During the last weeks before Hitler’s defeat and his suicide in the bunker of the Chancellery, the strange drama of intrigue within the Nazi leadership reached its final stage of adjustment. In this Bormann and Goebbels played the leading parts, contriving to share between them the lurid limelight in which Hitler chose to end his life, while in the shadows of the north Himmler in his sanatorium skirted round the possibilities of concluding a separate peace with the help of another Swedish peacemaker, Count Folke Bernadotte.
Goebbels made no secret now of his desperate contempt for Goering as the bombs blasted Germany’s helpless cities into ruins that matched those of Warsaw and Rotterdam and Coventry. In February, Semmler says, he was in a state of tears at the disasters that had befallen Dresden, claiming that Goering should be court-martialed: “What a burden of guilt this parasite has brought on his head by his slackness and interest in his own comfort.” He shook with anger at a story he had heard from Terboven of Goering shooting in the Schorfheide while the cities were being bombed. Goebbels had been Reich Trustee for Total War since July of the previous year and had brought in the most stringent mobilization decrees in August. On January 30 he was made Defender of Berlin, and he decided to stay in Berlin with his wife and children if the Führer should decide that this was the center from which to conduct the last stages in the total war of self-destruction.
Bormann had never associated with Goering in the way that Hitler had done. His comments on him are preserved in a few remarks that survive, mostly in the letters he wrote to his wife. Bormann was a secret man who concealed his power, preferring to keep close to Hitler and guide his master’s will; he had none of the independence of Goebbels and nothing of his flamboyant personality. He had crept to power in the empty shoes that Hess had left behind, rising in four years from a trusted but minor party official to the position of Hitler’s personal secretary, the man through whom everyone else was forced to go. In the final weeks, while Goering and Speer became the advocates of negotiation, Bormann shared with Hitler and Goebbels (though the latter feared and resented Bormann) the desire to see Germany utterly destroyed rather than survive the Nazi regime. Himmler shared the view of Speer and Goering, but he had no desire to associate with either of them.
Bormann knew that Goering had always tried to separate him from Hitler; he hated the Reich Marshal and delighted in his disgrace. As early as September 1944 he wrote to his wife: “The general grumbling about Goering’s setup . . . is reaching quite unparliamentary forms of expression.” And in October: “The Reich Marshal’s style of living had transmitted itself, quite naturally, to the Air Force.” In November he comments on the association that is growing up between Speer and Goering (“Neither of them can stand Goebbels—far less me”), and the following February he is sneering at Goering’s greed because an adjutant at the Obersalzberg has asked for five kilos of honey for the Reich Marshal’s household. 16 Bormann stood ready to deliver the final, subtle blow onee Goering should leave, but even he knew that it was necessary to wait for the appropriate opportunity. When Lammers asked him in January whether he thought the moment had been reached when Goering could be displaced as Hitler’s acknowledged successor, he replied, “If the question had not already been settled, I do not think the Führer would now nominate the Reich Marshal; but I do not think he will change the appointment he has once made. Let us drop the matter.”
At the conference on January 27, Hitler and Goering, as we have seen, indulged in the false hope that fear of the Russians would lead the Western Allies to conclude a separate peace with Germany. But in the event that peace could not be secured on terms that were favorable to Hitler, a desperate plan was worked out to create a mountain fortress in the south from which a last guerilla stand could be made; this plan was “mostly nonsense,” said Kesselring after the war, but with the ministries evacuated south along with the works of art, it was expected that Hitler would agree to leave Berlin on April 20, which was his fifty-sixth birthday. There was another wild burst of hope when Roosevelt died on April 12, and the astrologers were hastily consulted. Conferences went on at all hours, for life in the bunker was as artificial as its perpetual lights. Goering, his heart already set on the south, is described by an officer who was present as ostentatiously bored—“He put his elbow on the table and sank his huge head into the folds of the soft leather of his briefcase.” He even for a moment obscured one of Hitler’s maps.17
Galland had a last meeting with Goering around April 10 on the Obersalzberg. On reflection he believes that Goering summoned him south in order to give some sort of official cover to his own visit, for he found the Reich Marshal busy supervising the disposal of his art treasures. Goering was at least civil to the officer he had degraded, and told him he thought Galland had been right after all. He seemed deeply depressed, and when they parted he said, “I envy you, Galland, for going into action. I wish I were a few years younger and less bulky.” He pointed to his belly with an ironic smile. “If I were, I would gladly put myself under your command. It would be marvelous to have nothing to worry about but a good fight, as it was in the old days.”18 Galland was then dismissed to continue operations as best he could, and Goering returned to Berlin.
General Koller, Goering’s representative along with General Christian in the Führerbunker, was now vainly trying to resolve or evade the nonsensical orders Hitler was giving for the reorganization of the jet-fighter squadrons. Koller, who kept a diary which is of the greatest importance for tracing the events of these last chaotic days in both Berlin and Berchtesgaden, wrote on April 17: “Hitler lashes out at the Luftwaffe every day. My refutations of his illogical arguments are simply brushed away. His fury is constantly kept alive by lying statements made by his own personal staff.” All Hitler would say to Koller was, “You are responsible for seeing my orders fulfilled.”
April 20, Hitler’s birthday, was the occasion for a ceremony and a conference held belowground. Before the conference the distinguished gathering, which included Himmler, Ribbentrop, Goebbels, Goering, Keitel, Doenitz and Jodl, with Bormann hovering in the background, lined up for the macabre formality of handshaking and congratulations. Messages arrived that the Russians were already immediately south of Berlin, and Koller told Goering that if Hitler and everyone who intended to go south did not leave at once, he could not guarantee sufficient fuel for evacuation by air at some later time.
Goering’s own fleet of cars was waiting already loaded. At the conference Goering asked Hitler who should go to Berchtesgaden, himself or Koller. Hitler replied, “You go. Koller stays here.” Goering took his last leave of Hitler.
Koller meanwhile had left for the Luftwaffe’s headquarters, which were now west of Berlin, near Potsdam. Christian, who had remained with Goering, telephoned Koller to break the bad news that he was required to remain with the Führer. The raids on Berlin disorganized Goering’s departure, and for a while he lost touch with the fleet of cars, which was in the charge of Bernd von Brauchitsch. It was not till two-twenty on the morning of April 21 that Goering’s cavalcade eventually reached the Luftwaffe headquarters; the long delay in traveling this short distance had been due to the time Goering had been forced to spend in air-raid shelters, where he managed to laugh and joke with whomever he found. Although Koller had sent word that he urgently wanted to see the Reich Marshal, Goering made no attempt to find him. Koller was angry when he heard Goering’s cars rush off on their journey south at about three in the morning.
Koller had been left to deal alone with Hitler’s constant, nagging phone calls, demanding that he put his planes in the sky for the defense of Berlin, which was by now under artillery fire. When Koller explained that planes could not leave the damaged airfields, Hitler shouted that the Luftwaffe was useless and its leaders should be hanged. Later that night he insisted that Goering had left a private army to defend Carinhall, and he refused to listen to Koller’s explanation that this simply was not so; he ordered the private army to be thrown into the defense of Ber
lin and banged down the receiver. Then Koller’s telephone rang again; Hitler ordered the men of the Luftwaffe to resist the attack northeast and rang off before Koller could speak. By ten-thirty Koller was being threatened with death for sabotage because he had not sent his men to join a nonexistent army.
The Luftwaffe by now was without supplies of fuel for its planes. The following day, April 22, in spite of Hitler’s declaration over the telephone, “Mark my word, at the gates of Berlin the Russians will suffer the bloodiest defeat of their history,” the confusion became worse and Hitler, according to Koller, was “behaving like a madman.” Christian arrived and told Koller that the Führer had suffered a breakdown and was determined to die in the bunker. Koller decided later in the evening that he should report this to Goering.
The line to Berchtesgaden was poor, but Koller managed to reach Bernd von Brauchitsch. “The one we used to go to,” said Koller warily, referring to Hitler, “won’t leave where he is. But I’ve got to get away from here.” “Goering wants you to come here,” replied Brauchitsch, and the line went dead. Koller made contact with Jodl and confirmed the report that Hitler was to stay in Berlin. Jodl passed on to Koller what Hitler had said earlier in the day in his presence and that of Keitel. Jodl had challenged him that nothing could be done without the leadership staff, who had all gone south. “Well, then,” Hitler had replied, “Goering can take over the leadership down there.” But no one would fight for the Reich Marshal, they had said. “What do you mean, fight?” Hitler had sneered. “There’s precious little fighting to be done! When it comes to negotiating for peace, Goering can do that better than I. Goering is much better at those things. He can deal much better with the other side.” On hearing this, Koller at once flew south in a Heinkel, reaching Berchtesgaden eventually at noon on April 23.
The report that he brought from Berlin alarmed Goering. He was open in his criticism of Hitler’s decision to stay in Berlin. But he did not know now what to do for the best. The military situation seemed hopeless. “Is Hitler still alive?” he asked Koller. He was worried in case Bormann might have supplanted him as Hitler’s successor. Koller said he thought Berlin could hold out a week. “But the responsibility is now yours, Herr Reich Marshal. Hitler’s decision yesterday made him the commandant of Berlin and excludes him from the leadership of the State and the supreme leadership of the Army.”
Philipp Bouhler, a party official who was a close friend of Goering, was also there, and he agreed with Koller. But Goering remained full of misgivings, convinced that, because of the bad relations he had with Hitler, Bormann, his greatest enemy, would have become Hitler’s successor. He was sure that if he attempted to take supreme command, Bormann would have him killed as a traitor. “He is merely waiting for his chance to liquidate me,” said Goering. “If I act now, they’ll call me a traitor. And if I don’t act, I’ll be reproached for having failed Germany in the decisive hour.”
Goering had Hitler’s decree of June 29, 1941, there in a steel box, and together they studied it, wondering what best to do. The wording was quite clear: “Should I have my freedom of action curtailed or be somehow removed, Reich Marshal Hermann Goering is to be my deputy or my successor in all my offices of State, Party and Army.” This seemed decisive to Koller, Bouhler and Brauchitsch. But Goering was still uncertain, in case Hitler had meanwhile acted differently. He decided to consult Lammers, who was also in Berchtesgaden. Lammers’ view was the same as that of the others. “The decree is valid and legal,” he said. “The Führer has made no alternative edicts. Had he done so, I should have had to know of it. He couldn’t have done it legally without my knowledge.”
“If you want to make absolutely sure,” said Koller, “why not send Hitler a message that puts the matter quite clearly?” Goering at once agreed.
They sat down to draft a message. Goering’s attempt was long and full of legal protestations. Koller eventually drafted something briefer and more suitable:
MY FUHRER!
Since you are determined to remain at your post in Fortress Berlin, do you agree that I, as your deputy, in accordance with your decree of June 29, 1941, assume immediately the total leadership of the Reich with complete freedom of action at home and abroad?
If by 10 P.M. no answer is forthcoming, I shall assume you have been deprived of your freedom of action. I will then consider the terms of your decree to have come into force and act accordingly for the good of the people and the Fatherland.
You must realize what I feel for you in these most difficult hours of my life, and I am quite unable to find words to express it.
God bless you and grant that you may come here after all as soon as possible.
Your most loyal
HERMANN GOERING
The final, rather inconclusive sentence was added by Goering because he felt the message sounded too cold and formal without it.19
Before sending the message, Goering ordered the wireless posts to be taken over by staff officers for the sake of security. He also gave instructions for Colonel von Below in the Führerbunker to see that the Führer not only received the message but had every chance of leaving Berlin if he wanted to do so. He sent instructions to Ribbentrop and Keitel to report to him, unless the order was countermanded by Hitler himself, and he had Bormann informed that he had sent a message to the Führer and that he also should do his best to get Hitler away from Berlin. He even went so far, in spite of warnings from the others, as to consult Müller, Bormann’s representative at Berchtesgaden. Müller did not like the proposal and said so.
Goering, Bouhler and Koller then had lunch and discussed the next step. Goering decided he would fly to see General Eisenhower the following day, April 24, and talk it out “man to man.” He pondered over the draft of a proclamation to the Army and the German people. “The proclamation,” he said to Koller, “should make the Russians believe that we are continuing the struggle on both sides, but the Americans and the British should infer from it that we want to fight only against the East and not against the West. As for our own soldiers, they should understand that although the war is going on, there is to be an end to it somehow, and on more favorable terms than we could have dared to assume recently.” Koller remarked that to draft so involved and contradictory a proclamation was quite beyond his powers, but Goering persisted that he must try. Then there was the new Cabinet. Ribbentrop must go, of course. He, Goering, would probably have to take on the Foreign Ministry as well as all his other duties. He became exuberant and excited. To have sent the message to Hitler took a load off his mind, and he was looking forward to his contact with the British and the Americans. Goering began to dream of his new historic role.
Koller then left, going down the mountain road to the Villa Geiger, the Luftwaffe headquarters. He needed sleep, but he went into his office at five o‘clock. Shortly after five and again at eight he received telephone calls from Goering. But between eight and nine o’clock attempts by himself and other staff officers to reach Goering’s chalet by telephone failed. Something definitely seemed to be wrong.
When Goering’s message was being transmitted to the bunker, Berlin was already surrounded by the Russians and could be reached only by air. Aboveground the sky thundered with planes, and the earth trembled with bombardments. Speer had flown in for his last meeting with Hitler—at which he confessed he had disobeyed his master’s orders to destroy all of Germany’s resources, but was immediately forgiven; Hitler did not know that Speer had planned to poison him in the bunker by injecting gas. Speer found him surrounded by the remainder of those who still clung to him —Goebbels and his wife Magda; Eva Braun, Hitler’s mistress; Bormann; and even Ribbentrop, who was about to slip away and forsake this catacomb of madness and self-destruction. The endless discussion of Hitler’s decision to stay and die was repeated, and Speer agreed with Goebbels that it was more dignified for him to do so than to seek to escape south. Then the radio message from Goering was put into Hitler’s hands.
Bormann at once seize
d the opportunity to damn Goering in Hitler’s eyes. The messages Goering had sent to Keitel, Ribbentrop and Colonel von Below requesting them to protect the interests of both Hitler and himself in this most difficult matter either were never received or were made ineffective by Bormann, who immediately set to work to interpret Goering’s carefully worded statement in such a way as to discredit him still further, making it out to be an ultimatum to the Führer with a time limit. A radio reply was dispatched: “Decree of June 29, 1941, is rescinded by my special instruction. My freedom of action undisputed. I forbid any move by you in the direction indicated. Adolf Hitler.”20
In the presence of Speer, Hitler gave way to his anger and said he “had known for some time that Goering had failed him, that he was corrupt, and that he was a drug addict.” All Goering was fit for was to negotiate the capitulation. It did not matter, said Hitler with supreme contempt, who did that; the country that had failed him was worthless.
Then, in spite of the words he had said in Jodl’s presence only a short while before, he set about avenging himself against the man who Bormann said was betraying him. He ordered Bormann to send a second message to Goering depriving him of his offices and his liberty. The text of this message is not recorded, but it was seen by two of the surviving officers on duty in the bunker, and they clearly recall its contents. Goering was informed that he was guilty of high treason both to National Socialism and to the Führer, that he was to be spared the death penalty only because of his earlier service to the party, but that he must voluntarily resign all his offices and the right of succession forthwith. To this he was required to send an immediate answer, yes or no.
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