Thus far, Price had slowly drawn back within the space of southern Arkansas extending Steele’s lines of communication to the breaking point. The guerrillas and partisans had assisted his efforts by harassing couriers and making it extremely dangerous to pass wagon trains down the difficult roads from Little Rock. Every mile that Price moved backward drew the spring more taut on a trap. He now intended to step up the defense of southern Arkansas in order to protect the capital at Washington and buy time for Smith to defeat Banks in Louisiana. Once Smith defeated Banks, Price expected to receive reinforcements in order to complete the discomfiture of Steele.52 Then, Price hoped, he would be unleashed for an invasion of Missouri. Richard Taylor had other ideas, as he wanted to finish off Banks once he had unhinged him in Louisiana. For Price to reenter Missouri, everything depended on his ability to delay Steele and use all the tact he could bring to bear in convincing his commander that the true field for decision lay in Arkansas and thence Missouri. Within a few days Price’s large cavalry contingent—soon at seven brigades strong—would meet the Federal VII Corps on the field at the Prairie D’ Ane in the first large-scale engagement of the Camden Expedition.
* * *
Notes
1. OR, Vol. 34, Part 2, 638; and Edward S. McLeod, “Frontier Division in the Camden Expedition,” M.A. thesis, University of Northern Iowa, 2.
2. Edward S. McLeod, “Frontier Division in the Camden Expedition,” M.A. thesis, University of Northern Iowa, 2–3; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 2, 253, 345, 394, 408, 443–448, and 617–618.
3. Or, Vol. 34, Part 2, 618 and 638; and McLeod, “Frontier Division in the Camden Expedition,” 3–4.
4. Robert D. Black, The Railroads of the Confederacy, xxiii-xxix, and OR, Vol. 34, Part 2, 772 and 785.
5. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa Infantry, 59 and 67; and ORN, Series 1, Vol. 25, 774–775.
6. OR, Vol. 34, Part 2, 422–423.
7. Ibid., 424; and ORN, Series 1, Vol. 25, 774–775.
8. OR, Vol. 34, Part 2, 432.
9. Steele “Papers,” General Field Order #1 dated March 21, 1864.
10. Steele “Papers,” General Order No. 11 dated March 5, 1864.
11. Richards, “The Camden Expedition,” 15–16; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 2, 246, 368, and 646.
12. OR, Vol. 34, Part 2, 646 and 704, and Part 1, 657; and Richards, “The Camden Expedition,” 16–17.
13. Riachards, “The Camden Expedition,” 18; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 2, 706–707.
14. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 680; and Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 70–73.
15. Mike Fisher, “The Camden Expedition,” M.A. thesis, Pittsburg State College, 25; William L. Shea, “The Camden Fortifications,” AHQ (Winter 1982), 319; and Bob Reeves, “Fort Lookout,” Ouachita County Historical Quarterly (Fall 1998), 14.
16. OR, Vol. 34, Part 2, 1038–1039, 1077–1078, and 1102.
17. Fisher, “The Camden Expedition,” 26; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 2, 1056, 1062–1063, and 1096.
18. OR, Vol. 34, Part 2, 1095.
19. Ibid., Part 1, 672–673; and Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa Infantry, 73.
20. Lothrop, History of the 1st Iowa Cavalry, 149; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 672–673.
21. Castel, General Sterling Price, 161.
22. Johnson, Red River Campaign, 173; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 821.
23. Lonnie J. White, ed., “A Bluecoat’s Account of the Camden Expedition,” AHQ (Spring 1965), 83.
24. Richards, “The Camden Expedition,” 29–30; Wiley Britton, The Civil War on the Border, Vol. 2, 256; Wiley Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War, 348–349; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 661 and Part 2, 739.
25. Ibid., 659; and McLeod, “The Frontier Division in the Camden Expedition,” 4.
26. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 767–768.
27. Ibid., 768–769.
28. Ibid.; and W. S. Burke, Official Military History of Kansas Regiments, 116.
29. W.S. Burke, Orridical Military History of Kansas Regiments, 117–118; and Amanda M. Dooley, Autobiography of August Bondi, 112, on microfiche.
30. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 770–771 and 776–777.
31. Ibid., 769–770, 773, and 777–778.
32. Ibid., 770.
33. Dooley, The Autobiography of August Bondi, 112.
34. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 75–76.
35. John Edwards, Shelby and His Men; or, The War in the West, 251.
36. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 76.
37. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 679.
38. Ibid., Part 2, 784, and Part 3, 7.
39. Report of the Joint Committee, 383–385.
40. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 661, and Part 3, 77.
41. Samuel J. Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, 109.
42. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 78.
43. Fisher, “The Camden Expedition,” 38.
44. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 693–694 and 837; Sperry, The History of the 33rd Iowa, 77; and Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 252–253.
45. Richards, “The Camden Expedition,” 38–39; and Shea, “The Camden Fortifications,” AHQ (Winter 1982), 319.
46. Shea, “The Camden Fortifications,” AHQ (Winter, 1982), 319–320; and Reeves, “Fort Lookout,” Ouachita County Historical Quarterly, 13–14.
47. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 661.
48. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 710–712, 732, and 822; Lothrop, History of the 1st Iowa Cavalry, 152–155; and Francis M. Drake, “Campaign of General Steele,” War Sketches and Incidents: Iowa Commandery, Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, Vol. 1, 61–63.
49. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 661 and 721; and Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 78.
50. Richards, “The Camden Expedition,” 55; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 674–675.
51. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 780 and Part 2, 728; Britton, The Civil War on the Border, II, 271; Roman J. Zorn, ed., “Campaigning in Southern Arkansas: A Memoir by C. T. Anderson,” AHQ (Autumn 1949), 242; and Henry Cathey, “Extracts from the Memoirs of William Franklin Avera,” AHQ (Winter 1963), 101.
52. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 780.
6
A Change in Plans
The Frontier Division finally made contact with Steele’s column on April 5, but it would still take a few more days to complete the concentration at Cornelius’ Plantation, three miles from Elkins’ Ferry. While the unification of the army gave cause for relief to General Steele, it also brought with it a whole set of new problems in the realm of logistics. How much longer would the VII Corps be able to continue moving forward with only half-rations and sparse forage? Steele would have to decide. The Confederates now consolidated under Price were preparing to give Steele a hot reception the farther he moved south. His nondescript horsemen busied themselves by erecting breastworks on the wide Prairie D’Ane. The challenge for Price was to delay Steele long enough to allow Kirby Smith and Richard Taylor the time to complete the discomfiture of Nathaniel Banks’ Army of the Gulf in Louisiana. Also on Price’s mind was the protection of key locations in his district, Camden and the Rebel state capital, Washington. Loss of these nodes or a failure to adequately slow Steele could result in a disaster for the Trans-Mississippi Department. Could Price give Smith the time he needed and provide security to Confederate Arkansas? Based on the course of events so far, fate favored Price and his large cavalry contingent.
Having made contact with Steele, Thayer pushed south with a greater sense of purpose, but nature it seemed would do all in its infinite power to prevent the junction. Rain on the evening of April 6 once again turned the roads to mud holes. Moving out on the 6th from Rockport, it would take the Frontier Division three days to march to the Little Missouri. The bottomland bordering the rivers slowed movement to a crawl and Steele once more called upon his chief engineer, Junius Wheeler. Wheeler’s tough pioneers had done much to improve the road for the 3rd Division’s passage through the area only two days earlier. They had laid corduroy for several miles on either side of the Little Missouri and built a pont
oon bridge as a hedge should the rising waters make Elkins’ Ford untenable. To Wheeler’s chagrin he discovered “that all the work of the day before was undone; corduroying and bridges were all afloat, the whole bottom nearly was under water, and the Little Missouri was no longer fordable.” After making a quick assessment of the situation, Wheeler set his pioneers to work repairing the “worst places.” The work parties performed miracles laying timbers over three miles of rain soaked road and emplacing a second pontoon 140 ft long reinforced by cable within 24 hours.1 Without the effort of these determined engineers, it might have taken many more than three days to combine the VII Corps.
Thayer reported with his division late on the 9th bringing almost 5,000 men to raise Steele’s strength to almost 12,000. The Frontier Division itself was a hodgepodge in organization and appearance. Divided into three brigades, it consisted of two infantry and one cavalry brigade. The regiments hailed from Iowa, Kansas, Indiana, and Arkansas. The Arkansans were from the high country of the Ozark Plateau and similar to mountain men across the south, their independent nature influenced their decision to remain loyal. Probably the most interesting units were the 1st and 2nd Kansas (Colored) Infantry Regiments. Raised immediately after Congress’ authorization of recruitment of black troops, the 1st and 2nd had built an admirable combat record in battles on the frontier, including Honey Springs in Indian Territory. These regiments would play a fateful role in the expedition, but for now they were a curiosity to the white regiments of the VII Corps. Another oddity in the division was the regiments of Thayer’s cavalry brigade. These had been recruited from Indian reservations in Kansas and contained a high number of native Americans and mixed bloods. Their unkempt hair presented quite a spectacle in the opinion of many of Steele’s troops.2 Sperry of the 33rd Iowa once again provided a vivid description of the arrival of the Frontier Division.
While we lay here, the long-looked-for and much-talked-of, reinforcement of “Thayer’s command” arrived from Fort Smith. A nondescript style of reinforcement it was too, numbering almost every kind of soldiers, including Indians, and accompanied by multitudinous vehicles of all descriptions, which had been picked up along the road.3
While their appearance gave way to much camp discussion, the fighting qualities of the men in the Frontier Division would soon win the respect and admiration of the better clad and disciplined soldiers of the 3rd Division.
When Thayer reported in he brought with him sad tidings of his own destitute supply situation. Based on this information, Steele decided to make his turn to Camden. In an April 7 update to Kimball, Steele described his situation and the reasons for the detour.
Instead of [Thayer] taking the Caddo Gap road, as agreed upon, he went to Hot Springs, having turned off his road above Mt. Ida…. [As a result] He [Thayer] is entirely out of rations, and our delay has caused a consumption of the supplies which might have lasted us to Shreveport. I am now confident of having a sufficient force to walk over the rebels wherever they may meet us this side of Shreveport. I shall therefore, move straight on Camden after striking the prairie [D’Ane], and while supplies are reaching me from Little Rock or Pine Bluff will endeavor to clear your front, so that you will not be troubled with any considerable rebel force.4
In light of the failing logistics Steele intended to use Camden as a forward base to rebuild his strength before pressing on. In preparation for the army’s arrival he issued a sheaf of orders to put his plans into motion.
He began by instructing Kimball “to furnish transportation for the following supplies: thirty days’ supply of one-half rations of hard bread, one-quarter ration of bacon, and a full ration of salt and coffee for 15,000 men.” Kimball would forward these from Little Rock to Camden or if unavailable there, Clayton would make up the shortages from Pine Bluff. The key was to ensure the desired supplies met him at Camden before his arrival with the VII Corps so the force would not have to waste time refitting. Steele intended the process of regeneration to be as short as possible so that the army would lose little time on the trip south.5 Next, he dictated march orders for the advance, placing Carr in front with the cavalry followed by Salomon as the main body, and Thayer guarding the trains.6 Once the corps had pushed Price back on Washington from Prairie D’Ane, the army would break sharply to the east under cover of a heavy screen. Having given Price the slip, the Yankees would march hard to reach Camden before the Rebels realized what had happened. All in all, Steele’s scheme was competently planned and had a reasonable prospect of success. However, as events would show the enemy had a vote on whether Steele’s plan would succeed in readying the army for a further advance southward, and they would demonstrate an uncanny ability to upset the Federals’ ability to carry it out.
The 19th century appearance of the Prairie D’Ane has largely vanished as time has continually modified the topography. In the 1860s the prairie represented a prominent terrain feature for the casual observer as well as the military professional. The prairie is a circular plateau of land encompassing some 30 square miles. It lies approximately 100 miles southwest of Little Rock and about five miles south of the dank, forested bottomlands around the Saline, Ouachita, and Little Missouri Rivers. The open fields breaking out of the pine forest presented a refreshing change of scenery.7 Lieutenant Colonel Adolph Dengler, commanding officer of the 43rd Illinois Infantry Regiment, left a vivid description of the prairie’s appearance in April 1864.
Like an oasis lies this beautiful prairie in midst of dense forests and almost impossible swamps, a relief for the eye of the traveler, who has for many days hardly seen anything but rocks crowned by dark pines or the gloomy cypress swamp. The prairie, elevated above the surrounding country, rises gradually toward its center. A ridge running along the northern edge, slightly covered with brush….8
Jo Shelby also found the change of scenery to have an energizing quality. “The broad prairie stretched away smoothly as a sea of glass,” he recounted.9
As the VII Corps consolidated around Cornelius’ Plantation, Price and his lieutenants chose their ground carefully to contest further advance down the Military Road. Marmaduke, who had sparred steadily with Steele since Arkadelphia, was still in close contact with VII Corps and would have the leading role in the coming fight. He decided to establish a line of defense flanking the Military Road on the ridge described in Dengler’s narrative. The ridge lies about one mile south of the opening of the prairie with a small copse of trees known locally as Gum Grove adorning its center. Overlooking the entire prairie, it conveniently provided excellent observation of the surrounding area and also a superb field of fire to contest Steele’s pressure. The Confederates had taken advantage of the lull in the action to improve the natural strengths of the position. They had thrown up a stout line of breastworks of dirt and timber to protect the dismounted cavalrymen from flying iron and lead.10 Considering the fact that the Rebels had yet to dig in thus far in the campaign, their excavations at Gum Grove represent proof that they meant to give Steele a tough fight here on the prairie.
Engagement at Prairie D’Ane April 10-13. Price’s converging army chose Prairie D’Ane as the ideal site to conduct a delaying action. He placed Shelby and Dockery’s brigades forward at Gum Grove to contest the progress of the VII Corps. Steele’s men discovered Price drawn up in force on the prairie on the morning of the 10th. After heavy skirmishing the Federals conducted an assault on the position late in the evening, carrying it after dark. For the next three days the two sides engaged in skirmishing, with the Federals advancing and the Rebels steadily giving ground. On the 13th after having driven Price from the prairie, Steele slipped to the east on the Washington-Camden Road before Price realized the Federals were gone. On the 13th Price sent Dockery in pursuit of the rear guard of the Union army catching them at Moscow. After initial success in breaking the rear guard, the Frontier Division reformed and drove off Dockery’s Brigade closing the action at Prairie D’Ane.
Marmaduke maintained vedettes forward under Lieutenant Co
lonel L. A. Campbell of the 3rd Missouri Cavalry in order to stay in contact with Steele’s force at Cornelius’ Plantation. In the meantime, he arrayed his forces at Gum Grove in the breastworks with Shelby’s brigade on the right of the Military Road and Dockery’s—recently arrived from Mt. Elba and temporarily under Marmaduke—on the left. The record appears to show that Marmaduke’s mission was to staunchly contest the advance of the Union army without allowing his force to become decisively engaged or endangering his command. Price wanted time to marshal all of his converging brigades for a defense eight miles north of Washington. Marmaduke’s defense would buy time for Price to construct a strong defensive line farther south. Price would then have Marmaduke fall back luring an unsuspecting Steele into a trap “where I [Price] felt confident if he advanced I could attack him [Steele] at a great disadvantage.”11 However, Price’s haphazard style of command and management became manifest as he took personal command in the field making it doubtful he could form a coherent defense. The remaining brigades of Price’s makeshift army were scattered about with seemingly little organization or scheme of emplacement other than Marmaduke’s forces. As the commands arrived in the vicinity of the prairie, no one from Price’s headquarters took charge to arrange them in any order. As a result, the individual brigades simply found a place on the field where they felt comfortable with little regard for defense or even divisional organization in some cases.
The Camden Expedition of 1864 Page 15
