by Yael Tamir
of the income distribution whose real market income— their wages
and income from capital— were flat or had fallen in 2014 in com-
parison with 2005. This compared with less than 2 percent, or fewer
than 10 mil ion people, who experienced this phenomenon between
1993 and 2005.8
The Elephant in the Room • 115
When the elites are alienated from the needs and interests of
the masses and, particularly, when they are endorsing self- serving
policies, presenting them as a morally superior point of view, the
claim— often described as reactionary or populist— that the
elites do not represent the real interests of real people seems far
truer and less demagogic than some would like us to believe.
Growing social gaps lead to the formation of separate, hostile
identities; on the one side are those who experience a slowdown
of social mobility, feeling locked within their socioeconomic po-
sitions, left out of the competitive game; on the other are those
who have a secure place at the top. When the contours of suc-
cess are shaped in ways that are open mostly to members of the
elite, the formation of a real meritocracy is prevented, trust is
eroded, and anger surfaces.
The fact that elites devote “considerable effort to cultivating
their offspring’s stock of academic currencies to ensure succes-
sion along kinship lines”9 discloses the attempt to replace natural
talent with breeding or, to use Wil iam Deresiewicz’s term, with
a “hereditary meritocracy.”10 Affluent parents, he argues, raise
children who are “resume jockeys,” prepared from early child-
hood to be admitted to the best schools and universities that will
secure them prestigious jobs and high- level incomes. The
elites welcome the exceptional few but block the way of perfectly
able individuals whose parents lack the time and resources to
breed them for acceptance. Those who make it to the top are
taken to be proof that success is within reach. But it isn’t. As
social inequalities deepen, social mobility declines:
One striking feature is the decline in upward mobility among
middle- class workers, even those with college degree. Across the
distribution of educational attainment, the likelihood of moving to
the top deciles of the earnings distribution for workers who start
116 • Chapter
15
their career in the middle of the earning distribution has declined
by approximately 20% since the early 1980s.11
Social immobility is enhanced by geographic separation,
which, in turn, deepens feelings of estrangement and alienation.
The life experiences of the different social groups vary, and there
is very little social exchange across communities. Social differ-
ences are highlighted and used to raise social fences and make
the price of crossing them higher. In another context I have called
such moves “gap preserving policies,” and though no one com-
mends them publicly they are the motivating force behind many
private and public policies. No wonder that social and economic
gaps are growing faster than ever.12
From the perspective of the have-nots, the highly refined be-
havior of the upper classes and those who manage to join them
is a form of dominance and supremacy. It is rejected not because
it is deemed wrong, but because it is, for most, outside their
reach. In his book Hillbilly Elegy, James David Vance argues that
the hil bil ies’ resentment of Obama was an expression of such
feelings. Obama was resented, he argues, because he was too per-
fect, too aloof, too unreachable, less of a role model and more
of a source of irritation.
The president feels like an alien to many Middletonians for reasons
that have nothing to do with skin color. Recall that not a single one
of my high school classmates attended an Ivy League school. Barack
Obama attended two of them and excelled in both. He is bril iant,
wealthy, and speaks like a constitutional law professor— which, of
course, he is. Nothing about him bears any resemblance to the
people I admired growing up: his accent— clear, perfect, neutral—
is foreign: his credentials are so impressive that they’re frightening . . .
he conducts himself with a confidence that comes from knowing
that the modern America meritocracy was built for him. . . .
The Elephant in the Room • 117
President Obama came on the scene right as many people in my
community began to believe that the modern American meritoc-
racy was not built for them.
Barack Obama strikes at the heart of our deepest insecurities.
He is a good father while many of us aren’t. He wears suits to his
job while we wear overalls, if we’re lucky enough to have a job at
all. His wife tel s us that we shouldn’t be feeding our children cer-
tain foods, and we hate her for it— not because we think she is
wrong, but because we know she is right.13
This text captures the way social alienation turns into anger, re-
sentment, and animosity. Contrary to the expectations of many,
crossing the class line does not make one a local hero or a role
model but “the other.”14
The high correlation between socioeconomic background and
educational achievements (at all levels of education) makes suc-
cess class-based. Consequently, for some, poverty is a family
heritage, while for others it is inherent wealth. When a class sys-
tem turns into a caste system, it is not surprising that those left
outside adopt a policy of “if you cannot join them beat them.”
The social protests now erupting around the world are less about
gaining power and more about taking power away from those
who seem to have betrayed their duty.
Living in different territories, cultivating different traditions,
attending different educational institutions, confronting differ-
ent dangers, inculcating different expectations, eating different
kinds of foods, and facing different health problems and patterns
of longevity, the different social classes develop separate identi-
ties and sets of values. The less well- off value tradition, place
honor and duty high on their list of desirable virtues, and express
a clearer national identity than members of the more affluent
classes. Those who make it place freedom at the top of their list
118 • Chapter
15
of priorities and articulate a greater attraction to the globalist
vision.
Organized denial and ideological blindness leads the ruling
elites to underestimate the importance of these divisive pro-
cesses. They keep convincing themselves that ours is the best of
times, an age of freedom and progress. A public speech delivered
by Barack Obama in April 2016 captured the shortsightedness
of the elites.
We are fortunate to be living in the most peaceful, most prosper-
ous, and most progressive era in human history. . . . It’s been decades
since the last war between major powers. More people live in de-
mocracies.
We are wealthier and better educated, with a global
economy that has lifted up more than a bil ion people from extreme
poverty. . . . If you had to choose the moment in time to be born,
any time in human history, and you didn’t know ahead of time what
nationality you were, or what gender or what your economic sta-
tus might be, you’d choose today.15
This is the great speech of a global leader carrying the beacon
of global prosperity and freedom. It is a less convincing message
for many citizens who are experiencing the present as the worst
of times, a time of personal and communal destitution. The
speech highlights what I have been arguing thus far: the elites
took a global leap forward and forgot to look at their political
surroundings. Hence, they have broken the very first rule of so-
cial solidarity that lies at the heart of national and democratic
beliefs: members must come first, not because they are in some
inherent way better, but because we distribute what we have cre-
ated together, and the way we distribute it reflects our collective
wil . This is the essence of the national- democratic contract. Tak-
ing care of each other is the norm— taking care of others is the
exception.
16
The Birth of a Nationalist
In an article published following Brexit, Tony Blair, former Brit-
ish prime minister, divided the world into closed- minded and
open- minded individuals: “the open- minded see globalization
as an opportunity, with challenges that should be mitigated; the
closed- minded see the outside world as a threat.”1 Blair is wrong
to claim that the differences between nationalists and globalists
reflect a difference in levels of moral development or state of mind.
Being a nationalist or a globalist is not a constitutive state of
mind; on the contrary, in light of changing circumstances, indi-
viduals locate themselves at different points along the global-
national (G- N) continuum.
A 2016 global survey sheds new light on the correlation among
education, rationality, and the way individuals position them-
selves on the G- N continuum.2 The pol sters at GlobeScan ques-
tioned more than twenty thousand people in eighteen countries
about their position. More than half of those living in emerging
economies (such as Nigeria, China, Peru, and India) saw them-
selves as global rather than national citizens. The trend in the
developed, industrialized, richer, and better educated nations
seems to be heading in the opposite direction, with the concept
of global citizenship appearing to have taken a serious hit after
the financial crash of 2008. In Germany, for example, only 30
percent of respondents saw themselves as global citizens, the low-
est percentage in fifteen years.
120 • Chapter
16
Are you a global citizen?
Nigeria
China
Peru
India
Spain
Kenya
Ghana
Pakistan
Canada
Brazil
Greece
UK
Indonesia
US
Mexico
Chile
Germany
Russia
Figure 5. GlobeScan’s 2016 survey on global citizenship. Source: GlobeScan poll for the BBC.
According to the survey, Nigerians are far more globally
minded than Germans. The reason is not, however, that Nige-
rians are more rational, open- minded, or better educated than
Germans, but rather that most of them see no future in their
homeland and would like to be able to build their lives in a more
prosperous society. The global perspective makes it clear that
one’s position on the G- N continuum reflects his/her evaluation
of his/her individual and collective life chances. Rational calcu-
lations influence the tendency of the more educated and eco-
nomically established to place themselves closer to the G pole
The Birth of a Nationalist • 121
and of the less educated and more economically vulnerable to
position themselves at the opposite pole.
Globalists wish to convince individuals that national affilia-
tions have a diminishing influence on their risks and opportuni-
ties, hence they would like individuals to be looking beyond the
nation- state into a global world where nothing counts but talent
and wil . This is a naive and misleading point of view. Consider-
ing that less than 4 percent of the world’s population are immi-
grants (living in a country they were not born in), the assump-
tion that one’s life chances are independent of one’s country of
origin is deceptive. Most people’s lives are state- centered, so
investing in the wel - being of our nation- state is not a sign of
sentimental unreasonableness but of a rational evaluation of the
best means of promoting our goals. In fact, most of us have as
good a reason to invest in improving our collective wel - being
as in bettering our own personal welfare. The national way of
thinking reflects this reality. Is it any wonder that so many peo-
ple are drawn to it?
The bottom line is clear: Individuals are better off if they struc-
ture their preferences in light of actual risks and opportunities.
Wartime is a good example; being exposed to common existential
risks diminishes the importance of personal difference; hence,
individuals tend to lean toward the national pole. In times of
peace and prosperity, social cohesion is eroded and individuals
are inclined to endorse a more global and universal point of
view. The answer to the often- raised question, why cannot we
stick together in good times as much as in bad ones, is simple:
because it is against our best interests.
Obviously, social and economic circumstances aren’t the only
factors that affect a person’s scheme of risks and opportunities.
When membership in a racial, ethnic, gender, or religious group
122 • Chapter
16
determines one’s fate, the importance of other kinds of social dif-
ferences is being marginalized. The case of German Jews living
under the Nazi regime is a clear example of the way extreme
circumstances erased in- group differences and clustered all
members into one consolidated “risk group.” Before the Nazi era,
German Jews were not at all united. Many were in the midst of
assimilating; in fact, quite a number believed they had already
assimilated. They also differed in their human capital, financial
wealth, and social position as wel as in their religious and na-
tional preferences: some held cosmopolitan views and some were
German patriots, while others had turned to Zionism. The Nazi
regime erased their individual capital and made their risks and
opportunities dependent solely on their national- religious iden-
tity. At that particular point in history, being Jewish was all that
mattered. A miscalculation of one’s risks and opportunities or an
evaluation that relied on assumpti
ons that were no longer rele-
vant had fatal implications; many of those who assumed that their
wealth or skil s would save them ended up in the gas chambers.
One may never be in a situation where it is advisable to choose
the N pole or the G pole; this is not a reflection of one’s moral
qualities but of the life experiences imposed on the person de-
spite his/her wil . This claim raises questions concerning moral
luck. The moral tests we face are often determined by factors that
are beyond our control:
It may be true of someone that in a dangerous situation he would
behave in a cowardly or heroic fashion, but if the situation never
arises, he will never have the chance to distinguish or disgrace him-
self in this way, and his moral record will be different.3
We tend to ignore external circumstances and judge people “for
what they actually do or fail to do, not just for what they would
have done if circumstances had been different.”4 This biases our
The Birth of a Nationalist • 123
judgment against individuals forced to cope with more demand-
ing external conditions.
A discussion of moral luck may seem to bear the mark of so-
cial determinism. This is not necessarily true; it is reasonable to
assume that people are free to choose how to act in any given
circumstance, yet it is only natural that their decisions would re-
flect their self- interest. Attitudes toward immigration or affir-
mative action may highlight the case in question. Many of those
who support progressive immigration policies will encounter
immigrants only as cheap service providers or laborers, while
many of those who wish to restrict immigration will compete
with immigrants for a part- time job, or see the value of their prop-
erty decline as immigrants move into their neighborhood.
Apparently, those who support progressive immigration poli-
cies have less of a reason to be concerned with the impact of
immigration on their daily life than those who wish to restrict
immigration. Are those who are “pro- immigration” better people
than those who wish to restrict immigration? I doubt it.
Good luck does not reflect good character; think of wealthy
people celebrated for their generous donations (often regardless
of the way they have earned their fortune); are they better people
than a poor person who shares a meal with someone in need?
