commitment and
policy
convexity assumption
Corollary 6.2
intuition behind
Corollary 7.1
Corollary 9.2
Corollary 10.1
cost
of coups
of democracy
of redistribution
of repression
of taxation
Costa Rica
coup(s)
anti-democracy
Argentina’s
asset’s influence on
attractiveness of
benefits from
causes of
constraints
cost of
defensive
democratization’s influence on
disruptions of
economy’s influence on
financial integration and
games
incentive for
income influenced by
institutional solutions to
Latin American
mechanisms leading to
military
mounting of
payoffs to
political integration and
powerin
static model of
targeted transfers and
taxation and
unlikeliness of
waves of
Cranborne, Viscount
credible commitment
crises
dealing with
democratic consolidation
economic
culture, political
Dahl, Robert
democratization theory of
dataset, Denninger and Squire’s
decision calculus
defensive coups
de Klerk, L. W.
democracy. See also democratic consolidation; democratic transitions; nondemocracy; partial democracy
agriculture and
Argentina’s history of
basic characteristic of
Britain’s developing
burden of
capital-in and
capitalist development and
changing nature of
citizen’s desire for
collapsing of
commonalities in
costs of
coups against
creation of
destabilization of
determinants of
dictatorship’s manipulation of
differences in
direct
education and
efficiency of
emergence of
evolution of
France and
future of
Germany and
growth of
income ( 1990s) and
inequality and
instability of
institutional features of
investments in
labor share and
Latin America’s declining
majoritarian policies of
measuring
nondemocracy v.
patterns of
political equality and
power in
preferences for
presidential v. parliamentary
pro-citizen policies of
redistributive nature of
representative
repression and
rewards of
Schumpeter’s definition of
semiconsolidated
South Africa and
Sweden and
targeted transfers and
taxation and
Venezuela’s reinstatement of
waves of
wealth and
democratic consolidation
civil society’s
debate on
elites and
globalization and
inter-group inequality and
Mauritius and
middle class and
in a picture
political conflict and
political institutions and
shock/crises and
wealth and
democratic society
democratic transitions. See also transitions
capital, land, and
game
income and
nondemocracy and
political conflict and
democratization(s)
avoiding
baseline model of
Central American
civil society’s
coup’s influence on
Dahl’s theory of
defined
delaying of
economic prosperity and
educational reforms and
efficiency promoted by
elites and
forces leading to
game
Germany’s
globalization and
income sources and
incremental
inequality and
inter-group inequality and
Latin American
liberalization and
mass
middle class and
model of
nineteenth century start of
nondemocratic elite and
patterns of
in pictures
political institution’s
political power transferred via
process of
redistribution influenced by
repression or
revolution prevented by
rich’s options for
social unrest and
South Africa’s
static model of
theory of
timing of
trade-offs and
United States
waves of
wealth and
demonstrations
Denninger and Squire dataset
Des Forges, Alison
development
America’s
democracy and capitalist
development, political
conjectures about
four paths of
Singapore’s
deviation. See one-shot deviation principle
dictatorship(s)
Argentina’s
democracy’s manipulation by
Guatemala’s
labor’s role in
landowners and
Latin American
Nicaragua’s
opponents of
of proletariat
vulnerabilities of
Zaire’s
differentiation, implicit
Director’s law of income redistribution
discontent, social
disenfranchisement
citizens, nondemocracy and
collective action and
enfranchisement v.
middle class
nineteenth century
Disraeli, Benjamin
Gladstone v.
minority administration of
Radical reform of
reform opposed by
Tory party under
disruption
coup’s
revolution and
distributional conflict
divergence
Downsian competition
Downsian model
Downsian Policy Convergence Theorem
Downsian political parties
durability
Dutch East India Company
Dutch settlements
East India Company
An Economic Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution (Beard)
economy
allocations in
capital-intensive
closed
coups influenced by
Germany’s
globalized world
income distribution and
open
political conflict influenced by
redistributive politics and
revolution influenced b
y
education
democracy and
democratization and
policies
universal
Education Act of 1870
efficiency
allocative
democracy’s
nondemocracy’s in-
egalitarian society
elasticity
capital’s
taxation’s
electoral competition
partisan parties, probabilistic voting, and
electoral systems
elite(s). See also rich; wealth
Argentina’s military
Central American landed
citizens v.
Colombia’s
commitments of
concessions of
conflicts of intra-
decisions of
democratic consolidation and
democratization by
divisions within
heterogeneity of
high threat state of
incentive-compatibility constraint of
income of
indifference of
inter-group inequality and
investments of
losses of
military and
nondemocracy and
options for
payoffs to
political institutions and
power of
preferences of
promises of
punishment of
redistribution by
repression and
resources transferred by
revolution prevented by
South African white
taxation and
trade-offs for
welfare function of
El Salvador
end game
endowments
enfranchisement
disenfranchisement v.
middle class
Enlightenment
envelope theorem
equality, political
democracy and
Singapore’s
society and
equations
Bellman
comparative static
equilibrium. See also subgame perfect equilibria
actions
characterizing of
comparative statics of
Markov
nondemocracy and
oscillations
path
policy
political
probabilistic voting and
revolutions
specific
strategies
structure-induced
types of
ethnicity
Europe
fiscal policy in
South Africa and
events, timing of
exclusion
using of
experiments, thought
extensive-form games
factor endowments
factor price equalization
Heckscher-Olin model and
failure
of concession
of repression
Falklands (Malvinas) War of 1982-3
fascism
financial integration
coups and
globalization and
influence of
First Reform Act of 1832
fiscal policy
European
Latin American
fiscal volatility
inequality and
Latin American
FMLN. See Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional
foreign capital
taxation and
France
authoritarian phase of
flourishing democracy in
inequality’s rise in
Jacobin’s rise in
liberal phase of
political reforms of
Second Empire of
Second Republic of
Franco-Prussian War
Freedom House index
GDP v.
French Revolution
Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN)
functions
Cobb-Douglas production
concave
indirect-utility
Lagrangean
utility
value
Galtieri, Leopoldo
game(s)
continuation
contracts and
coup
democratization
Disraeli v. Gladstone
dynamic
end
enfranchised v. disenfranchised
extensive-form
infinite horizon
interactions
of promises
repeated
static
theoretic models of
theory
three stages of
transition to democracy
gap
inequality
rich v. poor
Gapon, Georgi
GDP. See Gross Domestic Product
genocide
George, Lloyd
Germany
democracy’s beginning in
economy’s collapse in
nondemocratic regime of
Social Democratic Party in
three-class voting system in
welfare state in
World War I and
Gini coefficient
Argentina’s
Gladstone, William
Disraeli v.
globalization
Argentina and
class conflict and
democratic consolidation and
democratization and
dimensions of
financial integration and
influence of
majoritarian policies and
political integration and
pre-World War 1
Propositions 10.1.2, and
trade integration and
upsurges in
world economy’s
Glorious Revolution of 1688
Goh Chok Tong
Gómez, Juan Vicente
governments
budget constraints of
military
Grey, Earl
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Freedom House index v.
labor income in
tax revenues in
Grossman-Helpman Lobbying Equilibrium
growth
democracy’s
income’s
Guatemala
Britain compared to
dictatorship of
forced labor in
hardliners
identity of
softliners v.
Harvard’s Center for Basic Research on the Social Sciences
Heckscher-Olin model
factor price equalization and
prediction of
technology’s influence on
heterogeneity
elite’s
sources of
history-dependent strategies
Hobbes, Thomas
homestead acts
horizon, infinite
House of Commons
House of Lords
human capital
importance of
international trade and
Human Rights Watch
Hutus
ideal points
median voter’s
of types of agents
identities, political
alternative
class and
conflict and
formation of
implicit differentiation
implicit function theorem
impossibility/possibility theorem
incentive-compatibility
constraints
promises
income
changes in
coup’s influence on
>
democracy ( 1990s) and
distribution
elites and
exogenous
growth of
increasing share of
labor and
manufacturing and
redistributing
repression/coups influence on
sources of
taxation and
transition to
index
Freedom House
Polity
indifference
elite’s
indirect-utility function
individual(s)
benefits to
economic choices of
interests of
median
providing benefitsto
taste differences of
induction, backward
industrialists
capital held by
conflicts of
landowners v.
new breed of
repression’s cost to
utilities of
Industrial Revolution
inegalitarian society
inequality. See also inter-group inequality
Argentina’s
Colombia’s
comparative statics and
decreases in
democracy and
democratization and
fiscal volatility and
France’s rise of
gap
intermediate levels of
limited
19th century rise of
political
redistribution and
revolution constraints and
revolution, political instability, and
Singapore’s
in society
South African
Sweden’s rise of
taxation and
variability and
infinite horizon models
instability, political
inequality, revolution, and
institutions
British feudal
commitment value of
designing
economic
policies v.
political power and
institutions, political
ANC’s
Cape Colony’s
citizen’s need for
commitment problems and
conflict over
democratic consolidation and
democratic v. nondemocratic
democratization of
durability of
economic consequences of
elites and
importance of
inter-group inequality and
paths of
political power regulated by
preferences over
role of
integration, financial. See financial integration
integration, political
coup’s costs and
globalization and
influence of
inter-group inequality
democratic consolidation and
democratization and
elites and
increasing
political institution and
repression and
revolution and
role of
international trade
assumptions about
implications of
redistribution and
skill-biased technology and
investments
democracy and
elite’s
in skills
Iron Law of Oligarchy (Michels)
Jacobins
Japan
Liberal Democratic Party of
Khoikhoi
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Page 57
