by Propaganda
stood the principles of propaganda and had insight into the moods of audiences, per-
haps through his academic study of the theatre.93 Starting out with very little money,
the Nazi Party attracted attention through violent confrontations. Blood-red post-
ers announced forthcoming meetings, with striking lettering and provocative titles.
On May 5, 1927, a few months after their office had been set up in the city, the police
banned the Nazis from Greater Berlin, and later Goebbels was banned from speaking in
the whole of Prussia. A poster was produced, showing a gagged Goebbels, proclaiming
that he alone among millions of Germans was not allowed to speak. He went to places
where members of the Reichstag would be speaking, since no meeting where they were
present could be banned. He was charged and fined, but such incidents were publicized
to gain sympathy for the party. Goebbels launched a newspaper, Der Angriff (“Attack”) on July 4, 1927, and with it he relentlessly ridiculed Bernhard Weiss, the Jewish Deputy
Chief of Police in Berlin, until he came to be seen as a joke. Police court hearings were
welcomed by Goebbels, who used them as media events where he could show off his
sarcastic wit. The ban was called off shortly before the Reichstag election in May 1928;
12 Nazi Party members were elected, Goebbels among them.
Despite their cal s for free speech, the Nazis showed no such spirit of toleration
for messages of which they did not approve. To discourage people from seeing the
movie All Quiet on the Western Front, SA troops ( Sturm-Abteilungen, Storm Troopers, founded in 1921) bought tickets to screenings at which they let off stink bombs and
released white mice. Eventually the government banned the showing of that movie as
likely to cause more rioting. When Goebbels was arraigned following the smashing
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of windows of Jewish-owned shops in 1930, he refused to testify, simply haranguing the court. He was fined only 200 marks, an indication, perhaps, of the fear that his
paramilitary force was beginning to instill.
Goebbels appears to have worshipped Hitler, and he worked at deifying him
for the general public, spreading legends about him living an Olympian existence in
Berchtesgaden, being a crack shot, etc. Leni Riefenstahl’s film, Triumph of the Will, assisted this aim: it shows Hitler descending from the clouds in an aircraft for the start
of the 1934 Nuremberg rally. The film also shows how the appearance of immortality
in the new Germany was given to deceased Nazi Party faithful. Beginning in 1932,
many funerals of SA or SS ( Schutzstaffel, “Protection Squad”) men were exploited
to serve as inspiration to others. Tens of thousands of people showed up for these
events, and aircraft displaying swastika flags circled overhead in a display of strength.
In one instance, Goebbels created a hero: Horst Wessel was the author of a political
verse, published in Der Angriff, that went well with a tune popular among Communist
youth. When he died in 1930, his lyrics and the tune became the “Horst Wessel Lied
[song],” which the Nazi Party adopted as its anthem to be sung at all ral ies.
Goebbels cleverly exploited the new media of communication. He entertained
large crowds with recorded discs of Chancellor Brüning’s speeches, which he switched
on and off, interspersing witty responses and “scoring emphatically on all his points,
which he had prepared carefully in advance.”94 The technique bears some theatri-
cal resemblance to the “empty chair” routine used by actor Clint Eastwood at the
August 2012 Republican National Convention, where he posed awkward questions
to an imaginary seated Democratic President Barack Obama as a way of supporting
presidential candidate Mitt Romney. Another technique successfully used at election
time by the Nazis was to concentrate forces in small winnable areas such as Lippe-
Detmold, with a population of only 150,000, thereby making gains and creating an
image of momentum.
Totalitarian Power
In 1933, the Nazi Party securely grasped the reins of power, riding a wave of indig-
nation following the February Reichstag fire—possibly, if not probably, engineered
by Goebbels himself, although accounts are divided.95 Of one thing we can be sure:
Goebbels would certainly have been aware of the huge propaganda coup to be made
with this event and was, in fact, delighted when it happened. Victor Klemperer, an
astute observer of goings-on in Germany at the time, observed: “I cannot imagine
that anyone really believes in Communist perpetrators instead of paid [Nazi] work.”96
News accounts of activities before the event show a pattern of Nazi power-plays,
especially following the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor of Germany on January
30, 1933 with the help of former Chancellor Franz von Papen. After a meeting with
President von Hindenburg, Hitler issued a proclamation that the coalition cabinet
he was to lead was not “truly representative of Hitlerism,”97since it limited his power.
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On February 6, Hindenburg issued a decree restricting freedom of the press, to great applause from the Nazis. Newspapers or periodicals were to be suppressed for, among
other more immediate threats to the state, “holding up to contempt the organs or
institutions or leading officials of the government.” Simultaneously, Hitler broad-
cast a campaign speech over radio, which he, as Chancellor, now controlled; it was
recorded on a phonograph record so that no one could miss it.98 A few days later, he
gave another speech in the Sportpalast (Sports Palace) announcing that there were
only one of two possible outcomes of the election: “the German nation or Marxism.”
The presentation of two exclusive alternatives, with the phraseology favouring one of
them, is a powerful propaganda device. It helps to polarize opinion, and, when that
happens, the shrill cries of the opposing forces drown out any voices of moderation.
US President George W. Bush used the same device when he stated to nations of
the world, in his “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People”
on September 20, 2001, “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.” (A
nation might be against terrorism but not necessarily supportive of the means chosen
by the United States, including suspension of certain vital civil liberties, to combat
terrorism.)
The Reichstag elections took place on March 5, 1933. The Nazis took 43.9 per cent
of the votes, other nationalists combining with them to make a bare majority. Goebbels
became Minister for Propaganda and Public Enlightenment just over a week later.
Now that they were firmly in control, the Nazis extended and consolidated power
on a breathtaking scale. Recognizing the radio as a powerful means of propaganda, they
fostered the manufacture of inexpensive sets, and by 1938 nearly 10 million were in use.
In October 1933, a Journalists’ Law required all journalists to get a licence issued from
Goebbels’s office. A journalist had to show “qualifications which fit him for the task of
spiritual influence in the sphere o
f publicity.”99This approval, of course, was determined
by party members. Jews were barred from any form of journalism, with rare exceptions.
Newspapers purchased by the party reached a circulation eventually of eight million
combined. A prestigious paper such as the Frankfurter Zeitung tended to be left alone to indicate to the wider world that there was still freedom of expression in Germany. In
February 1934, a Censorship Committee was formed to judge every film produced in
the country. Finally, the Reich Chamber of Culture, on September 22, 1933, took charge
of all cultural activities. To engage in a cultural occupation without being a member of
the Chamber meant making oneself liable to a fine of 100,000 marks.
Censorship was virtually complete. When the Vossische Zeitung printed the head-
ing, “The Stock Exchange Is Weak,” Goebbels’s ministry replied, “The Stock Exchange
is not weak” and suspended publication of the offending newspaper for three weeks.
Another paper, the Grüne Post, printed a satirical note about Goebbels and was banned. Goebbels sought and obtained the ability to orchestrate what appeared in
the press. In March 1933, he issued a decree announcing that all shares of the RRG,
the German Broadcasting Company, had been acquired by the Propaganda Ministry,
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and Eugen Hadamowsky was put in charge. Hadamowsky announced that “All major
officials with anti-National Socialist credentials have been dismissed, though only
one has behaved like a gentleman and hanged himself.”100Programming began with a
purely propagandist diet of march music, the “Horst Wessel Lied,” Wagner, etc., until
listeners got tired, after which Goebbels sought a greater proportion of entertainment
value to keep them tuned in.
Writers, publishers, booksellers, and anyone involved in any way in the literary
profession had to belong to the Reich Chamber of Literature, the president of which
was Hanns Johst, a playwright. One of his characters says, “When I hear the word ‘cul-
ture,’ I feel for the safety catch on my revolver.”101 Versions of this sentiment have been
attributed to Goering and other Nazis, usually simplified to “when I hear the word
‘culture,’ I reach for my revolver.” A decree of April 25, 1935 empowered the Chamber
of Literature to draw up a blacklist of all books and authors detrimental to govern-
ment policy.102On August 1, 1934, the president of the Chamber of Fine Arts was given
the power to prosecute people for neglecting to “give priority to [their] professional
responsibility to the nation and the Reich.” Art exhibitions were subject to supervi-
sion. Theatre was also given close attention as a means of propaganda. Goebbels paid
special attention to film, insisting that it be good entertainment and that it not “degen-
erate into a medium of intellectual and pseudo-intellectual experiments.”103Plots were
to be simple and to repeat themes of anti-Semitism, US decadence, and the German
Folkish attachment to home and hearth, woods and meadows. Attention also was paid
to architecture as propaganda, and buildings were required to be grandiose and impres-
sive—tall columns in long rows and huge arenas. Schools were not neglected, and texts
showed pictures of Hitler Youth with their future military vocations (air, sea, land).
German War Propaganda
In the so-called phoney war, which lasted from September 1939 to the Blitzkrieg in May
1940, the Goebbels propaganda machine cleverly exploited the boredom and disruption
of family life affecting new conscripts in the French Army. Messages of peace were broad-
cast, undermining any desire of the French to fight and capitalizing on memories of the
loss of life and the horrors of World War I. Goebbels managed to persuade an excellent
native French speaker to broadcast to France. Known to the French as “Ferdonnet, le
traître de Stuttgart,” the speaker popularized such slogans as “On ne mourra pas pour Danzig” (Danzig is not worth dying for) and “England will fight Germany down to
the last Frenchman” to exploit French distrust of its ally. In fact, while the real Paul
Ferdonnet wrote the scripts, another person with a better voice actually read them.104
After the war began, Ferdonnet broadcast that British soldiers were giving tips to people
to tell them which women had husbands at the front so they could make out with such
women.105Posters showed British soldiers barring the French from escaping Dunkirk.
Nazi propaganda directed to the rest of the world, particularly to the United
States, has been scrutinized by Edmond L. Taylor in The Strategy of Terror. Taking
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his information from French intelligence, he remarked that the real aim of Nazi propaganda was not to convert outsiders to their cause but to “demoralize the enemy, to
destroy the cohesion, discipline and collective morale of hostile social groups.” The
aim was to sow seeds of doubt, undermining confidence in authority. “I had just dis-
covered for myself, in Czechoslovakia and in Austria just before the Anschluss, the
Nazi trick of defying and ridiculing authority, to destroy its prestige.” Fomenting anti-
Semitism abroad was done for a similar reason, Taylor suggests: not because it was
likely to be adopted but because it would “get the Gentiles fighting among themselves
over the Jewish question.”106
In that context, the propaganda of William Joyce (“Lord Haw-Haw”) in his radio
broadcasts to Britain may have been more successful than has been acknowledged.
Born in New York of an Irish, naturalized American father, he studied in Britain and
became a follower of Sir Oswald Mosley and his Fascist organization. Moving to
Berlin, he was an obvious choice for radio propaganda to Britain. Joyce lampooned
the British upper class with humorous stories about tax-evaders and profiteers and
warned about air raids before they happened, thus demonstrating his insider knowl-
edge to make listeners trust him.107
Taylor observed that utilization of the foreign press was a major art of govern-
ment propaganda of the time and that foreign correspondents were the principal car-
riers of it. Nazi propaganda disguised itself by appearing in the newspapers of neutral
countries such as Sweden. Newspapers such as the Stockholm Tidningen and the after-
noon newspaper, the Aftonbladet, were often quoted by the US press. Both newspapers
were owned by Thorsten Krueger, a fanatic Nazi. An example of propaganda carried
out this way was an Aftonbladet story picked up by the New York Times and United Press correspondents in Stockholm. It reported that a British expeditionary force had
landed in Archangel. As noted by Sidney Freifeld, a news analyst for the Canadian
government in New York during World War II and later a Canadian ambassador,
this might seem at first sight to be contrary to Axis interests, but millions of people
in Britain, Canada, the United States, and other countries had been eagerly waiting
for the landing of Allied troops on the continent in order to divert Nazi pressure
from the Eastern front.108 The effect of this story was to raise false hopes, which were
subsequently dashed, and to encourage pessimism about British initiative. The British
denied the story. The Canadian Department of National Defence unwisely stated that
there “has been no confirmation that any Canadians are included in the expedition to
Archangel.” Upon this, the United Press issued the report: “Tacit acknowledgement
that Britain might have sent an expeditionary force to Archangel was given today by a
military spokesman here, but official defense sources discouraged any conclusion that
Canadians might have formed a part of the force.” This United Press report shows
two things: first, how wishes influence interpretations; and secondly, how one can
unintentionally launder a false news item. The press should have shown itself far more
sceptical about reports coming from Nazi newspapers.
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Goebbels’s propaganda also produced stories linking Jews with lice, and these stories actually were carried by the wire services. Freifeld noted that Louis Lochner, chief
for many years of the Associated Press bureau in Berlin, reported information derived
from a map he saw in a military office where he was conducting an interview. The map
indicated where Germany might invade Britain, but the newspaperman did not make
the reasonable assumption that this was a setup to deceive his readers into thinking such
an invasion was being planned. The US media could have—and should have—shown
more of the same kind of scepticism used to reject commercial press agentry at home.
Against Goebbels their guard all too often dropped.109
Two other sources throw light on Nazi war propaganda tactics. First are the
official British fortnightly summaries of German propaganda. For example, during
the Blitzkrieg in early May 1940, the theme of military operations was most promi-
nent. This was followed by British weakness, German strength, and finally British
brutality. As an analysis of German propaganda by the Department of Publicity in
Enemy Countries stated, “The invasion of the Low Countries was preceded by a very
