Brigadier General Eugene A. Carr, commander of the Federal VII Corps cavalry division, competently led Steele’s horsemen providing reliable service throughout a trying expedition in southwest Arkansas. Courtesy Massachusetts Commandery Military Order of the Loyal Legion and the United States Army Military History Institute.
Van Dorn’s plan was bold bordering on rash. In the midst of a blinding winter storm and a tenuous supply situation, Van Dorn attacked a surprised Curtis near Elkhorn Tavern. Although Curtis had constructed prepared defensive works to meet the Confederates, the Rebels did not oblige him by attacking frontally. After a grueling all night march Van Dorn appeared behind Curtis’ fortifications on March 7, 1862. Curtis immediately turned the army about to meet the unexpected threat. Curtis’ scouts discovered that Van Dorn’s army had marched on two separate avenues with two miles of heavy timber and the Pea Ridge intervening between the columns. Armed with this information, he dispatched three divisions to the small hamlet of Leetown to defeat the column commanded by Ben McCulloch. He sent his 4th Division under Carr to Elkhorn Tavern to delay Price’s column rounding the ridge in order to prevent the wings of the Confederate army from linking up.48
Carr force marched his division at breakneck speed to the tavern and quickly deployed his men into line. Price’s column outnumbered Carr’s division over three to one and had a four to one advantage in artillery. Shortly after 11 A.M., Carr had his line set and within minutes his division was heavily engaged. Price launched head-on assaults against Carr’s line several times from first contact until late afternoon. Having little success, Price began moving to the left to flank Carr’s defense. Price had pummeled the lone Federal division for hours wounding Carr three times in the process. For several weeks after the battle Carr had to dictate all correspondence to an aide due to a severe wound to his wrist and one to his spine that left him temporarily paralyzed. In spite of the pain Carr remained on the field throughout the engagement inspiring his division to greater exertions through his example.49 Carr now realized that it would be difficult to hold without reinforcements if Price found and hit his exposed right. In a precarious situation, Carr sent a hasty dispatch to Curtis requesting additional troops to bolster the line. Curtis responded that he had nothing to spare and that Carr must “persevere”50 and hold the line with his own resources. Price forced him to fall back several hundred yards, but darkness set in granting Carr a reprieve. As a result of Carr’s action, he bought precious time for Curtis’ column near Leetown to defeat McCulloch’s force. On a wintry March 7 night Curtis consolidated his army at Elkhorn Tavern with a view toward finishing off Price in the morning. The next morning Curtis struck hard thoroughly defeating Van Dorn and company.51
Curtis recognized the importance of what Carr had done at Pea Ridge and complimented Carr’s gallantry in his official report.52 Carr would soon receive a brigadier’s star and later the Medal of Honor for service beyond the call of duty. In addition, Carr would receive a transfer to Grant’s Army of the Tennessee and begin his association with Frederick Steele as a fellow division commander in the effort to take Vicksburg. Carr continued to build on his reputation during the campaign, shining at the Battle of the Big Black. Leading the pursuit by the Union army by Grant’s personal orders, Carr caught up with the Confederate rear-guard near the railroad bridge spanning the river on May 17, 1863. The Rebels had suffered several setbacks since Grant had crossed to the east side of the Mississippi, especially following their recent defeat at Champion’s Hill. Assessing the Confederate lines to be in utter confusion, Carr decided to launch an immediate assault. Carr maneuvered his 2nd Brigade into a position to turn the Confederate position. Upon leading the attack “the enemy were completely routed, and fled in confusion across the Big Black River.”53 The Confederates retreated to the safety of the Vicksburg fortifications sealing the fate of the city and army.
Carr’s actions had been near flawless throughout the campaign to take the city; however, controversy tainted his performance. Major General John A. McClernand—Carr’s corps commander and a “political” general—filed a skewed report attributing the laurels of the campaign to his leadership. Simultaneously, the report denigrated the performance of Carr and his troops. Incensed, Carr wrote to Grant pointing out the inconsistencies of McClernand’s statements and that “he always tried to show him [McClernand] the respect due to my commanding officer.” Grant, no fan of McClernand either, felt that the democratic politician was more interested in self-promotion than the welfare of his troops or the cause. Accordingly, he would relieve McClernand of command within weeks of the incident.54 The McClernand-Carr confrontation does provide more evidence of Carr’s character as a leader. While he might disagree with a senior, he always paid proper deference to the rank that commander held. Regardless of his loyalty to the commander, he would never hesitate to stand up in defense of his troops revealing his first loyalty. This is an admirable characteristic for the professional officer and Carr displayed it consistently throughout his career.
Following the victory at Vicksburg Carr took leave for a time before returning to his division. With campaign plans crystallizing for 1864, Grant realized that Steele needed a competent cavalry commander for the Camden Expedition. Steele’s cavalry commander, Brigadier General John W. Davidson, had publicly criticized his civil-military program known as the “conciliatory policy.” Davidson had even sent an open letter to the Missouri Democrat newspaper denouncing Steele’s efforts in Arkansas. Irritated by this lack of loyalty from a senior subordinate leader, Steele sought to relieve Davidson and replace him with a more palatable man. He did not hesitate to appoint Carr to the post in light of his mounted background and aggressive leadership.55 This would prove an excellent selection, as Carr would serve Steele with loyal, solid leadership. The Federal leadership in the Trans-Mississippi improved with each transfer and Carr only added to a noticeable upturn in the efficiency of Union endeavors.
Brigadier General Friedrich (Frederick) Salomon commanded Steele’s Third Division during the Camden Expedition and is the wild card among the leaders of the army. His background differs radically from that of his peers within the army. Yet, while he maintained opinions diverging from that of the commander, Salomon invariably demonstrated proper deference and loyalty to Steele. This factor prevented dissension in the ranks from lessening the effectiveness of the commander in conducting operations and is a credit to Salomon’s professionalism.
Frederick Salomon was born on April 7, 1826, in the province of Saxony, Prussia. While not of noble birth his parents managed to obtain a solid education for their son. His education included military instruction and Salomon would earn a commission as a lieutenant in the Prussian army. Following a short term of service Salomon went to Berlin to study architecture. Germany during the 1840s was undergoing a long period of upheaval as various factions struggled for control of the individual states. Salomon became swept up in the furor, but participated on the wrong side in the revolution of 1848. With retribution sure to follow, Salomon and three of his brothers immigrated to the United States.56
Salomon settled in the midwest, as would many thousand German immigrants. He made Manitowoc, Wisconsin, his home and his talents as a surveyor and engineer enabled him to rise to prominence among the German community. Salomon prospered as the sectional crisis began to tear his adopted country apart. Most German immigrants gave full allegiance to the Union because they identified closely with its principles. Most had fought for these same principles during the 1848 revolutions and Salomon was no exception. Young Germans turned out by the thousands to enlist when the Civil War broke out to show their commitment to the nation. Prominent Germans like Frederick Salomon were actively sought out by the government for commissions in the army because they believed this would solidify German support for the war. Salomon volunteered to serve and received a commission as a captain of volunteers.57
Salomon’s training in the Prussian army and experience in the 1848 revolution would s
erve him and his adopted country well. His first engagement came at Wilson’s Creek as a company commander in the 5th Missouri Infantry—his brother Charles’ regiment. He performed competently under fire in the battle and within a couple of months had command of his own regiment, the 9th Wisconsin.58 He would continue to serve quietly and solidly in all the major engagements in the Trans-Mississippi, including the battles of Prairie Grove and Helena.
The defense of the river town Helena would shine as the jewel of Salomon’s service during the Civil War. He had risen to brigadier general and command of a division by July of 1863 and had the task of defending the town under the supervision of district commander Major General Benjamin Prentiss. Vicksburg was on the verge of capitulation in late June and Confederate leaders sought for a way to relieve pressure on the citadel. Theophilus Holmes, commander of the Confederate District of Arkansas, hatched a plan to capture Helena to cut Federal river traffic southward and draw off Union troops from Vicksburg. Salomon had prepared the defenses of Helena and when the Rebels attacked the fortifications they received a hot reception. In the early morning hours of July 4, 1863, Holmes launched a series of desperate assaults against the fortifications. Sterling Price managed to make a temporary lodgment, but lack of support forced him to retreat. The Confederates suffered over 1,000 casualties to Salomon’s 239. Salomon had performed excellent service in holding the town.59 Following Helena, Salomon’s division would be rolled into the newly created Federal Department of Arkansas headed by Frederick Steele. In this capacity Salomon would command during the Camden Expedition.
Somewhere along the way, Salomon developed a great disdain for West Point educated officers. Captain H. A. Heinemann, a staff officer on Salomon’s staff, captured some of his commander’s thoughts on academy graduates during the Camden Expedition. “They [regular officers] map out battles on paper, draw their salaries, and smoke cigars,” recorded Heinemann in his diary after a conversation with Salomon.60 There is significant evidence to demonstrate that Salomon’s brigade commanders shared this prejudice concerning West Pointers. However, as an officer trained in the culture of the Prussian army, Salomon did not allow this attitude to enter into his official discourse.61 This element of loyalty helped to prevent any dissension that might have arisen as it did in the Confederate army in the Trans-Mississippi.
The Rebel commanders west of the Mississippi were a mix of contentious egos bent on satisfying personal interests. The Rebels would engage in vociferous infighting over the course of events in 1864. Thus, they lost the chance to inflict an irrevocable loss on the Union army invading Louisiana. By contrast, the Federals under Steele’s direction maintained an atmosphere of professional cooperation in spite of their individual attitudes and aspirations. Each man placed a premium on duty and loyalty that would pay off when the expedition turned sour. These attributes not only preserved their own force, but forced the Confederates to divided their armies at a time when they had the opportunity to destroy a large army and fleet in the Red River Valley. In sum, the Union commanders performed admirable service for their country rather than seeking self-gratification.
* * *
Notes
1. Patricia Palmer, Frederick Steele: Forgotten General, 6 and 14.
2. Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue, 474.
3. John F. Lacey, “Major General Frederick Steele,” Annals of Iowa, 424–425; Frederick Steele “Papers,” Stanford University, Special Collections Library, Collection #M0191. In a November 21, 1861, letter Steele speaks of his sorrow after the death of Lyon at Wilson’s Creek an associate of “over twenty years” and “intimate friend”; Lloyd Lewis, Captain Sam Grant, 72.
4. Ibid; and Lacey, “Major General Frederick Steele,” Annals of Iowa, 427.
5. Frederick Steele “Papers,” from a September 9, 1845, letter from Frederick and Nathaniel Steele to Erin Steele of Amherst, Ohio.
6. Lacey, “Major General Frederick Steele,” Annals of Iowa, 427–428.
7. Winfield Scott, Memoirs, Vol. II, 517–518; J. S. D. Eisenhower, So Far From God, 340–342; Cadmus Wilcox, History of the Mexican War, 460–461.
8. Scott, Memoirs, 516–517. Extract from his report to the Secretary of War.
9. Lewis, Captain Sam Grant, 218–219; and Lacey, “Major General Frederick Steele,” Annals of Iowa, 428.
10. Steele “Papers,” containing a copy of his promotion orders from the War Department dated March 14, 1855, and other documents, including courts-martial appointment orders dated November 15, 1855, detailing his activities.
11. Ibid., from a February 23, 1860, letter from Frederick Steele to Edgar W. Steele.
12. Palmer, Frederick Steele: Forgotten General, 6 and 16.
13. Edwin Bearss, The Battle of Wilson’s Creek, 1–2.
14. Ibid.; 15–16 and Steele “Papers,” containing an excerpt of Steele’s official report of the affair in an undated St. Louis Republican newspaper article.
15. Bearss, The Battle of Wilson’s Creek, 81, 106, 124, 131, and 135; Steele “Papers,” from Sturgis’ official report.
16. Steele “Papers,” from a letter dated November 21, 1861, recounting the events of Wilson’s Creek.
17. Steele “Papers,” from a December 31, 1861, note from Lincoln to Simon Cameron; A. A. Stuart, Iowa Colonels and Regiments, 179.
18. Foote, The Civil War, II, 76; B&L, III, order of battle and casualties, 471; and Grant, Memoirs, I, 438.
19. Sherman, Memoirs, I, 290–291; George W. Morgan, “The Assault on Chickasaw Bluffs,” B&L, III, 467.
20. Stuart, Iowa Colonels and Regiments, 180–181; Thomas L. Snead, “The Conquest of Arkansas,” B&L, III, 456–457; and OR, Vol. 22, Part 1, 472 and Vol. 24, part 3, 553.
21. Castel, General Sterling Price, 154–158.
22. John M. Thayer “Papers,” from a biographical sketch of General Thayer by his son, John, 2.
23. Ibid.
24. John M. Thayer “Papers,” “John M. Thayer, ‘41, Soldier and Civilian,” reprint from Brown Alumni Monthly, 2. Found in the Thayer collection.
25. John M. Thayer “Papers,” from biographical sketch by his son, 3–4.
26. Ibid., 4–5.
27. John M. Thayer “Papers,” Brown Alumni Monthly, 2.
28. Ibid., 3.
29. Benjamin F. Cooling, Forts Henry and Donelson: The Key to the Confederate Heartland, 148–149.
30. Ibid., 178–179, 183, & 251.
31. OR, Vol. 10, part 1, 173, 193–195.
32. George W. Morgan, “The Assault on Chickasaw Bluffs,” B&L, Vol. 3, 466–470; Thayer “Papers,” biographical sketch by his son, 6; Edwin C. Bearss, The Vicksburg Campaign, Vol. 1, 202–211; and OR, Vol. 24, Part 3, 554.
33. OR, Vol. 34, Part 2, 394.
34. James T. King, War Eagle: A Life of General Eugene A. Carr, 8–9.
35. Ibid., 10.
36. Ibid., 11–13.
37. Ibid., 13. Emphasis added.
38. Ibid., 13–14.
39. Ibid., 15–16.
40. Ibid., 20–21.
41. Ibid., 22–26.
42. Eugene A. Carr “Papers,” United States Army Military History Institute from a letter written by Clark Carr to Eugene Carr dated March 20, 1861.
43. King, War Eagle, 35–36.
44. Carr “Papers,” in a letter from Eugene to his father dated August 16, 1861, describing the Battle of Wilson’s Creek.
45. Bearss, Wilson’s Creek, 54, 70–71, and 95.
46. King, War Eagle, 40–41.
47. Carr “Papers,” in a February 23, 1862, letter to his father days before the Battle of Pea Ridge.
48. Shea and Hess, Pea Ridge, 93.
49. Carr “Papers,” from a March 15, 1862, letter to his father that Carr dictated to an aide. The letter is in the handwriting of this unidentified officer.
50. Shea and Hess, Pea Ridge, 184; and OR, Vol. 8, 258–262.
51. Ibid., 191, 201–203.
52. OR, Vol. 8, 192.
53. Grant, Memoirs,
I, 518; and OR, Vol. 24, part 1, 617.
54. King, War Eagle, 66–67.
55. King, War Eagle, 68; OR, Vol. 22, part 1, 709 and Vol. 34, Part 2, 105, 175, 187, 403, 427–428, and 433.
56. Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue: Lives of Union Commanders, 417–418.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Foote, The Civil War, II, 604–606.
60. M. A. Elliot, ed., The Garden of Memory, “Diary of Captain Heinemann, U. S. A.,” 76.
61. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 671.
4
Toward a Common Center?
Times had become desperate for the Confederacy in 1864, particularly in the Trans-Mississippi region. The capture of Vicksburg in 1863 had severed communications with the eastern Confederacy leaving the territory west of the river to fend for itself. Confederate national policy dictated that the region would have to conduct the war without help from the east using its own meager resources. Kirby Smith knew this was problematic at best and near impossible at worst, but as commander of the department he would defend the region to the utmost extent of his power. The Union forces were in a better position to exploit Confederate weaknesses, but a question arose as to whether the Federal armies really needed to conduct significant operations in the Trans-Mississippi in 1864. Competing demands in the east would require the preponderance of northern resources; however, some in the Federal high command desired to “clean up” the rear areas before conducting further offensives in the east. 1864 was a year of decision in the Civil War and events in the Trans-Mississippi had the potential to have a major impact.
The Camden Expedition of 1864 Page 9
