While the Gemini 5 crew toured Europe and Africa, their spacecraft toured Latin America. The capsule spent six weeks in each of three countries: Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. At its exhibition in Buenos Aires the USIA set up the capsule under a brightly colored tent near the Costanera. After waiting in line typically for over an hour, visitors would pass through another exhibit arranged by the Argentine Air Force, followed by photographic panels taken during Gemini missions and objects such as space food, a space suit, and human-waste-disposal equipment. According to a USIA report, “This panorama of people [visiting the exhibit] represented the humble and the great,” from mailmen to nuns to Arturo U. Illia, president of Argentina.59 During the exhibit, USIA/NASA Liaison Harry Kendall gave prepared slide lectures that he described as “pure Cold War rhetoric, reflecting Washington’s determination to convince the world that the United States was way ahead of the Soviet Union, not just in space but also in every aspect of science and technology.” Kendall decided to temper the tone of the lecture and include more technical information about the planned lunar landing.60
Gemini 5 crew members Charles “Pete” Conrad Jr. and L. Gordon Cooper Jr. show Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia a space helmet, 1965. (NATIONAL ARCHIVES)
Later, Kendall would explain that by the 1960s, the USIA and NASA had two different types of space-themed information campaigns: one for “industrialized societies” and one for the “Third World.” In European countries and other countries considered “industrialized societies,” the USIA made sure that local science writers and scientific organizations had access to information about the American space program. In contrast, Kendall recalled that “in most Third World countries materials had to be more refined.” For these countries the USIA produced press articles, films, and radio and television programs to distribute directly to foreign audiences. USIA programming in Africa required an even “more direct approach.”61
A month after the Gemini 5 astronaut and spacecraft tours, Friendship 7 astronaut John Glenn visited a number of European cities in October. NASA, the Department of State, and the USIA organized Glenn’s travel arrangements based on requests from US embassies. The President’s Report to Congress observed that Glenn’s tour “gave a real boost to public and official support in Western Europe for the US space effort.”62 USIS Naples commented that Glenn was a “continual lesson in diplomacy.” The Italian newspaper Il Giornale d’Italia suggested that Glenn’s “human appeal is irresistible, almost contagious… he is an unpretentious man, but a first-rate man with an exceptional, almost rare technical background.”63 American ambassador Margaret Tibbetts enthusiastically reported that the visit “contributed to a bettering of US image in Norway, particularly indirectly offsetting some of [the] reverses we have had here lately stemming from [the] Viet Nam issue.” After the tour, USIA Director Leonard Marks assured President Johnson that he would continue to program astronaut tours with NASA whenever possible.64
A few months later, Glenn traveled to Rangoon for the “American Progress in Space Science and Technology” exhibition. Burma had come under military rule in 1962 after gaining independence from Great Britain fourteen years earlier. The new Revolutionary Government of the Union of Burma (RGUB) sought to make the country a socialist state. The RGUB’s severe control of foreign propaganda necessitated that the USIA plan only low-key, education-themed events. All the material that the USIS distributed to local newspapers required the RGUB’s stamp of approval before it could be printed. The RGUB allowed the space exhibit and Glenn’s visit because, according to one American public affairs officer, “the United States exhibit was apolitical. Its soft-sell contents appealed to the RGUB’s reviewing committee, which noted the complete absence of anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese propaganda pictures.”65
Glenn was an astute politician; he sold US space exploration by downplaying competition with the Soviet Union, emphasizing the theme of unity, and explaining the local relevance of space exploration to the Burmese people. This approach not only promoted an idea of American-led progress; it also navigated the strict restrictions on information dissemination in Burma. In each of his lectures, Glenn praised the Soviet Luna 9 spacecraft, a gesture that encouraged neutralist leaders to allow Burmese press to cover the event in full detail. In both Glenn’s presentations and the USIA’s programming, the focus on global benefits, the dissemination of scientific and engineering information, and the use of inclusive rhetoric not only projected a particular image of American space accomplishment but also enabled the United States to sponsor a propaganda program in a country to which it otherwise had extremely limited access.
Thanks to Glenn and the exhibit, “the American ‘image’ looked more positive and glowing in Rangoon newspapers” than it had since the RGUB assumed power in 1962, according to a USIS field message.66 Glenn’s appearances and the space exhibit drew more than 250,000 people in just a handful of days, an impressive crowd even according to Burma’s anti-American press.67 A telegram from the US Embassy in Rangoon to Secretary of State Rusk described the reason for the success of Glenn’s visit: “Glenn’s discussion of space exploration de-emphasizing ‘space race,’ complimenting USSR for its achievements, depicting exploration as [an] adventure for all mankind, relating exploration to Burma—has been most effective here where more heavy-handed trumpeting of US achievements could have alienated neutralist-minded Burmese.”68
In 1966 the US sent Gemini 7 astronaut Frank Borman and Gemini 6 astronaut Wally Schirra to tour Asia. After his trip, Borman wrote President Johnson a firsthand account of his experience. The crowds and individuals received them warmly, he reported. In a number of private conversations, government officials expressed their support for US policy in Vietnam. Borman felt that the trip was so successful that “interest in the American space program… might be great enough to attract additional visits to countries with which we do not enjoy the same friendly climate that we do with the eight countries our trip included.”69 USIA Director Marks wrote to President Johnson to let him know that he was “convinced that the programming of astronauts is the best way to call attention to our superiority in science.”70 After the tour, Dean Rusk sent a letter thanking James Webb for allowing the astronauts to take time away from training to support US foreign relations. Rusk used this letter as an opportunity to stress the political significance of the upcoming astronaut tour of South America, pointing out “the importance of that area to our space program and that its development into an economically viable region, friendly to the United States, continues to be one of our major foreign policy objectives.”71
Frank Borman, on an eight-nation goodwill tour of the Far East with fellow Gemini astronaut Wally Schirra, is presented with the Philippine Air Force Aviation Badge by President Ferdinand Marcos as First Lady Imelda Marcos watches, 1966. (JUANITO PARDICO © STARS AND STRIPES)
Not long afterward, Gemini 8 astronaut Neil Armstrong and Gemini 11 astronaut Dick Gordon crisscrossed South America with George Low, NASA Manned Spaceflight Center’s deputy director. Low kept a travelogue of the journey. In one entry he enthusiastically commented that “I have no doubt whatsoever that our accomplishments in space have a profound influence on our relations with South America and how we are viewed by the South American people and their governments. This impact far exceeded my expectations and is perhaps a most powerful tool that the United States had in our international relations, pursued for the purpose of peace.” Before each lecture on the trip, Low gave an opening statement about how the group members were the official representatives of President Johnson sent to South America to share scientific and engineering information. Low recalled that in private conversations following these talks he learned that “during a visit to South America by the Soviet cosmonauts, the heroic efforts of the cosmonauts in space were hailed; our visit, on the other hand, was looked upon as an official visit by a team of scientists as well as space heroes.” This was an important distinction to Low, as it had been to public diplomats since the launch of
Sputnik in 1957. Although he observed that it might not make a difference to the general population of South America, government officials, scientists, and the press applauded this distinction.72
Low had been particularly impressed by Armstrong’s performance in South America. Before the tour, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Bob Sayre briefed Armstrong and Gordon on the political, economic, and social context of South America. Country directors then briefed them on the history, ideology, economics, and culture of each particular country. Armstrong put extra time into learning Spanish as well as some Guarani for their stop in Paraguay, he incorporated local history into his speeches, and he studied encyclopedias to learn about the countries he would be visiting. These gestures, Armstrong biographer James Hansen has suggested, may have been influential in 1969 when Armstrong was selected to be the first man on the moon.73 Low commented that Armstrong “had a knack of making short little speeches in response to toasts and when getting medals, in response to questions of any kind, and in each of those speeches he never failed to choose the right words.”74
The astronauts presented letters from the president to each of the chiefs of state of the countries they visited. The letter emphasized the United States’ interest in sharing knowledge gained from space exploration with the “world scientific community.”75 Many of the astronauts’ speeches highlighted national connections, promoted the sharing of space information, and frequently used the word “we.” These symbols of inclusiveness, like Armstrong’s efforts to link his mission with local heroes or history, became increasingly important features of astronaut tours.76 These gestures of cultural unity were not one-sided. At many stops, people integrated the astronauts and the space program into their culture and historical narrative through speeches, the presentation of keys to cities, including the astronauts in the lyrics of traditional songs, and numerous other gestures. For instance, during their stop in Panama the astronauts were given a colorful mola (appliqué) made by the Kuna indigenous community. The mola depicted their Gemini spacecraft.77 These small deeds and exchanges from both the astronauts as well as the populations they visited were part of a larger process that fostered a sense of interconnection. The astronaut tours emphasized commonality, shared history, and global unity through American-led space exploration: fundamental elements in the United States’ cold war “new diplomacy.”
The USIA produced a film on the Latin American tour titled The New Explorers in English, Spanish, and Portuguese, a title that hints of a colonial subtext in much of the space-themed public diplomacy programming. The film began with a narrator recalling sixteenth-century Spanish expeditions to “the new world,” where across uncharted waters these explorers arrived in “the newly discovered lands of the Americas.” These Spanish explorers “opened up the Western Hemisphere and doubled the size of the world as man knew,” the narrator added. This introduction positioned space exploration, as well as the astronauts’ tour of Latin America, as contemporary examples of sixteenth-century colonial expeditions. The narrator went on to emphasize the “unity” of the Western Hemisphere. The astronauts, he explained, did not see national boundaries from space, and when they visited Latin America, they came to learn as much as they came to teach.78
The title as well as the content of this film exposes a paradox of space program messaging. Government officials used words like “unity” and the phrase “for all mankind” in a way that was similar to the manner in which the American diplomat in Nigeria used quotation marks to refer to a “partnership” between NASA and the Kano tracking station. Historian Jenifer Van Vleck called this perspective “a global imaginary that represented the world as one but also endowed the United States with exceptional national characteristics and unique entitlements to global power.”79 Space exploration created fertile ground for public diplomats and astronauts to promote this vision of the globe, united under US leadership. Images of the Earth from space with no political boundaries, the US network of tracking stations spread across the world, and the repetition of phrases like “for all mankind” were part of the larger project of building a US-led global coalition.
In the mid-1960s, even after enhanced programming in Africa and countless new publicity strategies, officials within the State Department worried that the United States was not doing enough to take advantage of the potential impact of the space program on the country’s international standing. Secretary of State Rusk urged Vice President Humphrey, chair of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC), to have the council assess the US space program from the viewpoint of foreign policy objectives: “We have not yet recovered from the blow to our prestige and the burden imposed upon our diplomacy by the early Soviet sputniks and the continuing Soviet lead in manned space flight.”80
Before joining Kennedy’s Cabinet in 1961, Rusk served as the president of the Rockefeller Foundation. He kept the post as secretary of state when Johnson assumed the presidency. Described as “dogged, durable, unfailingly courteous and considerate,” he won both Kennedy’s and Johnson’s loyalty, even as antiwar protesters called him a “warmonger.”81 According to Rusk, the international standing of US science and technology hinged on the standing of the nation’s space program, and US military credibility hinged on the image of the nation’s science and technology capability, making future planning of space activities critical to maintaining the nation’s international posture: “The credibility abroad of our will to assure our own national security, and to assist effectively in preserving the security of the Free World, rests on the belief that we will not again fail to match major technological breakthroughs in space.” The United States had to demonstrate a robust space capability, even if these programs had very little to do with the actual military balance of power. Rusk was concerned that the United States was not investing enough in the types of space research and activities for long-term foreign relations dividends.82
During the next Space Council meeting, Humphrey told the council that he wanted to discuss the international aspects of the space program. As Rusk commented, “The mutuality of these cooperative projects, and the opportunities they present to further identify the interests of others with our own, constitute a new asset in our foreign relations.” This statement pinpoints the complexity of the space program’s role in foreign relations. Space exploration activities not only demonstrated US power and prestige; they could also, if properly employed, “increase the identity of foreign interests with our own [and] strengthen the fabric of common action based on mutual interest and commitment.”83 Space exploration, Rusk argued, could cultivate an idea of global interdependence in direct support of US foreign relations interests.84
Humphrey inquired about public opinion polls and how to improve the United States’ standing in space activities relative to the Soviet Union. The vice president was also interested in enhancing international cooperation in space and the effectiveness of the policy regarding the release of information about space activities. Humphrey wanted to know if NASA-themed exhibits had been “increasing understanding of our space program abroad” and “what the plans [were] for improving this part of the program.” His final question reflected Rusk’s thinking: “What space programs should be emphasized in our current planning so that the United States does attain and maintain a world leadership position in the future?”85
Rusk submitted the State Department’s responses to the vice president’s questions. Based on reactions abroad, Rusk’s report concluded that the United States must successfully complete Project Apollo to counter the Soviet lead in space. The United States government must also enlarge its space-themed public relations efforts and invest in international cooperative programs. Increasing NASA participation in events abroad like the Paris Air Show, broadening the number of space exhibits and space lectures, and organizing astronaut tours would have a significant impact on the image of US space capability, and in turn the geopolitical standing of the country, he argued. Even when the United States trailed the Sovie
t Union in space feats, public relations could emphasize the significance of the “openness, breadth and purpose” of the American space program. Rusk concluded by explaining that cooperative space programs would also serve foreign relations interests by encouraging foreign identification with American space efforts and offering another, and perhaps more credible, avenue for foreign publicity. Rusk’s main message was clear: all agencies should be doing more, not less, to exploit American space exploration in foreign relations.86
On January 27, 1967, in the early evening, Lyndon Johnson spoke to officials from Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and fifty-seven other nations. They had gathered in the East Room of the White House for the signing of the United Nations Outer Space Treaty, which laid out the basic framework for international space law. The treaty restricted the use of weapons of mass destruction in outer space and any claim to sovereignty over celestial bodies, among other legal principles. Johnson and the State Department also saw the treaty as a step toward the “de-fusing of the space race” and, in turn, a way of saving money that could be spent on domestic needs, “thus mitigating the strain of the war in Vietnam.”87 Speaking to his guests assembled in the classical-style room, Johnson called it “an inspiring moment in the history of the human race. This treaty means that the moon and our sister planets will serve only the purposes of peace and not war.” Signing ceremonies were also held in London and Moscow.88
A little over an hour later at Cape Kennedy, a fire ignited underneath astronaut Virgil Grissom’s couch inside the AS-204 spacecraft. Grissom and his crewmates, Edward White II and Roger Chaffee, were conducting a standard prelaunch test of an Apollo command and service module. Flames spread rapidly in the pressurized, pure-oxygen environment while thick black smoke engulfed the command module, impeding ground technicians’ rescue efforts. The three astronauts were trapped inside, and they perished from asphyxiation of toxic gases. The mission was later assigned the name Apollo 1, in honor of the crew. The horrific accident cast doubt on the competence of NASA management, the reliability of the spacecraft, engineering protocol and training, and the future of the Apollo program.89
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