One probable reason Smith favored pursuing Steele is that he could put some distance between himself and the irritable Richard Taylor. The commander of the District of West Louisiana had relentlessly criticized and insulted Kirby Smith in a deluge of correspondence. Although a patient and polite man, Smith certainly had a breaking point with reference to how much criticism he would tolerate from Taylor. Price, on the other hand, had paid Smith the proper respect due his position, making his relationship with Smith far more cordial. As a result, Smith moved north as much to get away from Taylor as to come to grips with Steele. When Taylor offered to accompany Smith north to assist in any fighting in Arkansas, the commanding general refused stating “that his leadership was no longer needed.” Taylor felt snubbed by the “curt manner” of this refusal and again brooded over his situation and perception of Smith’s poor style of leadership.37 In addition to the efforts of the Federals to divert attention from Banks, infighting between Smith and Taylor had contributed much to enabling the Army of the Gulf to escape disaster.
The Camden Expedition then had direct effects on the outcome of events in the Red River Valley, which, in turn had a vast indirect influence on the course of the war. Had this minor offensive not occurred it is highly plausible that with nothing to divert Confederate attention, the Rebels would have destroyed Nathaniel P. Banks and the Army of the Gulf along the Red River. This eventuality would have deprived the Union of over 30,000 veteran troops and a score of warships at a pivotal time for the United States. For the Confederacy to win the Civil War in 1864 it would have had to win in the minds of the northern voters by making it appear that the Federal armies could not defeat them. Confidence in the Lincoln Administration’s war policy was already fragile and any serious setbacks might have convinced the public that a change of government was in order. This could have led to the election of the Democratic candidate, George B. McClellan, whom the Confederates believed would push for a negotiated peace recognizing the Confederacy.38 Disaster in Louisiana would have facilitated this outcome since the Army of the Gulf could not have participated in the successful actions at Mobile, Atlanta, and Cedar Creek if captured.
It is a tribute to the senior leaders of the VII Corps that they were able to conduct the expedition in the manner they did in light of the serious obstacles facing them from the outset. After expressing his misgivings, Steele had reluctantly launched the expedition on Grant’s personal order and, in spite of the logistic constraints, turned in a competent performance. Of equal importance is the outstanding service provided by the subordinate commanders of the corps during the expedition. In contrast to the troubled Rebel command environment, the Union leaders maintained a high level of loyalty and civility. While an undercurrent of dissension existed within the army, to a man the division commanders exhibited the utmost deference to Steele. This promoted an air of cooperation and unity of effort that enabled the hungry Federals to overcome great adversity. Carr, Thayer, and Salomon each performed in a professional and competent manner bringing their unique capabilities to bear at the appropriate time throughout the trying six weeks. Salomon, in particular, commanded brilliantly in the rear guard action at the Battle of Jenkins’ Ferry saving the beleaguered corps from possible annihilation. The positive leadership environment existing in the Union Department of Arkansas played the leading role in the outcome of the Camden Expedition and directly influenced the results of the Red River Campaign.
On the Confederate side, Kirby Smith successfully implemented his Fabian defensive strategy, expelling the twin offensives and thus maintaining the integrity of his department. However, he fumbled a larger opportunity to succor the Confederate cause largely because of his defensive strategy and the poor command climate within his department. The Army of the Gulf escaped providing Ulysses Grant with a source of trained manpower to press his plans for the campaign of 1864. The arrival of the various corps at decisive points and critical times in the east made significant contributions to several victories in the summer and fall. This helped sagging morale in the North to rebound ensuring Lincoln’s reelection and, more important, vindicating his war policy of total victory.
Grant’s direct order forcing Steele to move, along with the poor command climate in the Trans-Mississippi high command, saved the Army of the Gulf from destruction. Steele’s assessment of the possibility of success proved quite correct as his army struggled just to feed man and animal. The Union army suffered from the elements, hunger, and the enemy in its forlorn attempt to cooperate with Banks in Louisiana. Many of the participants on the Federal side believed the expedition constituted a “gigantic failure” or “terrible defeat,” and, on the surface, this is the case.39 Yet, unknown to these men their sufferings had not occurred in vain. They diverted the attention of the Confederates away from the more lucrative target, the Army of the Gulf. This made that army’s escape and later contributions to winning the war possible. For this the soldiers and leaders of the VII Corps deserve great credit as their tiny force had done much to win the Civil War and preserve the Union.
* * *
Notes
1. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 670, and Part 3, 360.
2. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 109–110.
3. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 670.
4. Ibid., 790, and Blessington, Walker’s Texas Division, 253.
5. Walker, “The War of Secession West of the Mississippi River,” 66.
6. Blessington, Walker’s Texas Division, 253.
7. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 840.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., Part 3, 377–379.
10. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 110.
11. Ibid., 112.
12. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 727; and Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 112.
13. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 112–113; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 3, 395.
14. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 113.
15. Bearss, Steele’s Retreat From Camden, 175–177; Walker, “The War of Secession West of the Mississippi River,” 67; and Blessington, Walker’s Texas Division, 254.
16. Blessington, Walker’s Texas Division, 254–255; and Walker, “The War of Secession West of the Mississippi River,” 65.
17. Ibid., 248; Bragg, “Chasing Steele through Jenkins’ Ferry,” Ouachita County Historical Quarterly (Spring 1998), 10; Walker, “The War of Secession West of the Mississippi River,” 65; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 782, 790, 815, 818, and 837.
18. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 530–531, and Part 3, 728, 744, 759, 761, and 801–802; and Foote, The Civil War, III, 102–103.
19. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 537 and 540–548, and Part 3, 802 and 810–811; and John G. Walker “Papers,” University of North Carolina Southern Historical Collection. From an April 26, 1864, letter penned by Taylor’s aide-de-camp to Walker highly critical of Smith’s conduct of operations during the Red River Campaign.
20. OR, Vol. 34, Part 3, 828–829.
21. Foote, The Civil War, III, 576.
22. Shalhope, Sterling Price, 256–257.
23. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 684, 692, 712, 714, 746, 767, and 786–788. Confederate returns are estimates.
24. Grant, Memoirs, II, 129–140.
25. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 616.
26. Report of the Joint Committee, 382–385.
27. Wyeth, That Devil Forrest, 342–343; Foote, The Civil War, III, 104–115; and Vandiver, Jubal’s Raid, 25–26.
28. Wyeth, That Devil Forrest, 375–380.
29. Jeffrey D. Wert, From Winchester to Cedar Creek, 20–29.
30. Hearn, Mobile Bay and the Mobile Campaign, 70–79; and Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, II, 100.
31. Report of the Joint Committee, 244–245 and 250–253.
32. Foote, The Civil War, III, 101.
33. Report of the Joint Committee, XXXI-XXXII.
34. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 616.
35. Ibid., 526 and 531–532.
36. Ibid., 530 and 541–542.
37. Prushankin, “A Crisis in Command,”
81; and Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, 213.
38. Long, The Jewel of Liberty, 265–268.
39. Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, 134; and Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 113.
Appendix 1.
Campaign Chronology1
Date — Event
1863
10 August — Halleck sends dispatch to Banks informing him of need “to restore flag” to Texas soil and suggesting Red River as invasion route. Banks is cool to such an idea.
10 September — Union Army commanded by Major General Frederick Steele takes Little Rock, capital of Arkansas.
19 November — Major General John M. Schofield, commander of the Department of Missouri, expresses support for Halleck’s plan to Major General Nathaniel P. Banks as a means of securing Missouri from future threats from Rebel raids.
12 December — Steele states in a letter to Schofield, his misgivings about providing support to Banks from Arkansas.
1864
4 January — Halleck again “suggests” that Banks carry out a Red River Campaign with support from Arkansas by Steele.
23 — Banks for the first time gives his support to Halleck’s plan for a Red River Campaign and seeks assurances from him that adequate “cooperation” will materialized from the Navy, Sherman, and Steele in Arkansas. Steele, however, in a series of messages remains unconvinced of the merits of the proposed effort, especially the role assigned to him.
12 March — Steele requests permission from Halleck to make a “demonstration” with his cavalry rather than a full-scale expedition. At the same time, the Red River Campaign begins at Simmesport, Louisiana.
13 — General Edmund Kirby Smith expresses his opinion to Major General Richard Taylor that Steele in Arkansas represents the primary threat to the Trans-Mississippi Department.
14 — Major General A. J. Smith as part of the movement up the Red captures Fort DeRussy.
15 March — Lieutenant General U. S. Grant, the new Union general-in-chief, orders Steele to “move in full cooperation” with Banks’ campaign in Louisiana.
17 — Steele orders Brigadier General John Milton Thayer to prepare for march south in a cooperative effort to support Banks. They will link up at Arkadelphia.
18 — General Edmund Kirby Smith orders Major General Sterling Price to detach his infantry to Taylor in Louisiana.
20 — Sherman in a dispatch to Steele expresses his displeasure that Steele has dragged his feet on supporting Banks.
23 — Steele advances from Little Rock en route to Shreveport and immediately orders issuance of half rations for the duration of the expedition. Simultaneously, Thayer leaves Fort Smith en route to Arkadelphia.
26 — Steele crosses the Ouachita vicinity of Rockport after some skirmishing.
29 — Steele occupies Arkadelphia after some skirmishing around the town. He awaits Thayer here for the designated link-up on April 1, but Thayer’s column finds rough going in the Arkansas swamps and bottomlands and with guerillas nipping at their heels.
30 — Union cavalry under Colonel Powell Clayton disperses a Confederate brigade at the battle of Mt. Elba. This action secures the Federal supply base at Pine Bluff.
2 April — Banks and Admiral David D. Porter arrive at Grand Ecore, La. Steele decides to continue march after hearing no word of Thayer’s whereabouts.
4 — Banks receives orders from Grant to wrap up the Red River Campaign by April 10.
5 — Banks decides to diverge from river road to save time en route to Shreveport.
4–6 — Steele engages Price at Elkin’s Ferry attempting to cross the Little Missouri River.
7 — Steele sends urgent request to his rear detachment commander at Little Rock, Brigadier General Nathan Kimball, to send a supply train to Camden. Steele’s already depleted logistic situation is becoming desperate due to the delay in waiting for Thayer.
8 — Banks defeated by Taylor at Mansfield marking the turning point of the Red River Campaign. Steele continues his march southward as he has no established line of communication with Banks in Louisiana. He will not receive word of Banks’ setback for several days.
9 — Thayer’s lead elements begin arriving in the vicinity of the Little Missouri River, finally uniting Steele’s forces in Arkansas. Meanwhile, Banks repulses Taylor in the Battle of Pleasant Hill, but decides to retreat back to Grand Ecore. Steele now presses Rebel cavalry hard at the Prairie D’Ane in a feint toward Washington.
10 — Banks arrives at Grand Ecore while Porter’s fleet encounters trouble from guerillas and rapidly lowering water levels in the Red. Smith
10 April — informs Taylor of his intent to take three infantry divisions from his Louisiana army up to Arkansas to meet Steele, over Taylor’s loud objections.
11–12 — Steele forces Price’s cavalry back on Washington then suddenly shifts his line of march toward Camden.
13 — Discovering the Federals gone from his front, Price turns in pursuit of Steele sending the bulk of his force to the rear of the column while simultaneously pushing Brigadier General Jo Shelby’s brigade around the Union army to cut it off from Camden.
14 — Taylor reluctantly detaches Churchill’s, Parsons’, and Walker’s divisions north into Arkansas while he maintains a loose cordon around Banks’ army at Grand Ecore. Porter is now back at Grand Ecore after struggling with low water levels in the Red. Price skirmishes with Steele but cannot slow him appreciably.
15 — Shelby successfully places a line across the Federal avenue of advance, but Steele overwhelms him forcing his way into Camden. On the Red River, the pride of Porter’s fleet, Eastport, sinks when it strikes a mine.
16 — Steele receives rumors of Banks’ demise in Louisiana, later confirmed by a dispatch from Banks. Steele now has no regular rations and decides to send out foraging parties to provide relief from the strained subsistence situation.
17 — A large Union forage train of some 200 wagons and over 1,000 men departs Camden for farm areas west of town in search of subsistence.
18 — Confederate cavalry under Brigadier General John S. Marmaduke destroys all 200 wagons and disperses the guard at Poison Springs. This exacerbates the serious supply situation. The 1st Kansas (Colored) Infantry suffers horrendous casualties as Rebels seek to “punish” Negro soldiers.
20 — Confederate infantry starts arriving in Arkansas bolstering Price’s forces around Camden.
21 — Banks brushes aside Taylor at Grand Ecore and commences a retreat to Alexandria. Taylor pursues with a meager force in an attempt to trap Banks between the Cane and Red Rivers.
22 — Steele sends 240 wagons and about 1,800 men to Pine Bluff for supplies. Vigilant Rebel cavalry observes the movement.
23 — Taylor’s small “army” is defeated at Monette’s Ferry on the Cane River as the Federal XIXth Corps forces a crossing of the stream.
25 — Confederate cavalry under Brigadier General James Fagan ambushes the supply train at Marks’ Mills, once again destroying all the wagons and capturing most of the escort. In Louisiana Banks arrives at Alexandria.
26 — Steele knows that his position is now untenable and seeks the opinions of his officers. All but one general agree that a retreat back to Little Rock is the only course of action left to the army. The movement begins in secret that night.
27 April — Kirby Smith orders a pursuit of Steele when his pickets discover Camden abandoned. Banks and Porter are trapped at Alexandria when the gunboats cannot pass the rapids. Taylor clamors for reinforcements from Smith to no avail.
30 — Smith’s army in Arkansas catches Steele at Jenkins’ Ferry on the Saline River attempting to cross the stream. He launches a full-scale assault on the Federal rear, but is bloodily repulsed. Federals now destroy all remaining impediments to their retreat such as wagons and artillery that their weakened animals cannot pull. Steele successfully crosses the Saline and continues retreating to Little Rock.
3 May — Steele arrives unmolested in Little Rock ending the Camden Exp
edition.
4 — Rebels wreak havoc in Louisiana destroying several Union gunboats at David’s Ferry on the Red while attempting to communicate with Porter and Banks at Alexandria. Construction of dam begins in attempt to pass gunboats over rapids at Alexandria.
13 — Porter’s fleet passes falls as Banks pushes Taylor aside. Retreat continues to Simmesport.
19 — Smith directs Price in a dispatch to begin preparations for an August invasion of Missouri.
14–21 — After several sharp engagements the Federal Army of the Gulf crosses the Atchafalaya making good their escape from Red River Valley much to Taylor’s disgust. This ends the Red River Campaign.
22 — A. J. Smith’s XVI and XVII Corps divisions reembark for Mississippi.
5 June — Kirby Smith relieves Taylor after a long string of insubordinate correspondence.
11 July — Elements of the XIX Corps (formerly of the Army of the Gulf) arrive in Washington, D.C., in time to repulse Jubal Early’s attack on the city.
14 — A. J. Smith with XVI Corps (formerly attached to the Army of the Gulf) meets Nathan Bedford Forrest at Tupelo, Mississippi, forcing Forrest back into central Mississippi. This successfully prevents Forrest from cutting Sherman’s supply line to Georgia.
2–8 August — Elements of XIII Corps, Army of the Gulf, in conjunction with Admiral David Farragut take the forts protecting Mobile Bay sealing off the port for further Confederate use.
The Camden Expedition of 1864 Page 31
