That was put well by Gabriel in subsequent speeches where he talked about change in the world, and about Europe’s failure to adapt. “China currently seems to be the only country in the world with any sort of genuinely global, geostrategic concept,” he said in February 2018. This was a matter of fact, he added, noting that “China is entitled to develop such a concept.” The problem, said Gabriel, was that Europe and the West had no coherent ideas, no plans, no response and, seemingly, no ideas. “What we can blame ourselves for,” he said, “is the fact that we, as the ‘West,’ do not have our own strategy for finding a new balance between worldwide interests, one that is based on conciliation and common added value and not on the zero-sum game that is the unilateral pursuit of interests.”58
Gabriel’s successor as foreign minister, Heiko Maas, has tried to find a way to articulate the dangers of isolationism. He called for countries like Germany that “are too small to be able to call the shots on their own on the global stage” to find ways to work together. In a speech in Tokyo in July 2018, he warned of the consequences of President Trump’s willingness to use “280-character tweets” to undermine “alliances that have developed over decades.” This, coupled with the challenges of Russia and China, made it vital to “think about new paths.” Germany should work with Japan—a country, incidentally, that has very active aid and infrastructure programmes of its own along the Silk Roads—to form the “heart of an alliance of multilateralists” to work together to promote stability and to fill “the vacuum that has continued to emerge following the withdrawal of others from many parts of the world.”59
Beijing is attuned to such demands, and has been at pains not only to anticipate but even echo them. “We need to uphold multilateralism,” Premier Li Keqiang told a meeting of the 16+1 countries from Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. “We need to uphold free trade…and work together to prevent a slowdown of the global economic recovery.” The European Union, he added, “is a very important force for peace and stability and prosperity. It is an indispensible force in the world.”60
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China’s rise—combined with a clear-eyed understanding of what it wants and needs in the present and future—has also led to doors opening elsewhere, such as in the Middle East, for example, where Beijing has been both assiduous and successful in courting Riyadh. The potential sale of a stake in Aramco, the Saudi oil company that is privately owned but would become the biggest in the world if it floats on the open market, has drawn China’s attention—as have logistics facilities, infrastructure projects and smaller producers in the kingdom. China and Arab countries, said Foreign Minister Wang Yi, are “natural partners in Belt and Road cooperation.” The mantra of the Silk Roads supersedes all division: all should follow the “Silk Road spirit of peace and cooperation, opennesss and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit and seek greater synergy” in pursuit of “national renewal.”61
This is part of a wider charm offensive, where comments by Foreign Minister Wang that China “will always side with Arab countries and safeguard their just rights and interests as well as peace and stability in the Middle East” are music to Saudi ears—even if it belies the fact that most Chinese loans and investment in the region have so far gone to Saudi’s arch-enemy, Iran.62
A close relationship with Saudi Arabia does not preclude Beijing deepening its ties with Tehran. When the US withdrawal from the JCPOA was announced, for example, Chinese businesses had already made plans to take the place of major Western oil companies, including signing an option to acquire stakes such as those held by Total, in the event that sanctions were reintroduced and Western businesses forced out of Iran.63
But Beijing has been shrewd in creating and repeating a narrative that seeks to unite, rather than divide elsewhere. Just a week after hosting King Salman of Saudi Arabia, President Xi received a visit from Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, and shortly after that Palestine’s President Abbas. It was China’s hope, he said, that “Palestine and Israel can achieve peace as soon as possible and live and work in peace.”64 Such comments are always welcome; but they will not play a role in bringing peace to the Middle East.
All peoples in the region should work together and “in a just manner to avoid regional disputes.” This could be done, said Xi, if “we treat each other frankly, not fear differences, not avoid problems, and have ample discussion on each aspect of foreign policy and development strategy.” To show it is prepared to put its money where its mouth is, Beijing promptly pledged $20bn of loans for “projects that will produce good employment opportunities and positive social impact in Arab States that have reconstruction needs.”65 A further $100m of aid was promised “to revive economic growth.”66
This was part of a series of initiatives, said an official at China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “among which many measures are very forward-looking, innovative and pioneering” that are part of the Belt and Road masterplan.67 Such comments and actions sit in direct contrast to the words and actions of the US, which has chosen to take sides—and a very different tack.68 While Beijing has been busy trying to find partners in all places at all times, it is striking then to see how few friends the US and the West have along the Silk Roads.
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The consistency of China’s message sits in sharp contrast to that emanating from Washington, which is haphazard, erratic and contradictory. “We want all nations, every nation, to be able to protect their sovereignty from coercion from other states,” said Mike Pompeo in the summer of 2018. “We want the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes,” he said. “Where America goes, we seek partnership, not domination,” in comments clearly directed at China—which he did not mention by name. “We believe in strategic partnerships, not strategic dependency.”69
That is news to most around the world, where the US has earned a reputation, sometimes unfairly, for shooting first and asking questions second. But as historians learn, controlling the narrative is important in itself—that is to say, being able to showcase and demonstrate the benefits of cooperation, being able to show how “win-win” is possible and benefits all, taking care to make actions and words align when it comes to international affairs and, of course, also being ready and able to counter criticisms and arguments of rivals. And in this, the US has slipped a long way behind a highly competitive field.
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A case in point comes with Pakistan, a country that has been singled out and publicly humiliated, for example, partly as punishment for being too close to China, partly as a sacrifice on the altar of the US’s idealised grand alliance with India, and partly as a result of the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. In his first tweet of 2018, Trump stated that the US “has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools.”70 It was time to change tack in Afghanistan, said John Bolton, now national security advisor. “The big issue,” he said, “wasn’t land-war tactics. The big issue is Pakistan.”71
It was disgraceful, said Pakistan’s foreign minister at that time, Khawaja Asif, that the US should turn his country into a “whipping boy” rather than confront its own failures in Afghanistan and elsewhere.72 US statements and actions such as suspending more than $1bn of security aid have naturally served to push Pakistan and China closer together at a time when the latter has been busy promoting a common vision for the future, cheap finance, technical capacity and support.73
The relationship looks likely to deepen, despite widespread fears that Pakistan will need to seek a bailout from the IMF for as much as $12bn as a result of spiralling public debt—at least some related to infrastructure expenditure financed by China—but also because of a range of other factors, including a weakening currency. “Make no mistake,” said Mike Pompeo. “We will be watching what the IMF does
. There’s no rationale for IMF tax dollars, and associated with that, American dollars that are part of the IMF funding, for those to go to bail out Chinese bondholders or China itself.”74
This went down badly in Pakistan, where resistance to a potential bailout was seen as another case of Washington trying to prevent the country’s growth and ruin its future.75 Far from pushing back against Beijing, said Imran Khan, leader of the PTI party that won the most seats in the 2018 election, the opposite would be the case. He told the Chinese ambassador, “after the PTI assumes office it will fully cooperate with China and promote the persistent development and deepening of the bilateral relations.”76 As it happened, China immediately made a credit line of $2bn available—a demonstration that waving a carrot can be more attractive and as effective as wielding a stick.77
To keep options open, Pakistan also turned elsewhere for financial support. The Prime Minister, Imran Khan, received $6bn from Saudi Arabia—yet another sign of the new world that is being woven together.78 “By the will of Allah,” said Khan, “I will give you more good news in the coming days. We are also talking to two more countries, and by the will of Allah, we expect a similar package from them.”79 US policy does not just push countries into each other’s arms—it also strengthens their economic and religious ties.
Perhaps the single most important question mark hanging over the Belt and Road not only in Pakistan but elsewhere too is precisely how China deals with situations where major projects run into trouble or when restructuring of loans is necessary. Understanding how decisions get made in such circumstances and assessing how and why Beijing behaves when it is asked or expected to come up with a different medicine from that proposed by the US or by institutions that may well be more transparent—but can also have less flexibility when it comes to renegotiation or debt forgiveness—will shape reactions to the initiative as a whole, as well as its progress and success.
In the case of Pakistan, at least, the shift in US policy has not only pushed the country closer to China—partly as a last resort—but it has also strengthened the hand of Russia in the region. Moscow already has close ties with India, where the government was reported to be yet another considering buying Russia’s S-400 system.80 Its links with Pakistan, though, look set to improve too with deals announced that Islamabad would buy SU-35 fighters and T-90 tanks from Russia. Joint military exercises, intelligence sharing and criticisms of US policies in Afghanistan have provided further common ground—as does a proposed $10bn offshore gas pipeline deal that again serves to benefit both sides.81
While the idea that “permanent destabilization creates American advantage” might sound convincing to policy-makers in Washington, it has consequences. Announcements that children of illegal immigrants will be separated from their parents and held in a “separate refugee facility” in tented cities at military posts in Texas does not so much make America look determined and bold as unkind and cruel.82 Reports of mothers being in tears after their children were taken for a shower and then not brought back shocked the world.83
The revelations that DNA tests needed to reunite children with their parents—after some had been forcibly injected with drugs, leaving them unable to walk, afraid of people and wanting to sleep constantly did enormous damage to the US abroad.84 Such revelations are all but unbelievable in a country that has long been regarded as a beacon of hope, a bastion of decency and the defender of freedom and justice.
Part of this must stem from a brain drain and systemic failure in Washington. The decision to cut the budget of the State Department has reduced expertise and empathy. At a time when the US could and should be doing all it can to highlight the positive role it has played in global security and trade, to build friendships and offer a vision of the future that is hopeful, inclusive and collaborative, it is turning its back on history. Tariffs are not reserved for competitors and rivals—but also for former friends and allies, who stand to suffer most.85 “The question is no longer whether or not there will be a trade war,” said French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire in the summer of 2018. “The war has already started.”86
US policy towards Russia has also proved to be chaotic, if not counterproductive. According to the National Security Strategy document, Russia—like China—is viewed formally as “wanting to shape a world antithetical to US values and interests” and being determined “to restore its great power status.” It “aims to weaken US influence in the world and divide us from our allies and partners.”87 In the spring of 2018 a series of sanctions was announced targeting several high-profile oligarchs as well as leading officials in the Russian government. Citing intervention in Ukraine and Syria, along with “malign activity” that included “attempting to subvert western democracies, and malicious cyber activities,” the tough line was intended to send a strong message to President Putin and his inner circle.88 “Nobody has been tougher on Russia than I have,” said Trump at a press conference announcing the sanctions.89
In fact, as elsewhere, US actions have had the opposite effect to those intended. Diplomatic and political pressure on Russia has already served to push Moscow closer to Beijing—perhaps more closely than the former is comfortable with, as Chinese imports of energy resources have become disproportionately important to the Russian economy.90 In 2017, for example, even though total oil exports rose fractionally, Russian oil shipments to China went up by 40 per cent.91 In the same year, in a sign of the strengthening of commercial ties between the two countries, Chinese investment in Russia rose by nearly three quarters.92
The close relationship paid dividends after US airstrikes in Syria in April 2018, which, as well as seeking to target assets connected with Assad’s regime, were also intended as a show of force and a warning to Russia, which has troops on the ground offering support to the discredited Syrian leader. The airstrikes were promptly condemned by Beijing, with a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson saying that their government considered that the strikes “violated the principles and basic norms of international law.”93
More striking, however, were the comments made by General Wei Fenghe, the newly appointed defence minister in China, who was sent to Moscow in a display of solidarity. In remarkably candid language, General Wei remarked, “I am visiting Russia…to show the world a high level of development of our bilateral relations and firm determination of our armed forces to strengthen strategic cooperation.” His visit had a more immediate purpose, however: “The Chinese side has come to Moscow to show Americans the close ties between the armed forces of China and Russia…we have come to support you.”94
This is part of a narrative that emphasises friendship and common interests. “President Putin and I have built good working relations and a close personal friendship,” said President Xi before a state visit to Moscow in July 2017. It was not just important to note that China and Russia “are each other’s most trustworthy strategic partners,” he said. So too was it worth noting that China–Russia relations are at their “best time in history.”95
This can be seen from the enormous Vostok-18 military drills that took place in the summer of 2018—the biggest war games orchestrated by Moscow since 1981. Chinese and Russian forces have taken part in joint exercises regularly in the past, but the Vostok-18 exercises, to which Beijing committed thirty fighter jets and helicopters, nine hundred pieces of military equipment and more than three thousand personnel, are on a new scale altogether. If that is striking, then so too is the fact that the drills are designed to practice against foreign invasions, while also simulating the use of nuclear weapons. Perhaps not surprisingly, US officials have expressed unease about the operations and have asked Russia “to take steps to share information” to avoid any “potential misunderstanding.”96 Two of Washington’s main competitors are working more and more closely together.
For the US, this is part of a nightmare scenario. “Russia and China are cosying up to each other and it’s a lethal combinatio
n if they’re together,” said one official involved in the meeting between Presidents Trump and Putin in Helsinki in 2018. Henry Kissinger was among those advising Trump to work together with Russia to “box in” China—a concept that Richard Haase, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, admitted had obvious merits on paper but was impractical, if not impossible in practice, given Moscow’s current trajectory.97 For Washington, the options are either unrealistic, unavailable or unpalatable.
One gloomy recent report set out clearly that “the partnership between China and Russia has matured and broadened…with serious negative consequences for US interests,” strengthening significantly in recent years. “The current outlook,” notes the author, “is bleak, offering no easy fixes for the US.”98
Then there is the underwhelming response to the Belt and Road Initiative that was worked on for months before being unveiled by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo at a speech designed as a statement of intent for an “economic approach to the Indo-Pacific as a truly whole-of-government mission.” The Indo-Pacific, said Pompeo, “which stretches from the United States west coast to the west coast of India, is a subject of great importance to American foreign policy.” It is, he went on, “one of the greatest engines” of the global economy.99
As such, and to show how much the United States wanted to help play a role in the region, he was delighted to announce “$113m in new initiatives.” While the precise amount of Chinese investment and financing along the new Silk Roads is a matter of considerable discussion amongst specialists, all would agree that the amount promised by Pompeo is minuscule to the point of irrelevancy. To put it into perspective, the sum promised by the US was marginally more than Jared Kushner and Ivanka Trump, the president’s son-in-law and daughter, personally received in outside earnings in 2017.100 A tidy sum indeed for a young couple, but almost meaningless in the scale of international relations and large-scale, transformational infrastructure projects.
The New Silk Roads Page 18
