you, nor take from it; that you may keep the commandments of the LORD your
God which I command you." If one does not add or subtract from these
commandments, then they remain immutable. Copan may say that this is not
what Deuteronomy 4:2 means, but that would only be because of yet other faith-
based claims (e.g., the nature of a "New Covenant" in Jeremiah 31:31-40 is
being interpreted correctly by the author of Hebrews 8:8-13, etc.).
Notice also how Copan simply assumes that Jesus' reasons for certain Mosaic
laws are correct (e.g., Moses' law of divorce was given because of the obstinacy
of the Hebrews). This also is a faith-based claim because it assumes thatJesus is
correct about God's motives for that law. Throughout, Copan simply assumes
that the rules given by his god are true, while those of other gods are not. But
why couldn't we say that Shamash is the true god, and then judge biblical law
with how it accords with Shamash's law?
JUSTIFYING GENOCIDE
Copan's arbitrary privileging of his faith claims devolves into a morass of moral
relativism when he tries to justify the genocide of the Canaanites. First, the
genocide of the Canaanites flies in the face of Copan's touting of the concept of
humans being created in the image of god (Imago Dei) as a superior aspect of
biblical ethics. He remarks:
Even more fundamentally, human beings have been created in God's image
as corulers with God over creation (Gen. 1:26-27; Ps. 8)-unlike the ANE
mindset, in which the earthly king was the image-bearer of the gods. The
Imago Dei establishes the fundamental equality of human beings, despite
the ethnocentrism and practice of slavery within Israel.
Yet biblical narratives clearly show that the Imago Del matters very little in
ensuring human equality. There were many other events and reasons (e.g., birth
order, gender) that could generate inequality. Sometimes it could simply be that
Yahweh likes one person more than another, as in the case of Esau and Jacob. In
no instance does God state that they are both equal because they were both
created in his image (see Romans 9:13-16). After all, they are supposed to be
twins.
Nor is it true that the Bible does not view the king as being in a unique image-
bearing relation to Yahweh. In fact, there are passages that call only the human
king the son of Yahweh: "I have set my king on Zion, my holy hill. I will tell of
the decree of the LORD: He said to me, `You are my son, today I have begotten
you."'(Psalm 2:6-7). In John 8:44, Jesus says that Jews are not sons of God, but
rather of the devil: "You are of your father the devil, and your will is to do your
father's desires. He was a murderer from the beginning, and has nothing to do
with the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he lies, he speaks
according to his own nature, for he is a liar and the father of lies." In my book
The End of Biblical Studies I have explained how the effort to deny this anti
Judaism in the NT often relies on special pleading and arbitrary exegesis.19
Given the fact that Canaanite women and children are to be killed despite
being made in the image of God, Copan's main defense is a faith claim. He
remarks:
First, Israel would not have been justified to attack the Canaanites without
Yahweh's explicit command. Yahweh issued his command in light of a
morally sufficient reason-the incorrigible wickedness of Canaanite culture
... if God exists, does he have any prerogatives over human life? The New
Atheists seem to think that if God existed, he should have a status no higher
than any human being.
Of course, this assumes that Yahweh exists and has the authority to kill
women and children. Copan is accepting the faith claim of the biblical author.
By this logic, if Allah exists, does he have any prerogatives over human life?
Indeed, a jihadist Muslim could say that Allah has the authority to wipe out all
Americans because they are incorrigible and wicked. Of course, these jihadists
might also feel entitled to use their own definition of "wicked" and "incorrigible"
no less so than Copan.
As it is, Copan characterizes the Israelites as incorrigible ("Another dimension
of this harshness seems to be a response to the rebellious, covenant-breaking
propensity of the Israelites"). But this does not explain why Canaanite
incorrigibility should be punished with genocide, while Israelite incorrigibility
should be rewarded with mercy and patience. Consistent with my proposal that
the "moral heart" of the Bible is religious intolerance, Copan tells us: "We see
from this passage too that wiping out Canaanite religion was far more significant
than wiping out the Canaanites themselves." So if jidahist Muslims kill millions
of Americans in order to wipe out our supposedly corrupt religion, then I
suppose that would be morally acceptable by Copan's logic. It all depends on
whether you accept the faith claim that Allah is the true God. We must also
recall that all the supposed crimes and wickedness of the Canaanite are narrated
by their enemies, the biblical authors.
Over and over, we see Copan applying words such as "morally decadent" and
"wicked" to Canaanites because he is accepting the judgments of biblical
authors. In any case, Copan's procedure would be analogous to using only the
pronouncements of Osama bin Laden to judge American culture.20 In any event,
for Copan, "idolatry" allows Israelites the right to kill women and children as
long as the higher goal of wiping out idolatry is met. Of course, his view of
idolatry is what counts. It really amounts to this: "Genocide is okay when my
religion does it, but genocide is not okay if your religion does it."
But we could just as easily reverse this and say that, from the viewpoint of
some mono-Baal worshipper, the worship of Yahweh is idolatry. That should
give mono-Baalists the right to kill Yahweh worshippers if the higher goal is
wiping out Yahweh worship. Moreover, we know that, even according to biblical
materials, idolatry was not wiped out. Indeed, after all of the genocide carried
out by Joshua and his successors, we still find idolatry being lamented in
Jeremiah and other later prophets. Yahweh ends up killing women and children
in vain. Yahweh apparently lacks the foresight to see that genocide will not
work.
JUSTIFYING INFANTICIDE
To excuse the plain horror of infanticide, Copan offers this as comfort: "Death
would be a mercy, as they would be ushered into the presence of God and spared
the corrupting influences of a morally decadent culture." This rationale actually
follows a long apologetic tradition, such as this one evinced by the famed
fundamentalist apologist, Reuben A. Torrey: "The extermination of the
Canaanite children was not only an act of mercy and love to the world at large; it
was an act of love and mercy to the children themselves." 21
Copan does not seem to realize the theological implications of his own words.
First, if it is true that killing infants ushers them immediately into the presence of
God, and spares them corrupting influences, then this is
a fantastic argument for
abortion. Why allow any child to be born if we can send him or her straight to
heaven? After all, isn't the salvation of souls more important than any human
experience?
This is especially the case if we take literally the words of Jesus in Matthew
10:28: "And do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul; rather
fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell." If soul saving is the goal,
then abortion provides a 100 percent salvation rate. Yahweh could also
decriminalize killing infants today, since the goal of soul saving should be no
less worthy today than it was in the time of the Canaanites.
One can see that Copan seems not to value life as much as he claims.
Apparently, the value of practicing the right religion supersedes the value of life.
Copan wants to kill women and children to save them from corrupt and wicked
practices, but he does not see the killing of women and children as itself a
"corrupt" or "wicked" practice. Nor does Copan explain why infants have to be
killed for the sins of their parents. In fact, this contradicts God's own injunctions
in Deuteronomy 24:16: "The fathers shall not be put to death for the children,
nor shall the children be put to death for the fathers; every man shall be put to
death for his own sin."
Moreover, Copan assumes that his omnipotent god could find no other
alternative than to slaughter children to accomplish the purpose of preventing
their corruption. Yet Yahweh was believed to cause sterility in women (see
Genesis 20:17-18). So Yahweh could have sterilized Canaanite women
supernaturally, and the problem would be solved in a generation or two. No need
to kill children with this procedure.
A similar moral relativism and theological special pleading is at the heart of
Copan's defense of biblical polygamy. He tells us: "Let us consider polygamy as
an example: Why did God not ban polygamy outright in favor of monogamy?
Why allow a double standard for men who can take multiple wives while a
woman can only have one husband? For one thing, despite the practical
problems of polygamy, Wenham suggests it was permitted perhaps because
monogamy would have been difficult to enforce."
But if God allows polygamy because monogamy is difficult to enforce, then
why not do the same with idolatry, murder, and bestiality? The Bible itself tells
us that idolatry never did completely die out, so why does that not qualify
idolatry as a practice "difficult to enforce"? And by the same token, why should
we judge other ancient Near Eastern cultures for allowing practices that their
gods also might find "difficult to enforce"? If difficulty of enforcement is the
criterion, then why are ancient Near Eastern cultures judged as inferior? And
who decided that polygamy was a deviation from an ideal, original monogamy?
The idea that monogamy was original is a faith-based claim-that is, based on
accepting the word of the author of Genesis 2-3. After all, incest was also
original, as you could not have reproduced from the first pair without incest at
some level. So should we regard nonincestuous pairings as a deviation from the
original ideal?
JUSTIFYING CHILD SACRIFICE
Copan mentions child sacrifice twice in his article. The first time he cited
Richard Dawkins when he charged that Yahweh's commanding Abraham to
sacrifice his son Isaac was "child abuse." The second time it's mentioned in his
"Final Thoughts," where Copan wrote: "Genesis 1-2 undercuts ANE structures
approving of racism, slavery, patriarchy, primogeniture, concubinage,
prostitution, infant sacrifice, and the like." 22 [emphasis added].
But if Genesis 1-2 is intended as a cure for this horrible practice, it was not
very effective, for child sacrifice may have been perfectly acceptable to Yahweh,
something demonstrated in painstaking detail by Jon Levenson, the Albert A.
List Professor of Jewish Studies at Harvard Divinity School. In his brilliant
treatment, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, Levenson states,
"only at a particular stage rather late in the history of Israel was child sacrifice
branded as counter to the will of YHWH and thus ipso facto idolatrous."23 He
points to Ezekiel 20:25-26, as one example where Yahweh says: "Moreover I
gave them statutes that were not good and ordinances by which they could not
have life; and I defiled them through their very gifts in making them offer by fire
all their firstborn, that I might horrify them; I did it that they might know that I
am the LORD."
But of which statutes is Yahweh speaking when referring the sacrifice of a
firstborn son? That statute may be the one in Exodus 22:29-30: "You shall not
delay to offer from the fullness of your harvest and from the outflow of your
presses. The firstborn of your sons you shall give to me. You shall do likewise
with your oxen and with your sheep: seven days it shall be with its dam; on the
eighth day you shall give it to me." As Levenson observes, many Christian and
Jewish scholars have tried to mitigate or eliminate the obvious meaning of these
passages. But even Moshe Greenberg, author of a major commentary of Ezekiel,
and who otherwise minimizes the idea that normative Yahwism engaged in child
sacrifice, admits: "The polemic against child sacrifice (to YHWH) in
Deuteronomy 12:29ff.; Jeremiah 7:31, 19:5, 32:35 indicates that at least from the
time of the last kings of Judah it was popularly believed that YHWH accepted,
perhaps even commanded, it."24
For Levenson, it was late texts that sought to substitute animals for actual
human firstborn sons. Genesis 22, which shows Yahweh substituting a ram for
Isaac, is part of a late biblical tradition. Indeed, in Genesis 22, Abraham seems to
presume that child sacrifice is not an impossible request, and it is the substitution
of the ram that is unexpected. For most of biblical history, Yahweh was not
against child sacrifice per se, but rather against child sacrifice to other gods.25
Even the prophet Micah ponders whether he should sacrifice his oldest son "as a
sin offering" to Yahweh, although he rejects doing so in the end (6:6-8).
And, of course, Copan forgets that sacrifice of a son is the foundation of
Christianity. After all, Jesus Christ is viewed as the only-begotten son of God,
who must be sacrificed to redeem the world because of "love" (John 3:16).
Christ's sacrifice is premised on the sort of blood-magic inherited from the
ancient Near East. This blood-magic is evident in Hebrews 9:22: "Indeed, under
the law almost everything is purified with blood, and without the shedding of
blood there is no forgiveness of sin." Christian apologists might claim that their
god has the authority to order sacrifice, but this claim is no more verifiable than
that of any other religion that practices human sacrifice.
MISCELLANEOUS ERRORS AND DISTORTIONS
Copan's essay literally contains dozens upon dozens of factual errors and half-
truths that would take a book to correct. But here are brief responses to ten
claims from Copan that have not been discussed above.
1. Copan claims: "These narratives also inform us tha
t Israel's kings, no matter
how powerful, are not above God's law: Nathan confronts David about his
murder and adultery (2 Sam. 12)."
Actually, the narrative about David shows how much David is above the law.
David committed at least two sins that demanded the death penalty. He
committed adultery, and he committed murder (see 2 Samuel 12:9). A normal
human being would be executed for adultery or murder (see Leviticus 20:10 and
24:17). God himself promised not to acquit a murderer in Exodus 2 3:7. But
instead of David being put to death, it is David's son whom God kills (2 Samuel
12:14) in violation of his own law in Deuteronomy 24:16. Yahweh is the biggest
moral relativist of all, especially since he seems to break his own moral
promises.
2. Copan claims: "Furthermore, in Babylonian or Hittite law, status or social
rank determined the kind of sanctions for a particular crime whereas biblical law
holds kings and priests and those of social rank to the same standards as the
common person, The informed inhabitant of the ANE would have thought,
`Quick, get me to Israel!"'
Copan ignores the numerous instances in which Israelite kings were treated
differently from the common person. As I said before, a common person might
be executed for committing adultery and murder, but David was not. Also, slaves
did not have the same rights as their masters.
The idea that informed inhabitants of the ancient Near East were clamoring to
get to Israel is contradicted by the story of Nabal, who alludes to David, when he
exclaims "There are many servants nowadays who are breaking away from their
masters" (1 Samuel 25:10). In fact, David flees to Philistine territory, where the
Philistine king, Achish, gives him a whole town (1 Samuel 27:5-6).
3. Copan claims: "Even later on when the Jews returned from Babylon,
Nehemiah was properly appalled by Jews opening themselves up to idolatry by
marrying foreign wives (for example, Nehemiah. 13, esp. v. 25)."
Copan contradicts himself here because he also told us the following:
"Because of Yahweh's covenant with Israel, laws intending to preserve both the
family unit and Yahweh's unique covenant/ marriage relationship to Israel were
paramount." Yet the stories in Nehemiah and Ezra demonstrate that preserving
the family unit WAS NOT PARAMOUNT. Ezra, in fact, orders the break-up of
families. Thus, Ezra 10:10-11 states: "And Ezra the priest stood up and said to
them, `You have trespassed and married foreign women, and so increased the
guilt of Israel. Now then make confession to the LORD the God of your fathers,
and do his will; separate yourselves from the peoples of the land and from the
foreign wives."'
Again, for Copan, religious intolerance is more important than family values.
Ethnic values superseded family values. Rarely does one see families ordered to
break up because people had different religions in the ancient Near East. Ezra
and Nehemiah should count as a step backward for families.
Copan also claims "there are several disparities between ANE cuneiform laws
versus biblical laws," which forms the basis of some more factual errors and
half-truths listed below, numbered 4-8.
4. Copan claimed that cuneiform laws were made by kings (not gods) whereas
biblical laws came from God as mediated through Moses.
This is patently false. Laws can also be attributed to a god in the ancient Near
East, as in this Hittite text: "You (Sungod) establish the lands' customs and
law."26 Conversely, we can also find instances in the Bible where laws are made
by human leaders:
Then all the wicked and base fellows among the men who had gone with
David said, "Because they did not go with us, we will not give them any of
Why Faith Fails The Christian Delusion Page 29
