by Propaganda
that central control which we associate with modern propaganda,” with propaganda
functions carried out by different agencies: “At the centre the Committee of Public
Safety, the Commission of Public Instruction (an executive body), the Committee of
Public Instruction (a legislative organ), the Jacobin Club, and the Paris Commune all
shared in initiating and directing propaganda, producing such confusion that some
historians have habitually ascribed certain activities to the wrong agencies.”42
Ellul notes another technique used by the revolutionaries to promote cohe-
sion, that of naming official enemies of the people. Three things are effected by this
technique: crystallization of public opinion; removal of a feeling of inferiority and
injustice (revenge being a catharsis); and the possibility of compensating for certain
difficulties, such as shortcomings in the state leadership. Hitler was later to exploit
this technique against the Jews and Lenin against the Kulaks. Some care is needed
in the selection of enemies, Ellul observes. They should be near enough at hand and
relatively known, not too powerful, and sufficiently different from the people but not
entirely so. It helps if the chosen enemy is already suspect and little loved in the eyes
of popular opinion. The choice of clergy, immigrants, Chouans (western insurgents),
and Babouvists (followers of Babeuf, an egalitarian communist) as official enemies
satisfied these requirements. In the French Revolution, El ul’s categories of integration
propaganda, sociological propaganda, and horizontal propaganda had widespread
application to an extent not seen before. In Leith’s analysis, propaganda fitting El ul’s
other categories—agitation propaganda, political propaganda, and vertical propa-
ganda—also advanced under the Jacobin terror.
napoleon
Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) understood with a kind of genius the nature and
importance of public opinion and the means by which it might be shaped in order to
50 PROPAGANDA AND THE ETHICS OF PERSUASION
BV-Propaganda-Interior-04.indd 50
9/5/13 4:52 PM
gain control over the masses. His absolute dominance over France and most of Europe was testimony to his ability to lead people. When he tells us how it is done, we listen,
not because his totalitarian form of rule is attractive, but because knowledge of his tech-
niques helps in defending against them, and some of them might be applied for more
benign purposes and policies than those he pursued.
Two aphorisms stand out regarding Napoleon’s overal philosophy: “Government
is nothing unless supported by opinion” and “The truth is not half so important as what
people think to be true.”43 Like Aristotle and Plato, he understood the necessity of know-
ing one’s audience and of shaping minds from a young age. Because, like St. Ignatius
of Loyola, he knew the importance of reaching young people who “can hardly avoid
accepting whatever version of the facts is presented to them,” he exercised control over
the school system. Students had to read Caesar’s Commentaries, Pierre Corneille, and
other texts supporting established order. They had to pledge allegiance to Napoleon,
much as young Americans of my generation had to pledge allegiance to the flag. Certain
army bulletins were regularly read in schools as well. He made use of the established
religion. A catechism read: “What are the duties of Christians with respect to the princes
who govern them, and what are in particular our duties to Napoleon I our Emperor?”
The requisite answer was “... love, respect, obedience, fidelity, military service, tributes
ordered for the preservation and defence of the Empire and of his throne ... To honour
and serve our Emperor is therefore to honour and serve God himself ” (141).
Censorship was an important part of his method for control ing opinion. “I shal
never allow the papers to say or do anything contrary to my interests,” he said, and his
actions bore out this claim. By decree he reduced the number of newspapers in Paris
from 73 to 13; by 1811, there were only four remaining (44). Eliminating a newspaper
was simple: the police instructed the post office to stop any copies in their system
and directly blocked other forms of distribution in Paris. His official publication, the
Moniteur, was distributed in schools as well as army camps. To downplay his own totalitarianism, he had the press report on censorship occurring in other nations while ensur-
ing that newspapers were full of praise for him (52).
Napoleon also manipulated people by his control over awards, decorations, pen-
sions, the arts, and so forth. “You lead people with toys and trinkets—decorations and
the like,” he said. Authors received prizes from him, and actors got pensions. After a
decree of 1806, no theatre could be established without his authorization, the num-
ber of theatres was reduced from 33 to eight, and the remaining were regulated. Plays
would be censored if they were felt to affect opinion adversely. During the Russian
campaign, for example, “all plays with passages favourable to Russia or its rulers were
suspended” (147, 150).
The willingness of people to abide such totalitarian control was no doubt assisted
by the benefits of his rule. Public works such as the Arc de Triomphe provided employ-
ment. He established the lycées—superior schools for students of high school age and
slightly older—and supported the sciences and government administration with elite
CHAPTER 2: HISToRy oF PRoPAgAnDA
51
BV-Propaganda-Interior-04.indd 51
9/5/13 4:52 PM
post-secondary institutions. His military conquests brought prestige to France. He provided for old soldiers and widows and orphans of military men. Conspicuous pardons gave him a more humane image. He encouraged free vaccination of all citizens
(34).
Like Hitler years later, Napoleon promoted the identification of his own will with
that of the country he led. On May 31, 1815, he said: “Frenchmen, my will is that of the
people; my rights are its own; my honour, my glory, my happiness can be none other
than the honour, glory, and happiness of France” (173). Joey Smallwood, premier of
Newfoundland, although not in the same league, of course, also made use of the same
technique.44
Napoleon knew something about the principle of orchestration. Those who study
propaganda are aware that seemingly insignificant items can have cumulatively a pow-
erful effect on people’s thinking. Napoleon wrote that “Every day [propaganda] pieces
of every type, of every style, tending to the same goal but addressing themselves to
sundry sentiments and mind, must be published. It is thus that a whole nation is suc-
cessfully put into a kind of intoxication” (180). True to his principle that what people
believe true is more important than what is actually true, he exaggerated the strength
of his forces by two or three times, and he greatly underestimated his military losses
(189).
Finally, it is worth noting the technique Napoleon used of circulating rumours.
There were three purposes for these, Holtman tells us: they could bolster public
morale, as with rumours of peace; they could support military tactics; and they could
give an ind
ication as to whether public opinion was favourable to an idea or not
(112–13).
It is not difficult to see that Napoleon introduced and developed propaganda on
a grand scale. In turn, it is not surprising that Carl von Clausewitz, military leader of
one of his conquered nations, should have absorbed some of these ideas and taught
them to new recruits, ideas that were later to be used—ironically—against France
herself.
Carl von Clausewitz
Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), director of the Berlin Military Academy, is
renowned for having apparently stated, “War is a mere continuation of politics by
other means.” People often react with horror to this statement because it implies a
callousness about the brutality of war. In fact, von Clausewitz wished to ensure that
war had a rational purpose and that waging it—and experiencing its horrors—was
necessary only to achieve some important objective. In contrast to what he is reported
to have said, his actual words were, “War is not merely a political act, but also a real
political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same
by other means.”45
52 PROPAGANDA AND THE ETHICS OF PERSUASION
BV-Propaganda-Interior-04.indd 52
9/5/13 4:52 PM
Von Clausewitz knew all too well that war creates passions, which can fuel combat beyond the point where anyone’s interests are served. He felt that propaganda was
a vital instrument in war because it helped bring out the best in one’s own troops and
demoralized the enemy. Like Henry V at Harfleur, he looked favourably on the cheap
victory. If war is glorified, it tends to eclipse the policies it is meant to serve. By stressing the subordination of the military to the political, von Clausewitz was promoting
a humanitarian end, in relative terms.
His approach to war was coldly analytical: “War ... is an act of violence intended
to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.”46 The stronger the enemy’s feelings, the
costlier the war is likely to be. Conversely, he believed, if one’s own people don’t feel
strongly about the cause, success will be less likely. Sometimes feelings among one’s
own masses need stimulation because “usually no innate hostile feeling” exists between
individuals. However, once combat starts, it kindles a hostile feeling of itself. There is
a natural desire to retaliate against those bent on harming us, even though they may
only be following orders and have no personal animosity towards us. That people do
not aim their retaliation more selectively, giving priority to those giving the orders as
distinct from the followers in the field, is just a fact of human nature. The legacy of
hatred and ill-feeling that follows war, prolonging it unnecessarily, should be antici-
pated at the start and factored into the overall calculations. Otherwise, the war may
turn out to be more costly than anticipated and not justifiable.
Von Clausewitz also took note of the value that neutral nations may have for the
success of a war. It is important to present one’s case to neutrals in such a way as to
gain their sympathy since they could affect the course of war by supporting in various
ways one’s own side or the other’s. Therefore, he emphasized the value of propaganda
for accomplishing a nation’s objectives on three fronts: to one’s enemy, to one’s own
side, and to neutral nations.
LATER nInETEEnTH-CEnTURy DEVELoPMEnTS
Statistics
Given the widespread use of misleading statistics today, it is worth taking note of
a particularly controversial census, the US sixth census of 1840. It recorded 17,456
“insane and idiots,” with relatively similar proportions in the North and the South
for the white population but with a proportion 11 times higher for freed blacks than
for those under slavery in the South. This led to the pro-slavery argument that slavery
was far better for a black person than freedom, and the census was frequently cited
for that purpose.
However, a contemporary physician, Dr. Edward Jarvis, a founder of the American
Statistical Association in 1839 and a specialist in mental disorder, found minor
CHAPTER 2: HISToRy oF PRoPAgAnDA
53
BV-Propaganda-Interior-04.indd 53
9/5/13 4:52 PM
discrepancies between the national statistics and those of the Overseers of the Poor in Massachusetts, the former reporting far fewer “insane and idiotic paupers” than the latter. More importantly, he found internal inconsistencies in the census, such as reports
for many towns in the North where no black residents were listed but nevertheless where
several black insane were said to exist. He concluded that “no reliance can be placed
on what purport to be facts, respecting the prevalence of insanity among free Negroes
[sic], set forth in that fal acious and self-condemning document, the Sixth Census of the
United States.”47
Co-opting the Press
During the Civil War, US Secretary of War Edwin Stanton followed Napoleon’s
example by manipulating casualty figures, issuing daily bulletins, suspending news-
papers, arresting editors, and enforcing censorship in other ways. By the 1860s, the
mass-circulation press was well-established, and the military exercised various means for
co-opting correspondents, who were often denied adequate expenses by their editors.
Edmund Stedman, of the New York World, defended his acceptance of $50 from an
artillery officer on the ground of need. “Of course he expects me to keep a lookout for
his guns hereafter, and I believe I can do so with a clear conscience,” he wrote to his
wife. With hot competition between newspapers, reporters sought out any superior
vantage point from which to observe the war. Tom Cook of the New York Herald wrote
to his editor to suggest a deal with the Navy, whereby he would get a boat from them in
return for a promise of more favourable coverage in the Herald’s pages.48
Confederate propaganda was carried out by Henry Hotze who furnished, accord-
ing to his own account, news items and editorials to various London papers. He not
only had seven paid writers on his payroll but distributed boxes of cigars from Havana,
whiskey, and other articles as inducements to the British press to report favourably on
the Southern cause. On May 1, 1862, he began publishing a weekly periodical called
The Index, which, by appearing to be British, concealed its propaganda purpose.49
The novel aspect of Hotze’s technique was revealed in his private communications
in which he declared that the paper itself was not the primary vehicle of propaganda.
Since those who worked on the Index as assistant editors were also contributors to
major London newspapers, there was naturally a spillover effect. As Burton Hendrick
writes: “The information and opinions they had absorbed as Index workers inevitably
formed the groundwork of their contributions to leading London organs of opinion.
Thus they received double payment. Hotze paid them as salaried workers on his staff;
the London papers paid them for the same articles when warmed over for their edito-
rial columns. This wider field was the important one....”50 Hotze’s method of tangential
influence is worth remembering in the more recent context of payments by corpo-<
br />
rations to distinguished writers, seemingly with no direct interest in the content of
the subsidized articles. In 1976, E.B. White, the children’s book writer, essayist, and
54 PROPAGANDA AND THE ETHICS OF PERSUASION
BV-Propaganda-Interior-04.indd 54
9/5/13 4:52 PM
grammaticist, passionately denounced such practices, saying that “Buying and selling space in news columns could become a serious disease of the press.”51
The mass-circulation press had grown so much in power and influence by the end
of the nineteenth century that William Randolph Hearst was reported to have said
to an artist correspondent in Cuba, who had complained about there being no war to
depict, “You send pictures, I will furnish war.” He proceeded to do just that, whipping
up US hysteria against the Spanish, which led to the Spanish American War.52
With the Boer War came some of the earliest uses of newsreel cinema for war pro-
paganda. The Boers were depicted as immoral; for instance, one scene showed them
firing on a Red Cross tent while a brave British medical team tried to treat a wounded
soldier. According to Phillip Knightley, “[t]he film was a fake shot with actors on
Hampstead Heath, a suburb of London.” Unable to combat the Boers effectively on
their own guerilla warfare terms, the British resorted to producing the first concentra-
tion camps, along with suppression of news concerning them. Crowded tents, disease,
foul drinking water, heat, and suchlike brought a soaring death rate among the intern-
ees, largely composed of the wives and children of Boer warriors. About one-third of
the interned adults and half the children died.53
Another aspect of propaganda during the Boer War was the harnessing of racial
mythology to support the war effort. According to Knightley “the government did
everything it could to mobilize public opinion for queen and country. This involved
encouraging the racialism and jingoism, in their most virulent forms, and creating ani-
mosity against the enemy with the tireless ploy of the atrocity story.” The Times carried phrases such as “the common man of Empire,” “the fundamental grit of the breed,” and
“the unanalysable qualities that have made the Empire.”54 Such propaganda involved
