A second underlying factor in military professionalism was the growth of the nation state. The autonomous existence of an officer corps apart from other social institutions requires both that it be needed and that there be sufficient resources to support it. Both of these were supplied by the development of the nation-state system. Competition among the states caused each to create a corps of permanent experts devoted to the interests of military security. The loss or threatened loss of that security by war, or, more especially, by military defeat in war, was for each nation the immediate goad to professionalization. Prussia initiated a professional officer corps after its defeat in 1806 and started a second wave of professionalization following its humiliation by Denmark in 1848. Professionalism made its greatest strides in France after 1815 and 1870, and in England after 1856, 1870, and 1902. The size of the nation state also furnished sufficient resources to support a permanent military profession. As a part of the state bureaucracy, moreover, an officer corps could only be maintained by societies with highly developed governmental institutions.
The element of competitive nationalism had a peculiar applicability to Prussia. Lacking natural boundaries and with her territories scattered all over Germany, Prussia was uniquely dependent upon strong military force to maintain her independence and integrity. The rulers of Prussia had been aware of this since the middle of the seventeenth century and had poured tremendous resources and manpower into the maintenance of an efficient standing army throughout the eighteenth century. If Prussia, as Mirabeau claimed, was not a nation with an army but an army with a nation, this was because in a very special sense the existence of the army was essential to the existence of the nation. The defeat and humiliation of Prussia by the mass armies of Napoleon demonstrated to the Prussian rulers that the eighteenth-century type of force could no longer guarantee her security. To oppose the nationalism of the French Revolution, the Prussian population was enlisted in the army. To oppose the genius of Napoleon and the talents of his marshals selected for their ability in a haphazard but effective manner, the Prussians developed a collectively competent body of officers who triumphed through superior training, organization, and devotion to duty. In the long run, it was advantageous to Prussia that no natural leader appeared to rally the nation in her defeat. This deficiency caused the Prussians to resort to the systematic training of average men. As the most militarily insecure major power in Europe, it was hardly surprising that Prussia pioneered in creating a professional officer corps.
The rise of democratic ideals and parties was a third factor influencing the growth of professionalism. The democratic ideology was basically a system for organizing political institutions. Its proponents, however, attempted to shape military institutions in its pattern also. They substituted the representative ideal for the aristocratic ideal: the officer corps should be democratized and officers selected not by birth but by the choice of their fellow citizens. In the American Revolution the election of officers had been the prevailing means of appointment in the state militia. In the early years of the French Revolution the same system was tried again with equally unsuccessful results. The representative ideal was, of course, just as incompatible with military professionalism as the aristocratic ideal. It was, however, a key factor in breaking the monopoly of the nobles on the officer corps. The conflict between the two ideals in the first half of the nineteenth century produced a stalemate favorable to the advance of professionalism. When each party wished to subordinate the military to its own interests and principles, the only basis for compromise was mutual recognition of an independent officer corps free of partisan or class allegiance and organized in accordance with interests and principles of its own.
The balance favorable to professionalism existed particularly in Prussia and to a lesser extent in France. In the former country the aristocracy and aristocratic values remained strong in the century following Jena. At the same time, liberal ideas flourished, and the bourgeoisie became increasingly powerful. The conflict of rival classes and ideologies for dominance in the officer corps could best be resolved by a professional body isolated from politics. The Prussian reforms of 1806–1812 concretely reflect this situation. The military conservatives wished to maintain the aristocratic basis of the officer corps. The more extreme reformers, on the other hand, wanted to substitute a system of elective officers. Schamhorst was able to balance one group off against the other and produce a system based on professional standards which satisfied neither but was acceptable to both. Gouvion St. Cyr used the same strategy a decade later in France. The army under Napoleon had become impregnated with liberalism. The reactionaries of the Restoration wished to wipe it clean and return to the 1789 model. St. Cyr put through his reforms of 1818 against the opposition of the extremists at both ends of the political spectrum but with the support of a solid bloc of moderate opinion.13 In a country like England, on the other hand, where the conflict of aristocracy and democracy while existent was, nonetheless, neither so sharp nor as all-embracing as elsewhere, the same impetus to seize upon professionalism as a device of social compromise was lacking. Finally, in the United States, where there was no aristocracy, and where the democratic ideal reigned almost unchallenged, this incentive to professionalism was virtually absent.
The differing strengths of aristocracy and democracy on the European and American continents explain in part the peculiar historical failure of observers on either side of the Atlantic to recognize the emergence of military professionalism. In Europe professionalism challenged the dominant aristocrats; consequently, they identified it with democracy. In America professionalism challenged the dominant democracy, and hence it became identified with aristocracy. The consequences of this bizarre situation may be seen in De Tocqueville’s acute summary of the key characteristics of a professional officer corps. Viewing the world through European eyes, however, he describes these professional elements as characteristic of “democratic armies.”14 Paradoxically, however, at the same time the Jacksonians in the United States were castigating as aristocratic these identical institutions which De Tocqueville labeled as democratic. The institutions, of course, were neither aristocratic nor democratic; they were military. But neither the aristocratic nor the democratic perspective could differentiate them from the socio-political enemy.
A final factor facilitating the growth of professionalism was the existence of a single recognized source of legitimate authority over the military forces. A professional officer is imbued with the ideal of service to the nation. In practice, he must be loyal to some single institution generally accepted as embodying the authority of the nation. Where there are competing authorities, or competing ideas as to what ought to be the authority, professionalism becomes difficult if not impossible to achieve. The conflict of constitutional ideologies and governmental loyalties divides the officer corps and superimposes political considerations and values upon military considerations and values. The nature of an officer’s political loyalties becomes more important to the government than the level of his professional competence.
The need of a single locus of authority over the military limits the extent to which class conflict may stimulate professionalism. Professionalism is hindered rather than helped if the opposing classes become identified with competing governmental institutions each asserting some authority over the officer corps or if the two classes have fundamentally differing views on the constitutional structure of the state. Class conflict redounds to the benefit of professionalism only if both parties accept the authority of a particular governmental institution over the military. Professionalism thus requires the removal of party strife and political conflict one step away from the military forces themselves, and the channeling of political influence upon the military through some accepted formal institution of government. Some minimum degree of constitutional consensus is thus essential to military professionalism.
When viewed in the light of these considerations, the outstanding fact with respect to Prussia, France, and
Great Britain is that only in Prussia was there a constitutional situation favorable to the growth of military professionalism. Basic to Prussian professionalism was the recognition of the king as Supreme War Lord and sole authority on military matters. Despite their increasing power, the Prussian bourgeoisie were never able, except briefly in 1848–1850 and 1860–1863, to challenge this authority and assert that of the parliament. Consequently, it was relatively easy to isolate the army from constitutional politics.*
In Great Britain, however, the system of dual control established by the constitutional settlement of 1688 delayed professionalization. Parliament had the power to raise and maintain military forces; command and appointments were within the prerogative of the Crown. The institutional rivalry of executive and legislature involved the British military forces in domestic politics until the supremacy of Parliament was firmly established in the nineteenth century. The achievement of this supremacy in the military sphere began with the creation of the office of the Secretary of State for War in the 1790’s and ended with the abolition of the office of Commander in Chief one hundred years later. Meanwhile, however, the eighteenth-century system had been exported to the American colonies and copied by the Framers of the American Constitution. As a result, many of the problems of military professionalism and civilian control later faced by the United States closely resembled those of Georgian Britain.
In France the constitutional conflict went deeper, continued longer, and had far more adverse effects on professionalism. In isolated instances, such as in 1818, this conflict might be utilized to advance the professionalization of the armed forces. But normally the struggle was so intense, and involved such antithetical constitutional ideologies, that compromise through the isolation of the officer corps from politics was impossible. The schisms dividing the nation were reflected in its military forces. Republicans, Legitimists, and Bonapartists all made direct efforts to control the army. French statesmen were torn between the ideal of a completely nonpolitical, professional officer corps which would maintain a scrupulous neutrality, and the fear that if they did not exercise their influence to insure the loyalty of high ranking officers to their own constitutional ideology, the officer corps might prove unreliable or even revolutionary in an emergency. Although, in the Restoration, St. Cyr attempted to neutralize the officer corps by professionalizing it, the aristocratic leaders of the government insisted upon classifying officers according to their political opinions, purging those considered untrustworthy, and subjecting the army to the surveillance of the secret police.15 The names of Macmahon, Boulanger, Dreyfus, Sarrail, De la Rocque, Petain, and De Gaulle testify to the subsequent continued involvement of the French officer corps in constitutional politics.
UNIVERSAL SERVICE AND PROFESSIONALISM. The rise of nationalism and democracy had one important product which was closely linked to the emergence of professionalism. This was the concept of the “nation in arms” and its corollary of a national army, with a rank and file recruited through the universal service of all citizens for a brief period of years. The shift in the officer corps from amateurism to professionalism was virtually always associated with the shift in the rank and file from career soldiers to citizen-soldiers. Prussia, the first country to professionalize her officer corps, was also the first to introduce permanent universal service. The law of September 3, 1814 required all Prussian subjects to serve five years in the standing army (three on active service and two in the reserve) and fourteen years in the militia or Landwehr. While the terms of service varied from time to time, the basic system established by this law remained in force until the First World War. In France conscription, which had been employed on a temporary and confused basis during the Revolution and Empire, was prohibited by the Charter of Louis XVIII. Along with his reforms of the officer corps, however, St. Cyr attempted to introduce a form of universal service. Aristocratic opposition forced him to compromise upon a law under which the army was raised both by volunteer enlistment and by lot. Substitutes were permitted, however, and as the professionalization of the officer corps stagnated in the middle of the century, France returned to a pre-Revolutionary rank and file composed of career enlisted volunteers. Only with the second spurt of professionalization after the Franco-Prussian War did France adopt the mass army. England, like the United States, did not introduce peacetime conscription until the twentieth century. The triumph of Prussia in 1870, however, led the British not only to abolish the purchase system in the officer corps but also to take a step in the direction of a mass army — reducing the term of service from ten to six years and making strenuous efforts to increase short-term enlistments.16
In part the simultaneous introduction of conscription and professionalism was a parallel reaction to the need of military security. Prussia professionalized her officers and conscripted her rank and file as a result of her defeat by Napoleon. The other European countries adopted these twin aspects of the Prussian system as its merits were borne in upon them by either observation or direct and unfortunate experience. Countries such as Great Britain and the United States, which were geographically more secure, were slow in making either change. In addition, however, a more direct relation existed between conscription and professionalism. Aristocratic amateurs could be relied upon only so long as the rank and file were long-term regulars. When the latter became amateur soldiers, armies became larger and a much more capable and experienced leadership was necessary. It became the function of the officers to supply the continuing hard core of the military establishment, to be responsible for the advancement of military technique, and to train the constant stream of enlisted men through the ranks. The change in the nature of both officer corps and rank and file changed their relations with the rest of society. In the eighteenth-century army the rank and file formed an outcast group, isolated and distrusted, with no roots in, or connections with, the rest of society. The officers, on the other hand, had definite status in society by virtue of their aristocratic position. In the reversal of roles which took place in the nineteenth century, the enlisted men became a cross section of the national population — citizens at heart — and the officers became a separate professional group living in a world of their own with few ties to outside society. While the enlisted personnel were the most “military” part of the eighteenth-century army, the officers are the most “military” part of the modern army.
Some writers have tended to overemphasize the significance of the introduction of universal service and to neglect the importance of the changes in the officer corps.17 The victory of Prussia over France in 1870 was due as much to the superior professional ability of the Prussian officer corps and particularly its general staff as to the “mass” character of the Prussian Army. By stressing the shift from the old “professional army” to the new “citizen” or “mass” army, these commentators have obscured the appearance of professionalism in the officer corps. Their neglect of this factor has led them to conclude that mass armies inevitably mean total war and bloody national strife of unlimited ferocity. Conscription may indeed produce tendencies in this direction but these are in part balanced by the moderating, rational, calculating expertise introduced into the leadership of armies by the professionalization of the officer corps.
THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS, 1800–1875
ENTRY AND INITIAL EDUCATION. The evolution of professional methods of entry went through three phases: (1) the elimination of aristocratic prerequisites for entry; (2) the requiring of a basic level of professional training and competence; and (3) the requiring of a minimum general education and the provision of this education in institutions not operated by the military.
In Prussia the decree of August 6, 1808 abolished class restrictions on entry. An elaborate progression of educational and examination requirements was established to insure the basic competence of the officer corps.* Despite the formal opening of the corps to all qualified candidates, however, aristocratic considerations still remained significant. The more eli
te guards regiments were usually exclusively aristocratic, the technical arms largely bourgeois, and the regular line units more or less evenly divided. The requirements of nomination by a regimental colonel or, alternatively, admission to cadet school, made it possible to exclude candidates without the proper family background. Nonaristocrats, however, were always a substantial element of the officer corps; in the reaction after 1815 their proportion declined from about one-half to about one-third of the corps in 1860. Thereafter their numbers increased steadily until they made up about two-thirds of the corps on the eve of World War I. The education and examination requirements, which were raised in 1865, insured a basic competence in all officers, aristocratic or bourgeois, which was far higher than that in any other European army.
The early Prussian reformers emphasized the desirability of both general education and special education for officers. At first, however, the two types of education were intermingled with a confusing variety of schools and examining boards. But in 1844 a major reorganization increased the general education requirements and clearly separated general and technical education. The philosophy behind this change was that recruitment for officership should be on the same basis as recruitment for the other learned professions.†
In the words of one Prussian general:
The Soldier and the State Page 5
