Henderson also took a dim view of Mossadegh’s action on the point at issue, the nationalization of the company. “We did not believe,” he declared later in an interview, “that such an expropriation was in the basic interest of Iran, Great Britain, or the U.S. Acts of this kind tended to undermine the mutual trust that was necessary if international trade was to flourish.”18
The British, meanwhile, had approached Kim Roosevelt, well known to them from OSS days and currently one of the top CIA agents. Sir John Cochran, acting as spokesman for the Churchill government, proposed that the British Secret Service and the CIA join forces to overthrow Mossadegh. “As I told my British colleagues,” Roosevelt later wrote, “we had, I felt sure, no chance to win approval from the outgoing administration of Truman and Acheson. The new Republicans, however, might be quite different.”19
Roosevelt expected a different approach because of the nature of Republican attacks on the Truman-Acheson foreign policy. Ike criticized the Democrats for spreading American resources too thin, accepting the status quo too willingly, and concentrating too heavily on Western Europe. Eisenhower contended that the United States must wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, and if possible “liberate” areas from Communist control. Eisenhower seemed so much tougher than Truman that the New York Times wrote, “The day of sleep-walking is over. It passed with the exodus of Truman and Achesonism, and the policy of vigilance replacing Pollyanna diplomacy is evident.”20 Roosevelt also felt, based on his wartime experiences, that Eisenhower would be much more likely to use his covert-action capabilities than Truman had been.
The essence of the plan the British presented to Roosevelt was to keep the Shah while dumping his Prime Minister. Somehow Mossadegh learned of the plot. He then denounced the Shah for his intrigues with foreign interests and began to agitate for the Shah’s abdication.
At this point the Shah lost his nerve. On February 28, 1953, he announced that he would leave the country, along with his queen and entourage. The announcement brought on riots in the streets of Teheran. The Tudeh Party, along with the United Front, marched in support of the Prime Minister; at the other end of town, as H.I.M. recorded in his memoirs, “the mass demonstrations of loyalty to the Shah were so convincing and affecting that I decided to remain for the time being.” He canceled his agreement to abdicate.21
The active support of the Tudeh for Mossadegh fed the impression that the Prime Minister had gone over to the Communists, and for their own reasons the British—who had since the war lost colonies all around the world, a situation the new Churchill government was determined to reverse—clamored about the dangers of a Communist takeover in Iran. Strangely enough, no one seemed to notice that throughout this crisis, in which the stakes were nothing less than one of the world’s greatest oil pools, the Russians were content to stand aside. Nor did anyone in the West ever point out that Mossadegh had not appealed to his northern neighbor for help.
The idea that this reactionary feudal landlord was a Communist was, in fact, quite ridiculous. The old man has his own explanation of what was going on. When Henderson complained to him about Communist mobs demonstrating against the West in the streets of Teheran, Mossadegh replied, “These are not real Communists, they are people paid by the British to pretend they are Communists in order to frighten the United States into believing that under my Premiership the country is going Communist.” That may well have been true, but to Henderson it appeared that Mossadegh “had become a paranoiac so far as the British were concerned. He held them responsible for all of Iran’s ills and gave them credit for almost superhuman machinations.”22
Mossadegh’s policy was to attempt to split the United States and Britain. To that end, in May 1953, he once again appealed to Ike. In a long personal message he begged the President to help remove the obstacles the British had placed on the sale of Iranian oil and to provide Iran with substantially increased American economic assistance. “I refused,” Ike recorded bluntly, “to pour more American money into a country in turmoil in order to bail Mossadegh out of troubles rooted in his refusal to work out an agreement with the British.”
To Mossadegh, Ike wrote directly. “I fully understand that the government of Iran must determine for itself which foreign and domestic policies are likely to be most advantageous to Iran.… I am not trying to advise the Iranian government on its best interests. I am merely trying to explain why, in the circumstances, the government of the United States is not presently in a position to extend more aid to Iran or to purchase Iranian oil.”23 (It should be pointed out here that in those happy days, the United States was itself an exporter of oil, and in the world as a whole far more oil was being pumped out of the ground than was being consumed. Mossadegh’s problem was that the world of the early 1950s could get along quite well without Iranian oil.)
Iran was by now on the edge of financial and economic ruin. The Truman administration had increased American aid from $1.6 million before Mossadegh came to power to $23.4 million for the fiscal year 1953, but that was not even close to enough money to make up for the lost oil revenue. When Ike turned down his plea, Mossadegh was forced to draw money from the pension funds and the national insurance company.24
Moderates in Iran began to turn against the Prime Minister. In response, he suspended elections for the National Assembly and held a referendum to decide if the current National Assembly should be dissolved. He arranged the election so that those in favor of dissolution and those against it voted in separate, plainly marked booths, which were, of course, closely watched by his supporters. Under those circumstances, it was no surprise that Mossadegh won the referendum by 99 percent to 1 percent.
To Ike, the rigged election looked for sure like Communist tactics. He concluded that if old Mossy was not a Communist himself, then he was either a fool or a stooge for the Communists.25 His ambassador (he had kept Henderson on the job) told him that if Mossadegh got rid of the Shah, “chaos would develop in Iran, a chaos that would be overcome only by a bloody dictatorship working under orders from Moscow.”26 This impression was very much strengthened when Mossadegh, having been spurned by Eisenhower, turned to the Soviets for help. On August 8 the Russians announced that they had initiated negotiations with Iran for financial aid and trade talks.
Mossadegh, Ike wrote in his memoirs, “believed that he could form an alliance with the Tudeh Party and then outwit it.” To the President, this was improbable at best. He feared that “Mossadegh would become to Iran what the ill-fated Dr. Benes had been in Czechoslovakia—a leader whom the Communists, having gained power, would eventually destroy.”27 In addition to his determination to stop Communist expansion, the Republicans had just won an election, in part, by demanding to know “Who Lost China?” They were not going to expose themselves to the question “Who Lost Iran?”
Ike decided it was time to act. He ordered the CIA to go ahead with a plan that had been initiated by the British Secret Service, picked up by Kim Roosevelt, and approved five weeks earlier by his State Department in a high-level meeting in the Secretary of State’s office.
That meeting inaugurated the CIA’S covert-action program, going beyond simple financial support for America’s overseas friends, to active intervention in the affairs of a foreign nation, to the point of overthrowing a government.
THE MEETING BEGAN when Kim Roosevelt laid before Secretary of State John Foster Dulles a thick paper outlining a plan of clandestine action, code name AJAX. Picking it up, the Secretary glanced around the room, smiled, and said, “So this is how we get rid of that madman Mossadegh!” No one laughed; indeed, some of those around the table flinched.28
Among those present were Bedell Smith, who Ike had moved from the CIA to the State Department, where he was now the Under Secretary of State. Bedell was a neighbor and old friend of Roosevelt’s. He already knew of and had approved AJAX. Smith’s replacement as director of the CIA, Allen Dulles, was also there. He, too, knew and approved of AJAX. A third insider was Loy Henderson, “a gen
tleman himself,” Roosevelt recorded, “who preferred dealing with his foreign colleagues in a gentlemanly fashion. But Henderson was one of a small band of distinguished foreign-service officers of that era who understood the realities of life in this world we live in.” In other words, Henderson too supported AJAX.29
There were a number of State Department officials present who were not in on the plot, including Robert Murphy, who had been Ike’s first spy back in North Africa eleven years earlier. The new Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson (“Engine Charlie,” former head of General Motors) was there, ruddy-faced, white-haired, gruff, blunt to the point of embarrassment. Wilson had a habit of sitting through meetings with a cigarette in his mouth, letting it smolder right down until it started to burn his lips. He would toss it into the ashtray and light another and let it burn down. He had a way of getting to the heart of the matter. At one early Eisenhower cabinet meeting, there was a long discussion of America’s military posture vis-à-vis Communist China. Finally Wilson stubbed out a cigarette butt, turned to Ike, and said, “Mr. President, I understand from what’s been said that we could lick China. What I don’t understand is what we would do with China after we got them licked.”30
A group of hardheaded realists, in short, men of vast experience, able, cynical, accustomed to assessing evidence and making tough decisions, unafraid to take risks. Men Ike trusted to give him sound, practical advice. If Roosevelt could convince them that AJAX could work, they would convince Ike.
Roosevelt began by saying that, on Allen Dulles’ instructions, he had made two trips to Iran since the election in order to make a judgment on two points. First, that “the Soviet threat is indeed genuine, dangerous, and imminent,” and second, that in a showdown “the Iranian army and the Iranian people will back the Shah.” Roosevelt said he was satisfied on both points. He reported further that the British had approved AJAX and agreed to provide whatever support they could, but given anti-British sentiment in Iran would stay as far in the background as possible.
The objective of AJAX was to remove Mossadegh from office. The Shah had indicated that he wanted to replace Mossadegh with General Zahedi. That was a bit much for the British to swallow, as they had kept Zahedi in prison throughout World War II and he was almost as anti-British as Mossadegh. But Churchill and his Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, realized that their choices were limited, and between Mossadegh and Zahedi they preferred Zahedi.
The first task, Roosevelt continued, was to organize military support for the Shah. The chief of staff, General Riahi, was a supporter of Mossadegh. He would have to be removed or circumvented. The key to AJAX was to be prepared to give the Shah prompt support, both military and public, when he announced the dismissal of Mossadegh and the appointment of Zahedi.
“We are quite satisfied, sir,” Roosevelt concluded, turning to Secretary Dulles, “that this can be done successfully. All we wait upon is your decision.”
Allen Dulles spoke first. “Kim, you had better cover two more points before the Secretary comments: first, on the estimated cost, and secondly, I think you should give your idea of the ‘flap potential’—what could happen if things go wrong.”
Roosevelt responded that the cost would be minimal, one or two hundred thousand dollars at the most. On the second point, he said again that he saw no danger of failure, but if he had totally misjudged the situation and things did go wrong, the consequences “would be very bad—perhaps terrifyingly so. Iran would fall to the Russians, and the effect on the rest of the Middle East could be disastrous. But I must add this: These are the same consequences we face if we do nothing.”
Foster Dulles asked about General Guilanshah, the commander of the Iranian Air Force. Roosevelt said that although he was loyal to the Shah, he would not be a part of the plot because there was no role for the Air Force in AJAX and the conspirators wanted to keep the number of those in the know at the smallest possible figure.
The Secretary of State then polled the men around the table. Most signified consent with the least possible commitment. Roosevelt had no doubts about Bedell Smith—six months earlier, when Smith was still DCI, he had called Roosevelt into his office to demand, “When are those blanking British coming to talk to us? And when is our goddam operation going to get underway? Pull up your socks and get going, young man.”31 Now, when asked by Foster Dulles whether to go or not, Smith, surly as always, snarled that of course they should proceed.
Robert Murphy, the only man present with some experience in overthrowing governments, nodded his assent. Charles Wilson was enthusiastic. Loy Henderson spoke gravely: “Mr. Secretary, I don’t like this kind of business at all. You know that. But we are confronted by a desperate, a dangerous situation and a madman who would ally himself with the Russians. We have no choice but to proceed with this undertaking. May God grant us success.”
“That’s that, then,” the Secretary of State declared. “Let’s get going!”
Later, Roosevelt recorded his conviction that “I was morally certain that almost half of those present, if they had felt free or had the courage to speak, would have opposed the undertaking.”32
The next step was to get the approval of the heads of government. As noted, Ike gave his orders to go ahead after Mossadegh opened negotiations with the Soviets. On the British side, there was no problem—Churchill and Eden had been in on AJAX from the start; they had been the men who had initiated the operation.
HAVING CONVINCED HIS SUPERIORS THAT AJAX could work, and having obtained the President’s go-ahead, Kim Roosevelt’s next task was to persuade the Shah to act. This proved to be more difficult than convincing the Dulles brothers and Eisenhower. The Shah sensed that in trying to rid himself of Mossadegh, he could lose everything. In a showdown, the army and the people might very well support the Prime Minister rather than H.I.M.
When Roosevelt entered Iran in mid-July 1953 he knew that he had fudged a bit before the Dulles brothers in outlining AJAX when he guaranteed that the Shah was prepared for decisive action. In fact, the Shah was hesitant, confused, fearful. Two Iranian secret agents, who had once worked for the British, then joined with Roosevelt, had explained this quite carefully to him during one of his earlier visits.
H.I.M., the agents told Roosevelt, “is concerned over the apparent fact that he has no foreign support. Obviously the Russians … are his enemies. He knows they support Mossadegh. What about the West? As you know, as we know, they are with him. But how can he tell? Look at the terrific reception Mossadegh was given in Washington [by the Truman administration]. How can the Shah be sure, after that, that the U.S. will give him their backing? And the British, who are—whatever they may think—just about to be thrown out of Iran, why should he believe that they will come to his assistance? We hope you can find some way of convincing him, preferably not just of U.S. support but of British as well. We don’t know just how we are going to arrange all this, but we tell you: It must be done!”33
Ambassador Henderson, at Roosevelt’s urging, had tried to reassure the Shah of Western support. “I did have many frank private talks with the Shah during which I tried to encourage him,” Henderson later recalled. “I can remember, for instance, that at one time, almost despairing at the position in which Mossadegh had pushed him, the Shah had decided to go abroad. I pled with him not to do so, pointing out that his departure might well lead to the loss of Iran’s independence. I was greatly relieved when he decided that it was his duty to remain in the country regardless of the humiliations that Mossadegh was heaping on him.”34
The simplest, most direct way to buck up the wavering Shah would have been for Roosevelt himself to go directly to the palace, but the Dulles brothers were determined to keep AJAX a clandestine operation. When they agreed to allow Roosevelt to serve as the agent in charge of AJAX, it was with the explicit understanding that he would remain completely out of sight. “He has a very prominent family name,” Foster Dulles had declared, chuckling. “He will have to keep away from anyone who might know him
.” The Secretary did not want the American role revealed, under any circumstances.35
Roosevelt had therefore set up his command post in the basement of a “safe house” in Teheran, but there could be no coup if the Shah was afraid to act, and in early August the Shah was wavering more than ever. At this juncture, General Schwarzkopf appeared in Iran, “armed with a diplomatic passport and a couple of large bags” containing “millions of dollars.”*
Schwarzkopf requested and was granted an audience with the Shah. But H.I.M., fearing spies in his own palace, was cautious, and Schwarzkopf’s reassurances of Western support were not convincing. Meanwhile the Tudeh Party newspapers had learned of Schwarzkopf’s presence. In special editions, they loudly denounced H.I.M. for his contacts with “brainless agents of international reaction.” Mossadegh was furious. He threatened to hold another referendum, this time to depose the Shah. The crisis was at hand.
Obviously Schwarzkopf had to get out of the country, fast. Before leaving, he met with Roosevelt. “Kim,” he said, “you simply are not going to be able to deal with the Shahanshah through any intermediary. I’m convinced that you will have to meet with H.I.M. personally.” Nothing short of a direct meeting between the two men would convince the Shah to act.37
Roosevelt agreed emphatically. Using a communications network set up by the British on Cyprus, he got Ike to add a phrase to a speech he was making in San Francisco, and Churchill to alter the BBC time announcement. That night he made the first in his series of clandestine visits to the palace, where he managed to convince the Shah that with Eisenhower, Churchill, and a Roosevelt standing behind him, H.I.M. could afford to act.
Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment Page 24
