It has roughly the same shape, however large or small a coastline segment is. Fractals are ubiquitous, in art, pure mathematics (e.g., Koch snowflakes), biology (e.g., certain plant leaves, brain7), physics (e.g., critical phase transitions), and cosmology.8 For a fractal (or hierarchical) universe, galaxies are imagined to form clusters, which form superclusters, which in turn form super-superclusters, and so on, by preserving some initial cluster pattern (figures 11.1 and 11.2). A fractal universe is so far a cosmological hypothesis. But the fractal nature of a critical phase transition is a fact.
Figure 11.1 Triangular fractal universe in 2 dimensions.
Figure 11.2 Square fractal universe in 2 dimensions.
Consider as an example the phase transformation of water, from liquid to gas. The boiling temperature of 100 degrees Celsius occurs at the pressure of 1 atmosphere. The liquid phase coexists with the gaseous phase at these values, with each phase retaining its own unique properties (e.g., water is denser than steam). The boiling temperature rises as the pressure increases. But at the specific temperature of 374 degrees Celsius and the pressure of 218 atmospheres, something very special, critical, happens. Then, we no longer have two distinct phases coexisting, only a single fractal-like fluid phase—a supercritical fluid. The structure of this supercritical fluid phase fluctuates continuously more violently than ever before, with bubbles and droplets of all different magnitudes blended everywhere, forming, dissolving, and interchanging their natures (phases), and transforming the substance into a perfect fractal—with the same pattern of intermixed bubbles and droplets persisting at all magnifications, as is in Anaxagoras’s theory of matter! In a normal phase (solid, liquid, gas) the cooperativity between water molecules is short range; it extends only to nearest neighbors. It is as if you (a molecule) hold hands with two of your friends, who in turn hold hands only with their nearest neighbors/friends, and so on. By contrast, in a supercritical phase, cooperativity is long range; it extends throughout the substance and therefore is much stronger. It is as if everyone is friends, and everyone has as many hands as needed to hold everyone, in all combinations and regardless of each other’s distance. This long-range correlation is what preserves the fractal universality in critical phase transitions, even amid the wild fluctuations of the substance. The critical point of a phase transition is the “sweet spot [of perfect fractal universality that separates] boring order and useless chaos.”9
Anaxagoras’s “in everything is everything” has yet another interesting universal application.
The Perfect “In Everything Is Everything”
The ultimate example of “in everything there is a portion of everything” is the big bang singularity, the hypothesis that the primordial state of the universe was once, 13.8 billion years ago, a mere point. “In everything”—in the singularity, which itself was everything that existed, the whole universe—“there” was “a portion of everything,” matter, energy, space, time, and the laws (or ultimate law) they obey. And the reason the universe is diverse, with planets, stars, people, and plants is that, as Anaxagoras might have explained, there is only a portion of everything in everything and “each thing is most manifestly those things of which it has the most.”
Now, what remains enigmatic is this: (1) if indeed the notion of “in everything is everything” was true at the singularity, why would it not be true always? And (2) can plurality, all the beautiful and diverse nature of today, unfold from an absolute oneness, the singularity? Both are open questions.
On the first question, Anaxagoras would have answered “in everything is everything” always and everywhere. On the second question, all three pluralists, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Democritus, belie
ved that plurality must be absolute; that is, neither could plurality (the many) have come to be from an initial singularity (from what is initially one), nor a singularity (the one) from an initial plurality (from what is initially many). Nevertheless, whether nature is truly monistic or pluralistic is a question that has yet to be answered. The singularity hypothesis is problematic. Will our nous (mind) ever know the nature of nature? Amazingly, Anaxagoras preserves purity in an “impure” universe of “in everything is everything” by assuming that nous, found only in living things, is the only thing pure. However, what is the origin of our ability to reason? Why do humans have an intelligent nous, the most intelligent, in fact, of all the species that we know?
From Walking to Thinking
Anaxagoras believed that the cause of human superiority over animals is the hand. Although other primates walk upright occasionally, only humans walk upright habitually, and as a result only humans have freed two of their limbs permanently and have been using them as hands consistently. This unique trait of ours has been significant for both our biological and intellectual evolution because when Lucy, a species of the genus Australopithecus, about 3.2 million years ago “decided” to walk upright more habitually, it meant that two of her four legs were starting to evolve into hands, increasing her potential to use and make tools. Toolmaking stimulates thinking (silent and out loud, thus speech, too), which in turn refines toolmaking, which stimulates further thinking, in a continuous cycle, ultimately advancing both technology and the intellect, and making Lucy’s distant relative, the Homo sapiens (us), indeed sapiens intellectually superior to any other animal (at least on earth). And thus the origin of such superiority might truly be the hands. What actually ignited this development was a purely chance mutation in the spine that allowed our hominid ancestors to stand upright and evolve their forelegs into hands, become environmentally fitter, and get naturally selected further.
Upright posture (and consequently free hands), speech, and a complex brain (nous) are among the most unique traits of the human species and the source of our resourcefulness. The brain is the center of operations. Speech is controlled by the left side of the brain, but the coordination of the movements of our hands comes from the back part of the organ. Such coordination took literally millions of years of evolution to be mastered, during which the brain was driving the hands, which in turn were driving the brain, causing the enhancement of both organs, developing each to its present advanced stage of evolution compared to the hands and brains of other species. Without this type of evolution we would not have been able to make our first tools; stack up stones; build homes, the pyramids, the Parthenon, the Empire State Building; or create cell phones, computers, spaceships, MRIs, or the LASER, but also we would not have been able to pursue other more abstract endeavors, such as religion, philosophy, science, and the arts.
At the same time, however, I wonder if there is a limit to such brain-hands interactive enhancement. Even worse, I wonder, what the risks today are from the plentiful technology made by our hands as a result of the ingenious science conceived by our brains. Do we get to depend more and more on machines to think for us and on pills to save us, risking the weakening of both the mind and the body? If yes, our natural abilities might atrophy and our evolution might be stalled. We might even devolve, for habits have a say on whether we get to evolve. Namely, habits are transmittable culturally through teaching and can still change the environment in complex and subtle ways. And in turn, through the process of natural selection from biological evolution, the environment can influence a species by controlling the direction of its evolution.
The name of Galileo is often associated with the first major conflict between religion and science. He was tried by the Inquisition of the Roman Catholic Church for his support of the heliocentric model, which the Church then considered in contradiction of biblical accounts of an immobile earth in the center of the universe (i.e., the geocentric model). But it was really the science of Anaxagoras that caused such conflict first. He was charged with blasphemy by the Athenian democracy for thinking that “the sun is a fiery stone”10 and not a god. He was tried and found guilty. Although he was defended by his student Pericles, the famous statesman, still by one account he was exiled, by another he was sentenced to death. Anaxagoras was an original thinker. He is credited with explaining eclipses correctly and for introducing philosophy to the Athenians. When asked why he was born, he replied, “To theorize about the sun, moon, and heaven.”11 When told, “You are deprived of the Athenians,” he replied, “No, they are deprived of me.”12
Conclusion
Whether the nature of matter is infinitely cuttable (without smallest pieces) or finitely cuttable (with ultimate smallest pieces that make up everything) is still an open question. Anaxagoras held the former, but Leucippus and Democritus held the latter: namely, matter is atomic and thus made up of disconnected, indivisible pieces known as the atoms and surrounded by empty space. What revolutionized science was the atomic theory of matter, an idea that is two and a half millennia old.
* * *
1Simplicius, Physics 164.24–25, 156.13–157.4, 176.34–177.6. Or see Daniel W. Graham, The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 291 (text 31).
2Ibid., 164.23–24, trans. G. E. R. Lloyd, Early Greek Science: Thales to Aristotle (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1970), 44.
3Ibid., 27.2–23. See Gregory Vlastos, Studies in Greek Philosophy: Volume 1 The Presocratics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 319.
4Simplicius, Physics 176.29, 175.12–14. Or see Richard D. McKirahan, Philosophy before Socrates (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2010), 194 (Kindle ed.).
5We may think of the universe to be made of parallel universes.
6Petar V. Grujic, “The Concept of Fractal Cosmos: I. Anaxagoras’ Cosmology,” Serb. Astron. J. no 163 (2001): 21–34. Found at http://saj.matf.bg.ac.rs/163/pdf/021-034.pdf (accessed July 15, 2019).
7Sean Carroll, The Big Picture: On the Origins of Life, Meaning, and the Universe Itself (New York: Penguin, 2016), 323 (Kindle ed.).
8Yurij Baryshev and Pekka Teerikorpi, Discovery of Cosmic Fractals (River Edge, NJ: World Scientific, 2002).
9Carroll, The Big Picture, 323.
10Diogenes Laërtius 2.6–15, trans. Demetris Nicolaides. Or see Graham, Texts of Early Greek Philosophy, 275 (text 1).
11Ibid.
12Ibid.
12
Atoms of Matter and Energy
Introduction
Perhaps the greatest scientific achievement of antiquity, possibly of all time, was the realization of the atomic nature of matter. “There are but atoms and the void,”1 Democritus (ca. 460–ca. 370 bce) proposed. And he understood the great diversity of material objects as complex aggregations of uncuttable atoms, the building blocks of matter, moving in the void, the empty space between them. Leucippus, who flourished between 440 and 430 bce, invented the atomic theory, and Democritus, a true polymath and a prolific philosopher, developed it extensively. Uncuttable (the actual meaning of atom in Greek) are also the modern elementary particles of matter, the quarks and leptons, and although void is a controversial concept still, a kind of void is required to explain nature.
Atoms
Ancient Atoms
Atoms, in the ancient atomic theory, are the uncuttable smallest pieces of matter, disconnected from each other because they are surrounded by void, space devoid of matter that was required to enable the atoms to move. Atoms are invisible, impenetrable, solid (absolutely rigid), indestructible, eternal, unchangeable, unborn (not generated by something else more fundamental), and imperishable (they do not transform into something else more fundamental). Atoms are therefore like many Parmenidean Beings. Unlike the elements of Empedocles, which represented four different types of known materials, or those of Anaxagoras, which represented infinitely many types, all atoms are made from one and th
e same type of material (although not from any particular one of the everyday, such as water or air). Atoms have no internal structure (they are homogeneous) but differ from each other only as regards their size and shape. Their only behavior is motion. Roaming around in the void of an infinite space there exist infinitely many atoms of various shapes: angular, concave, convex, smooth, rough, round, sharp, and so on.
Their motion is perpetual (so, then, is change in accordance to the Heraclitean worldview). Motion continues by itself without requiring a force (or a causal agent in general). The fact that constant motion continues by itself was discovered via experimentation first by Galileo and was later restated by Newton through his first law of motion, also known as the law of inertia (“laziness”)—a body remains (because of its laziness) at rest or in uniform motion until affected by a force. Atomic motion is also thought random because space was correctly assumed to be isotropic (having no special location or direction; that is, space has no absolute up, down, right, left, in, out, center, or edge). Hence, when left to themselves (undisturbed), atoms had no reason to move more one way than another—all directions of motion were equally probable. Motion was not explained by Leucippus and Democritus; it was simply postulated to have always been, without a beginning. In fact, atoms and the void were also postulated. Not accounting for the cause of motion received Aristotle’s intense criticism,2 even though it is actually a normal scientific procedure. For we need to remember that postulating the truth of a certain beginning and proceeding from there to understand nature in a causal and rational way is the only way to do science. Science must begin from something (a postulate, an axiom, a primary cause); it cannot begin from nothing (Not-Being). For Democritus the atoms, the void, and motion were part of a primary cause, which by definition requires no cause of its own.
In Search of a Theory of Everything Page 17
