Based on his decision Steele issued verbal orders for the army to make preparations for a retreat. All baggage and ammunition would be quietly loaded during the 26th on the remaining transport assets. The troops would stay in position until nightfall and then commence a crossing of the river under cover of darkness. The decision to retreat gave Steele a great deal of consternation, yet under the circumstances there is little else he could have done without losing his army. Besides, his effort had already saved Banks’ army to fight another day when it most certainly should have perished.
The key subordinates dutifully supported their commander publicly, but privately an undercurrent of disapproval became evident in writings after the war. Mid-level officers recorded most of these memoirs and their criticisms of Steele are scathing. While the senior officers—Salomon, Thayer, and Carr—suppressed any criticism of the commanding general, one may surmise that the musings of their subordinates at least in part reflected the opinions of the division commanders. The two most prominent examples of dissension arose from the pens of Captain Frederick Heineman, staff officer to General Salomon, and Colonel Samuel J. Crawford, regimental commander in Thayer’s Frontier Division. Heineman in his war diary goes out of his way to accuse Steele of hard-headedness, sloth, and cowardice. After Poison Spring he ranted that “Steele … doesn’t appear to know anything about Arkansas, where he is or what he thinks of doing. Damn these regulars!” The debacle at Marks’ Mills moved him to say, “I think Steele will realize … that some of our citizen soldiers know more at times than a West Point book.” Finally, he alleges that “we all join without a dissenting voice” in condemning Steele for his conduct of the Camden Expedition.41
The fiery commander of the 2nd Kansas (Colored), Colonel Crawford, minced no words in his assessment of Steele’s generalship. He alternately described the expedition as “disgraceful” and “humiliating.” In a final summary of the campaign, Crawford pronounced it a “gigantic failure. Had General Thayer, General Carr, General Rice, Colonel Cloud or any one of a dozen officers in the corps been in command, he would have been thundering at the gates of Shreveport before a gun had been levelled [sic] at General Banks’s army.”42
The assessments of Heineman and Crawford are simply emotional ravings that stand empty of intelligent analysis of the true situation. Both men ignore the reality that the army could not feed the men or animals. No amount of determination or outpouring of emotion could make up for the fact that the army had inadequate transportation, operated in a country denuded of forage, and had an aggressive enemy in front and rear. It is very likely that if Steele had attempted what Heineman and Crawford proposed, the VII Corps would have been destroyed in detail. These men in subordinate positions, while certainly not on the inside at corps headquarters, must have known the army’s predicament. Yet, they chose to discount the significance of the logistical problems for their own purposes. Thayer, Carr, and Salomon may have shared the opinion of their officers, but did not leave anything to the record. This is of great credit to each officer for loyalty is an intangible of unit cohesion that sharpens the fighting edge, especially in times of great stress. Had the division commanders publicly adopted the stance of their underlings, it would have had a corrosive effect on the army. This did not happen and although the army lost much in material and personnel, the VII Corps, on the whole, remained intact when the expedition ended only days later.
The Union army at Camden would now begin an ignominious retreat that mortified many in the ranks. However, the worst of the expedition was yet to come. The VII Corps would fight a major battle—the biggest of the entire campaign—march through rain and knee-deep mud, and suffer acute hunger that would test the hardiest of souls. What these men did not know was that their efforts had extracted the 30,000 men of the Army of the Gulf and the Mississippi Squadron from a tight situation. The continuing exertions of Steele and his army ensured that Kirby Smith would not return to Louisiana in time to fulfill Richard Taylor’s fondest wish, the destruction of General Banks and his army.
* * *
Notes
1. OR, Vol. 34, Part 3, 768–771.
2. Joseph P. Blessington, Walker’s Texas Division, 242–243.
3. Bearss, Steele’s Retreat From Camden, 49 and 51 and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 481.
4. Ibid., 534 and 541 and Blessington, Walker’s Texas Division, 244.
5. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 581 and 788.
6. Ibid., 789 and 835 and Bearss, Steele’s Retreat From Camden, 51–52
7. Ibid., 55–56; OR, Vol. 34, 680, 688, and 712; F. M. Drake, War Sketches and Incidents of Iowa, I, “Campaign of General Steele,” 66; and Richards, “The Engagement of Marks’ Mills,” AHQ (Spring 1960), 54–55.
8. Drake, War Sketches and Incidents, I, “Campaign of General Steele,” 66.
9. Ibid.; Lothrop, History of the First Iowa Cavalry, 162–163; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 663.
10. Ibid., 712.
11. Ibid., 721–713.
12. Ibid. and Lothrop, History of the First Iowa Cavalry, 163.
13. Ibid.; Drake, War Sketches and Incidents, I, 67; and Richards, “The Engagement at Marks’ Mills,” AHQ (Spring 1960), 56–57.
14. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 788; Bearss, Steele’s Retreat From Camden, 62–63; and Richards, “The Engagement at Marks’ Mills,” AHQ (Spring 1960), 55–56.
15. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 788–789 and 835.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 793.
18. Drake, War Sketches and Incidents, I, “Campaign of General Steele,” 68–69.
19. Ibid.; OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 772; and Bearss, Steele’s Retreat From Camden, 61.
20. Ibid., 61–62 and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 713.
21. Drake, War Sketches and Incidents, I, “The Campaign of General Steele,” 68–69 and Richards, “The Engagement at Marks’ Mills,” AHQ (Spring 1960), 58.
22. Ibid.; OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 793–794; Evans, ed., Confederate Military History, X, 254; and Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 278.
23. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 793 and 835; Evans, ed., Confederate Military History, X, 254; and Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 278.
24. Ibid., and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 835–836.
25. Ibid., 789, 794, and 836; Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 279; and Drake, War Sketches and Incidents, I, “Campaign of General Steele,” 70.
26. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 713–714 and Drake, War Sketches and Incidents, I, “Campaign of General Steele,” 70.
27. Ibid., 71–72.
28. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 717 and 796 and Bearss, Steele’s Retreat From Camden, 73–74.
29. Lothrop, History of the First Iowa Cavalry, 163.
30. Ibid., 164.
31. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 665 and 787. Confederate reports noted in the OR are incomplete and the Federal totals are estimated by Colonel Powell Clayton two days after the fight.
32. Evans, ed., Confederate Military History, X, 260 and Bearss, Steele’s Retreat From Camden, 78.
33. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 714–715 and Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 279.
34. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 91–92.
35. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 683.
36. Bearss, Steele’s Retreat From Camden, 87–89.
37. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 676–677.
38. Ibid., 671.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., 668.
41. Elliot, ed., The Garden of Memory, “Diary of Capt. Heineman, U. S. A.,” 76 and 78.
42. Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, 113–114 and 134.
9
“There was no dry place to lie down”
The Union army began to make preparations to evacuate Camden on April 26. The retrograde to Little Rock was the point at which the Yankees were most vulnerable to annihilation during the Camden Expedition. The Rebels had successfully stymied Federal attempts to reach the Red River in support of Banks’ army in Louisiana. They did this by capitalizing on the major liability of the Union army, the rickety logistics situation. Having forced the
VII Corps to turn back to Little Rock, the Rebel high command had two possible courses of action. First, Kirby Smith could attempt to destroy Steele as his haggard column struggled northward to the line of the Arkansas. Or, he could merely shadow Steele with a small force and turn back to Louisiana with the bulk of Price’s army to finish off a cornered Nathaniel P. Banks on the Red River. Smith’s decision would have far reaching effects beyond the confines of his remote department and was heavily influenced by the dispositions of his primary subordinates, Sterling Price and Richard Taylor.
Following the council of war, Steele issued instructions for the army to prepare to retreat on April 26th after dusk. The poor condition of the public animals required that the army would have to abandon much of its supplies. Rather than leave valuable stores to the enemy, Steele ordered the destruction of all wagons and supplies that the army could not move. Steele’s headquarters sent out orders in the early morning hours of the 26th to all divisions to prepare for movement that evening. Captain Henry received details of soldiers from the several divisions to assist in the business of destroying excess baggage.1 Imperative to their efforts on the 26th was operational security. The Federals had to go to great lengths to conceal the purpose of their activities. With the large Rebel army hovering outside the Camden fortifications, any sign of a hasty evacuation could bring about an attack, upsetting Union plans.
Captain Henry and the rest of the VII Corps expertly handled their instructions as the citizens of Camden failed to perceive fully the purpose of Federal work details that day. To deceive the town folk Captain Henry moved the army trains in small packages across the Ouachita rather than massing them for movement. Additionally, he assembled those wagons earmarked for destruction at different locations. Just prior to the time of movement, he would commence destruction so the citizens would have little time to relay word to the Confederates outside the city. The chief quartermaster also issued what rations he had available in a manner that appeared as the normal routine since the army arrived in Camden. This scanty fare amounted to two pieces of hardtack, a half-pint of cornmeal, a small portion of meat, and a few beans of coffee per man. This would have to suffice the soldiers for the entire march to Little Rock.2
The ruse the Federal soldiers created worked beyond all expectation, as many of the populace had no inkling that the occupying army was preparing to leave. “I was not wise enough to know that General Steele’s whole army was going that very night,” recalled one resident.3 Private Sperry stated that word of the retreat was withheld from many in the ranks as well. The 33rd Iowa received orders for a night march in the early afternoon and began quietly packing up.4 In spite of Federal efforts to keep the planned retrograde a secret, a few observant residents did take note of unusual activities in town on the 26th. Steele had foreseen that word would leak out and took the precaution of closing Camden to civilian movement for the day in order to prevent anyone from alerting the Confederates. Nevertheless, one man attempted to slip through the lines to notify the Rebels. Union pickets shot him on the spot for violating Steele’s order.5
The deception continued into the evening as the army went about its normal routine. Regiments conducted changing of guards, sounded tattoo and taps, and kindled cooking fires. Meanwhile, the business of destroying excess supplies and baggage started shortly after dusk. Details of soldiers fired ninety-two wagons, tents, mess kits, and astonishingly, a large quantity of meat and hardtack. Obviously, some provision should have been made to distribute the remaining foodstuffs in light of the dire lack of rations prevailing among the ranks and the hard march in the offing. Regardless, the chief quartermaster managed to systematically liquidate everything of value while simultaneously moving the army trains over the Ouachita. Once the trains and rear echelon troops had cleared the river, the combat units began to fall in for the start of the march.6
Shortly after taps at about 9:00 P.M., the army commenced its movement. Steele assigned Carr’s cavalry division to lead the march providing a screen forward of the army to protect the main body from Fagan’s cavalry. Thayer’s Frontier Division would follow Carr as soon as his troopers had cleared the pontoon bridge over the Ouachita. Salomon’s division would constitute the rear guard. Critical to success of the retrograde was the security provided by Salomon to the very last minute. During the entire rearward movement Salomon would show himself more than equal to the task of protecting the rear of the army. On this night he initially doubled the picket posts to ensure no lapse of security. Second, he assigned the recently attached 2nd and 6th Kansas Cavalry Regiments to conduct patrols in Camden to prevent any depredations against the local population. Finally, he assigned Adolph Englemann the mission to contract the perimeter as the rear guard covered the final retreat across the river. All in all, Steele’s choice of Salomon was a wise one, as the army evacuated Camden without tipping its hand to the Confederate sentries outside the city.7
Carr’s cavalry intended to reach a point well beyond the range of direct observation of the town, easily defensible, and with forage and water in immediate proximity. The crossing of the cavalry was completed in the early evening hours of the 26th. Thayer’s division began crossing the pontoons within minutes of Carr’s unit and had cleared the bridgehead just before midnight. At this point, Salomon started Rice’s brigade over the bridge and the efficient colonel pushed his four regiments to the far side of the river in a timely manner. Meanwhile, Salomon left the 40th Illinois on the near bank of the river to protect Junius Wheeler’s pioneers as they broke down the pontoons. This was the most agonizing process of the whole evacuation as the engineers had to pull up and load planking, and stringers, and deflate the India rubber rafts that provided buoyancy to the bridge. Englemann and Salomon worried that the Rebels would attempt to rush the bridgehead while the engineers worked to clear the area.8
Nevertheless, the evacuation came off “to its last soldier without confusion or accident.”9 However, the precautions Salomon took to safeguard the population was not entirely successful. The inevitable stragglers would give Salomon’s provost guard fits in preventing them from visiting outrages. Mrs. Stinson reported that after dusk the Yankees revealed their intent to pull out. As these revelations came out troublemakers “threatened to burn the town before they left.” Further, “the Yankees began shooting my chickens and they kept it up until they had killed every chicken…. What a night of terror it was.”10 Even with such incidents, Camden survived the evacuation relatively unscathed in contrast to the destruction Banks’ army perpetrated when they pulled out of Alexandria, Louisiana.11 More importantly the Federal VII Corps evacuated literally under the nose of a larger Confederate army that failed to discover the occurrence.
Kirby Smith assumed direct command of the Confederate army only days before the Federal evacuation. One reason he took direct control of the army was his dissatisfaction with Price’s handling of affairs thus far. While Price had stopped Steele’s advance, a lack of energy marked his operations and Smith found this unacceptable. To step up the pressure on Steele, Smith had personally ordered Fagan on his raid that resulted in the victory at Marks’ Mills. Yet, Smith’s effort to instill greater vigilance failed as the entire VII Corps pulled out of Camden without the Rebels suspecting anything was afoot. Price reported hearing word of the evacuation sometime before 9:00 A.M. as his advance guard “liberated” the town at that time. By the time Price’s men arrived there, Steele’s army was already over an hour up the road to Little Rock. Further, the Confederates had no way to cross the Ouachita. As mentioned earlier, Smith had ordered his pontoon bridge north angering Richard Taylor. However, by some mismanagement the engineers had received orders to halt and return to Shreveport.12 The error was not discovered until it was too late on the morning of the 27th and the Rebels were immobilized on the south side of the river.
The Confederates now attempted to improvise a crossing as Steele’s army increased its lead over the hapless graybacks. Smith, upon learning of Steele’s escape, immedi
ately ordered a pursuit of the Federal army. In response, Price’s men began construction of a rickety raft bridge using timbers from the scuttled steamer Homer. Orders went out to the infantry divisions to move to Camden and await completion of the bridge preparatory to conducting a vigorous pursuit. Dr. Junius N. Bragg of the 33rd Arkansas, Churchill’s Arkansas Division, recorded the excitement that raced through the Rebel camp that morning. At noon, “a citizen came out and brought the information that the enemy had evacuated Camden.” Immediately the camp was bustling with activity as the division prepared for a forced march to catch Steele. The 33rd Arkansas cooked three days’ rations and loaded a minimal number of wagons with supplies of ordnance and foodstuffs to accompany the unit. By early afternoon Churchill’s men had left their bivouac and marched into Camden to assemble for the river crossing.13 Construction of the raft bridge proceeded at a snail’s pace since all the materials were improvised. Interminable delays occurred as Price’s men scrounged for logs, planking, and stringers. Price’s ad hoc pioneers did not complete the bridge until late that night forcing the Confederates to delay the pursuit until the next morning.
Walker’s Texas Division had just arrived in the vicinity of Camden on the 26th as Steele’s army was making preparations to leave. The soldiers had hoped to spend the day resting and recovering from the long march from Shreveport. The sudden evacuation of the Federal army dashed these hopes when orders arrived to pursue the fleeing Yankees. Sergeant Joseph Blessington remembered hastily cooking three days’ rations and packing his gear for yet another forced march. About mid-afternoon the Texans moved out arriving in Camden at four o’clock. Since they could not press on Walker’s men assembled near Churchill’s troops by the Ouachita waiting for completion of the floating bridge. Knowing it would take all night to complete the bridge, Blessington and his comrades used the respite to gather some much needed rest before commencing the pursuit. However, some troops milled around the town inspecting the fortifications surrounding Camden. Blessington was so impressed with the apparent strength of the earthworks that he stated “we should have had some difficulty in taking it [Camden].”14 Indeed, a direct Rebel assault on Camden could have only resulted in a long casualty list.
The Camden Expedition of 1864 Page 23
