After Germany liberated Ukraine, they gave what little there was of the remaining seed grain to the starving citizens which caused a reduction in the amount of acreage they could plant. Additionally, there were no tractors, gasoline, or draft horses. Experts estimate that the Occupied Eastern Territories had grown about forty-three million tons of grain under the Soviets in 1940 as opposed to thirteen million tons under Germany in 1941. In 1942, under Germany, they harvested only 11.7 million tons. The Soviets had also taken the supply of fertilizer which contributed to the reduced yield. Given the Soviet scorched earth policy and the other circumstances, including partisan terrorist activities, the lack of workers and machinery, and the inability to distribute agricultural products to everyone, it is amazing that more people did not perish. Certainly, there was a difference between the brutal Bolshevik/Allied policies regarding civilian populations, and the German mentality. Apparently, the Allies and the Soviets, via their propaganda apparatus, projected their own psychotic deadly behavior onto the Germans, a tactic they have maintained to this very day. 1282
Rural peasants in German-occupied territory were better able to take care of themselves and stock up on food compared to the civilians in the larger cities. Between 1941 and 1943, Germany sent 15,000 rail cars of agricultural equipment and machines to the Occupied Eastern Territories, including 7,000 tractors, 20,000 generators, 250,000 steel plows, and 3,000,000 scythes. They also sent thousands of bulls, cows, swine, and stallions for breeding purposes in order to produce quality livestock at a cost of 445 million Reichmarks (RM). In 1940, the German Army requisitioned about two million tons of grain, a rather modest amount compared to the 3.25 million tons of grain that the Red Army used in the same year. The Germans sent 350,000 tons of grain to Germany which left about seven million tons for the fifty million Soviet civilians. There was a black market as urban dwellers obtained necessities from the peasants, food that the German authorities were unable to trace. 1283
Germany also tried to rehabilitate the transportation network by sending road-building equipment, at a cost of over one billion RM. Germany spent over 2.5 billion RM to reconstruct the industrial infrastructure, not including the agricultural assistance worth about a half-billion RM. The Germans began this assistance, including repairs by the German army, when they first occupied the area until the end of 1943, at an estimated cost of five billion RM. Germany spent more in non-agricultural economic aid than the total industrial production of the area during her occupation. Historically, this foreign aid to the local native citizens is an absolute anomaly in an ongoing war between a triumphant occupier and the residents of the defeated territory. 1284
Partisans, illegal according to international law, many of whom were Jewish, destroyed and/or seized harvested grain while German authorities attempted to acquire extra rations for the workers in war-related factories or in heavy industry, though their efforts often proved unsuccessful. Meanwhile, unemployed urban residents faced certain starvation if they had nothing of value to trade with the peasants for food. On November 11, 1941, the ESE reported to Berlin that food scarcity and the lack of essential goods greatly affected the morale of the Russian and Ukrainian people. The city of Kiev had received no grain since its occupation began on September 19. The partisans also confiscated food from the civilians and physically forced able-bodied men to join them in their terrorist activities. The partisans often burned or destroyed food. In the south, it was impossible to feed all of the thousands of POWs and the authorities resorted to the limited amount of gruel and buckwheat. 1285
Partisans successfully caused the death of 300,000 German soldiers, according to Russian sources, or 50,000 per the Germans. Duty assignments on the eastern front, with potential partisan activities and counterinsurgency, brought fear to the average German soldier. Fellow partisans in each unit would kill the family of any partisan whose courage wavered when it came to killing Germans. Partisans viewed Germans as “inhuman beasts” while the Germans considered the partisans as “despicable bandits,” a cause for brutality on both sides. From May 1943 to May 1944, there were an estimated 27,000 partisans working against the Third Panzer Army. Given the threat of a death sentence by their own leaders, and uncertain treatment by the Germans, there were still over 1,000 partisans who deserted to a German unit. 1286
The partisans frequently tortured and killed any German that fell into their hands. The Soviet propaganda apparatus prodded the partisans to “let the ravens eat the eyes of the German scoundrels! There is only one answer: Death to the Cannibals! They are sowing death, and they shall reap death! Instead of bread, give them bullets!” Soviet hatemongers urged the soldiers to “avenge the tears and blood of our dear ones… to take revenge on the enemy, every day and every hour, to starve him, burn him, shoot him, kill him with a hammer, to destroy the Fascist reptiles day and night, in open combat or from behind.” It was little wonder that German soldiers dreaded an assignment to the eastern front. 1287
On March 1, 1942, the ESE reported that, in the highly populated Donets area, there had been no food distribution to the population which resulted in the deaths of several thousand people. On March 5, the Germans discovered that people, in some areas, were trading human flesh, telling people it was pork. Another report on June 3, described the devastated condition of the population, caused in part by the partisans who continued to destroy food. Despite the efforts of the Germans, brutal Bolshevik policies would form the basis of German guilt. Germany supplied one billion RM worth of mining, energy and manufacturing equipment. 1288
A number of factors, primarily the Soviet’s scorched earth and deportation policy, contributed to the desperate economic situation. However, Germany did not recognize the extent of the Soviet military strength or the size of their arms and least of all, their preparations. Germany was also unprepared for managing an economy that had previously depended on Moscow’s centralized style of governing. Moscow officialdom had stifled private initiative and taken over the management of labor and all record-keeping activities. This organizational model was alien to Europe and caused insoluble problems.1289
Stalin’s intelligence sources, like Richard Sorge, had informed him that Germany was preparing to attack, apparently even the exact date. However, Stalin may have believed that Germany was insufficiently prepared militarily to strike on that day. However, the significant aspect is that both sides knew and therefore Germany’s attack, despite later Soviet propaganda, was not a surprise attack on the “peace-loving” Soviet Union. The German military achieved success despite Stalin’s foreknowledge and notwithstanding Soviet military superiority, the very purpose for Germany’s preventive war. Soviet/Allied propagandists cite the starvation as evidence of German genocidal practices and policies. Just during World War II, it was the Soviet’s scorched earth policies and their military tactics that caused the combined massive starvation of over thirty million Soviet citizens, POWs in the German-occupied Soviet territories, as well as the deportees in Siberia and the Urals who perished from exhaustion, lack of shelter, disease and starvation. In order to perpetuate the Holocaust account, court historians have cleverly concealed the Soviet’s long-term preparation for warfare and the fact that over 3.5 million Jews lived in the area prior to June 22, 1941, many of whom they relocated out of harm’s way. The Soviets, with their policies established the historical framework, for massive genocide then shifted all culpability for it to Germany after the Soviets forced Germany out of the area.1290
Germany’s Elite Traitors
Hitler underestimated the influence and activities of the noble class or the aristocracy remaining in significant positions though many individuals accepted the changes, joined the NSDAP or the SS, or willingly served in the armed forces. A small minority among this class, many in the army general staff, along with ill-advised intellectuals, clerics, financiers and ideological Marxists, detested the new mentality that assigned equal value to everyone while demoting their elevated status.
Instead of contributing their talents to build the new Germany, they connived and plotted against their nation, despite whatever costs it might entail. Some of the traitors included Carl Goerdeler, Leipzig’s mayor, Richard von Weizsäcker, in the Foreign Ministry, Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, Erich Kordt, and Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the chief of military intelligence. 1291
After World War I, Theodore Rowehl became concerned about the alliance between Poland and France and rumors of Polish construction of border fortifications. He began flying a hired plane and photographing from 13,000 feet to avoid detection. In 1930, he shared the photos with the Abwehr and he began working with it, often flying along the Polish border. By 1934, Rowehl’s project grew to five aircraft and a small group of select pilots. In 1934, after Germany and Poland signed the Non-Aggression Pact, the unit went underground. In 1936, Herman Göring invited Rowehl’s unit to join the Luftwaffe, as the Squadron for Special Purposes. Rowehl recruited pilots that are more experienced and purchased more planes and specialized aircraft. The Rowehl Group then provided strategic information to the army and the Luftwaffe. After the war began, the group had three squadrons, each with twelve planes, and became the Reconnaissance Group of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force. Rowehl supervised the Luftwaffe’s strategic air reconnaissance program.
By 1935, Germany flew high-altitude reconnaissance missions over the USSR during which air crews photographed Soviet naval facilities, armaments and industrial complexes, troop concentrations and from those photos, created maps. In 1937, the Germans had the capability of deciphering Soviet photo-telegraphic transmissions. Through these interactions, the Germans obtained information about the Soviet’s arms and industrial productions as well as the logistics of their industrial production. 1292 The monitoring stations sent all of this incredibly valuable information to the Abwehr for evaluation. Admiral Canaris, the Abwehr chief, hired Hans Oster to direct the Central Department of the agency. Abwehr, the German military intelligence organization (1921-1944), dealt exclusively with human intelligence, specifically information reports from field agents and other sources. Canaris reported directly to the High Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or OKW). Then the Operations Branch (as distinct from the Intelligence Branch) of the OKW disseminated intelligence summaries to the intelligence-evaluation sections of the Army, the Navy and Luftwaffe. The Abwehr headquarters was adjacent to the offices of the OKW.
Those who opposed Hitler recognized that he was so popular with the people that they would never be able to provoke a national insurrection against him. Instead, they sought assistance from external entities, leading and backbencher politicians in the queue for influential positions in Britain. In June 1937, Canaris sent Goerdeler to London, using foreign currency provided by Hjalmar Schacht. There, Goerdeler met with Lord Halifax, Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, Sir Robert Vansittart, and Montague Norman and told them about the increasing success of the opposition movement in Germany and its proposed coup. In December 1937, Ribbentrop, warned Hitler about the deceptive designs of the British. Meanwhile, Weizsäcker told the British that Ribbentrop told Hitler that the British were far too cowardly to oppose Germany. 1293
By 1938, certain military personnel began to share Germany’s state secrets with the West and the Soviet Union. Those who collaborated with Germany’s enemies opposed National Socialism. They included, Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg (and his brother), Admiral Canaris, Helmuth von Moltke, Major General Herrmann von Tresckow, Colonel General Ludwig Beck, Albrecht von Quirnheim, Colonel General Friedrich Fromm and General Friedrich Olbricht and others. They acknowledged that the common folk, because of their actions, would view them as traitors and they were well aware that they were committing high treason. They had selected Carl Goerdeler to replace the commoner, Adolf Hitler, who they regarded as “the Bohemian corporal.” The new leadership would fashion their government after the British model. 1294
During the Sudetenland situation in mid-1938, Kleist-Schmenzin attempted to convince the British to reject Hitler’s proposition to annex that German-populated area. On August 19, Kleist-Schmenzin assured Churchill, an MP, that if and when war erupted, the German opposition would revolt and impose a new government within forty-eight hours. He also shared confidential information with details about Germany’s military capacity. Prior to that, Goerdeler told Churchill that German rearmament was a “colossal bluff” while Kleist-Schmenzin assured the British that Germany was totally ill-equipped for warfare. On September 7, 1938, Erich Kordt delivered a message to Lord Halifax from Weizsäcker which stated, “The leaders of the army are ready to resort to armed force against Hitler’s policy. A diplomatic defeat would represent a very serious setback for Hitler in Germany, and in fact precipitate the end of the National Socialist regime.” By encouraging London politicians, Weizsäcker sought to ignite an armed conflict. 1295
Chamberlain received better, more accurate information from his ambassador in Berlin, Sir Nevile M. Henderson who had written to Undersecretary Cadogan in July, reiterating the fact that although Hitler did not want war, Germany was cognizant of the real possibility and was organizing for war. The opposition perceived the annexation of the Sudetenland, as part of the Munich Pact, as a disappointing defeat. On October 18, Goerdeler told the British politicians that Ribbentrop was claiming that Chamberlain “signed the death sentence of the British Empire” in Munich and that, “Hitler will now pursue a relentless path to destroy the empire.” Roger Makins, a British diplomat, after talking with Carl J. Burckhardt, wrote in a memo to the Foreign Office, “Great Britain should continue to show an absolutely firm front. This is the course advocated by Baron von Weizsäcker and by most well-disposed Germans.” 1296
German opposition continued to deliver false information to Chamberlain, especially claims that the German economy was in shambles, that Hitler was unpopular, and that the opposition depended on the British to help them get rid of Hitler. On July 4, 1939, Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, who worked with Henderson, wrote to Lord Halifax, “I have a deep-rooted mistrust of their advice and their information. They are quite powerless to get rid of the Nazi leaders by their own efforts and they place all of their hopes for this purpose in war with England and the defeat of Germany. One can have little respect for or confidence in Germans for whom the destruction of a regime is a higher aim than the success in war of their own country.” Immediately after the war started, Chamberlain wrote in his diary, “What I hope for is not a military victory—I doubt very much that this is possible—but a collapse of the German home front.” 1297
Stewart Menzies, grandson of the immensely wealthy whisky distiller and head of a very profitable cartel, became Chief of MI6 in 1939. He directed and further developed the wartime intelligence and counterintelligence departments at Bletchley Park, especially its code breaking activities. He acquired Ultra material from the Government Code and Cypher School located at Bletchley Park during World War II, which allowed MI6 to break the German Enigma signals. This gave Menzies and MI6 insight into Hitler’s strategy, information unknown until 1974 when Frederick Winterbotham wrote his book The Ultra Secret. The Germans thought that Enigma was unbreakable and did not realize that the Allies had access to a majority of their wireless communications. Menzies, on a daily basis, informed Churchill of all important Ultra decrypts. By 1945, Bletchley Park, with the latest technology, to keep pace with Germany, employed almost 10,000 people.
Karl Doenitz, referring to the lack of logistics for Germany’s North African landing, said, “The German High Command received no concrete information of any kind. In this instance the German Intelligence Service under Admiral Canaris failed completely, just as it failed throughout the war, to give U-boat Command one single piece of information about the enemy which was of the slightest use to us.” 1298 Beginning in 1939, Oster conveyed copies of documents and vital information to Colonel Giysbertus Sas, the Dutch military attaché in Berlin, who often forwarded it to the Western powers.
On April 3, 1940, Oster shared the specifics of Germany’s invasion of Norway with Sas, who then notified officials in Oslo. Always protected by Canaris, who also shared sensitive materials throughout the 1930s, Oster provided Sas with the date that Germany intended her surprise attack in the West. 1299
In January 1941, the Reconnaissance Group of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force added a fourth squadron to spy on the Soviets. In the initial stages of Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, German troops seized documents generated by local authorities that they had not destroyed. These documents provided even more information about troop strength, ground attacks, available ammunition and fuel, and even civilian attitudes. 1300
Canaris, Oster and others did not convey any of their discoveries in the Soviet Union to Hitler. Instead, they deposited a huge cache of documents in Angerburg, East Prussia. Despite Rowehl’s amazing photography, military cartographers created maps of the USSR without looking at his photos. Thus, they were unable to produce accurate maps which affected the army’s efficiency. It received maps that depicted dirt roads, impassable in the winter, as modern highways. This deliberate disinformation disrupted and thwarted the advance of Germany’s mechanized forces. In early 1941, Georg Pemler, a reconnaissance flight officer then in Romania, in looking at Rowehl’s photos, saw images of a tank on railroad flatcars. Soviet deserters warned the Germans about the new heavy tanks that the Soviets had. Romanian Colonel Krescu explained that the Soviets were receiving these new tanks. Pemler immediately flew to Berlin to talk with intelligence agents who failed to tell the OKW what Pemler discovered. 1301
The Ruling Elite Page 47
