John Thayer’s Frontier Division, having a longer distance to march, started for the rendezvous at Arkadelphia on March 21. Thayer’s line of march would prove extremely challenging. His route would cover 170 miles of the roughest terrain in Arkansas including the Ouachita Mountains, wetlands, and areas under mob control where guerrilla factions freely roamed. Added to these difficulties, the weather now intervened as torrential spring rains turned dirt roads into swamps slowing the movement to a crawl. This resulted in it taking two days for Thayer’s troops to clear Fort Smith. Steele had set April 1st as the date for the columns to combine, but with seven days to march 170 miles it was doubtful that Thayer could move that quickly. Shortly after departure Thayer realized that his original route by way of Waldron would not support the movement for want of forage. Changing directions in mid-stream, he chose the more circuitous route through Booneville, Danville and then to Mount Ida and Caddo Gap as “it is the only route I [Thayer] can get corn.”13
Meanwhile, Steele’s hasty preparations concluded on March 23 as Salomon’s division preceded by Carr’s cavalry division moved out shortly after nine o’clock in the morning. “The march seemed hard[er] at first, from our having been in camp so long,” observed Private Andrew Sperry of the 33rd Iowa. “But,” he continued, “we made the nine miles marked out for the first day without difficulty.” In contrast to the poor weather encountered by Thayer’s men, Steele’s column was blessed by a “clear and beautiful” day. Each man carried forty rounds, his knapsack, and two days’ provisions moving in cadence to Yankee Doodle. By all accounts the Camden Expedition was starting out “in style,” but things would not take long for the situation to deteriorate. After another day’s hard march the men received the unwelcome news that the quartermaster would issue only half rations, except coffee, for the duration of the march. As could be expected this action immediately touched off a round of grumbling in the ranks as the soldiers speculated about the relative intelligence of the officers at headquarters. A half ration amounted to “two hardtacks, a little salt pork, a little salt, and some coffee.” As Private Sperry pointed out in his post-war account, this meager sustenance would hardly keep up the strength of soldiers on a march through mud, hills, and broken terrain. Nevertheless, the men trudged on making good time, approaching the banks of the Saline River by the evening of the 24th.14
The Confederates had not been idle over the winter months of 1863–64. Kirby Smith anticipated the Federal offensives in January and accordingly made preparations to defend the interior of the Trans-Mississippi. In Arkansas Smith’s program included construction of a series of supply caches, the wholesale relocation of the civilian population along the expected avenue of the Union thrust, construction of fortifications at key locations, and reorganization of forces. The cache sites extended from Camden to Shreveport. The purpose of them was to provide a regular system that the Rebels could use to sustain their forces in country destitute of resources. The intent behind removal of the populace was to further denude southwest Arkansas, so the advancing Federals would find it difficult to forage as they moved further from their own supply base. Camden figured to be a major objective of the Federal thrust given its strategic location astride a prime avenue to Shreveport and as a potential logistic hub on the Ouachita. As such, Smith authorized construction of a series of fortifications to protect the city. Finally, Smith provided the impetus behind a reorganization of forces in the District of Arkansas when he relieved the aged Theophilus Holmes with Sterling Price.15
Camden Expedition Overview
In addition to Price’s usual scheming for a Missouri expedition, he had been busy reorganizing his new command and planning for the defense of Arkansas. Price’s command consisted of his old infantry division and two divisions of cavalry commanded by Brigadier Generals John Sappington Marmaduke and James F. Fagan in five brigades. Upon Holmes’ relief Kirby Smith in short order split Price’s division into two small divisions now commanded by Brigadier Generals Thomas Churchill and Mosby Parsons for ease of management. Upon taking command Smith alerted Price of the impending advance and implored his new district commander “to exert all your energies in preparing to meet the storm.” Additionally, Smith informed Price that he held Brigadier General Samuel Maxey’s division from the Indian Territory in readiness to cooperate with his command should it become necessary. Finally, Smith needed intelligence from Price in order to make decisions regarding the defense of the department.16
Price’s troops were disposed in a wide swath across southern Arkansas to watch all possible Federal approaches to Shreveport. Churchill’s and Parsons’ divisions concentrated their infantry forces around Camden as Price anticipated the main Federal advance would move through this city. Marmaduke’s cavalry patrolled northwest of Camden to observe the routes leading to Washington while elements of Fagan’s troopers spread out northeast toward Pine Bluff to contest an advance from that direction. The dust had barely settled from making these dispositions when orders came from Kirby Smith ordering Price’s infantry to Shreveport on March 18. Banks’ campaign along the Red was already a week old and at Alexandria, Louisiana, while Steele had not even started from Little Rock. Though Smith was not sure if Banks’ force represented the greatest threat to the department, it was certainly closer to Shreveport and had to be dealt with immediately. Therefore, he wanted Price’s infantry to augment Taylor’s forces to turn Banks back. Perhaps sensing that Price would have strong objections to the taking of all his foot soldiers, Smith ordered Maxey from the Indian Territory to reinforce Price partially making up for the loss of the infantry. Uncharacteristically, Price cheerfully complied with the order and promptly sent the troops to Shreveport.17 His support made Smith’s job much easier as Price offered no argument and also, to Price’s benefit, Smith became amenable to future designs in Missouri.
Price’s strategy for opposing the Union advance was dictated by Kirby Smith in a final piece of guidance as operations commenced. Smith instructed Price to:
Retard the enemy’s advance. Operate on their communications with your cavalry if practicable. Time is everything with us. Do not risk a general action unless with advantage to yourself. You fall back toward reinforcements.18
This represents the implementation of Smith’s Fabian defensive strategy and Price would prove adept at parrying with the Federals as they moved south.
The Federals under Steele had enjoyed fair weather and steady progress over the first 48 hours of the march from Little Rock. However, late on the night of March 24–25 the heavens opened up thoroughly drenching the army and turning the lowlands in the Saline River Valley into a sea of mud. As the Federals attempted to ford the river they quickly bogged down in the mire as the innumerable vehicles churned up what had been the road. In response, the Pioneer Corps began corduroying the road to provide a foundation and traction for the movement of vehicles and men. Andrew Sperry of the 33rd Iowa described the march “as a tiresome and disagreeable one … for it necessitated slow marching [and] sometimes a good deal of work in getting out of the mud.” The struggles through the bottomlands exhausted the already weakened animals forcing the Federals to cut short their march on the 25th.19
On the 26th, now out of the bottom and moving through rolling terrain, the army closed in on Rockport on the east bank of the Ouachita. As they advanced, troopers from Carr’s cavalry began coming into contact with elements of Marmaduke’s gray squadrons probing for intelligence. Confederate resistance while light, stepped up significantly as the blue clad cavalry approached the nearly deserted river town of Rockport late in the afternoon. The Ouachita at Rockport was normally fordable at several locations around the village. Steele, now faced with unpredictable weather, ordered the army pontoon bridge erected to span the river should another downpour further swell the river. Such an event could endanger the army if it suddenly became separated in crossing a now unfordable stream in the face of the enemy. Chief of Engineers Junius Wheeler worked his pioneers all night to have the b
ridge in place by morning on the 27th enabling the army to continue its tramp to Arkadelphia. Wheeler’s engineers completed the task and the army began crossing the span at daylight, only two days’ march from Arkadelphia and the rendezvous with the Frontier Division.20
Price had anxiously observed Steele’s movements since he had departed Little Rock. In order to execute Kirby Smith’s order to “retard the advance of the enemy” Price first had to determine which avenue the Federals would use to advance on Shreveport. The Military Road to Washington had a couple of branches leading to Camden and other points suitable for use by the Federal army. However, once the army reached Rockport it had to commit to a single direction for the next several days. The moment the Federals began crossing the pontoon, Price knew they were headed toward Arkadelphia and Washington. Armed with this information Price now mobilized his minions to begin contesting the Federals’ march in earnest. He ordered Brigadier General William Cabell and Colonel Colton Greene to challenge Steele in front while he directed Brigadier General Joseph Shelby—described by one author as a sort of Trans-Mississippi Nathan Bedford Forrest21—to “operate upon his rear.” The march of Steele’s men would now face ever-increasing resistance as Price would do his best to delay Steele so that Smith could land a blow on Banks in Louisiana.22
Thayer’s Frontier Division was not having as easy a time of it trudging toward Arkadelphia. One trooper recounted that the men spent hours laying rails to firm up roads and “pushing wagons up mountains.” Compounding the problem was the shortfall of rations causing the soldiers to exhaust their energies.23 Thayer had chosen a somewhat roundabout route of march in order to maximize his ability to forage for the animals. The line of march led through the Arkansas River Valley greatly increasing the distance required for the movement. Before making the move Thayer made no intimation that he could not complete the march to Arkadelphia by April 1 and never informed Steele of the change of route. Within a few days Thayer realized that he could not make it by the appointed time. In an attempt to quicken the pace of his march he took to destroying superfluous equipment in an effort to lighten up his load. While knowing he could not make it in time, Thayer had no way of communicating this to Steele. With both Steele and Thayer on the move there was simply no way to send a message by telegraph. Attempts to send couriers would prove futile as well because the region of the Arkansas Valley literally teemed with guerrillas and partisans.24 Steele could not even communicate with Little Rock once he reached Rockport. Guerrillas had turned back messengers with dispatches bound for Nathan Kimball in the rear area. Therefore, Steele continued to move resolutely forward oblivious to the fact that Thayer, with almost half the force required for the expedition, would be delayed for several days. This made Steele vulnerable to attack and worse, forced him to consume precious supplies while waiting for Thayer’s arrival at Arkadelphia.
Steele’s logistic posture, as already discussed, was strained before commencement of the march. By the 28th—only five days from Little Rock—Steele began to feel the squeeze caused by his rickety arrangements. He reported in a dispatch to Sherman:
More than half of my cavalry are dismounted, and most of the rest very poorly mounted. Artillery horses and transportation in the same condition…. We have had to haul most of our forage 30 and 40 miles…. Still I am confident of being able to do my share of the work before me.25
Steele’s confidence was only a façade for he knew that he could not push on indefinitely with failing transportation and fast dwindling stocks of supply. Should the rendezvous with Thayer’s wayward division cause a significant delay in forward movement, it would force a major change in the course Steele would follow if the expedition was to have any chance of success.
While Steele and Thayer struggled forward a splendid little action took place at a place called Mt. Elba that would have a positive effect on the expedition for the Federal VII Corps. Colonel Powell Clayton commanded the garrison at Pine Bluff. The post at Pine Bluff was a key supply depot and strategic location in Arkansas. Situated on the west bank of the Arkansas River, it controlled access to Little Rock by boat. Clayton’s command consisted of a small brigade of three cavalry regiments, two infantry regiments and a battery of artillery, which secured Pine Bluff from Rebel incursions. Elements of two Confederate brigades under Brigadier General Thomas Dockery and Colonel William Crawford opposed Clayton’s diminutive brigade. Steele worried that the Rebels would make a lunge at the base and capture it. Rebel possession of Pine Bluff would disrupt Steele’s source of supply, as they would be able to interdict river traffic to Little Rock while simultaneously destroying the depot itself. To prevent such an eventuality, Steele wanted Clayton to employ aggressive tactics to deceive the Rebels. He instructed Clayton to move forward in cooperation with his own advance and “if our movement shall cause them to fall back” he continued, “press them with all force you can use, making the entire safety of your post the primary object.”26 Clayton dutifully complied and in the process the pugnacious cavalryman delivered a smart victory to Federal arms.
Clayton initially sent out two small probes of forty picked men under Lieutenants Grover Young and Frank M. Greathouse of the 5th Kansas Cavalry and 1st Indiana Cavalry respectively to determine enemy dispositions and intentions. Departing on the evening of March 24th they returned on the 26th with troubling intelligence. The lieutenants reported that they had observed the Confederate horsemen encamped around Monticello apparently making preparations to break camp for a march. Clayton surmised that Dockery and Crawford would move off to stiffen Price’s effort to slow Steele’s main column or worse, slip in behind Steele to cut his line of communication with Little Rock. Clayton resolved to prevent this by striking an immediate blow on the enemy. His plan combined boldness, deception, and decisive action to produce favorable results.27
First, Clayton again sent his trusty lieutenants out on a critical mission, this time with one hundred troopers to destroy the bridge over the Saline River at Long View to prevent a hasty retreat in that direction. Second, he planned to make a demonstration from Pine Bluff toward the Rebel camp at Monticello to make the Confederates believe he would attack from this direction. Finally, with the balance of the force, Clayton would personally lead them to Mt. Elba on the Saline. Here he would cross the river and make a feint toward Camden to further deceive the baffled Confederates. Then by quick marches he would retrace his steps back across the Saline to come down on the Rebel camp from the south—an unanticipated quarter.28 If everything clicked according to the scheme, Clayton would potentially remove two brigades from Price’s order of battle making Steele’s advance infinitely easier.
Clayton’s plan to first destroy the bridge at Long View provided an unexpected coup. As Lieutenants Young and Greathouse approached their objective they corralled several prisoners who informed them that a large wagon train with supplies intended for Dockery and Crawford had crossed the Saline headed for Monticello only a short time before. Taking some liberty with their orders, the lieutenants decided to follow the train with a view toward destroying it. The raiders tracked it for several hours before the train halted for the night. The party surrounded the camp and rushed it just after dark demanding surrender from the train guard. The Rebel pickets on outpost duty had mistaken the raiders for their own comrades and never fired a warning shot to alert the train guard. The frightened guards quickly submitted to the entreaties of Greathouse and Young. The evening’s haul came to 250 enlisted men, eight officers, over 30 wagons, and 300 horses and mules.29 The raiding party now turned to burn the bridge in accordance with their original instructions, now with over 200 prisoners in tow. The Federal troopers made short work of the Saline bridge destroying it and dumping some 200 small arms into the river from their prisoners. Their primary objective completed, the raiders, prisoners, animals, and dozens of runaway slaves made their way back to Pine Bluff arriving there a mere 24 hours after starting. The lieutenants’ exploits electrified Clayton, who reported in his account o
f the action at Mt. Elba that their acts were “brilliant” and “almost without parallel.” The small raiding party accomplished all expected and had succeeded in throwing the two Rebel brigades off balance.30
The demonstration at Monticello commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Marks of the 18th Illinois Infantry and Lieutenant Colonel Wilton Jenkins of the 5th Kansas Cavalry also had its desired effect as the Rebel troopers seemed confounded about Federal intentions. Clayton now moved with his main body across the Saline toward Camden to further compound Confederate confusion. Dockery and Crawford moved out of their cantonments toward Marks and Jenkins to confront what they believed was Clayton’s main column, but was actually the demonstration. After making a quick stab toward Camden, Clayton turned back to attack the Rebel rear. By the time the Union colonel reached the Confederate encampment on March 30, the Rebels had already moved to assault Marks and Jenkins.31
A courier from Jenkins now reached Clayton informing him that he was under attack by a large force of the enemy. Clayton, hearing the report of artillery in the distance, had his troopers in the saddle riding with “utmost dispatch” to assist the beleaguered lieutenant colonels near Mt. Elba. Upon arriving Clayton discovered his small demonstration force had “handsomely repulsed” the assault of the much larger force, but the Rebels were preparing another attack imperiling Marks and Jenkins. Clayton, squarely in the rear of the unsuspecting Confederates, deployed his force to deliver a surprise. Once his artillery was in position, Clayton ordered a charge through a peach orchard resulting in a rout. Clayton reported:
The Camden Expedition of 1864 Page 13
