by Yael Tamir
Probably not, yet the poor person will rarely be noticed. The fact
that we are products not only of our own free will but also of our
external circumstances points to the importance of the combi-
nation of freedom and fate that structures our private and com-
munal lives.
It is evident that the general economic and political state of
affairs influences the way people evaluate their risks and op-
portunities. In times of prosperity, when growth is assumed to
produce more for everyone, people are more generous and
open- minded; in times of austerity, when the economy slows
124 • Chapter
16
down, people assume that things will get worse, that their
risks will mount and their opportunities will shrink; they are
therefore more protective of their interests and less inclined
to support policies that would intensify competition.
When economic optimism reigns and progress seems inevi-
table, it is reasonable to follow the “Lockean proviso,” according
to which individuals have the right to acquire as much private
property as they can (mostly land in Locke’s days), as long as
what they leave behind for others is enough and “as good.”5 The
moral assumption is simple (maybe simplistic): cultivating one’s
talents will create more goods to be enjoyed by all; leaving
enough for others ensures that they too can carve a qualitative
piece out of these goods. Provided everybody has enough, it wil
be fair if the diligent and creative have more.
The impact of the Lockean proviso on modern thinking can-
not be overestimated. Even though Lockean conditions of
abundance no longer exist, the idea that having more as a result
of hard work is not unfair, and that envy, in and of itself, is
unjustified has deeply influenced modern conceptions of justice.
But what happens if there simply isn’t enough for everyone?
Locke’s assumptions are reversed in times of austerity. Expecting
there will be less to share, we must be much more careful with
the way goods are distributed, making sure that what is left for
others is indeed qualitative and good enough. Caring about
others’ wealth thus turns from a matter of pure envy into a way of
securing future needs. No wonder that the haves are eager to con-
vince the public that growth and progress are endless while the
have-nots warn against the dangers embedded in austerity. If the
former are right, then we should all be envy-free; if the latter de-
scribe social reality in more adequate terms, then each and
every one of us must fight to secure her/his need.
The Birth of a Nationalist • 125
Class
Risks/opportunities,
social status,
self-esteem
Personality
Optimism/ pessimism
risk aversion/ risktaking
Nationalism
Globalism
envy free/ status
motivated
Figure 6. Proposed model of the G- N continuum.
The claim that one’s stand in the G- N debate correlates with
one’s circumstances may irritate nationalists and globalists alike;
both would prefer to present their position as normative rather
than instrumental. If the difference between the two points of
view has little to do with holding the right set of moral values,
then neither can claim moral superiority or aspire to convince
others to join its camp, as such a move will demand not merely
a change of heart but also of one’s life chances.6
Figure 6 summarizes the argument, showing that individuals
move along the G- N continuum, positioning themselves at
126 • Chapter
16
different spots due to a complex calculation of their risks and
opportunities (also mediated by their personality).
My argument thus suggests that changing social and economic
circumstances causes individuals around the world to reevaluate
their risks and opportunities, leading many to assume that
putting their nation first will best serve their interests. The time
is therefore ripe for the emergence of a new kind of nationalism
that is rational and well calculated.
17
The Nationalism of the Vulnerable
We already have some explanations for the question, why would
the vulnerable adopt nationalism as their preferred strategy? The
answer marries the economic crisis with a crisis of identity. The
roots of this state of affairs are to be found somewhere at the very
end of the last century— a growing sense of self- satisfaction led
liberal democratic nation- states to passivity. With no ideologi-
cal enemies to fight they allowed themselves to let go of some
of the most valuable tools of nation building.
To members of the majority, nationalism became transparent.
The national assets became so invisible that many believed lib-
eral democratic states were moral y and cultural y neutral. At first
liberals were surprised when minorities complained that the par-
ticular culture, tradition, or religion characteristic of the public
sphere alienates them and discriminates against them. Yet twenty
years of identity conflicts ended in victory— the rebel ion of the
minorities added to the public discourse terms such as cultural
domination and cultural exploitation. Nonrecognition was ac-
knowledged as a form of oppression and disrespect. Cultural
recognition turned into a human right.1
Looking at the world from their secure position, liberals felt
safe in allowing newcomers and those previously excluded to
partake in structuring a far more diverse and open public sphere.
Aware of the oppressive nature of the power of majorities,
walking a thin line between toleration and domination, they
128 • Chapter
17
agreed to share their public assets. Diversity flourished. In Amer-
ica, Mark Lil a argues, this process of abdication started when
liberals “threw themselves into the movement politics of iden-
tity, losing a sense of what we share as citizens and what binds
us as a nation. An image for Roosevelt liberalism and the unions
that supported it was that of two hands shaking. A recurring
image of identity liberalism is that of a prism refracting a single
beam of light into its constituent colors, producing a rainbow.
This says it all.”2
The most significant change happened in schools and aca-
demic institutions that were no longer called on to make and
remake the national narrative but rather to be critical, open-
minded, and pluralistic. The same academic fields that fostered
the national narrative were now happy to highlight its fictitious
roots and exclusionary nature.3 The consensual narrative started
to be questioned, and each minority culture, ethnicity, race,
color, or gender was encouraged to voice its own version of his-
tory, culture, traditions, and norms. National unity was eroded
and pluralism replaced the “melting pot” policy. This was a lib-
erating moment, bu
t a price tag was attached to it. The newly
emerging rainbow coalition was colorful and attractive; it stressed
internal differences, yet it made the notion of a national collec-
tive very ambiguous. Ambiguity calls for a struggle, and each and
every group felt this was the moment to try and imprint the pub-
lic sphere with its particular qualities. In order to do so, minor-
ity groups attempted to crystallize their identity, making it richer
and more distinct than all others.
As long as the theme was remembered, social, political, and
economic variety made life richer, more interesting. Yet, in time,
the different narratives started competing for primacy, and the
newly established harmony turned into cacophony. While it
The Nationalism of the Vulnerable • 129
would have been natural for the majority to fight back in order
to restore balance, members of the elite were more interested in
securing their place in the global world than in remaking the na-
tion. The mobile members of the majority thus lost (some
would say surrendered) their position of leadership. While mi-
norities were consolidating their identity, the defining features
of the majority started to fade; soon they become known as
those who do not carry any specific identity. In Canada, for ex-
ample, they are defined as “the rest of Canada” (as opposed to
those in Quebec with its clear cultural and linguistic identity); in
Spain they are the rest of Spain (as opposed to those in Catalo-
nia and the Basque country). In other places the majorities ad-
opted the identity of the megacities they inhabited, being Tel-
Avivians, New Yorkers, Londoners, or Berliners, rather than
Israeli, American, English, or German.
Weak members of the majority were left behind; they inhab-
ited the mainland and the rural areas; the megacities and coastal
areas were foreign to them. In this new world, being what they
are— white, male, members of a majority— was to be apologiz-
ing for the privileges you do not have, to be forced to give way
to others, be pushed back by those defended by affirmative action.
To be situated in a defensive position while your social networks
are falling apart, your income has stagnated (if not decreased),
your children are worse off, and your life expectancy drops is a
reasonable source of anger.
Feeling excluded and deprived, those left behind wish to re-
vive the traditional social and national contours that provided
them with a wel - defined and privileged identity. In the heydays
of the nation- state they could have recruited the elites for this
purpose, but nowadays the elites are less keen to define them-
selves in national terms and have left national terminology and
130 • Chapter
17
symbols for the vulnerable to adopt. Can it be any surprise that
the vulnerable claim to be the true representatives of the
nation?
The vulnerable are not territorially concentrated and they
do not share a distinct language, culture, or history, so they
tend to define themselves in sentimental terms. They cling to a
nostalgic memory of “the good old days” when their nation
gave them a sense of dignity. Being unable to be proud of
themselves, they emphasize the shortcomings of others that
disrupted the traditional way of life that afforded them a com-
fortable social place. Consequently, their self- definition is
grounded in exclusionary ideas, often sliding into xenophobia,
racism, and misogyny, negative perspectives that help them
cope with their hardships. While their aspiration to secure for
themselves the privileges they had is unjustified, their demand
to be equally treated, not to be ignored and left behind, de-
serves careful attention.
The disintegration of the majority, the fact that it is divided
into separate socioeconomic groups who share no common fate
or culture, erodes feelings of belonging and isolates members
from their reference group. The less successful parts of the face-
less majority seek support by recruiting two players, a team that
played well in the past and won many victories: God and the na-
tion. Recounting the mood among hil bil ies, Vance describes
his grandmother’s set of beliefs. She “always had two Gods: Jesus
Christ and the United States of America, I was no different, and
neither was anyone else I know.”4 No wonder religious funda-
mentalism and extreme right- wing nationalism simultaneously
reappear. History teaches us that there is no social, cultural, and
political vacuum. When the elites lose their desire to nurture the
nation, when liberal democrats surrender their educative mis-
sion, others fill their place.
The Nationalism of the Vulnerable • 131
Having lost their protected social status, the vulnerable find
themselves at the bottom of the social heap. Worse still, their
plight attracts ridicule rather than empathy. Rejected and locked
into their social position, they feel hurt and angry. In Strangers
in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right,
Arlie Hochschild travels deep into what is known as “Trump
Land,” meeting good people swamped by anger, despair, and
deep pessimism. They regard the liberal talk on progress and di-
versity as deceptive “mumbo jumbo” and distrust the elites and
the federal government.5
They are sad and pessimistic. A Pew Economic Mobility Proj-
ect studying how Americans evaluate their economic risks and
opportunities shows that “there is no group of Americans more
pessimistic than working class whites.”6 While the majority of
blacks, Latinos, and college- educated whites expect their chil-
dren to do better than they did, “among working class whites,
only 44% share that expectation . . . and 42% of working class
whites report that their lives are less economically successful than
those of their parents.”7
Being pushed out of the social resel ing ring is bad enough;
being blamed for your failure makes things even worse. Being
members of the majority, the vulnerable are expected to take re-
sponsibility for their lives. A failure to do so is taken to be a
result of one’s own doing. In The Working Poor: Invisible in America,
David K. Shipler contends that the “American Myth” (repli-
cated in most Christian countries) provides a justification for
laying the blame for poverty on the poor.
In the Puritan legacy, hard work is not merely practical but also
moral; its absence suggests an ethical lapse. A harsh logic dictates
a hard judgment: if a person’s diligent work leads to prosperity, if
work is a moral virtue, and if anyone in the society can attain
132 • Chapter
17
prosperity through work, then the failure to do so is a fall from
righteousness. In the American atmosphere, poverty has always car-
ried a whiff of sinfulness.8
True to the naive and self- serving belief that those who work hard
> are rewarded for their efforts, poverty, especially white poverty, is
taken to be a sign of personal misdemeanor. The poor, it is argued,
own their poverty just as much as the rich own their property.
This is not just an American point of view; all over the world
the poor are stereotyped in similar ways. A Save the Children
Fund study conducted in Britain shows that the poor are seen
as irresponsible, having too many children, lazy, reluctant to
work, disposed to cheat the system in order to get undeserved
benefits, unmotivated, politically illiterate, or simply dumb.9
Media reports of poverty often include references to antisocial
behavior, which add to the feeling that the principle of deserv-
ingness is particularly conspicuous.
Poor whites thus remain the one group it is still legitimate to
label. A philosopher friend shared the following tel ing anecdote:
Editors of a prestigious academic journal accepted a paper on
humor and stereotyping for publication. The paper opened with
the following joke: “Why can’t Stevie Wonder read? Because he
is black.” They rejected it, feeling the joke painted the journal in
a racist light, and decided to exchange it with the following joke:
A brain transplant patient is offered a choice between two types of
brains. The doctor tel s him, “We have a normal brain for $5,000 and
a Redneck brain for $10,000.” “Why are Redneck brains twice as
expensive as normal brains?” he asks in amazement. The doctor re-
plies, “Wel , they are brand new— they have never been used.”10
This is a superb example of the way the liberal bias in favor of
diversity and against poor whites plays itself out. It is particularly
The Nationalism of the Vulnerable • 133
poignant, because the editors of the journal see themselves as
progressives who despise racism and chauvinism. While they
find jokes about blacks disturbing they are less concerned about
rednecks. As Vance painfully concluded:
White trash is the one ethnic group it is still OK to make fun of. . . .
And if you’re an elite white professional, working- class, whites are
an easy target: You don’t have to feel guilty for being a racist or a
xenophobe. By looking down on the Hil billy, you can get that high
of self- righteousness and superiority without violating any of the
moral norms of your own tribe.11
Social dismissal causes pain and anger; the people Hochschild
