The Mystery of Capital

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The Mystery of Capital Page 6

by Hernando De Soto


  In addition, all standard formal property documents are crafted in such a way as to facilitate the easy measurement of an asset’s attributes. If standard descriptions of assets were not readily available, anyone who wanted to buy, rent, or give credit against an asset would have to expend enormous resources comparing and evaluating it against other assets—which also would lack standard descriptions. By providing standards, Western formal property systems have significantly reduced the transaction costs of mobilizing and using assets.

  Once assets are in a formal property system, they endow their owners with an enormous advantage in that they can be split up and combined in more ways than an Erector set. Westerners can adapt their assets to any economic circumstance to produce continually higher valued mixtures, whereas their Third World counterparts remain trapped in the physical world of rigid, non-fungible forms.

  Property Effect No. 5: Networking People

  By making assets fungible, by attaching owners to assets, assets to addresses, and ownership to enforcement, and by making information on the history of assets and owners easily accessible, formal property systems converted the citizens of the West into a network of individually identifiable and accountable business agents. The formal property process created a whole infrastructure of connecting devices that, like a railway switchyard, allowed the assets (trains) to run safely between people (stations). Formal property’s contribution to mankind is not the protection of ownership; squatters, housing organizations, mafias, and even primitive tribes manage to protect their assets quite efficiently. Property’s real breakthrough is that it radically improved the flow of communications about assets and their potential. It also enhanced the status of their owners, who became economic agents able to transform assets within a broader network.

  This explains how legal property encourages the suppliers of such utilities as electricity and water to invest in production and distribution facilities to service buildings. By legally attaching the buildings where the services will be delivered to their owners, who will be using and paying for the services, a formal property system reduces the risk of theft of services. It also reduces the financial losses from bill collecting among people hard to locate, as well as technical losses from incorrectly estimating the electricity needs of areas where businesses and residents are clandestine and not recorded. Without knowing who has the rights to what, and without an integrated legal system where the ability to enforce obligations has been transferred from extralegal groups to government, utilities would be hard-pressed to deliver services profitably. On what other basis could they identify subscribers, create utility subscription contracts, establish service connections, and ensure access to parcels and buildings? How would they implement billing systems, meter reading, collection mechanisms, loss control, fraud control, delinquent charging procedures, and enforcement services such as meter shutoffs?

  Buildings are always the terminals of public utilities. What transforms them into accountable and responsible terminals is legal property. Anyone who doubts this need only look at the utility situation outside the West, where technical and financial losses plus theft of services account for 30 to 50 percent of all available utilities.

  Western legal property also provides businesses with information about assets and their owners, verifiable addresses, and objective records of property value, all of which lead to credit records. This information and the existence of integrated law make risk more manageable by spreading it through insurance-type devices as well as by pooling property to secure debts.

  Few seem to have noticed that the legal property system of an advanced nation is the center of a complex web of connections that equips ordinary citizens to form ties with both the government and the private sector, and so to obtain additional goods and services. Without the tools of formal property, it is hard to see how assets could be used for everything they accomplish in the West. How else could financial organizations identify trustworthy potential borrowers on a massive scale? How could physical objects, like timber in Oregon, secure an industrial investment in Chicago? How could insurance companies find and contract customers who will pay their bills? How could information brokerage or inspection and verification services be provided efficiently and cheaply? How could tax collection work?

  It is the property system that draws out the abstract potential from buildings and fixes it in representations that allow us to go beyond passively using the buildings only as shelters. Many title systems in developing nations fail to produce capital because they do not acknowledge that property can go way beyond ownership. These systems function purely as an ownership inventory of deeds and maps standing in for assets, without allowing for the additional mechanisms required to create a network where assets can lead a parallel life as capital. Formal property should not be confused with such massive inventory systems as the English Domesday Book of nine hundred years ago or a luggage check operation in an international airport. Properly understood and designed, a property system creates a network through which people can assemble their assets into more valuable combinations.

  Property Effect No. 6: Protecting Transactions

  One important reason why the Western formal property system works like a network is that all the property records (titles, deeds, securities, and contracts that describe the economically significant aspects of assets) are continually tracked and protected as they travel through time and space. Their first stop is the public agencies that are the stewards of an advanced nation’s representations. Public record keepers administer the files that contain all the economically useful descriptions of assets, whether land, buildings, chattels, ships, industries, mines, or airplanes. These files will alert anyone eager to use an asset about things that may restrict or enhance its realization, such as encumbrances, easements, leases, arrears, bankruptcies, and mortgages. The agencies also ensure that assets are adequately and accurately represented in appropriate formats that can be updated and easily accessed.

  In addition to public record-keeping systems, many other private services have evolved to assist parties in fixing, moving, and tracking representations so that they can easily and securely produce surplus value. These include private entities that record transactions, escrow and closings organizations, abstractors, appraisers, title and fidelity insurance firms, mortgage brokers, trust services, and private custodians of documents. In the United States, title insurance companies further help the mobilization of representations by issuing policies to cover parties for specified risks, ranging from defects on titles to unenforceability on mortgages and unmarketability of title. By law, all these entities have to follow strict operating standards that govern their document-tracking capabilities, physical storage facilities, and staffing.

  Although they are established to protect both the security of ownership and that of transactions, it is obvious that Western systems emphasize the latter. Security is principally focused on producing trust in transactions so that people can more easily make their assets lead a parallel life as capital.

  In most developing countries, by contrast, the law and official agencies are trapped by early colonial and Roman law, which tilt toward protecting ownership. They have become custodians of the wishes of the dead. This may explain why the creation of capital in Western property happens so easily, and why most of the assets in developing and former communist countries have slipped out of the formal legal system in search of mobility.

  The Western emphasis on the security of transactions allows citizens to move large amounts of assets with very few transactions. How else can we explain that in developing and former communist nations people are still taking their pigs to market and trading them one at a time, as they have done for thousands of years, whereas in the West, traders take representations of their rights over pigs to the market? Traders at the Chicago commodities exchange, for example, deal through representations, which give them more information about the pigs they are trading than if they could physically examine each pig. They
are able to make deals for huge quantities of pigs with little concern about the security of transactions.

  Capital and Money

  The six effects of an integrated property process mean that Westerners’ houses no longer merely keep the rain and cold out. Endowed with representational existence, these houses can now lead a parallel life, doing economic things they could not have done before. A well-integrated legal property system in essence does two things: First, it tremendously reduces the costs of knowing the economic qualities of assets by representing them in a way that our senses can pick up quickly; and second, it facilitates the capacity to agree on how to use assets to create further production and increase the division of labor. The genius of the West was to have created a system that allowed people to grasp with the mind values that human eyes could never see and to manipulate things that hands could never touch.

  Centuries ago, scholars speculated that we use the word “capital” (from the Latin for “head”) because the head is where we hold the tools with which we create capital. This suggests that the reason why capital has always been shrouded in mystery is because, like energy, it can be discovered and managed only with the mind. The only way to touch capital is if the property system can record its economic aspects on paper and anchor them to a specific location and owner.

  Property, then, is not mere paper but a mediating device that captures and stores most of the stuff required to make a market economy run. Property seeds the system by making people accountable and assets fungible, by tracking transactions, and so providing all the mechanisms required for the monetary and banking system to work and for investment to function. The connection between capital and modern money runs through property.

  Today it is records of property ownership and transactions that provide monetary authorities with the crucial evidence they need to issue additional legal tender. As cognitive scientists George A. Miller and Philip N. Johnson-Laird wrote in 1976: “Paper currency owes its origins to the writing of debt notes. [Therefore] money…presupposes the institution of property.”9 It is property documentation that fixes the economic characteristics of assets so that they can be used to secure commercial and financial transactions and ultimately to provide the justification against which central banks issue money. To create credit and generate investment, what people encumber are not the physical assets themselves, but their property representations—the recorded titles or shares—governed by rules that can be enforced nationwide. Money does not earn money. You need a property right before you can make money. Even if you loan money, the only way you can earn on it is by loaning or investing it against some kind of property document that establishes your rights to principal and interests. To repeat: Money presupposes property.

  As the eminent German economists Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto Steiger point out, “Money is never created ex nihilo from the point of view of property, which must always exist before money can come into existence.”10 Recognizing similarities between their work and mine, they brought to my attention an unpublished draft of an article stating “that interest and money cannot be understood without the institution of property.”11 This relationship is obscured, they maintain, by the common misapprehension that central banks issue notes and support the ability of commercial banks to make payments. In Heinsohn and Steiger’s view, what escapes the naked eye is “that all advances are made in good banking against securities,”12 or in my terms, legal property paper. They agree with Harold Demsetz that the property rights foundation of capitalism has been taken for granted and note that Joseph Schumpeter already had an inkling that it is property rights that secure the creation of money. As Tom Bethell correctly states in his extraordinary book The Noblest Triumph, “the many blessings of a private property system have never been properly analyzed.”13

  Capital, as I argued earlier, is therefore not created by money; it is created by people whose property systems help them to cooperate and think about how they can get the assets they accumulate to deploy additional production. The substantial increase of capital in the West over the past two centuries is the consequence of gradually improving property systems, which allowed economic agents to discover and realize the potential in their assets, and thus to be in a position to produce the noninflationary money with which to finance and generate additional production.

  So, we are more than squirrels who store food for winter and engage in deferred consumption. We know, through the sophisticated use of property institutions, how to give the things we accumulate a parallel life. When advanced nations pulled together all the information and rules about their known assets and established property systems that tracked their economic evolution, they gathered into one order the whole institutional process that underpins the creation of capital. If capitalism had a mind, it would be located in the legal property system. But like most things pertaining to the mind, much of “capitalism” today operates at a subconscious level.

  Why did the classical economists, who knew capital was abstract and had to be fixed, not make the connection between capital and property? One explanation may be that in Adam Smith’s or even Marx’s day property systems were still restricted and undeveloped, and their importance was difficult to gauge. Perhaps more significantly, the battle for the future of capitalism shifted from the book-lined studies of theoreticians into a vast web of entrepreneurs, financiers, politicians, and jurists. The attention of the world turned from theories to the real deals being made on the ground, day by day, fiscal year after fiscal year.

  Once the vast machine of capitalism was firmly in place and its masters were busy creating wealth, the question of how it all came into being lost its urgency. Like people living in the rich and fertile delta of a long river, the advocates of capitalism had no pressing need to explore upstream for the source of their prosperity. Why bother? With the end of the Cold War, however, capitalism became the only serious option for development. So the rest of the world turned to the West for help and was advised to imitate the conditions of life on the delta: stable currencies, open markets, and private businesses, the objectives of so-called macroeconomic and structural adjustment reforms. Everyone forgot that the reason for the delta’s rich life lay far upriver, in its unexplored headwaters. Widely accessible legal property systems are the silt from upriver that permits modern capital to flourish.

  This is one of the principal reasons macroeconomic reforms are not working. Imitating capitalism at the level of the delta, by importing McDonald’s and Blockbuster franchises, is not enough to create wealth. What is needed is capital, and this requires a complex and mighty system of legal property that we have all taken for granted.

  Braudel’s Bell Jar

  Much of the marginalization of the poor in developing and former communist nations comes from their inability to benefit from the six effects that property provides. The challenge these countries face is not whether they should produce or receive more money but whether they can understand the legal institutions and summon the political will necessary to build a property system that is easily accessible to the poor.

  The French historian Fernand Braudel found it a great mystery that at its inception, Western capitalism served only a privileged few, just as it does elsewhere in the world today:

  The key problem is to find out why that sector of society of the past, which I would not hesitate to call capitalist, should have lived as if in a bell jar, cut off from the rest; why was it not able to expand and conquer the whole of society?…[Why was it that] a significant rate of capital formation was possible only in certain sectors and not in the whole market economy of the time?…It would perhaps be teasingly paradoxical to say that whatever else was in short supply, money certainly was not…so this was an age where poor land was bought up and magnificent country residences built, great monuments erected, and cultural extravagance financed…. [How do we] resolve the contradiction…between the depressed economic climate and the splendors of Florence under Lorenzo the Magnificent?14

  I b
elieve the answer to Braudel’s question lies in restricted access to formal property, both in the West’s past and in developing and former communist countries today. Local and foreign investors do have capital; their assets are more or less integrated, fungible, networked, and protected by formal property systems. But they are only a tiny minority—those who can afford the expert lawyers, insider connections, and patience required to navigate the red tape of their property systems. The great majority of people, who cannot get the fruits of their labor represented by the formal property system, live outside Braudel’s bell jar.

  The bell jar makes capitalism a private club, open only to a privileged few, and enrages the billions standing outside looking in. This capitalist apartheid will inevitably continue until we all come to terms with the critical flaw in many countries’ legal and political systems that prevents the majority from entering the formal property system.

  The time is right to find out why most countries have not been able to create open formal property systems. This is the moment, as Third World and former communist nations are living through their most ambitious attempts to implement capitalist systems, to lift the bell jar.

  But before we answer that question, we have to solve the rest of the mystery of why governments have been so slow to realize that a bell jar exists.

  CHAPTER FOUR

 

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