The Rebels made it over the Ouachita at two points at around 6:00 A.M. on the 28th with Greene’s cavalry and Churchill’s infantry effecting crossings. Greene’s mounted men swung into the road setting a torrid pace in an attempt to close the gap. Marmaduke’s orders to Greene were to proceed by a circuitous route to a crossroad known as Buck Snort. From there Greene would place his brigade across the Military Road blocking it long enough to allow the slower infantry divisions to make contact with Steele’s rear. Unfortunately, the Yankees had too much of a jump on the Rebels. Greene pushed his tired brigade hard for the next thirty hours pressing on through the night of the 28th. Greene reached a position north of Princeton on the 29th—just after an early departure by Steele. Signs of the recent passage of the Union army greeted Greene and his men. Discarded articles of every description littered the road and abandoned campsite. Aware that he had lost the race, Greene sent a short dispatch to Price informing him of the situation and pressed on now in pursuit of the Federal rear.29
Churchill’s Division began crossing the floating bridge at Camden nearly simultaneously with Greene and his brigade. The crossing took an inordinate amount of time due to the flimsy nature of the bridge construction. Dr. Bragg reported, “the men could only walk in single file and ten feet apart” in order to prevent the bridge from giving way. “The crossing was tedious and slow,” and as a result, it took several hours to complete the transfer of Churchill’s men to the far side of the river. The Arkansans finally began moving up the Military Road at about noon bound for Princeton.30 Parsons’ and Walker’s divisions followed Churchill closely coming over the bridge in the late afternoon. In order to achieve maximum speed, Kirby Smith restricted the impediments that could slow the infantry. He ordered only enough wagons to haul ordnance for battle and that each man would carry adequate rations and ammunition for three days. All the Confederates were confident of catching the fleeing Federals as they set a fast march pace that afternoon. In spite of the late start, the Confederates made seventeen miles on the 28th camping at the same point the Union army had used the previous night.31 Since Steele had moved a mere eight miles on the 28th, the Confederates were miraculously within striking distance of the Federal VII Corps. It seems that Steele’s decision to stop and feed his men north of Princeton had nullified the considerable head start he had achieved by the brilliant evacuation two days earlier.
As Smith’s main body started rolling north, Fagan was moving west toward the Military Road from Pratt’s Ferry. He struck the road in the early evening hours of the 28th and immediately sent out forage parties. Fagan reported after the expedition that he was astride the Military Road about 25 miles north of Princeton that night. This placed him only a few miles from Steele’s army squarely across the enemy’s route of escape. Fagan, however, was not aware of this important development and when his foragers failed to procure adequate provender for his horses he was unsure of his next move. Having not heard from Smith in several days and completely oblivious of Steele’s plight, he decided to continue westward to Arkadelphia. Here, he hoped to communicate with Kirby Smith and obtain forage for his animals and troopers.32 Fagan’s move to Arkadelphia is arguably the pivotal tactical decision of the expedition. Shelby’s biographer lamented that Fagan chose to continue westward rather than acceding to Shelby’s suggestion that he close off “the only two roads open to Steele.”33 Had Fagan consented to block off the Military Road and Pine Bluff Roads, Steele would have found himself in a very tight predicament changing the entire dynamic of the retreat. When Fagan moved to the west on April 29 he unwittingly opened Steele’s line of retreat. Only the weather could slow Steele now.
The Federals moved out at 4:00 A.M. on the 29th once again retaining the same order of march per General Steele’s directive. Salomon continued his method of rotating brigades so that his rear guard would remain as fresh as possible under the circumstances. Englemann pulled rear guard preceded by Rice’s brigade. As the Iowa troops moved north away from Princeton they found the country of the same pleasant character as their Iowa farms. The terrain “was more striking” than any “we had ever noticed in the South.” The region provided the jaded Yankees with a much-needed change of pace. However, by noon the scenery was changing as well as the weather as the army began moving into the Saline Bottom. The Saline River is a sluggish stream that branches off the Ouachita. It is bordered on either side by an impenetrable bog extending a couple of miles from its banks. Carr’s troopers reached the low swampland first and soon after rain began to fall, becoming incessant within minutes, slowing the march to a crawl. The cavalry and the trains began to churn up the road until it was indistinguishable from the swamp. This forced Junius Wheeler’s pioneers to deploy forward to make the road passable.34
The Confederates started two hours earlier than the Federals in their attempt to close the final eight miles. Kirby Smith issued orders dictating that the army should rise at 2:00 A.M. to commence the pursuit. The groggy infantrymen rolled out of their blankets in the predawn darkness and it took about an hour to get the column rolling, but once they started the Confederates set a torrid pace. Sterling Price reported that the army marched 28 miles in spite of the fact that the rain turned the road into a quagmire. Blessington recorded that while his division made no contact with the enemy, they saw innumerable signs of recent enemy activity encountering “blackened ruins” and discarded gear. Obviously, the Federals were in a rush to escape the rapidly closing Rebels.35
The infantry divisions failed to engage, but Smith’s cavalry finally made contact in the early afternoon. Marmaduke, with Greene’s Brigade, had narrowly missed Steele’s column the day before. He knew that without a force to block the head of the Federal column, the Confederates had to reach the rear guard or the Yankees would make good their escape. Therefore, Marmaduke assigned the 8th Missouri and Wood’s cavalry battalion in the lead followed by the 3rd and 4th Missouri regiments. About mid-morning the Rebels finally caught sight of the fleeing bluecoats. The 8th Missouri began exchanging shots with the 6th Kansas, attached to Salomon’s division, as the rain began. A running skirmish developed lasting all afternoon as the feisty Confederates attempted to break through to the Union main body. The efforts of the Missourians would go frustrated as Englemann deployed his brigade to stiffen the resistance of the Kansas troopers. The 40th Iowa, 43rd Illinois, 27th Wisconsin, and Springfield Light Artillery formed a line of battle that arrested the advance of the lightly armed Rebel cavalry. Greene attempted to throw in the 3rd and 4th Missouri along with Harris’ Battery to bull through the determined Federals, but he drew off after a sharp engagement. Greene now called for additional help before he became involved in a battle he could not handle.36
Greene’s disengagement ended the fighting for the day as each side took stock of the situation. Things did not look good for the Federal army at this juncture. Carr’s cavalry reached Jenkins’ Ferry on the Saline around 2:00 P.M. where the advance was arrested by the raging river. The level of the stream had remained high in recent weeks because of the heavy rains. Compounding the problem was the deluge that started shortly after midday and continued all afternoon into the evening. A quick reconnaissance by Carr convinced him that the Union army could not ford the Saline. The army would have to build a pontoon to effect a crossing and this would take time. Further, once constructed it would require several hours to push the force over the single span bridge.37 The time required to construct the bridge would stall the retreat for about 24 hours and now the process would have to take place under Rebel pressure.
Carr reported his findings to Steele who made a quick assessment of the situation and began issuing orders for the next several hours’ operations. Steele now realized that he had squandered the huge lead the army had built up on the 27th. The Rebels had closed a seventeen-mile gap with hard marches and now stood poised to land a hammer blow on the Federals pinned against a raging river. Nevertheless, sound deliberations and the energetic action of Steele would once again ext
ricate the Federal army from a dangerous situation. First, he ordered Carr to proceed to Little Rock “as rapidly as possible by the shortest route” as soon as the pioneers completed the pontoon. The purpose of this was to sweep ahead of the main body to intercept Fagan’s cavalry that was rumored to be lurking on the far side of the Saline. Next, he dictated that the army would consolidate the trains at the ferry in readiness to cross over the moment Carr cleared the bridge. Thayer’s Frontier Division would provide near side security to the bridgehead and act as a reserve for Salomon. To Salomon fell the arduous duty of providing security for the army by deploying his division away from the river to enable the force to cross free of enemy action. Salomon understood that if required he would have to fight a full-scale engagement against the entire Confederate army to protect the Federals.38 Steele assigned the right officers to each mission, particularly Salomon with the rear guard.
The Federal army began concentrating around Jenkins’ Ferry in the Saline Bottom as scattered skirmishing continued in the early evening. Some of Captain Wheeler’s engineers were busily corduroying the approaches to the ferry while the remainder toiled in constructing the vital pontoon bridge. Carr’s cavalry fidgeted while awaiting the completion of the bridge so they could carry out Steele’s latest order. Thayer’s hardy Frontier Division cordoned the bridgehead and assembled strike columns for quick reinforcement of Salomon if required. Finally, Salomon supervised the emplacement of a solid, coherent defensive line to fend off the Rebel assault everyone expected the next morning. Regardless of where they stood, the soldiers of each unit found the conditions universally poor. The rain continued to pelt the hapless troops as they struggled to carry out their assigned duties. This compounded the already atrocious situation in Saline Bottom. There were no tents for shelter, and further, there was no place to erect one if anybody had the time or inclination. Many of the Union soldiers reported that the swamp stood at depths ranging from knee to waist deep and the road was a thick, soupy mass of clinging mud. Attempts to start fires to warm and dry soldiers were thwarted by an obstinate mother nature that extinguished the flames. As the evening twilight gave way to a dark night, the rain droned on and some soldiers ate a miserable and meager dinner while others searched for a suitable place to get some sleep. All were destined for a sleepless night though, as the standing water frustrated their efforts. The soldiers simply stood at their posts all night since “there was no dry place to lie down; and if there had been, the rain was too cold.” Thus, the Federal army passed a miserable night, a “fit[ting] prelude for the bloody morrow.”39
* * *
Notes
1. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 680.
2. Ibid.; Bearss, Steele’s Retreat From Camden, 90; and Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 95.
3. Elliot, ed., The Garden of Memory, Mrs. Virginia McCullom Stinson, “Memories,” 33.
4. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 95.
5. Ira Don Richards, “The Battle of Jenkins’ Ferry,” AHQ (Spring 1961), 4.
6. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 95; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 680.
7. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 668, 677, and 688–689.
8. Ibid., 677, 689, 697, and 723.
9. Ibid., 689.
10. Elliot, ed., The Garden of Memory, Mrs. Virginia McCullom Stinson, “Memories,” 33.
11. The Army of the Gulf left a path of wanton destruction in its wake during the long retreat from Mansfield. This culminated in the burning of Alexandria as Banks’ army embarked on the final leg of its escape from the Red River Valley in the second week of May.
12. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 782; Bearss, Steele’s Retreat From Camden, 93; and Richards, “The Battle of Jenkins’ Ferry,” AHQ (Spring 1961), 5.
13. Dr. Junius N. Bragg, “Chasing Steele through Jenkins’ Ferry,” Ouachita County Historical Quarterly (Spring 1998), 9.
14. John G. Walker, “The War of Secession West of the Mississippi River,” Myron Gwinner Collection, US Army Military History Institute, 61; and Blessington, Walker’s Texas Division, 246–247.
15. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 790.
16. Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 290.
17. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 826–827, 829, and 834; and Walker, “The War of Secession West of the Mississippi River,” 62.
18. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 846–847; and Bearss, Steele’s Retreat From Camden, 100.
19. Forsyth, The Red River Campaign of 1864, 89–108.
20. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 583–591, and Part 3, 791, 795–796, and 822–823.
21. Walker, “The War of Secession West of the Mississippi River,” 56.
22. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 763.
23. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 96–97.
24. Ibid., 680, 763; and Bearss, Steele’s Retreat From Camden, 96–97.
25. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 97.
26. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 723.
27. Ibid., 680 and 723; and Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 97.
28. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 97.
29. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 829.
30. Bragg, “Chasing Steele through Jenkins’ Ferry,” Ouachita County Historical Quarterly (Spring 1998), 9–10.
31. Ibid.; and Blessington, Walker’s Texas Division, 247–248.
32. Evans, ed., Confederate Military History, X, 261–262.
33. Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 290–293. Edwards is referring to the Military and Pine Bluff Roads.
34. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 677, 723, and 764; and Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 97.
35. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 782; and Blessington, Walker’s Texas Division, 248.
36. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 723–724, 826, and 829; and Burke, Official Military History of the Kansas Regiments, 141.
37. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 669, 677, and 764.
38. Ibid., 669; and Britton, The Civil War on the Border, II, 299–300.
39. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 726; and Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 97–98.
10
“There was nothing of the romance of war…”
As the Union army made its preparations for battle and worked on the Saline bridge, the Confederate high command met to etch out a course of action for April 30. At dusk on the 29th only Greene’s cavalry had made contact with the Federal army. Greene’s Brigade currently occupied positions on the ridge overlooking the bottom with skirmishers maintaining observation of the Federal rear guard. But, the Confederate infantry was still several miles from Saline Bottom. Price’s divisions were about fourteen miles from Jenkins’ Ferry and Walker another six behind Price. While Smith had finally caught up with Steele, he did not yet have an adequate force to prevent him from crossing the Saline. If Smith did not move quickly the fleeting opportunity to deal a severe blow would vanish. Determined not to let Steele elude him again, Smith issued orders to bring him to battle early on April 30.
As Smith and his staff set about penning written orders, a courier arrived bringing news of Fagan’s whereabouts. One of Smith’s scouts finally caught up with the wayward cavalryman on the 29th when he was 34 miles from Jenkins’ Ferry. Fagan instantly perceived the enormous opportunity that had slipped through his fingers over the past 24 hours. The cavalry commander instantly ordered his column to countermarch back to the ferry in order to assist Smith’s effort to destroy Steele before he could reach Little Rock. He would commence at dawn on the 30th in the hope that Steele would still be attempting to cross the river.1 Fagan’s dispatch greatly disappointed Smith for he also saw that a rare chance to bag an army had passed. Nevertheless, he redoubled his own effort to close with Steele. If he could engage Steele on the 30th and prevent his crossing of the Saline, then perhaps Fagan would cut across the route of retreat and trap the haggard Federal army. Therefore, Smith decreed that the army would wake at midnight and move no later than 1:00 A.M.2 This would give the weary Rebel infantry very little rest before they had to hit the road again. However, the Rebels, like their Yankee antagonists, would have no respite as the weather made it im
possible to find any comfort.
Churchill’s Division, leading Price’s command, reached the small town of Tulip after dark on the 29th. The incessant rains and long march had exhausted the men as they moved north. The dreary night also had a somewhat demoralizing effect on the ranks as well. Dr. Bragg reported that “the night was so black that one could almost feel the darkness with the hand. Sounds of distant thunder,” he continued, “fell upon the ear, which as it came nearer, swelled into a roar.” Price ordered a halt for the evening here and the men immediately sought a place of shelter from the rain. Some soldiers tore up fences and laid the rails down so they would not have to lie on the wet ground. In spite of their efforts, the Rebels found it difficult to get a fitful sleep as the rain came down in sheets interspersed with thunder and lightning.3 Walker’s Division shared the misery of their comrades in Price’s command. Many a Texan was awakened by rising water as the rain “partly overflowed” their bivouac site. What rest the Rebels did get was cut short by Smith’s orders for an early march. Throughout the camp officers and non-commissioned officers roused their soldiers to form ranks and move shortly after midnight. After a hardtack breakfast, Smith’s army fell in at 1:00 A.M. and began trudging north to ensnare the Yankees at Jenkins’ Ferry.4
Though it seemed inconceivable, the march from Tulip to Jenkins’ Ferry was worse than the movement on the 29th. The rain continued endlessly as the Confederate column slogged through the mire. Many a weary infantryman found himself ridden over by mounted officers hustling up and down the column. Each time an officer trod upon a hapless soldier the column issued a stream of curses at him for his indifference to their plight. At one point, a clumsy horseman knocked down three men as he trotted forward. The angry soldiers cornered the officer threatening him at bayonet point to know his name and business. The gentleman “replied that his name was E. Kirby Smith, and that his business was to command the army.” The stunned soldiers sheepishly acceded the commanding general the right of way and fell back into ranks.5
The Camden Expedition of 1864 Page 25
