The transfer of the Missouri troops to the east bank of the river represented a major change of Confederate national policy. The Confederate government had relegated the Trans-Mississippi theater to a backwater of the war—a fact that Price found hard to accept. Nevertheless, Price arrived in Memphis ready to beat back the blue tide and seek opportunity to advance his own agenda—Missouri. The Confederates in Tennessee and Mississippi were reeling after a series of setbacks in the spring of 1862. After a heartbreaking defeat at Shiloh in April, General P. G. T. Beauregard pulled out of the strategic rail center at Corinth lest the huge Union army under Major General Henry Halleck46 encircle and capture his smaller Army of the Mississippi. Beauregard’s retreat and the prospect of little action held no appeal for Price and his desire to assist fellow Confederates in the east waned. He now sought to turn attention back to the Trans-Mississippi and Missouri. He made a personal journey to Richmond to call on Jefferson Davis to discuss the early return of his troops to Arkansas. In addition, he sought overall command of Confederate troops west of the Mississippi.47
The trip to the capital brought many accolades as the entire South viewed Price as a hero. Unfortunately for Price, Davis did not share the same opinion of him as his countrymen. Davis believed that Price was the “vainest man” he had ever met and further was nothing more than a glorified military amateur. This set the tone for a stormy meeting between the two men on June 16. Colonel Thomas Snead, Price’s chief of staff, recorded the results of the conference and described it as “contemptuous.” Price presented his views of the situation in writing and expressed his desire to return to Missouri with his troops at the earliest date. Davis succinctly stated that he could not order Price west of the river. To this Price replied, “you cannot prevent me from doing that. I will send you my resignation and go back to Missouri … and win new victories for the South in spite of the [G]overnment.” This response angered Davis and he informed Price that his “resignation will be promptly accepted” and that should he win victories for the South no one would be “more pleased or, more surprised.”48
“Indignant and furious” Price left Richmond intent on resigning and returning west to recruit a new army. Davis, however, had a change of heart sending word to Price that he would send him and his troops back to the west as soon as the situation permitted. Davis knew that Price’s ability to attract recruits and his folk hero status in the South were too valuable to lose. This mollified Price and he agreed to stay on with the Confederacy.49 His pattern of agitating superiors based on his own high opinion of his military skills would continue unabated throughout the war, but his strategy would change as he tried a different approach.
For now the situation in Mississippi had changed radically. General Braxton Bragg had taken over command of Beauregard’s army and transferred it to Chattanooga in preparation for a drive into Kentucky. The seemingly invincible Federals were reeling in the face of the renewed Rebel vigor. The Union army had pulled back significant numbers from northwest Mississippi and west Tennessee in an attempt to stop Bragg. This left the important railhead at Corinth ripe for an attack and an offensive into west Tennessee in support of Bragg. Price, now in command of the Army of the West, prepared for offensive operations at the behest of Bragg. Further, he authorized Van Dorn to join forces with Price to ensure Grant did not shift more forces northward to Kentucky.50 Van Dorn failed to reinforce Price in a timely manner causing more friction in an already strained relationship.
Bragg, concerned for his army’s security in Kentucky, wrote to Price on September 6 urging him take action to prevent reinforcement of the Federal army facing him. Already impatient, Price could wait no longer for Van Dorn and decided to move immediately for west Tennessee. Price moved from Tupelo thence to Iuka in northeast Mississippi intending to push on from there to Nashville. The presence of a large Union force under Grant around Iuka forced a change of plan. Grant set a trap for Price, nearly snaring him on September 19 between the converging divisions of Major General William S. Rosecrans and E. O. C. Ord. Only an acoustic “shadow” saved Price from destruction as Ord’s force never attacked because he could not hear Rosecrans in action to the south. Breaking off the action at Iuka on September 19, Price sought refuge at Baldwyn, Mississippi.51
Within a few days Van Dorn belatedly joined Price and characteristically called for offensive action in an attack on Corinth. Although Price held great disdain for Van Dorn he subordinated his lack of respect for him for the good of the cause. Despite his vanity Price had the good sense to ensure command harmony over self-interest. Price argued against making an attack on Corinth in light of the heavy fortifications surrounding the town. Van Dorn, as impudent as ever, refused to listen and laid out plans to attack Corinth. Against his better judgment Price agreed to the scheme, much to his chagrin.52
Corinth was a disaster for the Confederacy, Price, and his Missourians. On October 3–4 Van Dorn impetuously rushed the defenses in an uncoordinated manner and although in some sectors the Confederates enjoyed success, on the whole the Rebels met with bloody repulse. The Missourians suffered especially high casualties in the assault and Price determined that he would never serve with Van Dorn again and would cross back to the Trans-Mississippi.53
In order to ensure his and the Missouri troops’ prompt return west, Price decided to make another trip to Richmond to plead his cause. He arrived in late January 1863 and held meetings with the new Missouri Governor Thomas C. Reynolds and Secretary of War James Seddon. On this second journey Price had greater success in achieving his purpose, but it was only a partial victory. While a command awaited Price west of the river, the secretary informed him that his troops were needed in Mississippi to defend Vicksburg. While leaving his men was distasteful Price’s drive to get back to Missouri overrode his desire to remain with his division. Therefore, on March 18, 1863, Price finally returned west on orders from the War Department to assume command of a new division of Arkansas and Missouri troops.54
1863 would prove a disheartening year for Price as the Trans-Mississippi Department suffered setback after setback. First, Price participated in a disastrous assault on Helena, Arkansas, in an attempt to relieve pressure on Vicksburg. Then, Vicksburg itself fell cutting off the department from the rest of the Confederacy. Finally, in September Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas, surrendered to Federal forces under Brigadier General Frederick Steele as Price’s small army took refuge in the southern part of the state. Much of the blame for the disasters fell to the aged and decrepit Lieutenant General Theophilus Holmes. Further, the Missouri congressional delegation lobbied for Holmes’ removal since they believed he would do nothing to aid in the liberation of their state. In February 1864 Holmes resigned his post as commander of the District of Arkansas due to the “loss of confidence” in his abilities. Kirby Smith felt Price unequal to the command but the want of competent leaders in the Trans-Mississippi forced him into giving the appointment to Price.55 On March 16, 1864, Price assumed his new command and would serve in this capacity throughout the Camden Expedition. During his tenure he continued to press for a move into Missouri, but his tone underwent a noticeable change. It seemed that the past few years had taught him a lesson in tact and he exercised it now to achieve his ends. His commander, Kirby Smith, was quite amenable to his proposals because of the irritating manner by which Smith’s commander in Louisiana, Richard Taylor, pushed for his agenda.
Major General Richard Taylor did not have a direct combat role in Arkansas since his command encompassed the District of West Louisiana. However, he exerted enormous influence over the decisions made regarding the expedition, and its outcome. He had a background paralleling that of Price while contrasting sharply with Kirby Smith. Therefore, an understanding of this complicated man in the context of his peers is necessary for a fuller appreciation of the expedition’s results.
Major General Richard Taylor, commander of the Confederate District of West Louisiana, vociferously disagreed with Kirby Smith’s policy
for defending the Trans-Mississippi and his home state, Louisiana. Courtesy Jack McCormack Irish Collection at the United States Army Military History Institute.
Taylor was the son of a president—Zachary Taylor—an army brat, and of aristocratic upbringing. His background contributed significantly to his social attitudes, political persuasion, and military command style. Though Taylor lived in a great many places as the son of a ranking military officer, he would claim Louisiana as his home state. Richard Taylor had a pronounced independent streak that his father attributed to the lengthy separations from his family required of him as a commander on the frontier. Zachary attempted to compensate for his absence by sending him to private schools with reputations for discipline. Nevertheless, Richard would develop an irascible personality noted for its combined sarcasm and childishness.56 This would prove a source of irritation for Kirby Smith in 1864 while at the same time providing Sterling Price with an opportunity to fulfill his wish to liberate Missouri.
Taylor entered Yale after his time in private school and here he became stricken with a lifelong ailment, rheumatoid arthritis. It flared up throughout his life, and associates found his disposition unbearable when he was suffering bouts of the malady. As a result, Taylor’s health impaired his judgment and soured his working relationship with subordinates and superiors alike.57 A serious spell during the Red River Campaign would influence his tact and the decisions he made affecting all military operations in the Trans-Mississippi in the spring of 1864.
Like Price, Taylor was a full-time planter and a sometime politician in Louisiana. He would settle there after receiving his college education from Yale to live the life of a privileged planter. As a major land and slaveholder he was predictably a conservative and Democrat. He believed in maintenance of a classed society of planters, peasant farmers, and humble servants. Since this was the natural order he believed all should remain in their respective places for the good of the larger society. He viewed the secession crisis as disastrous for the country and felt that Louisiana’s best interest lay with remaining in the Union. As a delegate at the Louisiana secession convention he opposed secession. When Louisiana left the Union he initially vowed to stay out of the war remaining at his plantation, Fashion. It took little time to change his mind when he received an invitation from General Braxton Bragg to serve on his staff. Bragg’s exhortations convinced him to reluctantly join the Confederacy.58
Taylor had no formal military training like Price, once again diverging from Kirby Smith’s background. Yet, as one contemporary noted, “probably no civilian of his time was more deeply versed in the annals of war.” While having a great respect for the military profession, he held great disdain for the professional officer. He once stated that the frontier officer of the U. S. Army “furnish[ed] the most complete illustration of suppressed mental development.”59 When the war began Taylor quickly developed into an outstanding combat leader with sound grasp of tactics and operational art. Part of the reason for his rapid progress is his service under Stonewall Jackson. Taylor would adopt Jackson’s philosophy of using lightning maneuver to gain advantage and then strike hard to finish the enemy.60 After serving his apprenticeship with the aggressive Jackson, Taylor would find his service under the cautious Smith intolerable.
After missing the Peninsula Campaign in 1862 because of his arthritic condition, Taylor received a new assignment. The Trans-Mississippi held the distinction of being a junkyard for incompetent commanders in the Confederacy. Jefferson Davis—a former brother-in-law of Taylor’s—realized the shortfall of leadership in the department and how it plagued efficiency. Additionally, state governors west of the Mississippi began demanding competent commanders for the army in that region. In response, Davis asked Taylor to accept command of the District of West Louisiana. Taylor accepted the challenge and assumed command in his home state on August 20, 1862. The situation he found defied description as he noted shortages of everything from men to ammunition. Through herculean efforts he brought a semblance of order out of the chaos.61 His incentive was a driving ambition to succeed as a commander and the attachment he felt to the home state he was defending.
Soon after taking charge Taylor began to clash with the department commander over matters of resource distribution, priorities of defense, and where the decisive point of the region lay. Taylor tactlessly pummeled Smith with his thoughts on how best to defend the department with the primary focus in Louisiana. Every barb grated on Smith in spite of the deference he paid Taylor and eventually Smith would have enough. Price also proffered his opinions to superiors on the best course of action for the Confederacy west of the Mississippi. In his opinion the liberation of Missouri should be the top priority of the department. However, having been unsuccessful for so long in his hard-nosed efforts, Price would change tactics in 1864. He became more agreeable while suggesting what he believed Smith should do. By April 1864 Smith was receptive to Price while conversely agitated by Taylor, directly leading to his decision to move into Arkansas.
The Smith-Price-Taylor triumvirate would decide the fate of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department and in a larger sense affect the outcome of the war. The interaction of these men influenced decision-making and set the tone for the Red River Campaign and the Camden Expedition. The inability of Taylor to get along with Smith would have an overall detrimental effect on events. Price’s moderation of his tone enabled him to win over Smith and set the military priorities of the department. His deference to Smith would also allow him to realize his fondest wish, reentering Missouri.
* * *
Notes
1. Joseph H. Parks, General Edmund Kirby Smith, C. S. A., 1–6.
2. Namesake of her mother, also Frances Smith.
3. Parks, General E. K. Smith, 9–12.
4. Ibid., 15–19, 36–39; Edmund Kirby Smith “Papers,” in a letter to his father Joseph Smith dated February 1842.
5. Parks, General E. K. Smith, 39–41.
6. Ibid., 61–62.
7. Smith “Papers,” in a letter to his mother dated September 28, 1852.
8. Parks, General E. K. Smith, 87–88.
9. Smith “Papers,” in letters to his mother dated November 23, 1860, and December 24, 1860; Parks, General E. K. Smith, 121.
10. Ibid., 130–137; and Nina Buck Smith, “Blucher of the Day at Manassas,” Confederate Veteran, VII (March 1889), 108.
11. OR, Vol. 5, 1072–73 and 1078; Parks, General E. K. Smith, 154–158, 165–167, and 174–175.
12. Ibid., 197–199.
13. Frank T. Ryan. “The Kentucky Campaign and the Battle of Richmond,” Confederate Veteran XXVI (April 1918), 158–160; OR, Vol. 16, Part 2, 833–834.
14. U. S. Grant, III, “Military Strategy of the Civil War,” article from Military Analysis of the Civil War, 11–13; Archer Jones, Civil War Command and Strategy, 78–79 and 110–127.
15. Parks, General E. K. Smith, 220–239.
16. Ibid., 251; OR, Vol. 19, Part 2, 643.
17. Parks, General E. K. Smith, 252–256.
18. Robert E. Shalhope, Sterling Price: Portrait of a Southerner, 1–4.
19. Ibid., 5, 10–11.
20. Ibid., 6–8.
21. Ibid., 12–13.
22. Ibid., 15–16.
23. Albert Castel, General Sterling Price and the Civil War in the West, 3.
24. Shalhope, Sterling Price, 27–29.
25. Ibid.; and B. H. Roberts, History of the Church of Latter Day Saints, Vol. III, 205–206.
26. Shalhope, Sterling Price, 39–40 and 46–47.
27. James K. Polk, Diary, Vol. I, Quaife, ed., 440.
28. Shalhope, Sterling Price, 58–59.
29. William E. Connelley, Doniphan’s Expedition, 515–516; Joseph D. Gill III, “American Civil-Military Government: The Service of Colonel Alexander Doniphan in the Mexican War,” Armed Forces and Society (Summer 1996), 558–559; J. S. D. Eisenhower, So Far From God, 236–240.
30. Shalhope, Sterling Price, 70–71; Quaif
e, ed., Polk Diary, Vol. III, 450–451.
31. Cadmus Wilcox, History of the War with Mexico, 538–541; Shalhope, Sterling Price, 72.
32. Quaife, ed., Polk Diary, Vol. IV, 8–9.
33. Shalhope, Sterling Price, 78–82.
34. Ibid., 98–99, 102–103, and 130.
35. Castel, General Sterling Price, 7–11.
36. Thomas L. Snead, “The First Year of the War in Missouri,” B & L, Vol. I, 264.
37. Shalhope, Sterling Price, 157–158; Anthony Monachello, “Missouri in the Balance: Struggle for St. Louis,” America’s Civil War (March 1998), 44, 47–52.
38. Shalhope, Sterling Price, 164–167; Castel, General Sterling Price, 25.
39. Castel, General Sterling Price, 28; Price “Papers,” Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University of Missouri Columbia, G. O. #8.
40. Castel, General Sterling Price, 35.
41. OR, Vol. III, 53–129; N. B. Pearce, “Arkansas Troops in the Battle of Wilson’s Creek,” B & L, Vol. I, 299–303.
42. Price “Papers,” Western Historical Manuscript Collection, August 12, 1861, proclamation to the people of Missouri and Price “Papers,” Special Collection Library, Rice University, August 13, 1861, G. O. to the Missouri State Guard.
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