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In the case of the new, emerging world, and in particular with a rising China, the US has decided to bet the house on India. This had seemed likely even before Trump’s election. At a time when the then presidential candidate was talking about how China was damaging the American economy, he also made clear that he saw India very differently. “I am a big fan of Hindu. I am a big fan of India. Big, big fan,” he said while on the campaign trail. “If I’m elected president,” he added, “the Indian and Hindu community will have a true friend in the White House. That I can guarantee you.”107
The desire to create a new bulwark in Asia was expressed equally forcefully by Vice President Mike Pence in the summer of 2017. US strategy in Afghanistan and beyond, wrote Pence, should be based on “a stronger strategic partnership with India—the world’s largest democracy and a key security and economic partner.”108 Secretary Mattis was even more explicit: “What we have now,” he told one Senate hearing, “is a strategic convergence, a generational opportunity, between the two largest democracies in the world [US and India] to work together based on those shared interests of peace, of prosperity, of stability in the region.” India was playing a “bigger role in the world,” he said, “and that role, from our perspective, is a wholly positive one right now.” It was obvious, he said. “We are natural partners, India and the United States.”109
History is not on the side of this glossy view, given that India was a leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War and had close relations with the Soviet Union, which not only supplied all three Indian armed forces with the bulk of their weapons, but did so on generous credit terms and even allowed co-production of the MiG fighter jets in India.110 In four years in the 1980s the Soviet Union delivered more than $7.5bn of weapons to India—an eye-watering sum at the time.111 Even now, Russia is by far the largest supplier of arms to India. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia accounted for almost two-thirds of all Indian arms purchases between 2013 and 2017.112 The acquisition of a controlling stake in the Indian assets of Essar Oil for $12.9bn in 2017 is mirrored by Indian investment in Russian producers, oil fields and the first imports of liquefied natural gas, and provides other important ties between the two countries.113 Delhi has looked to Moscow for support and partnership, in other words, rather than Washington, not just for years but for generations.
US attempts to curry favour with Delhi explain why Secretary Mattis weighed in heavily on the rights and wrongs of the Belt and Road Initiative when challenged in Congress. The plans involve “going through disputed territory,” he said, and, “I think that in itself shows the vulnerability of trying to establish that sort of a dictate.”114 It made sense, in other words, for US and India to work together, given they have a rival in common.
Briefings by the State Department talk in similar terms. Although China is not mentioned directly, it does not take much to see that the US’s aim is to balance out Beijing’s influence and power. “It is our policy,” stated one senior official, “to ensure that India…does become over time a more influential player” in the “Indo-Pacific region.” This aim was explicitly linked to America’s idealised vision of global affairs. “It is in our interest, the US interest, as well as the interest of the region, that India plays an increasingly weighty role in the region.”115
The assumptions of a natural alignment between the US and India are clear from the comments of Admiral Harry B. Harris, then commander of US Pacific Command, who told the annual Raisina Dialogue conference in New Delhi that “American and Indian navy vessels steaming together will become a common and welcome sight throughout Indo-Asian Pacific waters as we work together to maintain the freedom of the seas for all nations.”116
There certainly are mutual interests in so far as it serves India to keep options open. Military strategists in Delhi set considerable store too by co-operating with Taiwan, whose close attention to Chinese military deployments is eagerly followed in India. “We are dependent on Taiwan because they are watching the Chinese,” said one senior source, adding that Indian officers regularly visit Taiwan “on study leave.”117
The problem here is that while India seems a perfect partner for the US in Asia, it is by no means clear that the Indian government feels the same way. For one thing, there are close ties to Russia, which has been careful to court Prime Minister Modi at every opportunity—to good effect, to judge from the announcement of a slew of agreements ranging from the sale of military hardware to nuclear reactors in Goa in October 2016. Russia is “an old friend of India,” said Modi—which, he added, is better than two new friends.118 Some in India also see Russia as a better bet as a partner to counter the rise of China. There is “ample room,” noted one commentator, “for India and Russia to work together in Eurasia to ensure balance of power is restored to avoid Chinese dominance,” such as in cooperating in IT and renewable energy sectors.119
The Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army answered bluntly when asked about weapons procurement from Russia and the possible steps the US might take against India and its military as a result. We appreciate, he said, that the United States could impose “sanctions on us, but we follow an independent policy.”120
This helps explain why there was loud criticism in India after Admiral Harris’s remarks, including a statement released by the minister of defence, Manohar Parrikar, declaring that “no talks have been held with the United States on conduct of any joint naval patrols. Further,” he went on, “[the] Indian navy has never carried out joint patrols with another country.”121 Those whom the US think of as natural allies guard their independence warily—and may behave more quixotically than might be expected in Washington.
Then there are the problems of a tetchy commercial relationship between India and the US. On the one hand, India is seen as an ideal partner, but on the other as a rival—and one that is dealt with scornfully. It was time for India to stop using the United States as a “piggy bank that everybody is robbing,” said Trump in the summer of 2018. Calling Prime Minister Narendra Modi “a beautiful man” might appeal to the Indian leader’s ego, but most Indians hearing Trump talk like this and threatening to slap taxes on “thousands and thousands” of Indian products are unlikely to think more sympathetically about the US than if the president had not said anything at all—especially in the context of how Trump talks about America and how he talks about the rest of the world.122
The threat of being priced or shut out of American markets is one reason why Delhi has tried to keep Washington happy—for example, by offering to buy aircraft and step up imports of oil and gas from the United States. Following the American refusal to allow India an exemption from steel and aluminium tariffs, the government in Delhi imposed new duties on walnuts and almonds, a step that was not insignificant given that around half of all US almond exports are bought by India, but one calculated as a gesture to respond but not to antagonise.123 The economic muscles of the United States are so strong that fighting back needs to be done carefully and cautiously.
Nevertheless, there are important benefits to aligning with the US—as is clear from the signing of the landmark Communications Compatability and Security Agreement (COMCASA) that will allow for closer cooperation across a range of defence topics, give India access to sensitive equipment and nudge India into an “Asian NATO” along with Japan and Australia. All stand to gain from better ties, especially when it comes to the question of China.124
And yet, despite its rivalry with China, India is reluctant to be unnecessarily antagonistic towards its powerful neighbour, seeking to develop a constructive narrative rather than sharpen antagonisms for the sake of it. In India’s case, moreover, there are obvious advantages in trying to keep relations with China—and indeed with other countries—as pragmatic as possible. A summit in Wuhan that in the spring of 2018 witnessed important statements of solidarity between Presi
dent Xi and Prime Minister Modi, alongside diplomatic niceties, saw the Indian leader received with particular distinction. It was striking that, rather than emphasise difference, not least over the Doklam frontier dispute and over maritime issues, Modi was keen to underline the leading role that both countries had played in world history. The two had much in common, he said. Not surprisingly so, given that “India and China acted as engines for global economic growth for 1600 years out of the past 2000 years.”125 The leaders also talked at the summit about how to work more closely together—with projects in Afghanistan mooted as possible initial scenarios for collaboration.126
Cooperation has continued since the Wuhan meeting. During the meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation held in Qingdao in June 2018, for example, it was announced that China had agreed to provide hydrological data on the Brahmaputra River in flood season to India—a step that is helpful both to predict floodwaters and to be able to anticipate shortages well in advance. An agreement under which China commits to importing non-basmati rice and tentative plans for military cooperation provide more examples of early-stage collaboration between the world’s two most populous countries.127
If that muddies the waters as far as US hopes for India go, then so too does the decision by President Trump to withdraw from the nuclear agreement on Iran. Few were surprised by the announcement that the president would take this action, given the fact that it falls into a pattern of systematically disparaging, denigrating or dismantling almost every step taken in both international and domestic affairs by his predecessor in the White House, Barack Obama. The determination to talk about liberating the Iranian people and effecting regime change showed that more effort could be usefully expended studying even recent history by those in or within shouting distance of the Oval Office.128
Withdrawing from the JCPOA in May 2018, Trump claimed that “a constructive deal could easily have been struck at the time [of the Obama presidency], but it wasn’t. At the heart of the Iran deal was a giant fiction that a murderous regime desired only a peaceful nuclear energy program.” Despite assurances to the contrary from the International Atomic Energy Agency, Trump said that he had “definitive proof that this Iranian promise was a lie.” The agreement was “poorly negotiated,” he said. “It didn’t bring calm, it didn’t bring peace, and it never will.” It was important to scrap the agreement, he went on, to help Iranians themselves. “The future of Iran belongs to its people,” he said. “They are the rightful heirs to a rich culture and an ancient land. And they deserve a nation that does justice to their dreams, honour to their history, and glory to God.”129
To enable that to happen, said Mike Pompeo, secretary of state, two weeks later, “we will apply unprecedented financial pressure on the Iranian regime.”130 The effects were almost immediate, with the Tehran bazaar effectively shutting down because traders could not import goods to sell—and also because of the difficulties of properly pricing what merchandise they did have available in the face of rampant inflation and economic uncertainty.131 The collapse in the value of the rial was one immediate result of US policy; street protests in many cities across Iran in the summer of 2018 was another.132
With sanctions being applied, doctors warned of medical shortages across the country, noting that while supplies of pharmaceuticals were exempt, crackdowns on Iran’s banking system meant that in practice it is impossible to pay for them. “The burden is not on the United States to identify safe channels” for transactions, said Pompeo, adding that it was “Iran’s problem” if banks do not “have confidence in Iran’s banking system.”133
Similar sanctions against Iraq in the 1990s had a catastrophic effect on the poor, the hungry and the sick.134 When asked about the fact that innocent people would suffer, Pompeo told the BBC that the leadership of Iran “has to make a decision” about whether “they want their people to eat.” The steps taken by the US “aren’t aimed to punish the Iranian people, and indeed exactly the opposite.”135
Further evidence of the strain that US measures have placed on the country are clear from the sacking of the minster of the economy, the arrest of dozens of economic saboteurs and a remarkable televised grilling of President Rouhani.136 The impeachment of Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif on trumped-up charges after he made comments about stamping out corruption in Iran shows that attempts to destabilise the regime in Tehran are more likely to silence or even drive out moderate voices and strengthen the position of hardliners—precisely the opposite, in other words, of what Washington has in mind.137
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In an effort to buy time, Iran issued a suit at the International Court of Justice in The Hague seeking to suspend the US sanctions, describing these as “naked aggression” whose aim was nothing less than the “economic strangulation” of the country.138 The US response was to declare that it did not matter what verdict the court reached; it had no jurisdiction to rule over the dispute.139 If Iran wants a new agreement with the US, there were twelve demands it had to meet; if it did so, Washington would drop “every one of our sanctions,” “re-establish full diplomatic and commercial relationships with Iran” and even allow the country access to “advanced technology.”140
The problem is that the list of demands is reminiscent of those included in the ultimatum issued to Serbia in the build-up to war in 1914—that is to say, a sweeping series of requirements that are designed to be not so much humiliating as impossible to achieve. In any event, assuming that the approach causing Iran to break will produce an outcome that is positive for the country’s people, for the region or for the US is unclear. As Chinese Premier Li Keqiang warned, perhaps the greatest risk was precisely that there would be unforeseeable consequences locally, regionally and potentially beyond.141 So while the US might be behind the decision by the authorities in Iraq not to pay Iran $1.5bn for energy supplies, as some Iraqi politicians have claimed, the result—street protests and riots in Basra and the south of the country after Iran stopped supplying electricity—may serve not just to make life difficult in one country, but bring about the implosion and collapse of another.142
As it is, the US approach has been a catalyst for an alignment within Iran, with the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps writing to President Rouhani after the latter issued fiery words about Trump’s actions. “I will kiss your hand,” said Major General Qasem Soleimani, “for your timely, prudent and correct statement”—sentiments shared by the hard-line Vatan-e Emrooz newspaper, which likewise praised the angry rhetoric of the Iranian president.143 As could have been predicted, pressure from outside usually serves to unite, rather than divide.
But the pressure applied to Iran also demonstrates the dangers of focusing on one country and neither seeing the bigger picture nor recognising or understanding the consequences of what decisions made in one place have on others. The sanctions on Tehran introduced after the US decision to withdraw from the JCPOA have also created opportunities for Tehran and Moscow to draw closer—one reason for the reconciliation over the legal status of the Caspian Sea in the summer of 2018. “Iran is not a country that one can bully,” said the Russian ambassador to Iran, Levan Dzagaryan. The only way to work with Iran is through diplomacy, engagement and persuasion, he added. From Moscow’s point of view, he went on, US sanctions against Iran are “illegal.” Threats from Washington would have no impact on Moscow’s relations with Tehran, said the ambassador.144
The alignment between Russia and Iran has led to the proposals of future collaborative projects—such as plans to link Crimea, annexed by Russia in 2014, with Iran via new train lines and the Volga-Don canal, which are more expressions of hope than reality given their cost and limited economic sense.145 They are part of a wider enthusiasm to cooperate and reassure, of which enthusiastic reporting by institutions like the Oriental Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences is another element. Iran has always been the “back door” to Russia, according
to one article that explains what would happen if Tehran was attacked by the US. “War with Iran might well be the end of America as a world power,” would result in Saudi oil supplies being stopped “for all time” and lead to the ruin of Israel for good measure.146
“America should know that peace with Iran is the mother of all peace,” said President Rouhani soon after, “and war with Iran is the mother of all wars.” Hostile policies would only result in regret, he added.147 This brought an immediate response from President Trump. “NEVER, EVER THREATEN THE UNITED STATES AGAIN,” he tweeted in capital letters for emphasis, “OR YOU WILL SUFFER CONSEQUENCES THE LIKES OF WHICH FEW THROUGHOUT HISTORY HAVE EVER SUFFERED BEFORE.”148 The warning, presumably a reference to a nuclear strike, was re-emphasised by US national security advisor John Bolton shortly after. “If Iran does anything at all to the negative,” he said, “they will pay a price few countries have ever paid.”149 These were the threats of a nightclub owner, said Major General Soleimani, a nod at Trump’s business interests in casinos. Perhaps it would be better for the president to reflect on the US’s track record in Afghanistan and elsewhere before expecting Iran to back down.150
While the prospect of an escalation of animosities, barbed comments and threats is a real one, in the meantime the war of words promises to be highly problematic for India. Delhi has worked hard to establish good relations with Tehran, both to build trade links—particularly in the energy sector—but also as a counterbalance to India’s long-standing rivalry with Pakistan.
The declaration that any company doing business with Iran would face sanctions is a source of considerable alarm in India, which has been in discussion about laying a new deep-water pipeline from southern Iran and increasing sales of gas and oil to help fuel the growing Indian economy. Given that India currently receives around a third of its oil from Iran, US sanctions have significant implications for hundreds of millions of people living in India—designated as the US’s principal ally in South if not all of Asia. “Why would any business, why would the shareholders of any business, want to do business with the world’s central banker of international terrorism?” asked National Security Advisor Bolton when pressed about the purpose of sanctions.151 Those trying to heat a stove or switch on a light in Mumbai would be able to answer that question.
The New Silk Roads Page 15
